In December, COMOPS was invited to participate in a question and answer forum with General Stéphane Abrial, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, hosted by Atlantic-Community.org. Atlantic-Community is a leading European online think tank focused on transatlantic relations. The Q&A reveals that General Abrial has an integrative, forward-looking conceptualization of the role of strategic communication in NATO.  A close read also suggests that NATO faces both internal, as well as external, strategic communication challenges.

As the head of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), General Abrial is one of two strategic commanders in the NATO organizational structure (Allied Command Operations or ACO is the other, led by Admiral James Stavridis), and is charged with leading and facilitating the continuous improvement of NATO capabilities to meet NATO missions, operations and goals now and into the future.  The online forum consisted of a video by General Abrial introducing the concept of “Smart Defense”, an initiative recently put in place by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and General Abrial’s thoughts on what Smart Defense means for ACT.

Members of Atlantic-Community were invited to submit questions to General Abrial, facilitated by the editors at Atlantic-Community, and over the course of two subsequent sessions General Abrial answered a selection of these questions.  The first set of questions addressed specific implementations of Smart Defense, including definitions and ACT implications as well as transparency and development concerns.  The second inquired about broader NATO issues such as maritime security, cultural obstacles to cooperation and strategic communication.  The complete question and answer session can be found here.

One of the underlying factors driving Smart Defense, emphasized both in General Abrial’s introductory video and his answers to multiple questions, is the increased pressure on defense budgets in the face of the current European debt crisis and severe recession in the United States.  Yet, the security challenges faced by NATO and member countries have not abated.  These fiscal conditions motivate a need to do more with less, or as the general puts it: “We need to spend better.”  General Abrial provides some interesting thoughts about cooperative procurement as a method to leverage economies of scale.  In addition, he suggests the coordination of each member-country’s unique strengths and capabilities would be more efficient than developing parallel capabilities across the Alliance.

Acknowledging the fiscal challenges underpinning Smart Defense, my question to General Abrial centered on what sort of security dividend could be realized by emphasizing strategic communication as an additional tool for achieving NATO security objectives.  In other words, with the significant rise in insurgency and other irregular warfare situations, might non-kinetic solutions offer a cost-effective supplement to traditional kinetic military capabilities (and by implication, could successful non-kinetic solutions reduce the need for expensive weapons systems procurement and maintenance, if only slightly)?

General Abrial’s answer emphasized the role of strategic communication as part of a broad public diplomacy effort and cited a 2009 NATO Summit conclusion that strategic communication must be an integral part of both political and military objectives.  This dual role of strategic communication points to a significant challenge for conducting it effectively.  Which arm of NATO (or any government for that matter), the political or military, should lead strategic communication?

Thinking of strategic communication in terms of public affairs and information operations is too restrictive. It is a discipline that bridges both political and military domains and is intricately enmeshed with both political and military operations.  It requires careful planning and forethought, otherwise devaluing its strategic benefit.  General Abrial calls for “building a professional framework strategic communications related military disciplines” and I would argue that this framework should be overtly collaborative with the political dimension of the alliance’s functions.

General Abrial’s answer also got me thinking about two sides of strategic communication and the special challenges faced by NATO.  All countries when seeking to communicate their objectives and goals, and seeking to persuade an audience to cooperate in the achievement of those goals have two audiences, external and internal.  In its traditional definition—communication crafted and coordinated to support the achievement of a goal—strategic communication is often conceived as an externally focused process, and this is especially true when subcomponents of the discipline such as public diplomacy, information operations and psychological operations (psyops) are considered.  However, countries have domestic audiences that require information and need to understand what their government is trying to accomplish.

In NATO’s case, this internal audience presents a particular challenge:  28 member countries, each with its own unique security and diplomatic concerns, its own internal political turmoil, not too mention significant historical and cultural concerns.  Each country itself has both internal and external audiences.  General Abrial’s comments introducing Smart Defense indicates this need to address this internally-focused facet of strategic communication.

He observes that a question facing NATO is: “how do we best encourage groups of like-minded countries to reap economies of scale by working together more often?”  This sounds like a strategic communication issue, but not one suited to information operations or pysop campaigns.  Rather, it is about getting all the member countries to share the same vision of NATO’s future and the same vision about how they can contribute to that future.  In short, they need to participate in the same narrative.

This challenge illustrates how approaching narrative from a systemic perspective can be helpful, not only in terms of narrative analysis and understanding, but also in terms of strategic communication planning.  Smart Defense already articulates some fundamental themes: cooperation, fiscal prudence, balancing sovereignty and solidarity, etc.  As we’ve noted here at COMOPS Journal before (notably here and here), a narrative is (1) an explanatory organization of information; (2) is structured with a trajectory towards the resolution a conflict or satisfaction of a desire (and the events of this trajectory illustrate themes, values and ideals); and (3) is a system of stories.

Constructing a Smart Defense narrative, then, would consist of identifying a variety of stories that constitute the events in the overall narrative trajectory.  For an effective and coherent narrative that unites the alliance, these stories would ideally be sourced from the member countries and thus consistent with those narrative landscapes.  Next, they would contain within them actions and characters and events that, when collected together, place Smart Defense at the resolution of the conflicts or the satisfaction of  desires germane to each member country.  Of course, that’s easier said than done.

The most encouraging of all the general’s comments, though, was his assertion that strategic communication “must be incorporated into all operational planning, instead of being relegated to an after-the-fact attempt to explain, or build support for a decision that has already been taken.”  As my co-authors and I argue in our upcoming book Narrative Landmines, understanding the narrative landscape and incorporating that knowledge into the decision-making process at operational and strategic levels can make the difference between success or failure of civil affairs, public outreach, crisis management and other soft power enterprises.

We at COMOPS thank General Abrial and Atlantic-Community for the opportunity to engage in this dialogue, and look forward to following NATO’s efforts in implementing Smart Defense and ensuring both European and Transatlantic security in the years to come.

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*Dr. Scott W. Ruston is an Assistant Research Professor at the Center for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University. A specialist in narrative theory and media studies, he is the co-author of Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (Rutgers UP, available March 2012).  He is also an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve newly assigned to a NATO ACT reserve support unit.

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Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People, November 15, 2011.  While nearly half (46%) of Afghans say their country is moving in the right direction, more respondents (35%) than at any time since the Foundation began polling there in 2004 say Afghanistan is headed in the wrong direction.  Attacks, violence, and terrorism are cited.  The survey also found, however, that Afghans see progress in access to education, drinking water, health services, and in household financial well-being.  Sympathy for armed opposition groups declined dramatically in 2011, reaching its lowest level since the Foundation’s surveys began.

Tom Bartlett and Karin Fisher, “The China Conundrum,” The New York Times, November 6, 2011.  In this NYT Education Life feature, Bartlett and Fisher argue that American colleges have been slow to adjust to challenges caused by the rapid rise in Chinese undergraduates — now the largest group of foreign students in the United States.  In their eager competition for students from China’s expanding middle class who can afford to pay full tuition, American colleges contend with application, language, and acclimation problems as they “struggle to distinguish between good applicants and those who are too good to be true.”  The article is a collaboration between The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education.

British Council, Corporate Plan 2011-2015, posted September 2011.  The British Council’s vision for 2015 anticipates significant reductions in government funding, more collaboration with corporate and civil society partners, increased income from paid services, and greater priority to countries with strategic importance to the UK.   Includes a foreword by Council CEO Martin Davidson and sections on English teaching, education and society, the arts, sports, science, climate change, digital platforms, regional programs, and a financial plan.  See blog comments by Alex Case on implications of a 26 percent cut in government funding and keeping an eye on the Council’s “increasing commercialism.”

British Council, “Trust and Why it Matters,” Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, pp. 190-193.  Calling for an evidence-based approach to trust building, the Council reports on its survey of young urban, educated, and online “influencers” (age 16-34) in India, China, Poland, and Saudi Arabia.  The survey tested for levels of trust in the people and governments in the UK, the US, Germany, and France.  The Council found “a clear positive association” between self-assessed levels of trust and some form of cultural relations activity involving the base line countries as well as a willingness to engage further with those countries.  Levels of trust were significantly higher for the UK, Germany, and France than for the United States.

Broadcasting Board of Governors, Impact Through Innovation and Integration, BBG Strategic Plan, 2012-2016, posted November 2011. In this brief (seven pages) and imaginative five year plan, the BBG outlines a strategy for US international broadcasting intended to address fundamental changes in the global information environment.  Its strategy includes a revised statement of mission, a vision for “altogether new ways of doing business” in programing and use of new technologies, making internet censorship circumvention and anti-jamming a top priority, and transformational changes in the identity and organizational structure of the BBG and its broadcasting services.  See also the BBG’s press release and “Frequently Asked Questions.”

