President Obama’s speech from the Oval Office last night announced the end of combat operations in Iraq. The speech was largely driven by his choice of a defining metaphor:

“We have sent our young men and women to make enormous sacrifices in Iraq, and spent vast resources abroad at a time of tight budgets at home” . . . “Through this remarkable chapter in the history of the United States and Iraq, we have met our responsibility. Now, it’s time to turn the page.”

But as I’ll explain, that page-turning metaphor fails to deliver the closure that is so important to a good narrative.

Ever since he assumed the presidency, I have been following Obama’s “narrative gap” on matters related to the conflict formerly known as “the global war on terror.” His speech in Cairo seemed like a good start for defining a new beginning in our relations with Muslims and with the Middle East.

Yet I found his subsequent speech at West Point to be a narrative failure. It neither advanced the themes of the Cairo address nor broke new ground in the way Americans (or indeed the world) were to understand our continuing role in the Middle East.

I was then greatly pleased to see a major leap forward in his masterful Nobel Prize address in Stockholm. There he not only outlined a clear and–in my view–responsible mission for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also complicated the dominant binary of war/peace that so divided public opinion.

Viewed as a narrative trajectory, the previous speeches defined the U.S. mission as a reluctant but noble quest, casting the women and men fighting the war in the role of reluctant heroes who aimed to secure the safety of war-torn countries and reestablish local authority for policing and governing them. The speeches reserved for Obama the behind-the-scenes role of a wise wizard who commands “the long view.”

In such narrative constructions–think of “Lord of the Rings” or “Star Wars”–otherwise ordinary citizens are called to action (usually against their better judgment) to fight dark forces that threaten their way of life (or sometimes the security of the universe). The wise wizards provide helpful advice and direction, but rarely give final answers. Nevertheless, these oft-told tales–whether in fiction, film, nonfiction, or presidential speeches–provide powerful cultural expectations for not only “what should happen next” but also for “how it should (or must) end.” In other words they create expectations for closure.

The president’s speech last night offered him the opportunity to provide narrative closure on Iraq. Did our would-be wise wizard succeed? The short answer is that he did not. Those on the left wanted to hear our president blame his predecessor for an unwarranted war that cost thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives, and over a trillion dollars in treasure that has been a major cause of our burgeoning budget deficit. There was no blame for the Bush administration; in fact, the president was gracious in his avoidance of blame. There was even praise for Bush’s patriotism.

For those on the right it was (predictably) even less successful. As Representative John Boehner (R-OH) observed even before the speech was given, it didn’t give credit for the surge where it was due–the Bush administration. David Gergen, commenting on CNN on the speech on behalf of mainstream Republicans, said the message that Obama “loved the troops but hated the war” probably wouldn’t help. Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, when asked after the speech whether the war had been worth it, replied somewhat evasively if honestly, “It really requires a historian’s perspective in terms of what happens here in the long run.”

Beyond these partisan interpretations, Obama’s end-of-war speech was also notable for what it did not include. There was no declaration of “victory,” no mention of “democracy,” and no clean announcement of an exit from the country or region. There was no mention of the awkward ironies that permeate our seven-year involvement in Iraq:

• We declared victory after two months of war despite the fact that nothing has been won.
• The democratic government that we promised has yet to fully materialize and is possibly even in serious jeopardy.
• No clean exit was likely, there would be no immediate “happy ending,” because there is rarely a clean-cut outcome in this kind of conflict.

Instead we are “turning the page” from combat in Iraq to combat in Afghanistan, and the story goes on. This is a fact that is neither popular with the American people nor with politicians on either side of the aisle.

Realizing this, President Obama, in his role as wise wizard, once again affirmed the longer view:

“One of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all elements of our power — including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America’s example — to secure our interests and stand by our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that is based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes — a vision that recognizes the real dangers that exist around the world, but also the limitless possibility of our time.”

Given these responses to the speech, it would be wrong of me to suggest it was successful. There was good in it–praising the troops for their valor and sacrifice, ending the official combat commitment to Iraq, and reminding us that we still have responsibilities to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it was narratively and pragmatically unsatisfying because it clearly demonstrated a lack of closure so necessary to a successful “end of war” speech.

Put in the terms of narrative trajectories associated with heroic quests: order has not been fully restored and justice does not yet prevail. True to his theme, Obama announced only that we had “turned the page.” But what he failed to do was close the book.

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Indonesian police have charged Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Basyir with supporting terrorism for his role in the the Jemaah Islamiyah training camp in Aceh. He has been accused of participating in planning and funding the project and ordering others to commit terrorist acts, and police reported finding progress reports and videos from the camp.

The training camp, led by Javanese who came to Aceh thinking they would find support, was broken up in February 2010. Its members were either arrested or killed by police (CSC blog post on the camp here).

Police arrested Basyir on August 9, but after seven days — the time allowed by Indonesian law for detention without charges — they requested and were granted a 40-day extension. Now that charges have been filed, the police are weighing whether to release him or continue to detain him until the trial begins. Baysir is old and frail, and police may assume that he would pose a minimal risk for flight.

Basyir served two brief jail terms for his involvement in the bombings of Christian churches in 2000 and for his role in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2003 attack on the Marriott hotel. In these trials, police were unable to make the most serious charges stick, and Basyir served relatively brief jail sentences. Indonesian media reports over the new charges, however, give detailed information regarding, for example, money transfers from Basyir to the Aceh group (such as this English language story in the Jakarta Post), which may indicate that the police have enough evidence to convict Basyir on more serious charges this time.

As is to be expected, extremist blogs and web sites jumped to his defense. Some argued that his arrest was engineered by the US government. A hacker calling himself Ashaburayatisud posted a defense of Abu Bakar Basyir and Mohammad Jibriel,  disrupting several web sites (including the official government site for the province of East Kalimantan; a list is included here). As of this writing, about half of the sites have returned to normal. Mohammad Jibriel was sentenced to five years in prison for supporting the July 2009 Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings.

The hacked web pages demand: “Free them, hey you enemies of Allah!” Followers of “human law” such as democracy, the Indonesian Constitution, and Pancasila – Indonesia’s state ideology — are condemned to hell as non-believers, polytheists, and godless. In an oddly polite twist, the hacker also promised that he did not damage any of the sites’ important information.

A “Free ABB” website has also emerged (http://freeabb.com/), as well as a facebook page (http://facebook.com/free.abb), which is ironic considering Islamists’ condemnations of Facebook for promoting “free sex.” Leaders of other Islamist groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Jamaat Ansharut Tawhid (a group Basyir co-founded), have also made statements condemning the arrest. Basyir’s pesantren (Islamic boarding school) al Mukmin posted a statement lamenting the arrest, and promised that it will not disrupt the pesantren’s activities.

Islamists claimed a minor victory, however, by declaring that their prayers had been answered and that Police Chief Bambang Hendarso Danuri fell ill because of the arrest of Basyir.

Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, issued a statement supporting the arrest.

The announcement of charges and the early indications of evidence bode well for the police and Indonesian governmnet’s case. Indonesia was embarassed by the inability to make charges against Basyir stick in his earlier trials, and was criticized by other governments, notably Australia and the United States. It would be another embarassment should Basyir be able to elude these latest charges. If convicted, however, it would be a significant victory for Indonesia’s anti-terrorism efforts.

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In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, Indian novelist and activist Arundhati Roy wrote an opinion piece in the British daily The Guardian, stating:

[Bin Laden] has been sculpted from the spare rib of a world laid to waste by American foreign policy: its gunboat diplomacy, its nuclear arsenal, its vulgarly stated policy of ‘full-spectrum dominance,’ its chilling disregard for non-American lives, its barbarous military interventions, its support for despotic and dictatorial regimes, its merciless economic agenda that has munched through the economies of poor countries like a cloud of locusts.

In case you were wondering, Roy is neither an Islamist nor even a Muslim; she’s the daughter of a Christian and a Hindu. I cite Roy’s words because I think it illustrates a widespread international attitude toward American foreign policy, or what some have described as American “imperialism” and “militarism.” Wherever you stand on this issue, I want you to focus on one important question: At what point do actions speak louder than words? It’s a vital question. So far the American government is failing to support its words with appropriate actions. America’s ideals and principles are not being communicated by its actions.

The speech that President Obama gave in Cairo at the beginning of his term was generally met with enthusiasm and approval in Muslim societies, albeit with some caution and reserve. Justifying that reserve, I dare say that the government’s actions have yet to live up to the President’s words. Meanwhile, the public discourse in the United States has taken a decidedly hostile turn against Muslims, hardly the “new beginning” Obama spoke about.

From Congress all the way to Main Street, the majority of Americans, if polls about the Cordoba House project are indicative, appear to equate the nineteen 9/11 hijackers (15 Saudis, 1 Egyptian, 1 Lebanese, 2 from the UAE) with all Muslims, including American Muslims, despite the fact that there is no evidence Americans were involved in the attack. “They” are all one and the same.