Massimo Calabresi, “Hillary Clinton and the Rise of Smart Power,” Time, November 7, 2011, 26-33.  Time magazine’s cover story chronicles US Secretary of State Clinton’s efforts to face different situations, threats, and opportunities with smart combinations of diplomacy, development, and military hard power.  Her tools include the “convening power” of connections with civil society organizations, greater control over US foreign aid strategy, expansion of political advisors in the Department of Defense, and immersing “everyone from entry-level foreign service officers to newly appointed ambassadors in social media.”  Many of her initiatives, Time observes, are low on budget, “long on jargon and short on deliverables,” and run out of her office making their duration problematic.  Includes a Q&A with the Secretary by Time’s Managing Editor Richard Stengel.

Daryl Copeland, “Science Diplomacy: What’s It All About?” Center for International Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 13, November 2011.  Copeland (Canadian diplomat and author of Guerrilla Diplomacy) calls for greater attention to science diplomacy in addressing global issues that challenge development and security.  He distinguishes between science diplomacy (a subset of public diplomacy with governance connections) and international scientific collaboration among corporate and civil society partners.  His paper frames conceptual issues and outlines difficulties flowing from dominance of defense-related funding and lack of awareness and capacity in foreign ministries, multilateral organizations, and science-based institutions.

Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “All Talk and No Action,” Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, pp. 20-25.  Cross (University of Southern California) looks at rising Euro-pessimism in the United States and finds widespread lack of awareness of Europe’s political, economic, and military achievements.  She suggests three images that Europe should strive to promote:  a Europe “united in diversity,” a Europe that acts and doesn’t just talk, and a Europe that effectively combines hard and soft power in facing 21st century challenges.  Cross examines the role the European External Action Service can play in addressing US misperceptions with particular emphasis on the value of networked cultural diplomacy.

Recent articles by Professor Cross also include:  “Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the EEAS,” European Foreign Affairs Review, (2011), 16: 447-464.  On building professionalism, expertise, flexibility, and collective identity in the European External Action Service.  “Europe, A Smart Power?” International Politics (2011), 48, 691-706.  On the meaning of smart power and Europe’s use of soft and smart power.

European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC), Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011.  This fourth edition of the Culture Report — published for the first time within the framework of EUNIC (a network of 19 European cultural diplomacy organizations) — examines the current state of Europe’s external cultural relations.  Includes chapters by 30 scholars and practitioners from 20 countries that examine external perspectives on Europe, the role of culture in Europe’s external affairs, and the evolution of the EUNIC network.

“2011: Facets of Diplomacy,” Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars, Syracuse University, November 2011. Graduate students at Syracuse University have published their second edition of online journal Exchange.  Includes:

Simon Anholt (Editor, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy), “Beyond the Nation Brand — The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations”

Rachel Wilson (Syracuse University), “Cocina Peruana Para El Mundo: Gastrodiplomacy, the Culinary Nation Brand, and the Context of National Cuisine in Peru”

Sofia Kisou (Ionia University), “The Power of Culture in Diplomacy: The Case of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in France and Germany”

Ivaylo Ladjiev (University of Bath), “Searching for Influence and Persuasion in Network-Oriented Public Diplomacy: What Role for ‘Small States?’”

Shahihul Alam (Independent University) “Stretching the Parameters of Diplomatic Protocol: Incursion into Public Diplomacy”

Ellen Huijgh (Netherlands Institute of International Affairs), “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension”

Candace Ren Burnham (University of Southern California), “Public Diplomacy Following 9/11: The Saudi Peace Initiative and ‘Allies’ Media Campaign”

Michael Schneider (Syracuse University), “Book Review: The Practice of Public Diplomacy — Confronting Challenges Abroad”

Bruce Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6 (2011) 351-372.  This article looks ways in which characteristics of an American approach to public diplomacy are rooted in the nation’s history and political culture.  These include episodic resolve correlated with war and surges of zeal, systemic tradeoffs in American politics, competitive practitioner communities and powerful civil society actors, and late adoption of communication technologies.  The aarticle examines these characteristics in the context of the Obama administration’s strategy of global public engagement and three illustrative issues:  a culture of understanding, social media, and multiple diplomatic actors.  It concludes that characteristics shaping US public diplomacy significantly constrain its capacity for transformational change.

Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts, (Lexington Books, 2012).  Hayden (American University) asks why do international political actors increasingly believe communicating with foreign audiences is crucial to their interests?  His answers are provided in a significant new inquiry into the theoretical nature of soft power and the variety of ways soft power is interpreted and implemented in the public diplomacy initiatives of different actors.  Hayden draws on concepts and methods in international relations and communications to develop a theoretical treatment of soft power and public diplomacy.  He then examines discourses and practices of soft power in case studies of the public diplomacy and strategic communication policies of China, Japan, Venezuela, and the United States.  Hayden is particularly concerned with the rhetoric of soft power — the reasoning, policy discussions, and public arguments that shape how public diplomacy programs of these actors are imagined and what they view to be necessary political action through communication.

Institute for International Education (IIE), Open Doors 2011, November 2011.  IIE’s annual report on cross border student flows finds international student enrollment in the US increased 5% in 2011. Students from China led the increase followed by students from India, South Korea, Canada, and Taiwan.  The top three countries comprise almost half of the international enrollment in US higher education.  Although only 270,604 American college students studied abroad in 2010-2011, there has been a steady annual rise with an increase of about 10,000 from the previous year.  Most US students still choose traditional destinations in Western Europe.  However, enrollment in less traditional destinations such as India, Israel, and Brazil is on the rise.

Robert Kelley, “Repairing the American Image, One Tweet at a Time,” The United States After Unipolarity, LSE Ideas, London School of Economics, 2011, 35-39.  Kelley (American University) looks at the Obama administration’s public diplomacy.  He commends efforts to put “social media and technology exchanges into the toolkit of the public diplomat.”  In contrast with these innovations in method, however, he finds an “absence of a strategic framework for public diplomacy” and a “strategic incoherence” in which means matter more than content.

Michelle Lee, “Public Diplomacy: At the Crossroads Between Practitioner and Theorist,” Council of American Ambassadors, The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2011.  Lee (a US Foreign Service Officer currently assigned at the Department of State) looks at reasons for the divide between practitioners and academics in public diplomacy and what might be done in the two communities to benefit from greater collaboration.  Her article discusses recent efforts to bridge the divide, the value of advanced educational as well as increased training for mid-career diplomats, and recommendations to strengthen the practice and study of public diplomacy.

Jan Melissen, Beyond The New Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Discussion Paper No. 3, October 2011.  The Director of Clingendael’s Diplomatic Studies Program and co-editor of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy looks at changes in diplomatic practice in a world of multiple actors and diverse networks.  His paper assesses criticisms of public diplomacy; varieties of public diplomacy practices by states; the increasing public diplomacy roles of sub-state, regional, and civil society actors; and points of learning from the public diplomacy of East Asian countries.  Given these changes, Melissen argues the juxtaposition of “traditional” and “new” public diplomacy is no longer satisfactory.  Rather, public diplomacy and diplomacy are merging into a more inclusive and “societized” form of diplomacy.  In a polylateral world of multiple actors, states remain highly relevant, but their diplomacy can best be understood in a context where non-state and non-official actors have a much greater role in international relationships.  Practitioners, he suggests, can learn much “outside their comfort zone from how public diplomacy is practiced in distinct organizational and cultural settings.”

Pew Research Center, Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking Popular Worldwide, December 20, 2011.  Pew’s survey of digital communication in 21 countries finds overwhelmingly large majorities in most major countries use cell phones for text messages (75%), taking pictures/video (50%), and Internet use (23%) based on median percentages across the nations surveyed.  Social networking remains popular but with only marginal change in use since 2010.  Exceptions are Egypt and Russia where usage has increased from 18% to 28% in Egypt and 33% to 43% in Russia.  Multiple uses of cell phones and social networking correlates with youth demographics and education. Media release.

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, guest editors, “American Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 6, Nos. 3-4 2011.  In this special issue of the Journal, Sharp (University of Minnesota, Duluth) and Wiseman (University of Southern California) convene a team of scholars and practitioners to look at the conduct of American diplomacy, the character of its diplomatic culture, efforts to reform, and suggestions for what lies ahead.  Includes:

Introduction

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, “American Diplomacy,” 231-234

Research Papers

Geoffrey Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” 235-259

David Clinton (Baylor University), “The Distinction Between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice,” 261-276

CHEN Zhimin (Fudan University), “US Diplomacy and Diplomats: A Chinese View,” 277-297

Michael Smith (Loughborough University), “European Responses to US Diplomacy: ‘Special Relationships,’ Transatlantic Governance and World Order,” 299-317

Karin A. Esposito and S. Alaeddin Valid Gharavi (School of International Relations, Tehran), “Transformational Diplomacy: US Tactics for Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2004-2006,” 319-334

David Bosco (American University), “Course Correction: The Obama Administration at the United Nations,” 335-349

Bruce Gregory (George Washington University/Georgetown University), “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” 351-372

James Der Derian (Brown University), Quantum Diplomacy: German-US Relations and the Psychogeography of Berlin,” 373-392

Paul Sharp, “Obama, Clinton and the Diplomacy of Change,” 393-411

Practitioners’ Perspectives

Chas W. Freeman Jr. (US diplomat, retired), “The Incapacitation of US Statecraft and Diplomacy,” 413-432

Thomas Hanson (University of Minnesota, Duluth), “The Traditions and Travails of Career Diplomacy in the United States,” 433-450

Alec Ross (US Department of State), “Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign Policy,” 451-455.