For instance, a popular Facebook group opposing the Cordoba House project in New York City has over 115,000 online supporters and states:

Planting a mosque just two blocks from where Muslims murdered Americans on 9/11 in the name of Islam is a huge slap in the face. . . They claim a right to be insulted by cartoons mocking their prophet, even to the point of beheading people. [Emphasis added]

Apparently there is no distinction between American Muslims, including those who have lived in NYC long before the 9/11 attacks, and the 19 foreign nationals (most of them Saudis) who killed some 3,000 Americans, including many Muslim Americans. Opposition to mosques is not limited to the two-block radius around Ground Zero either. It is being documented around the country. Detractors are no longer citing traffic concerns either, they openly claim that mosques will bring terrorists into their neighborhoods.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, there was a conscious effort on the part of the Bush administration and many other groups to try to allay anti-Muslim sentiment in our country and prevent the outbreak of widespread violence against American Muslims. Furthermore, despite persistent urban myths to the contrary, there was widespread condemnation of the attacks throughout the Muslim world.

In the years since that time, in which violence against American Muslims did nevertheless occur, the efforts by the Bush administration and others to promote coexistence have become the subject of ridicule as dishonest “political correctness” and “pandering” to extremists. President Bush’s televised statement that “Islam means peace” has since become a derisive joke. This is even evident in President Obama’s own obvious discomfort with Muslims, rooted in his need to distance himself from anything that may feed the persistent conspiracy theories that Obama himself is some sort of “covert Muslim,” or even an Islamist.

For example, after a statement of support for Mayor Bloomberg’s position on the Cordoba House project, Obama–who is still in his first term–qualified his remarks, stating that:

I was not commenting, and I will not comment, on the wisdom of making the decision to put a mosque there. I was commenting very specifically on the right people have that dates back to our founding. That’s what our country is about.

The Cordoba House case, along with many incidents at home and abroad, communicates a clear message: A substantial number of Americans, even a majority, think, or privately suspect, that we are at war with Islam as a whole. This idea is furthermore guiding actions and informing public discourse. In such a climate, all the bags of wheat with the red, white, and blue logos on them, all the smiling soldiers playing soccer and handing out candy, all the official Ramadan greetings and public speeches relating holiday words of kindness, do nothing so long as our actions provide ample fodder for Osama bin Laden and other extremists who are telling Muslim societies that we are at war with them, with “Islam,” the religion of over 1 billion people.

There are plenty of non-Muslim Americans, including government officials, who agree with Bin Laden too, and they write best-selling books, give speeches, fund organizations, and elect candidates to communicate Bin Laden’s message for him, of America versus Islam. In fact, I would say that those who advocate the fantasy of a holy “clash of civilizations” are far more inclined to action than those who disagree with it. Far more.

So what do these actions communicate? When an audience cannot understand English, they can still understand a bullet, a bomb, or, yes, a reconstruction project. When Afghan civilians are killed by an American drone firing missiles into the mountains near Peshawar, no amount of apologies, translated or not, will atone for it. No bags of wheat, medical treatment, school books, or new wells, will make up for the loss of a family member or a child (if indeed they get any of those things). America will be seen in the unflattering terms expressed above by Ms. Roy. Of course, the extremists have killed countless civilians. In fact, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have killed far more Muslims than they have “infidel” Americans. Far more.  So what are the extremists saying or doing that America is not?

America is a foreign power; a superpower, in fact, with over 700 military bases around the world. The Taliban may be brutal, oppressive, tyrants, and thugs, but they are Afghans. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be vicious, but they are North Africans (Arabs and Berbers). A narrative of freedom from occupation is a very easy message for extremists to communicate, a story long understood in many regions of the Muslim world. We must be far more attentive to what our actions are communicating in such contexts.

It is wise and informed actions that go farthest in neutralizing the shamefully effective actions by extremists to cast America into “crusader” narratives. The invasion of Iraq was an absolute gift to them, in more ways than one. The ongoing financial and political support of authoritarian regimes is another. Words about freedom and democracy mean nothing to people in the Middle East when our actions and tax dollars support the Saudi monarchy and the Mubarak regime. How can so many Americans be up-in-arms about the American Muslim Cordoba House project, when they buy products and stock from companies (such as Apple and Priceline) that are part-owned by members of the Wahhabist Saudi monarchy?

Yes, actions do speak louder than words. The act of building the Cordoba House has created irrational outrage before construction has even begun, despite statements and speeches attempting to allay the hostility over the project. The act of America’s physical military presence in numerous Muslim societies also speaks louder than a thousand statements about noble ideals of freedom and democracy for those societies, especially when America fails to live up to those ideals by backing oppressive authoritarian regimes.

In terms of a communication strategy, there’s obviously serious work to be done — not just talked about — as the status quo goes on. Our current actions clearly aren’t communicating the right message, and our well-intended words are being undermined by our actions.

Editor’s Update — August 23

Since Jeff posted this, there has been news of growing concern about the public diplomacy and strategic communication implications of this controversy.  Two articles, in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, cite counterterrorism officials saying that the controversy is being exploited by extremists.  The latter article is especially interesting because WSJ is owned by Rupert Murdock’s News Corporation, which liberal commentators like Frank Rich accuse of stoking the controversy.