Clay Shirky, Salant Lecture — Press Freedom in a Global Era, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, October 2011.  Shirky (New York University and author of Here Comes Everybody) looks at press freedom as a relationship between technological capability and the regulatory power of legal and policy constraints.  Using Wikileaks and other examples, Shirky examines challenges to freedom of expression in “a post national environment.”  He argues the US and other democracies, which have been good at lecturing autocracies on freedom of speech, need to become much better at holding themselves to the standards they espouse.  (Courtesy of Bob Coonrod)

Russell Shorto, Descartes’ Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict Between Faith and Reason, (Vintage Books, 2008).  Intellectual historian and journalist Russell Shorto tells the story of Descartes’ legacy and its relevance to today’s competing fundamentalist impulses (secular, Christian, and Muslim).  His lively and witty narrative uses the strange story of a centuries long struggle between scientific and religious authorities over the disposition of Descartes’ physical remains as a metaphor for understanding the continuing conflict between faith and reason.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A New Theory for the Foreign Policy Frontier: Collaborative Power,” The Atlantic, November 30, 2011.  Slaughter (Princeton University) updates her inaugural Joseph S. Nye lecture at Princeton to frame a concept of “collaborative power,” — defined as “the power of many to do together what no one can do alone” — which she contrasts with Nye’s concept of “top down” relational power.  Elements of collaborative power include mobilization, connection, and adaptation of one’s preferences to enable meaningful dialogue.  For Slaughter, collaborative power is not held by A in relation to B.  Rather it is an “emergent phenomenon,” which leaders can learn to unlock and guide but not possess.

Tara Sonenshine, Under Secretary-designate for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, US Department of State, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 8, 2011.  In prepared remarks for her confirmation hearing, Sonenshine (Executive Vice President, US Institute for International Peace) described public diplomacy as “a shared means to a shared goal of extending America’s reach and security by influencing how individuals around the world come to know and understand us.  It is about the advancement of foreign policy goals through people-to-people connections in a complex, global networked society.”  Successful public diplomacy, she stated, “is inextricably linked to national security.”  Public diplomacy “increases economic security through global engagement,” and it “must be agile and adaptive in using state of the art information technologies.”

In a Huffington Post blog, “America’s Next Move on Public Diplomacy,” co-authored with her USIP colleague Sheldon Himelfarb on May 5, 2009, Sonenshine offered her ideas to then incoming Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale.

Janet Steele, “Justice and Journalism: Islam and Journalistic Values in Indonesia and Malaysia,” Journalism, 12(5) 533-549.  Drawing on interviews with journalists in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Kuala Lumpur, Steele (George Washington University) looks at ways in which Southeast Asian journalists think about their work and implications for US public diplomacy.  She argues “journalists in Indonesia and Malaysia express universal values of journalism, but do so in an Islamic idiom” that privileges goals of economic justice and the legitimacy of those in authority more than freedom.  If the US wishes to engage journalists in these countries, Steele contends, “rather than focusing on ‘the role of a free press in a democracy,’ it would make far more sense to focus on ‘the role of independent media in a just society.’”

Kishan S. Rana, 21st Century Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Guide, (The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).  In this recent contribution to the Key Studies in Diplomacy series, former Indian Ambassador and DiploFoundation scholar Kishan Rana provides a guide to modern diplomacy for diplomacy practitioners and scholars.  His book is written with particular attention to its use in foreign ministry training courses and by teachers and students in academic institutions.  The book divides into three categories.  (1) A section on the international environment includes chapters on globalized, regional, and small states diplomacy; public diplomacy and country branding; and disapora diplomacy. (2) Chapters on institutions and processes look at foreign ministry reform, the reinvented embassy, decision-making and risk management, performance evaluation, information and communications technologies, the new consular diplomacy, and protocol.  (3) A section on diplomacy skills offers guidance on professional responsibilities, advocacy and public speaking, media skills, writing skills, and training exercises.

Websites and blogs of Interest

Robert Albro (American University), Public Policy Anthropology, a blog site that looks at cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, intercultural dialogue, and other topics.

Intermedia’s AudienceScapes, an interactive tool and knowledge resource “on how citizens and policymakers gather, share, and use information for all sources.”  In a news release on December 15, 2011, Intermedia announced the appointment of Ali Fisher (Director of Mappa Mundi Consulting) as Associate Director of Digital Media Research.

R. S. Zaharna (American University), Culture Posts, an interactive blog site on USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy platform.

“U.S. Department of State Announces Launch of New Website,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, October 12, 2011.  The Department’s interactive Discover Diplomacy website seeks to introduce the world of diplomacy and the work of the State Department to high school and college students.

Gem from the past

Walter R. Roberts, “The Evolution of Diplomacy,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 17.3 (Summer 2006), 55-64.  In this article, retired US diplomat and scholar Walter Roberts examines the origins of diplomatic practice as it focused increasingly on publics and differed from traditional diplomacy between governments during the second half of the 20th century.  It is a succinct overview of a transformation in diplomatic practice that led eventually to a global conversation on the meaning and methods of public diplomacy.  His article is a useful foundational reading as scholars and practitioners in the 21st century ask whether another transformation is occurring.  Has public diplomacy become so central to diplomacy that it is no longer helpful to treat it as unique theoretical concept and subset of diplomatic practice.  Mediterranean Quarterly lists “The Evolution of Diplomacy” as its seventh most cited article of the past eleven years.  His article is available online courtesy of the Public Diplomacy Alumni Association.

Walter Roberts career, which began in the Voice of America in 1942, included diplomatic assignments in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, service as an associate director of the US Information Agency, and a presidential appointment to membership on the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.  He pioneered the teaching of public diplomacy at George Washington University in the 1980s and 1990s.
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*Bruce Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

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A few weeks ago I did a keynote speech at a public meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission in Public Diplomacy.  Later in the meeting I heard a presentation by Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).  The topic of his talk tied together several topics recently discussed on COMOPS Journal, and accordingly I want to share it with readers.

Presumably in response to the myriad calls to better coordinate U.S. government strategic communication, the CSCC was charged in a recent executive order to

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Among other things, the CSCC oversees the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which has been the subject of  previous posts on this blog, both appreciative and critical. Amb. LeBaron’s talk focused on a recent DOT effort that allows me to add another post in the appreciative category, and I don’t believe it is very well known.

The DOT recently produced three videos juxtaposing AQ’s ideology with facts-on-the ground in the Arab Spring protests.  The first features clips from an Ayman al-Zawahiri video where he insists that “apostate regimes” can only be overthrown by violent jihad and that change through peaceful means is hopeless.  The second is based on a rant against democracy by Abu Yahia al-Libi.  The third (and most hilarious) uses clips of captured video from bin Laden’s compound showing him watching videos of himself.  In all three cases the AQ clips are intercut with news footage of the Arab Spring protests.

In my opinion this is a superb effort for a number of reasons:

• They reinforce messages that have long been priorities for U.S. strategic communication in the counterterrorism arena, namely that violent jihad is not necessary for social change, and that the best change is democratic.
• They present these messages while side-stepping problems with U.S. credibility, by mashing-up AQ’s own video with clips from independent news reports.
• They are “prosumer” efforts, done by DOT members with desktop video editing software, rather than slick professional productions.  As such they embrace cutting-edge trends in social media.
• They effectively employ the principle of ridicule as strategic communication, poking the Bad Guys in the eye by making them seem silly and out of touch with reality, and contributing to their developing image as a toxic brand.

We have argued that on the rugged-landscape of counterterrorism communication more out-of-the-box efforts like this are needed.  So hats off to the DOT for taking the leap.

You can watch the DOT videos, with English subtitles, here:

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I’ll admit that I slip sometimes in everyday conversation and use the word “story” as a synonym for “narrative.” A lot of people do it. But I should know better. There’s an important difference between the two. For the average conversation the difference doesn’t really matter much. However, when it comes to strategic communication and understanding the role of narrative in messaging strategies, it’s a distinction that has to be made.

Explaining the difference between a story and a narrative can easily get bogged down in academic jargon. Eyes will glaze over. There might be some dismissive comments about the “ivory tower.” I think I can avoid this with a good example that illustrates the differences.

First, I want to give you a definition of narrative. We have a detailed definition in our book Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). But since we’re avoiding academic language here, let’s abbreviate it by defining narrative simply as a “system of stories.” That means that narratives are composed of multiple stories that relate to one another.

The aforementioned book also provides a nice academic definition of “story.” But again to keep things moving, I’ll abbreviate that too. Let’s define story simply as an “event unit.” It relates the ‘who, where, when and how’ of an event that occurred (or will occur if we’re talking about ‘prophecy,’ although prophecy is prefaced as something ‘revealed’ in the past). A narrative is made up of several of these interrelated “event units” that work together as a system. There’s no maximum number, but there is a minimum (at least two). And the system isn’t exclusive either. A narrative can have stories added, subtracted, and swapped out. Confused? Let’s get to that great example I told you about.

Talk to your average Christian at church on Sunday morning and ask him or her to tell you the “story” of Jesus (by which you actually mean “narrative”). The response is what we’ll call the “Jesus narrative.” Most readers probably already know the narrative. You’ve seen it depicted in a movie or two or three. It’ll start with Jesus being miraculously born to a virgin, Mary. The virgin birth (no, it’s not called the Immaculate Conception – that’s Mary’s birth, honest) is a story. It’s one story that operates within the system of stories that makeup the Jesus narrative.

Now if you open a Bible while you’re at church, you’ll find that the New Testament contains four different narratives about the life and mission of Jesus Christ. We call them the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John. Each one of these Gospels contains similar but different narratives, which is why the Church fathers decided to include four Gospels instead of one. For example, the story (event unit) of the virgin birth is found in only two of the Gospels, namely Matthew and Luke. We won’t find it in the narratives of Mark or John. As you’ll recall, narratives aren’t exclusive. That means that when you ask someone at church to tell you about Jesus, the stories from all four Gospel narratives can come together to form a coherent system of stories, the Jesus narrative.

Let’s take another example. When I was a kid attending Risen Christ Lutheran Church in Rochester, New York, I was taught the Lord’s Prayer. It’s the one that starts, “Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name.” Jesus teaches this prayer to his disciples in the Jesus narrative. But again, if you pick up the Bible, you’re only going to find that story in the narratives of Matthew and Luke. You won’t find it in Mark and John. Additionally, the “Lord’s Prayer” I was taught, the one Christians use every week at Church, is only found in Matthew (6: 9-13).  It’s much shorter in Luke. This story unit from the Matthew narrative is freely incorporated with the stories of John, Luke, and Mark to form the system of stories we know as the Jesus narrative.

Seeing the distinctions between stories and narratives may sound like academic nit-picking. But it’s essential when it comes to organizing and making sense of narrative and the way people deploy or use them. Stories are pieces that can come and go, change, and morph, but the narrative remains.

When the narrative shows great resilience, we have “master narratives,” meaning narratives that have endured the test of time and become deeply embedded in culture. These are the most important narratives in strategic communication. People make use of them all the time. The American Revolution is a master narrative that we learn in grade school civics class, and it’s composed of a lot of stories like Paul Revere’s ride, Washington crossing the Delaware, the Boston Tea Party, and so on.  A modern political group calls itself the “Tea Party,” using revolutionary slogans, dressing up in period costumes, and so on.  They don’t do that for nothing:  Their aim is to invoke the values, thinking, and grievances of the American Revolution in the minds of people they hope to persuade.

When we look at the way extremists utilize master narratives, we can see the dynamics of the story system working. An extremist may invoke a master narrative as a whole while ignoring some stories it contains, to better serve his or her ideological goals.  For example, Islamist extremists like to call the U.S. and other Western countries Christian “crusaders” and liken themselves to the Muslim champion Saladin. However, Saladin was actually allied with Byzantine Christians against the Crusaders of the Holy Roman Church. It was hardly a cosmic clash of civilizations.

Recognizing these kinds of inconvenient stories allows us to subvert, refute, and disrupt extremists’ use of  narratives, perhaps by promoting a different variation of the story system that challenges their own.

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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Manan Ahmed, Where the Wild Frontiers Are: Pakistan and the American Imagination, (Just World Publishing, 2011).  The author of “Chapati Mystery” blog and a historian of Islam in South Asia (Freie Universitate Berlin) gathers his commentaries on US imaginings about Pakistan and historical and political trends within Pakistan.  Sharply critical, humorous, and well written, Ahmed’s short essays portray a failure on the part of American officials and writers in mainstream media to “imagine” the realities of Pakistan’s people and society.  Ahmed’s blogs make a case for deeper comprehension of relations between the two societies:  “Unless we decide to get local, to pay attention to local narratives, facts, histories, realities, languages, religions, ethnicities, cultures, and so forth, we will remain in this deeply flawed discourse.”  Includes a foreword by Amitava Kumar (Vassar College).

Robert M. Beecroft, “Taking Diplomatic Professional Education Seriously,” Foreign Service Journal, July/August 2011, 66-69.  Retired US Foreign Service Officer Beecroft argues the “new diplomacy” requires “a systematic regimen of professional diplomatic education at the Department of State.”  His article summarizes key findings and recommendations in the 2011 report sponsored by the Stimson Center and the American Academy of Diplomacy on Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service Through Professional Education and Training.

Lee C. Bollinger, “News for the World — A Proposal for a Globalized Era: an American World Service,” Columbia Journalism Review, July/August 2011, 29-33.  Bollinger (Columbia University) finds (1) a contradiction between the need for global news and the diminished supply of foreign reporting; (2) a rise in national media intended to have a global presence (BBC World Service, Al Jazeera, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, and France 24), (3) a continuing need for journalistic institutions to offset laissez-faire “citizen journalism;” and (4) a trend from local to regional to global in civil society institutions such as universities and the media.  He discusses America’s dual system of public broadcasting — the journalism of National Public Radio and PBS and international broadcasters such as Voice of America and RFE/RL, which are rooted in the Cold War and barred from broadcasting to US audiences by “constitutionally suspect” provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948.  Bollinger calls for an “American World Service” to provide a “stronger publicly funded system of international news.”

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In Afghanistan’s Garmser District, Praise for a U.S. Official’s Tireless Work,” The Washington Post, August 13, 2011. The Post’s correspondent and author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City (2006) profiles the work of State Department representative Carter Malkasian during his two year stay in Garmser on the Helmand River.  Chandrasekaran attributes Malkasian’s success to his Pashto fluency, sensitivity to local cultural norms, willingness to take risks, countless meetings and roadside conversations, residence in a local trailer, two-year  stay in one district, a “soft spoken manner” combined with “fierce negotiating skills,” his credibility with US troops, and his willingness as a temporary civilian hire to “to forge his own job description, even if it meant bucking the State Department’s rules.”  In a letter to the Post on August 23, 2011, US Ambassador Ryan Crocker comments that “hundreds of foreign service officers and other federal agency workers are doing similar work in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.”

Jacob Comenetz, “Innovating Public Diplomacy for a New Digital World,” The Washington Diplomat, July 27, 2011. Contributing writer Comenetz discusses conceptual issues and operational challenges facing US diplomats in using social media tools.  His essay looks at (1) implications of ideas on network power and “Internet Freedom” in the writings of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former State Department official Anne-Marie Slaughter; (2) projects and institutional changes in the Department’s public diplomacy bureaus; and (3) uses of digital technologies to create stealth networks and enable activists challenging regimes in Iran, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere.  Comenetz also summarizes contrasting views, drawing particularly on Evgeny Morozov’s critique in The Net Delusion (2010).

Paul Cornish, Julian Lindley-French, and Claire Yorke, Strategic Communications and National Strategy, A Chatham House Report, Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 2011.  Cornish (University of Bath), Lindley-French (Netherlands Defense Academy), and Yorke (Chatham House) call for a whole of government approach to strategic communication and increased awareness of its central role in the development and implementation of national strategy.  They argue the UK government has a good understanding of strategic communication’s importance, but this understanding is “relatively limited in its sophistication and imagination.”  Their recommendations fall into three categories:  (1) establish a clearer definition of strategic communication and its place in national strategy, (2) reform how strategic communication is managed within government, and (3) adapt and strengthen strategic communication in response to the challenges of new information technologies and cyber security.  (Courtesy of Robin Brown)

Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks Are Transforming the European Union, (The University of Michigan Press, 2011).  Cross (University of Southern California) argues the European Union has made significant advances in achieving internal and external security through collaboration in and among epistemic communities — i.e., knowledge-based transnational networks of diplomats, soldiers, scientists, civilian crisis professionals, and other areas of shared expertise. Her generally optimistic view of EU integration is grounded in her reading of the capacity of networks to supersede national governments in the diplomacy of “security decision making.”  Through their common culture, shared professional norms, frequent meetings, speed, and flexibility, epistemic communities are changing how we think about governance, diplomacy, and approaches to dealing with terrorism, immigration, cross-border crime, drug and human trafficking, and other transnational security threats.