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Efforts in European countries including France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands to restrict or prohibit women from wearing burkah and nikab (face veil) are well known in Indonesia. Reports about these efforts in the Indonesian media are overwhelming negative.

There is no visible support for these efforts even among women who do not cover their hair. There is also growing concern among Muslim women who wear the hijab (headscarf) that they would not feel safe or welcome in European countries. Some students are now reluctant to consider studying in countries where headscarves have become politicized. Most Indonesian criticisms of European “veil policies” are written from Muslim perspectives and at least implicitly describe Europeans as “Islamaphobic.”

The article we discuss below is written from a different point of view. Its arguments resonate strongly with those made by Joan Scott in The Politics of the Veil. Scott suggests that  “anti-Burkahism” is deeply rooted in colonial discourse about sexuality and the control of women’s bodies. She argues that claims made by proponents of such legislation about “liberating” women are ironic, yet another example of the politicization of the female body in attempts to enforce sexual and cultural order.

On April 27th, the Jakarta daily Koran Tempo published an article entitled “Pelarangan Burqa: Membebaskan Perempuan?” (Prohibiting the Burkah: Liberating Women?). The author, Dr. Soe Tjen Marching, is a well-known feminist thinker and activist, and a staunch critic of Islamist causes. She holds a Ph.D. from Monash University in Australia and now teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. She is also an award-winning composer of avante guard piano pieces. She divides her time between Jakarta and London.

In this article Marching is critical of those who would require women to cover their faces but is concerned primarily with European attempts to outlaw the practice in the name of “freeing women who are trapped by religious fundamentalists.”

This argument closely resembles Scott’s. Marching begins with the observation that on a recent trip to London she found that laws and regulations concerning women’s clothing were a frequently debated topic. She observes that some people find the sight of women wearing either the burkah or hijab disturbing and even frightening. She also states that she found it ironic that in the Netherlands she encounters nineteenth and early twentieth century paintings of bare breasted Balinese women, produced at a time when women in “Puritan” areas of Europe were required to cover their ankles. By contrast, today in Indonesia one encounters local women who cover their hair, and bikini clad European women on the beaches.

Marching notes that some European secularists want to prohibit women from covering their faces and some Islamists want to require it for the same reason, to “safeguard” their honor and dignity. Indonesian Islamists and European secularists use similar language. Both speak of safeguarding women’s dignity and human rights. Islamists use these arguments to justify making women put on the veil. Some European secularists use the same arguments to make them take it off.  She compares these claims and counter claims to a football (soccer) match: “If this was only a game and what rolled back and forth was a ball, it would not be a problem. But it is women’s bodies that are being used as a ball by male dominated cultures and political leaderships and this is NOT funny!”

Perhaps the most important points she makes are that those who would outlaw the burkah and those who would require it engage in the same type of controlling discourse, attempting to use women’s bodies for their own purposes. Her argument that there is not a fundamental difference between opposing the practice of female face covering and prohibiting it is as profound as it is simple. By prohibiting the burkah the state makes women into puppets that it can manipulate at will for its own purposes. To oppose  face veiling is to attempt persuasion and employ coercion. In an irony of Orwellian proportions, she observes that burkah bans would make criminals out of women who refused to be coerced in the name of liberating them. Her argument is libertarian –- that the state can not legitimately require women to cover their faces nor prohibit them from doing so. Many Indonesian women who would never consider wearing a burkah themselves nevertheless oppose attempts to prohibit others from doing so.

*Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta Indonesia.

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While in Singapore for the ICA conference with colleagues from the CSC, interesting news kept coming in from Indonesia concerning its ongoing fight against terrorism. It was quite a contrast to what appeared to be the biggest story in Singapore: the conviction of a foreigner who spray-painted a train, a story that took up several pages of coverage and included a detailed step-by-step illustration recreating the crime. Such news seemed to drown out some of the more important regional goings-on (and brought back memories of the caning of American Michael Fay).

In Indonesia, the media continued its coverage of the trial of Mohammed Jibril, the continuing arrests and trials of Noordin Top’s accomplices and associates, and the arrest of terrorist Sunata.

Jibril was accused of seeking financial support for the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists who bombed the Ritz-Carlton and J.W. Marriott hotels in Jakarta last summer. He runs the jihadist Ar Rahmah website, where he has publicly denied wrongdoing. A court in Jakarta disagreed, and he was given a 5-year sentence.  Ar Rahmah continues to publish jihadist commentary and news.

The web of arrests connected to Noordin Top’s demise continues to expand, with police charging his father-in-law Baharudin Latif, Baharudin’s son Ata Sabiq Alim, and Noordin’s wife Arina Rahmah with knowingly giving refuge to a wanted terrorist. Last week, Putri Munawaroh, a survivor of the 17 September raid last year during which Noordin Top was killed, was sentenced to eight years for harboring him. Finally, this week brought an eight-year sentence to Saefudin Zuhri, also accused of aiding Noordin Top.