“Diplomacy Post 9/11: Life in the US Foreign Service,” The Kojo Nnamdi Show, National Public Radio, September 22, 2011. Host Kojo Nnamdi interviews American Foreign Service Association President Susan Johnson, US Foreign Service Officer Matthew Asada, and US Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter.  Issues discussed include tensions between security and fulfilling mission goals, changes in recruitment and promotion, training requirements, and debates between proponents of “a traditional service and an expeditionary service.”  Available in audio and transcript versions.  (Courtesy of Michelle Lee)

Ali Fisher and David Montez, Evaluating Online Public Diplomacy Using Digital Media Research Methods, A Case Study of #ObamainBrazil, InterMedia Global Research Network, July 2011 (available online through USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy.  In this study, Fisher (Mappa Mundi Consulting) and Montez (InterMedia) (1) discuss research methods needed to develop, implement, and evaluate social media campaigns in public diplomacy; (2) assess the State Department’s use of digital media to support President Obama’s March 2011 visit to Brazil; and (3) offer recommendations for using social media in future public diplomacy campaigns.  They conclude that, to be effective, public diplomacy practitioners must adopt new research methods and strategies that take into account opportunities and constraints in using social media.

Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 6, 2011.  Fitzpatrick (Quinnipiac University) finds a lack of consensus among scholars, practitioners, and informed observers on the methods and goals of public diplomacy in the decade since 9/11.  Her paper draws on dialogue theory to assess US public diplomacy during the Bush and Obama administrations and to create a prescriptive relational model that seeks to ground its practice in two-way “symmetric engagement.”

Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used To Be Us, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).  Using stories, interviews, and analysis, New York Times columnist Friedman and Johns Hopkins (SAIS) professor Mandelbaum assess the causes and implications of four challenges: globalization, the revolution in information technology, America’s chronic deficits, and its excessive energy consumption.  Their critique — intended as “both a wake up call and a call to collective action” — offers a change manifesto grounded in more and better education and different habits of saving and consumption.  Students and teachers will find useful their chapters on bottom up innovation and “creative creativity” as today’s necessary adjuncts to learning critical skills and mastering knowledge domains.

Amanda Foreman, A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War, (Random House, 2010).  Forman (University of London) puts the war in an international context with a focus on Britain’s policy of neutrality, deep opposition to slavery, and dependence on the South for cotton; the South’s need for British-made weapons and ships; and the North’s frequent consideration of war with Britain and efforts to block diplomatic and economic connections with the Confederacy.  Her massive (958 pages) and critically acclaimed study reinforces the correlation between US public diplomacy and armed conflict throughout American history.  She offers many fresh insights into the practice of traditional and public diplomacy midway between the American Revolution and World War I. Written from the perspective of political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, journalists, writers, and citizen activists, Foreman’s narrative includes a thorough assessment of the diplomatic and public opinion implications of the North’s capture of Confederate agents Mason and Slidell in the Trent affair, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, military successes and failures, and the political and economic interests all concerned.

Public diplomacy practitioners and scholars will find particularly interesting Foreman’s discussion of US Minister Charles Francis Adams’ skills in traditional diplomacy, which contrasted with his pronounced unwillingness to engage journalists and British publics; the methods and tools used by Thurlow Weed, sent by Secretary of State William Seward to influence European public opinion; the methods and tools used by the skilled, multi-lingual journalist Henry Hotze, who was recruited by the Confederacy to engage the press on behalf of the South’s Commission in London; Hotze’s pro-South journal the Index; the uneasy relationship between diplomats and spies; the influence of citizen activists and journalists with pro-South or pro-North sympathies; dissemination of unattributed speeches and editorials; and the roles of the telegraph, photographs, political cartoons, debates in Parliament, and non-governmental organizations in shaping public opinion.

Seward’s controversial release of all US diplomatic correspondence in the first half of 1862, motivated by domestic political considerations, proved deeply embarrassing to Adams who never imagined his letters would become public.  Britain’s political leaders and diplomats took this 19th century precursor to WikiLeaks in stride.

Peter W. Galbraith, “How to Write a Cable,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2011, 102-103.  The former US Ambassador to Croatia and Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Afghanistan argues that, contrary to what Julian Assange might say, most diplomats “do not worry that the wrong people will read their cables, but that the right people won’t.”  With a twinkle in his eye, Galbraith in this short piece, offers this advice:  (1) “be strategically nasty,”  (2) “a spoonful of Ukrainian nurse helps the cable go down,” (3) accuracy is at a premium (except about the home team); (4) “pretend you’re a foreign correspondent — back in the glory days;” and (5) “be literate.”

Susan Gigli and Ali Fisher, “Networked Audiences: 10 Rules for Engagement,” The Channel (Association of International Broadcasters), Issue 2, 2011.  Gigli (InterMedia) and Fisher (Mappa Mundi Consulting) provide a brief guide for media organizations seeking to embrace new networked media platforms.  Their 10 rules show how “users behave and cluster with these networks, and how users are shaping their own news and information environments.”

William Hague, “The Best Diplomatic Service in the World: Strengthening the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as an Institution,” London, September 8, 2011.  In a speech at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Foreign Secretary outlines his vision for the future of the Foreign Office and steps needed to improve the skills and capabilities of Britain’s diplomats.

Steven Livingston, Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to Stability and Security, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Research Paper No. 2, December 2010, March 2011.  Livingston (George Washington University) looks at cellular telephony and other emerging information and communication technologies in the context of emerging democratic institutions in Africa.  He concludes that although these “technologies can, at times, be used for less positive purposes, including crime and politically motivated violence, on the whole they are enhancing human security and sustainable economic development across the continent.”

Ali Molenaar, Reading Lists, Clingendael Library and Documentation Centre, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.  Clingendael’s librarian continues to provide useful literature lists on public diplomacy and a wide range of related topics.  Recent updates include:
– Literature on Public Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Celebrity Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Cultural Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Citizen and Track 11 Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Branding, July 1, 2011
– Literature on External Relations of the European Union, July 1, 2011
– Literature on European Level Diplomacy and the EU Diplomatic Service, July 1, 2011
– United States of America: Diplomatic Relations, July 1, 2011

Alex Oliver and Andrew Shearer, Diplomatic Disrepair: Rebuilding Australia’s International Policy Infrastructure, Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2011.  In this in-depth followup to a 2009 blue ribbon panel report on Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, the Lowy Institute’s Oliver and Shearer conclude that Australia’s international policy infrastructure and overseas diplomatic network “remain seriously under-resourced and lagging behind comparable nations.” Their study looks at overstretched diplomatic posts, critical shortfalls in foreign language training and other critical skills, “lackluster” public diplomacy, “almost nonexistent use of new digital platforms,” and a significant gap between diplomatic capacity and the nation’s interests.  An appendix compares Australia’s diplomatic service with those of the US, the UK, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the European Union.  The 33-page report and a 2-page Fact Sheet can be downloaded from the Institute’s website.

Alasdair Roberts, “The WikiLeaks Illusion,” The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2011, 16-21.  Roberts (Suffolk University Law School) argues that although new information technologies make it easier to leak and broadcast sensitive government information, barriers remain to what WikiLeaks seeks to achieve.  His article discusses implications of the large amount of information released, minimal public outrage, business decisions by commercial companies that hurt WikiLeaks’ functionality, and the lack of surprise at the “open secrets” released.  Roberts, quoting former New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller, agrees the disclosures did not “expose some deep unsuspected perfidy in high places.”  Rather they provided only “texture, nuance, and drama.”

Paul S. Rockower, “Projecting Taiwan: Taiwan’s Public Diplomacy Outreach,” Issues & Studies, 47, No. 1 (March 2011), 107-152, (Available on the USC Center on Public Diplomacy’s Resources website).  Rockower (a journalist and former Israeli Foreign Ministry press officer) analyzes Taiwan’s soft power and use of public diplomacy “not only as a means of promotion, but also as a means of ensuring its diplomatic survival and access to the international arena.” His essay discusses Taiwan’s public diplomacy strategies and tactics, narratives, institutions, and methods.  Rockower looks particularly at Taiwan as a middle power with unusual limitations and capacities and its emphasis on polylateral connections with non-state actors and multilateral institutions.  His paper combines an academic assessment of Taiwan’s public diplomacy with recommendations for practitioners.

Max Schulman, “The State Department’s Shameful Record on Internet Freedom,” The New Republic, August 8, 2011.  TNR intern Schulman finds “significant failures, both in overall funding efforts and in the omission of vital tools” in implementation of the State Department’s Internet freedom agenda.  He summarizes the arguments of Congressional and public policy critics, views of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors, and views of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Notes From the Foreign Policy Frontier,” The Atlantic, July 2011.  Slaughter (Princeton University and former director of policy planning at the US Department State) has joined The Atlantic as a correspondent and “curator/host’ of an online feature that examines ways of thinking about foreign affairs in a “framework that moves beyond states and addresses both governments and societies.”  In her first post, “The New Foreign Policy Frontier” (July 27, 2011) she summarizes her goals and intentions.  See also her YouTube video presentation, DIY Foreign Policy, Personal Democracy Forum 2011, June 27, 2011 (19 minutes).

US International Strategy for Cyberspace:  Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Washington, DC, May 2011.  In his covering letter, President Obama describes his cyberspace strategy as “an approach that unifies our engagement with international partners on the full range of cyber issues.”  The document contains elements of a US cyberspace policy, a vision for cyberspace’s future, and a statement of policy priorities.  The section on diplomacy focuses on the need to “strengthen international partnerships” and “engage the international community in frank and urgent dialogue” on “principles of responsible behavior in cyberspace” and actions needed to build a system of cyberspace stability.  Like White House national security strategies, the cyberspace “strategy” is more a policy and public diplomacy statement than an analysis of tradeoffs among priorities, resources, costs and risks, and specific steps needed to achieve its goals.

US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Kerry Introduces Legislation to Authorize and Strengthen the State Department and U.S. Diplomacy,” July 27, 2011.  Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry’s authorization bill for Fiscal Years 2012-13 contains a number of proposals to modernize the State Department, build the capacity of US diplomacy, strengthen public diplomacy, increase program accountability, exempt US international broadcasting from restrictions on domestic dissemination of “public diplomacy information,” and support global development, cyberspace, and Internet freedom.  The full text of the bill, S. 1426, is available on the Library of Congress Thomas website.

Richard Wike, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power: Changing Global Perceptions of the U.S. in the Post-September 11 Era,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, September 7, 2011.  Findings in the Pew Research Center’s 2010 and 2011 surveys include:  (1) America’s global image improved significantly in Western Europe and many parts of the world after Barack Obama’s election in 2008; (2) the Obama bounce has staying power overall, but with lower marks for his handling of Iran, Afghanistan, and Israeli-Palestinian issues; (3) there has been no Obama bounce in Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, and Palestine; and (4) the economic downturn since 2008 did not significantly affect positive opinions, but did lead to a reassessment of American economic power overall and relative to China.

R.S. Zaharna, Battles2Bridges blog. American University communication scholar Zaharna blogs on relational approaches in public diplomacy, assertive public diplomacy, Palestinian public diplomacy, digital strategies, and other issues.

Gem from the Past

Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy, (The University of Chicago Press, 2004).  In Projections of Power, communications scholar Robert Entman (George Washington University) developed his cascade model of media framing and examined its implications for public opinion, foreign policymaking, and the “framing” of events by political leaders.  When it was published to critical acclaim in 2004, Harvard University’s Thomas E. Patterson called it a “stunning achievement” and observed that “scholars and practitioners alike will be relying on this book for years to come.”  The reviewers were right.  Projections of Power recently earned Professor Entman the American Political Science Association’s Doris Graber Book Award for the best book published in the last ten years in political communication.
*Bruce Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

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Last year, my colleagues Steven Corman, Jeffrey Halverson and I wrote a series of blog posts exploring Islamist reactions to anti-Islam and anti-Muslim events in the US, including the debate over the Park51 Islamic Center and an American pastor’s proposal to burn a Qur’an on 9/11, among others. One of the points we made in our final post was that these events fuel the extremist narrative that the US and its allies are at war with Islam, rather than counter the extremists’ messages. We also argued that the State Department could play a more proactive role in refuting the acts and rhetoric that damages the American message abroad, especially since the acts and rhetoric were mainly coming from private citizens, and not the government. What to do, however, when it is the government itself that is making the gaffes?

Last week a story about an FBI trainer gained a lot of traction in both the American mainstream media as well as various online outlets including blogs and news sites. William Gawthrop, who is an instructor at the American Military University and has held several positions in national security and intelligence, also trains law enforcement officials in counterterrorism. On June 8 he was discovered to have been continuing to conduct law enforcement training lectures that repeat messages about Islam and Muslims, even though the FBI claimed that the presentation was a one time affair that ended in April after fierce criticism of its content. Gawthrop’s analysis, which essentially states that the problem isn’t radical Muslims but Islam itself, was spread to a room full of law enforcement officials who likely trusted that their source of information was not only better informed that they were, but well informed. Gawthrop violated this trust, however, and delivered a lecture that demonized Islam.

Counterterrorism experts have widely criticized Gawthrop, yet he continues to misinform law enforcement. From a Wired article (with a video clip of the presentation), here is Aki Peritz, a former analyst with the National Counterterrorism Center:

This is mind-numbingly stupid and dangerous. If we were to follow his idea to a logical extension, that means we have individuals in every single government agency, at top levels, from CIA to the Defense Department to members of Congress, that are part of this cabal to destroy Western civilization. If you truly believe that, then this is McCarthyism on steroids.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s plays right into the terrorists’ narrative. First, some of what Gawthrop said.

Gawthrop’s assertion that Islam was 17 percent religion and 83 percent ideology might have seemed charitable when compared to Dutch Islamophobe Geert Wilder’s assertion that the proportion are more like 5 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Both comments cry out for an explanation, however; how in the world did Gawthrop come up with that number? He doesn’t say. Most offensive, however, is his general demonization of Islam, comparing Muslims to iron filings and stating that Islam is like a magnet determining their movement, and whose “force is exerted against you” — a room full of New York City police officers. Most dangerous is his claim that instead of focusing our counterterrorism efforts on groups such as al Qaeda, we should instead focus them on the “ideology” of Islam. Gawthrop cites Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which has been widely criticized for its lack of depth and understanding and broad generalizations of the “civilizations” that Huntington purports are destined to fight each other.

This kind of disinformation about Islam is unfortunate because it spreads incorrect and dangerous ideas to American law enforcement, and increases tension between them and the American Muslim community. This tension causes distrust, and makes law enforcement more difficult. Yet it is not simply a domestic problem.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s ideas are consistent with Islamist extremists’ narrative. It plays directly into the hands of Islamist extremists the world over, and bolsters their message that America’s desire to end Islamist terrorism is really a war on the religion of Islam itself. This message could be effective at drawing recruits to terrorism. But is the message really spreading? Is the Muslim world paying attention?

The answer is a definite yes. In Southeast Asia, Islamist extremists have picked up the story about Gawthrop and spread it, including on social media cites such as Facebook. Posted Wednesday, September 21, the ar Rahmah story on Gawthrop’s lecture had nearly 3000 hits by Thursday afternoon, and the link was recommended by 811 people on Facebook. On their Facebook posting of the same story, it was “liked” by 101 people, and 30 comments. Comments range from the hope that non-believers will find one day find Islam to agreeing that this is proof that the United States is at war with Islam. Some of these comments include violent rhetoric. Does this mean everyone who posted comments will take up arms against the United States? Of course not. But will they spread the message that Americans are admitting that they are at war with Islam? Almost certainly, and this can lead to radicalization. In the Arab-speaking world, the story spread as well; Islamist Ansar al Jihad, for example, has posted it. The story has also been reported in mainstream news outlets in the Muslim world.

This is similar to a flap that occured last week, when an FBI manual was found to contain similar anti-Islam sentiments. In one graph, the manual argued that the more devout a Muslim was, the more likely the Muslim was to be violent. This story was also reported in the Muslim world, for example here on al Jazeera (this is the English language version), an here on Islamist site Islamic Awakening.

The United States Government has repeatedly acknowledged that it needs to work on its message to the Muslim world. This latest flap shows that it also needs to work on its message to Americans, because the wider Muslim world continues to pay attention.

 UPDATE, January 26, 2012

In another example of a messaging gaffe on the part of the American law enforcement, the film “The Third Jihad,” an anti-Muslim film that purports to show the threat to the United States from American Muslims, continued to be shown to law enforcement oficers despite widespread condemnation and statements that it was no longer shown, according to the New York Times and other sources.

The film is another example of anti-Muslim scare tactics that do not reflect reality, but rather complement the Islamist extremists’ messages that the US is at war with Islam. “This is the true agenda of much of Muslim leadership here in America… A strategy to infliltrate and dominate America… This is the war you don’t know about,” warns a narrator. Using this kind of misinformation to train law enforcement is not only mind boggling, but it creates clear difficulties and mistrust between law enforcement and the Muslim community.

The New York city Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly is featured in the film, but a police spokesman initially denied that he participated, stating that his presence in the film was based on old interviews. The film’s website, however, contradicts that claim and states that the Commissioner sat for an exclusive 90-minute interview. Yesterday the New York Times printed a story describing Kelly’s acknowledgement and regret at having participated in the film.

The film shows inflammatory images such as an Islamic flag flying over the White House. Images such as these are easily obtained from Islamist extremist sites, but to portray them as common ideas among American Muslims is grossly misleading. Furthermore, in a statement defending the film, its producer Raphael Shore argues that it is based on information provided by terrorism experts, including Kelly and Rudolph Giuliani. These two may have tactical knowledge regarding how to deal with terrorism, but I question the depth of their knowledge of Islam as a religion, or even Islamist movements in general, based on their statements. And despite what the Islamist extremists and the anti-Islam propagandists want us to believe, the two are very different subjects.

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Have you seen this picture?