The arrest of Sunata continues to make headlines in Indonesia. He joined KOMPAK to fight Christians in Maluku in 1999, but was first arrested in 2005 for weapons possession and hiding Noordin Top. He was released after being considered a shining example of Indonesia’s deradicalization program, but returned to his old ways, plotting a Mumbai-style attack on Jakarta as well as the assassination of the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He was also linked to the recent arrests and killings of militants who created a training camp in Aceh, partly in an attempt to forge common ground between different militant groups. He will join Amir Abdillah in prison, sentenced earlier in June for his connection to the assassination plot.

The arrest of Sunata raises some important questions about Indonesia’s deradicalization program. The English-language broadsheet the Jakarta Globe interviewed Agus Nahrowi, the Senior Program Officer for Search for Common Ground, an NGO aimed at deradicalization in Jakarta’s prison following the arrest. Curiously, the interview doesn’t mention Sunata’s arrest, but rather paints a somewhat sunny picture of deradicalization. Sunata’s arrest raises serious doubts about its effectiveness. Both the CSC and the ICG have posted criticisms of the deradicalization program (here and here); this story should focus greater attention on the need for better efforts in this direction.

In Surabaya, police arrested three housemaids who were accused of stealing from their employers in order to support terrorism activities. While common theft is not a new tactic for JI, using maids to steal apparently is (and of course it raises questions about the judgment of people who let them into their homes in the first place).

And in above-ground political maneuvering, the Islamist PKS party is making some interesting moves. In Eastern Indonesia, it has been fielding Christian candidates in local elections, which some see as a sign of sell out. One of its Islamist competitors, the PBB, is hoping to capitalize on what it sees as the potential flight of supporters as the PKS tries to broaden its base. Yet at the same time, PKS-backed Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring recently compared the sex tape scandal of boy band Peter Pan’s vocalist Nazril Ariel Irham to the crucifixion of Jesus, infuriating Indonesian Christians. Ariel stated that it might be someone else on the tape, and some Muslims believe that Judas Iscariot — or someone else, or an angel – replaced Jesus before the crucifixion. Many have called for the minister’s resignation.

On a lighter note, I viewed the film “Obama, Anak Menteng” (“Obama, Menteng Kid”) on its opening day in Bandung. It’s a children’s movie, so one can’t read too much into it. It’s full of the usual positive messages (accept diversity, play fair, work and study hard) that are about as subtle as a Mack truck, but it also has some typically ugly stereotypes. Obama’s childhood nemesis is darker skinned than he is — he’s from eastern Indonesia — reinforcing the light-skinned-is-better bias. There is a money-grubbing ethnic Chinese bookie, a particularly ugly stereotype. One of Obama’s family’s helpers is a flamboyantly gay, overwrought, cross-dressing diva with a heart of gold; this role is so overacted as to be a caricature. The character wins acceptance, which is a positive message, but I wonder when homosexuals will play regular roles where they don’t have to act in over-the-top stereotypes. The film avoided discussion of some of the serious issues of the time — Obama’s stepfather was recalled to Indonesia in the wake of a massacre of hundreds of thousands, if not more, suspected communists, and was sent to West Papua, where a separatist insurgency was gaining steam — but I suppose that’s to be expected from a children’s film. Trailer here.

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To say Somalia has problems would be the very definition of an understatement.  Piracy has certainly received its share of attention, primarily because it is sensational and somewhat easy to comprehend.  The chaos in the south also gets some attention due to the rise of Islamists groups and the potential for Somalia to become a terrorist safe haven.  Despite this increase in attention, there has been no real political or humanitarian progress in the country.  Education is lacking, violence is a way of life and the political system is a shambles.  It is time to make some dramatic changes to American policy toward Somalia.

Since the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has been mired in chaos.  In the subsequent twenty years various warlords and Islamist groups have come and gone.  Al-Shabaab is the current Islamist power in the country and has control over much of the south; Hizbul Islam is another emergent Islamist group but it does not have the strength of al-Shabaab.  Both of these groups fight the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Somalia’s “official” government.

One of al-Shabaab’s tactics is the use of child soldiers.  Children as young as twelve are given weapons and sent out to fight the TFG.  This is not a new tactic in Somalia; Mohammed Farah Aidid, a powerful warlord in the 1990s, used to get teenagers hopped up on qaat, a narcotic plant popular in the region, hand them AK-47s and send them into the streets to foment chaos and frighten the local populace.

Jeffrey Gettleman recently produced a short video and article about child soldiers in Somalia, and pointed out a terrible fact–some of these kids essentially work for the United States.  Gettleman’s piece looks at child soldiers who fight, not for al-Shabaab but for the TFG.  The U.S. provides aid, including pay for soldiers’ salaries and presumably weapons, to an organization that actively uses child soldiers.