Last Friday the always-excellent PBS Newshour ran a story that left me floored.  It featured interviews with several ordinary Afghans who were handed pictures of the 9/11 World Trade Center attack. Of a dozen or so people asked, only one man (a police chief in Marjah) knew the story behind the pictures. All but one person said they had never seen the pictures before and did not know what they represented.

The conclusion of the segment mentioned a report published last November by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS).  It is odd that we were not previously aware of this report, and that it seems not to have gotten much play anywhere in the strategic communication blogosphere. It paints a concise picture of our narrative problems in Afghanistan.

One thousand participants from Helmand and Kandahar provinces were shown pictures of the 9/11 attacks, and asked if they recognized the pictures. About two-thirds said yes.

But then they were read the following story of the 9/11 attacks:

On September 11 2001, Al Qaeda attackers hijacked planes in the United States which were full of ordinary passengers, including women and children. They flew these planes, full of people, into two tall buildings in the city of New York. They destroyed both buildings, which were full of ordinary people. The attacks killed 3000 innocent citizens, including Muslims. They were organised and directed by Al Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden, who was then living in Afghanistan protected by the Taliban government. The American government asked the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. They refused, so the Americans and their allies NATO attacked the Taliban, and came into Afghanistan to look for Osama Bin Laden and overthrew the Taliban.

When asked “Did you know about this event which the foreigners call 9/11?” only 8% responded “yes,” 11% responded “no,” and 81% responded “no answer/don’t know.”

There could hardly be a more stark illustration of the essential strategic communication problem of the Afghan conflict: Huge swaths of the population have seen foreign troops enter their land and launch attacks for 10 years but seem to have no idea why they are there. Since nature abhors a narrative vacuum, this is fertile ground for the development of alternative stories about what we are doing there.  These integrate to form a narrative that is not favorable to our interests.

In the same study ICOS asked participants: “Why do you think the foreigners are here?”  Here is a graphic I produced based on a table from their report (click to view full-size):

Half of respondents either don’t know why we are there or think it is for “evil” reasons–my term for a set of responses.  Only half think we are there for benign reasons (consistent with the narrative we favor).

Looking at the breakdown on the right, we see that of the respondents who see “evil” motives, around three-quarters believe we are there to create mayhem (terrorism?).  A bright spot is that few participants think we are there to destroy Islam, but the “evil” set overall is consistent with our opponents’ narrative that we are crusaders.

Among other interesting results in the report is the belief that foreign forces kill around two times as many civilians as the Taliban.  These figures are almost exactly opposite those released by UNAMA at around the same time, which show that anti-government forces kill twice as many civilians as pro-government forces (i.e. ISAF plus the Afghan military).  As I have argued before, we are missing a significant opportunity by allowing such beliefs to persist.

The ICOS study shows, and the more recent PBS interviews reiterate, that our narrative in Afghanistan remains remarkably murky.   Only a small number of people in that country know the story of 9/11.  As for why we are there, the reason that actually aligns with our domestic narrative–namely that we are there for self-defense–is believed by only one out of six respondents.  Over twice that many believe we are there for reasons that align with our opponents’ “crusader” narrative, and that we are killing most of the civilians.

This makes it pretty easy to understand why people there would support an insurgency.  As the tenth anniversary of our invasion of Afghanistan approaches, we still have a lot of  ‘splaining to do.

Update 9/7/2011

A colleague from the UK informs me that a book just published by Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (Yale, August 2011) has a whole chapter on this subject and that the book “makes very sober reading.” Here is a reviewer who says it is “one of the most upsetting books I have read about Britain’s part in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Update 9/9/2011

A colleague forwarded me this link to a related story that ran yesterday on National Public Radio.

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In business marketing, branding means creating demand for a product by creating an image that is appealing to potential consumers.  This probably brings to mind successful brands like Coca-Cola, Disney, and Nike.  But brands can also become “toxic.” Recent evidence suggests al-Qaeda may now be one such failed brand.

Brands become toxic when they are initially strong and well known, then negative events transform their image in a way that turns off potential customers.  A strategic communication asset is suddenly transformed into a liability.  The stronger the initial brand image, the greater the liability when it goes bad.

In recent years several well-known brands have turned toxic.  Rupert Murdock’s News Corporation is now being called a toxic brand because of fallout from scandals in the UK over voice mail hacking.  The label was applied to BP in the wake of the Gulf oil spill disaster, and to AIG because of its role of the U.S. economic meltdown.

In some cases, a brand becomes so toxic that the only solution is to throw out the old identity and start over.  This was the strategy used by Blackwater Worldwide.  After its brand was hopelessly contaminated by scandals in Iraq, it changed its name to Xe.

Reports suggest that Osama bin Laden considered the same move for al-Qaeda.  According to The Telegraph, documents seized in the raid on bin Laden’s compound “portray bin Laden as a terrorist chief executive, struggling to sell holy war for a company in crisis following in the footsteps of arch-enemies like Blackwater, which became Xe after a run of bad headlines.”

Now there is a possibility that bin Laden wasn’t the only one concerned about AQ brand weakness.  Last week, Saeed al-Jamhi of the Al-Jahmi Centre for Studies and Research claimed that in May, groups associated with al-Qaeda in Yemen began operating under a new name, Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Sharia).  The purpose of the change is to avoid to toxic associations with AQ and provide an image of greater religious legitimacy:

The al-Qaeda name conjures up terror and signifies violence and destruction. The organisation was compelled to hatch groups that operate under local religious-oriented names to persuade others to support them and move from under the spotlight that is cast on them as terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda.

It is unclear whether this is a wholesale change or just the launch of a new subsidiary.  But in either case, these developments–along with the widely-acknowledged irrelevance of al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring–are signs that the brand is fading, if not toxic.

Whether due to Western efforts to undermine AQ’s image or their own contradictions coming home to roost, it would be a welcome development.  Some U.S. leaders claim AQ is on the verge of organizational defeat, but for years they have not been very threatening as a discrete actor.  Brand toxicity may be the thing that finally kills AQ as a social movement.

Update December 16, 2011

This story from Fox News quotes a “senior Arab diplomat” who corroborates this report of a name change for AQAP.

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Intended for teachers of public diplomacy and related courses, here is an update on resources that may be of general interest.  Suggestions for future updates are welcome.

Jozef Batora and Monika Mokre, eds., Culture and External Relations: Europe and Beyond, (Ashgate, 2011). The essays compiled by Batora (Comenius University, Brataslava) and Mokre (Austrian Academy of Sciences) examine conceptual issues, historical case studies, and trends in the uses of culture in external relations.  The authors assess ways in which political entities use culture to generate goodwill and frame international agendas, culture’s role in creating boundaries, and its role in building connections across boundaries.  Includes:
– Jozef Batora and Monika Mokre, “Introduction: What Role for Culture in External Relations?”
Part I, Universalism Versus Particularism
– Erik Ringmar, “Free Trade by Force: Civilization Against Culture in the Great China Debate of 1857″
– Iver B. Neumann, “Our Culture and All the Others: Intercultural and International Relations”
– Srdjan Vucetic, “The Logics of Culture in the Anglosphere”
Part II, Boundary Building Versus Boundary Transcendence
– Monika Mokre, “Culture and Collective identifications”
– Jozef Batora, “Exclusion and Transversalism: Culture in the EU’s External Relations”
– Bahar Rumelili and Didem Cakmakli, “‘Culture’ in EU-Turkey Relations”
Part III, Policy Aspects
– Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-Ullmann, “Abstract Expressionism as a Weapon of the Cold War”
– Milena Dragicevic Sesic, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Cultural Policies of and Towards Serbia”
– Emil Brix, “European Coordination of External Cultural Policies”
– Monika Mokre and Jozef Batora, “Conclusions”

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), Board Meeting, Transcript, Washington, DC, June 3, 2011. In its “first ever public meeting,” BBG Chair Walter Isaacson and US international broadcasting’s bipartisan board “outlined initiatives to reform U.S. international broadcasting, provided an update on the BBG’s strategic review, announced the Burke Award winners to recognize courage, integrity and originality of BBG journalists, and took questions from the public on U.S. international broadcasting.”  Additional information and related documents are available at the BBG’s website.  A subsequent BBG board meeting was held on July 14, 2011.

Rosa Brooks, “Ten Years On: The Evolution of Strategic Communication and Information Operations since 9/11,” Statement Before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, US House of Representatives, July 12, 2011. Brooks (Georgetown University) draws on her past two years as senior advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in these reflections on drawbacks in the term strategic communication, lessons from the past decade, and thoughts about the future.  Among many useful observations, Brooks calls for:  (1) clear distinctions between strategic communication and related terms; (2) appropriate assumptions about accountability, metrics, methods, and timeframes; (3) the compelling need to understand human terrain (the languages, narratives, memories, and hopes of others); (4) learning from the “major mistake” of validating Osama bin Laden’s “special” status and fixation on terrorism; (5) a willingness to take risks and recognition that mistakes will happen; and (6) recognition that “obsession with who does what” in government-wide communication is a waste of time.