This is a horrible situation.  President Obama and officials at the State Department have acknowledged and regret that we are supporting child soldiers.  Senator Russ Feingold argues that we should suspend  security assistance to the TFG until the use of child soldiers stops.  Beyond the obvious tragedy of using children in war, this undermines the authority of the United States.  Foreign intervention is viewed with a great deal of skepticism in Somalia, but a foreign power that is literally putting Somalia’s children in harm’s way is not going to be viewed favorably by the locals or the world community at large.  It is certainly not going to give the local population any reason to trust the U.S.  The U.S. publicly condemns the use of child soldiers yet pays them in Somalia, a blatant hypocrisy.  What do we do about all of this?

The U.S. has hung its hopes on the impotent TFG, a group that has proven time and time again to be ineffective.  The TFG holds only a few blocks of Mogadishu and manages to hold that largely due to the presence of about 6000 African Union troops.  It is time for a radical game change in Somalia.

First, the U.S. must abandon the idea of a centralized Somali state.  Clan divisions alone have proven hard to overcome and are enough to undermine a central government.  Instead we should support a confederal system, a collection of regional governments with a central government limited to very specific functions.  These smaller regional governments need not be divided along clan lines.  Smaller regional governing bodies would allow for greater local autonomy and more cooperation among those who live in close proximity to each other, and eliminate some of the conflict that exists in the current national system.

Second, if the U.S. is going to back a Somali group it should be Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah, a Sufi paramilitary group that is opposed to radical Islam.  They have been the most effective in combating al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam.  The TFG should be disbanded or alter its mission to that of community and humanitarian support, dispensing food, medicine and other logistical tasks.

Third, there needs to be a humanitarian surge; our actions cannot only be military in nature.  The Somali people have enough distrust of foreign intervention that military intervention itself will not be enough to win any hearts or minds.  There needs to be an organized and accountable relief effort.  To avoid some of the pitfalls of the 1990s, this relief effort needs to be backed up by a military force from the African Union.

Fourth, the moderate Islamists need to be won over.  Just as there are meetings between government officials and moderate members of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the moderate Islamists in Somalia need incentives to work with us.

A strong military effort by Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah and AU forces, tactical support from the U.S., plus organized humanitarian effort will help stabilize the country; it will not solve all of Somalia’s problems but it will be a drastic improvement.  Stability is a prerequisite to any type of nation-building in Somalia, therefore stability should be our first priority.

There is much that could go wrong with the scenario I have outlined,  but what is abundantly clear is that the status quo is not working.  Somalia has been the poster child for failed states for over twenty years and it is time to rethink our strategy.  Somalia should be a country in which children are given lunch and an education rather than an AK-47 and an extra clip courtesy of the U.S. taxpayer.  The most radical and experimental ideas are not out of bounds when it comes to Somalia.  Our current policy is not working and it is far past time to try something, anything, new.

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For some time people who think about the problem of terrorism have faced a puzzling question: Why is it that some Muslims who hold fundamentalist or radical beliefs about Islam become violent, while others don’t? New research shows that the answer is probably not what you might think.

A popular view is that Islam is simply a violent belief system. For example, in National Review’s blog The Corner Andy McCarthy writes:

[A]s an admirer of the courage of moderate Muslims, it is my most fervent wish that they are successful in reforming Islam. We need to be honest, however, that they are trying to achieve reform precisely because there are problems with Islam as is. The most frustrating thing about “moderate Islam” is that no one seems to be able to say what it entails. The so called “radicals” tell us exactly what they believe and (accurately) cite chapter and verse in the scriptures. The moderates never persuasively refute the radicals — they just say the radicals are too “extreme.” This doesn’t come close to making the case that the radicals have Islam wrong. If your goal is to persuade other Muslims — and everyone seems to agree that only Islam can settle its internal divisions — that’s the case that has to be made.

Underlying this statement is a view that Islam, at least as currently constituted, is inherently violent. If so, then the more people know about it the more likely they are to want to kill non-Muslims, and institutions like madrasas, pesantren, and Islamic universities are little more than jihadist indoctrination camps.

However, Mark Woodward (a frequent contributor to this blog) and colleagues find that, at least in Indonesia, the exact opposite seems to be the case. In the abstract of a paper now under review they write:

The paper refutes the linkage of Muslim education in Indonesia with radicalization, and addresses the commonly held, if incorrect, perception that theological conservatism has a causal relationship with violent extremism. Rather than a causal agent for extremism, Muslim education in Indonesia tends to operate as a protective mechanism against radicalization, as does participation in vibrant religious and cultural celebrations. Students attending the secular universities are most susceptible to extremist discourse, through the process of re-Islamization, and the development of a stark and detached rational understanding of Islam.

So the more people know about the theology and traditions of Islam, the less likely they are to be radical.

Also reflected in McCarthy’s viewpoint is the idea that the Muslim world is divided into two camps, the fundamentalists/radicals and the “moderates.” The former group is large, dangerous and violent, while the latter is small, tolerant and peaceful. But Muslims are thought to make up about a quarter of the world’s population. If any large percentage of 1.2 billion people (let alone most of them) were really dangerous and violent the world would have been a smoking ruin long ago. So why isn’t it?

A recent report by Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell and Michael King of the UK think tank Demos sheds some light on this question. They spent two years examining the differences and similarities between violent and non-violent Muslims in Europe and Canada who hold radical Islamist political views. The biggest difference difference they found was in the approach to religion. The non-violent radicals are more “humble and reflective” with respect to their faith. They also  tend to study subjects in the humanities and have a better understanding of history and other aspects of social context.

The violent radicals are more likely to be dogmatic and to have an uneducated ”do-it-yourself” approach to religion. They study technical subjects like engineering and computer science and tend to use pejorative terms to reduce people’s worth. They also have a “bizarre obsession” with texts about how to recognize unbelievers, people against whom any action is justified. They believe the ummah (worldwide Muslim community) is under attack, a view the non-violent radicals tend not to support.

So simply holding strong religious views is not enought to make someone violent. What, then, is the difference that makes the difference? It may be youthful boredom.

Many people who became violent said they did so because it was cool, exciting, and dangerous. Training camps were like adventure camps–a counter-culture experience where they got to hang out in in exotic locations and play with weapons. The camps also provided meaningful structure: A sense of camaraderie and a system for building prestige that they found lacking in their normal lives.

Finally, in a new book my colleague Jeff Halverson (another frequent contributor to this blog) argues that theology (kalam)–the rational debate over Muslim beliefs and readings of the sacred texts–became virtually extinct in Sunni Islam in the late Middle Ages. In the absence of theology extremists can espouse heretical and radical viewpoints under the guise of orthodoxy, and promote highly questionable readings of the Qu’ran and Hadith to support their violent enterprises. One anti-theological or Athari group that emerged in the absence of kalam was Wahhabism – a sect that considers theology “satanic.” Today, few institutions and resources remain in place to challenge these Athari formulations (or innovations) of Sunni Islam. In this kind of intellectual environment, it is hardly surprising that unsophisticated views of religion and a “do-it-yourself” approach can prevail.

So a new view of the role of Islam in violence seems to be developing and it is challenging taken for granted views like those of McCarthy. More education in Islam seems to prevent, not cause, violent radicalism. Many or even most politically “radical” Muslims are just as non-violent as the elusive “moderates,” providing they have a sound education that encourages critical thinking and reflection. Those who become violent often do so not because they believe in Islam per se. Instead they are adolescents or young adults who think it would be cool to be a mujahid, and are influenced by self-appointed religious “authorities.” These people are able to self-appoint because there is a dearth of theological institutions to challenge their views.

On the whole this new research suggests that, ironically, the way to combat violent extremism may be to strengthen Islamic education, theology and religious authority, and to provide more constructive, non-violent outlets for youthful desires and radical beliefs.

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The following is a summary of some arguments  from my new book, Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam: The Muslim Brotherhood, Ash’arism, and Political Sunnism, published by Palgrave Macmillan.  It offers an explanation of why fundamentalist literal interpretations of the Qu’ran have so much influence in contemporary Islamist extremism, and why extremists’ views about what the Qu’ran says can be so difficult to challenge.

Mohammed Arkoun has described the notion of the “unthinkable” in Islamic thought, referring to the expansive realm of the intellectually forbidden. In recent decades, this realm has been greatly fortified.  But among the pre-modern casualties of the “unthinkable,” there was a surprising fatality, the discipline of Sunni theology (‘ilm al-kalam). Through a complex confluence of events, kalam fell into steady decline during the waning of the ‘Abbasid Caliphate and into virtual extinction as an active discipline by the fifteenth century (CE), replaced by a distinctly creedal enterprise.

Theology is the systematic, rational, defensible articulation of religious beliefs about God, revelation, and the cosmos. Therefore, when I describe the demise of Sunni theology I am referring to theology in this technical sense and not the disappearance of particular axiomatic religious creeds, called ‘aqidah (“creed”). Nor am I referring to Islamic philosophy, a separate discipline known as falsafah.

Among the leading factors behind the demise of kalam was an anti-theological school of thought that opposed the classical theological enterprise as it responded to a range of sociopolitical concerns, principally from the seventh to tenth centuries (CE).  This movement, known as the Athariyya, stressed strict adherence to the literal outward meanings of the sacred texts. For the Atharis, human reason cannot be trusted in matters of religion, thus making theology a sinful (even satanic) and dangerous exercise in human arrogance. Following the demise of kalam, Athari thought has flourished and, I argue, contributed in important ways to the reformulation of Islamic political theory in the twentieth century commonly known as “Islamism.”

This new Islamic polity borrowed heavily from modern European political ideologies and centered on the so-called “Islamic state.” In this book, I propose a new definition of Islamism, articulated in great detail, as the marriage of Athari-imposed creedalism and the modern-nation state. The turmoil and bloodshed that the Muslim world endured in the early centuries, out of which the dominant schools of Sunni theology (e.g. Ash‘arism and Maturidism) eventually emerged with important resolutions, is now being forced to play out once again, with the most dangerous elements emanating from those factions opposed to theology as a satanic force and a deserving prisoner of the “unthinkable.”

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The Consortium for Strategic Communication has released a new white paper by Mark Woodward, Ali Amin, and Inayah Rohmaniyah entitled Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization.  The full white paper can be downloaded here.

The executive summary is as follows:

Although the International Crisis Group’s reports on radicalism in Indonesia are extremely detailed and well informed, their recommendations tend to be short-term solutions aimed at preventing terrorist acts in the near term. This report argues the value of a longer term approach to both prevent radicalization as well as to rehabilitate jihadis who have been identified and arrested. Although the “soft” approach to imprisoning arrested jihadis is more successful than harsher approaches, this approach still has counterproductive shortfalls, such as allowing unrepentant radicals the opportunity to preach to inmates and guards. Allowing ustad and imam with similar theological backgrounds but without sympathies for terrorism would be an effective way to counter radicalism in prisons as it would not represent a major shift in theological views of terrorists but rather in how they act with respect to terrorism.

This report also shows that although there appear to be three different groups that have emerged from Jemaah Islamiyah, their goals remain the same and they differ only with regard to which tactics to employ. Thus, disengagement efforts aimed at shifting perceptions of operational or tactical matters may be more effective than attempts at de-radicalization that require the transformation of worldviews and identities. However further research is needed on the cognitive restructuring processes involved in these kinds of transformations.

Inayah Rohmaniyah

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Indonesian police have continued to make arrests of those with suspected ties to terrorism, including 14 people in the last week. Remarkably, many of those arrested have direct ties to firebrand cleric Abu Bakar Basyir and the organization he founded in 2008, Jemaah Anshoru Tauhid (JAT, the Supporters of Monotheism). According to the Jakarta Post, Basyir, who has been imprisoned twice in Indonesia, issued a statement stating that he is ready to be  questioned by the police.  He stressed that the JAT had no ties to terrorism, but I suspect that is a connection best left investigated by police.

Of course the JAT issued a statement denying any ties to terrorism (on the jihad-friendly Ar-Rahmah website, whose owner remains on trial for his purported connections to terrorism funding in connection to the Ritz Carlton and J. W. Marriott bombings in Jakarta last summer). This statement cited Basyir as claiming that the arrests amount to kidnapping, that the JAT was not causing problems in the neighborhood, and that god will punish those responsible.

Mainstream media source detik.com reported that Basyir is known to have visited those arrested and to have led them in prayer. Its article also stated that those arrested are suspected of having ties to Dulmatin, the Jemaah Islamiyah leader and Bali Bomb plotter was was killed by Indonesia’s anti-terror police squad Densus 88 in March. Of course Basyir commented on Dulmatin’s death, but it was more of the intricate dance of words that Basyir has become adept at in order to remain out of prison: he was not a terrorist, he was a martyr, he defended Muslims overseas, etc.

Those arrested are suspected of having ties to the failed plot to train jihadists in Aceh (see prior post here). Although it is easy to become overly optimistic when reports such as these surface, they do show that the Indonesian authorities are not resting on their laurels but rather continue to try to root out extremists. One can also safely assume that their intelligence gathering has been successful, whether through assistance by civilians (as in the Aceh case), through interrogations, or through rehabilitated former extremists.

During the Suharto era, extremists such as Basyir and fellow Jemaah Islamiyah co-founder Abdullah Sungkar were forced to leave Indonesia for Malaysia when they faced prosecution. Following the messy and chaotic beginning of Indonesia’s transition to democracy in the late 1990s, Basyir was able to return and Jemaah Islamiyah increased its activities. Although the irony of the JAT making appeals to democratic principles such as due process — when they promote a system of shariah that would eliminate personal choices for many — should not be lost on anyone, it appears as though Indonesia may be rebuking the conventional wisdom that it’s harder to quash terrorism in a democratic environment. Perhaps with the latest wave of arrests and killings of terrorists in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore will become appealing once again as places from which to lead their operations.

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