Caitlin Bryne and Rebecca Hall, Australia’s International Education as Public Diplomacy: Soft Power Potential, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 121, July 2011. Bryne (Bond University) and Hall (International Education Resources Group) discuss trends and opportunities in international education as an instrument of public diplomacy.  They argue that Australia has not realized its full potential and call for more active public diplomacy leadership, enhanced evaluation, and increased dialogue within Australia’s public diplomacy community and civil society.

Damian Carrington, “Artists Condemn British Council’s Decision to Axe Climate Programme,” The Guardian, July 14, 2011. In an open letter on July 14, a group of well-known British authors and artists “with affectionate connections to the British Council” have written to express “mystification and deep concern” that funding and staffing have been radically cut for work on climate change, one of the Council’s three top priorities. The move was criticized by the UK’s Foreign Minister Jeremy Brown in a letter to British Council Chief Executive Martin Davidson.  In his letter, leaked to The Guardian, Brown reportedly admonished Davidson “for his apparent ‘termination’ of one of the council’s ‘success stories.’”  In a letter to The Guardian on July 16, Davidson stated the Council’s work on climate change would continue.  He noted, however, that “we are not a climate change organization” and that the Council would focus on its “core programmes in the arts, English, education and society around the world.”  (Courtesy of Robin Brown’s (Leeds University) Public Diplomacy: Networks and Influence blog.)   

Daniel Costa, Guestworker Diplomacy, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper No. 317, July 11, 2011. In this report critical of the State Department’s exchange visitor program, EPI’s Immigration Policy Analyst Costa finds that the J visa program “gives U.S. employers significant financial incentives to hire foreign workers over U.S. workers, while providing them no labor protections.”  He faults the State Department, which oversees the J visa program, for collecting “very little data” on visa holders and for relying on employers and sponsoring organizations to regulate themselves.  His report looks at the history of the J visa program, including its large Summer Work Travel program, and at the “severe exploitation of J visa holders” consequent to the outsourcing of State’s oversight responsibilities.

For the State Department’s views on “New Regulations for J-1 Visa, Summer Work Travel,” see “Question Taken at the June 20, 2011 Daily Press Briefing,” Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, June 21, 2011 and Holbrook Mohr and Mitch Weiss, “Student Visa Program: New Rules, Same Problems,” ABC News, Associated Press, June 20, 2011.

Nicholas Cull and Ali Fisher, eds., The Playbook: Case Studies of Engagement. InThe Playbook, a project commissioned by the British Council, Cull (University of Southern California) and Fisher (Mappa Mundi Consulting) host a coordination point for international practitioners to share experiences on methods of engagement and the practice of public diplomacy.  Examples from among dozens of cases in its growing collection include:  China’s Panda Diplomacy, Framing Climate Change at the G-8 Summit, Forgotten Voices Listening Project UK, Creative Cities Project East Asia, Japan’s International MANGA Award, The Franklin Book Program, and the New York Philharmonic’s Trip to North Korea.  Users are invited to register, comment, and contribute cases.

Shawn Dorman, ed., Inside a U.S. Embassy: Diplomacy at Work, 3rd edition, Foreign Service Books, 2011. Dorman (Associate Editor, Foreign Service Journal) has compiled an entirely new edition of essays on the lives and work of US foreign service officers and other foreign affairs professionals.  Its broad spectrum of nearly 100 short chapters by practitioners include profiles of the work of ambassadors (Marie Yovanovitch, Armenia), political officers (Dereck Hogan, Russia), public affairs officers (Christopher Teal, Mexico), and entry level officers (Carolyn Dubrovsky, Nepal); “day in the life of” accounts of a cultural affairs officer (Anne Benjaminson, Tajikistan), a public affairs officer (Michael McClellan, Iraq), and an environment, science, technology, and health officer (Jason McInerney, Honduras); chapters on embassies, employees, and families; chapters on a variety of field activities; and chapters with guidance for those interested in joining the foreign service and foreign affairs agencies.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, 57-68. Drezner (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) asserts that grand strategies matter far less than national economic and military power and the actions taken by states.  He contends that grand strategies are important, however, as “cognitive beacons” or signals to others in times of “radical uncertainty” — i.e., during wars, revolutions, depression, or power transition.  Grand strategies for Drezner are communication strategies far more than planning and decision-making guides.  Drezner argues that although the Obama administration was wrong early on to assume that improved standing in the world would give the US greater policy leverage, it was right to pivot to a more assertive grand strategy of “counterpunching.”   Yet the administration has failed to clearly explain its grand strategy to Americans and to the rest of the world, which for Drezner defeats the whole purpose of having one.

For a critique of Drezner’s argument, a defense of the Obama administration’s worldview, and an argument that the search for grand strategies is misguided in “today’s multipolar, multilayered world,” see Fareed Zakaria, “Stop Searchng for an Obama Doctrine,” The Washington Post, July 6, 2011.  For Drezner’s reply, see “The Virtues of Grand Strategies” on his Foreign Policy blog, July 7, 2011.  See also, David Ignatius, “Obama’s Communications Gap,” The Washington Post, July 15, 2011.

Alexandra Dunn, “Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s January 25 Uprising,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol.35:2, Summer 2011,15-24. Dunn (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies) assesses the Egyptian government’s shifts from a strategy of content suppression to a “shutdown strategy” that sought to close entire media platforms and tools — and then to a strategy of “commandeering the country’s mobile phone networks to conduct a countrywide SMS message campaign directed at quelling protests.”  She concludes that Egypt’s strategies “alienated the business community, disproportionately impacted apolitical citizens, and inadvertently increased international focus on the crisis.”

“International Broadcasting,” PD Magazine, Issue 6, Summer 2011. Now in its third year, the online publication edited by graduate students at the University of Southern California’s Center for Public Diplomacy continues to provide useful articles by scholars and practitioners on issues in public diplomacy.  Articles in the sixth issue focus on international broadcasting in a transformational media environment and include:
– Simon Mainwaring, “Social Media and Business: Creating New Pathways in Diplomacy”
– Alan Heil, “VOA and BBC at a Crossroads”
– Shawn Powers, “R.I.P., Broadcasting”
– Philip Seib, “Al Jazeera English in Focus”
– Oliver Zollner, “International Broadcasting in the Social Network Era”
– Interviews with former members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors James Glassman and Ted Kaufman and current members Michael Meehan and S. Enders Wimbush
– Philip Wang, “Transformation of Radio Taiwan International”
– Alex Oliver and Annmaree O’Keefe, “Struggling to be Heard: Australia’s International Broadcasters Fight for a Voice in the Region”
– Kim Andrew Elliott, “In International Broadcasting, Even the Static Must be Credible”

Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp, eds., America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, Volumes 1 and 2, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), June 2011. In this detailed examination of cyber security issues, CNAS editors Lord and Sharp have organized the work of some 200 analysts in a project co-chaired by Robert E. Kahn (Corporation for National Research Initiatives), Mike McConnell (Booz Allen Hamilton), Joseph Nye (Harvard University), and Peter Schwartz (Global Business Network).  Volume 1 discusses findings and recommendations relating to interests, trends, risk assessments, policies, strategies, and government-private sector partnerships.  Volume 2 contains thirteen chapters by subject matter experts.  Includes chapters by Joseph Nye on “Power and National Security in Cyberspace,” Martha Finnemore (George Washington University) on “Cultivating International Cyber Norms,” and Richard Fontaine (CNAS) and Will Rogers (CNAS) on “Internet Freedom and Its Discontents.”

Marc Lynch, Upheaval: U.S. Policy Toward Iran in a Changing Middle East, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), June 2011. In this CNAS report, Lynch (George Washington University) argues that the US policy of “strategic patience” toward Iran, which until recently has had some success, can no longer be sustained.  In today’s environment, a viable Iran policy means “aligning the United States with the emerging empowered Arab publics and preserving key regional alliances, while denying Iran the ability to exploit the changing environment.”  Lynch’s recommendations include engaging with publics in the Arab world and Iran, a significantly increased focus on human rights in Iran, accommodating legitimate demands of Bahrain’s Shi’a population, continuation of lower level diplomacy and confidence building measures rather than a new public negotiating initiative, and a strategic communication campaign that highlights Iran’s failures.  He notes this does not mean calling for regime change or supporting subversion in Iran and that it is essential to disaggregate the challenge posed by Iran from local political problems.

Johannes Matyassy and Seraina Flury, Challenges for Switzerland’s Public Diplomacy: Referendum on Banning Minarets, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 4, June 2011. Matyassy (Switzerland’s Ambassador to Argentina) and Flury (Switzerland’s Department of Foreign Affairs) examine Switzerland’s communication strategy in dealing with the anti-minaret initiative.  Their paper examines the strategy’s strengths and limitations and provides practical “Do’s” and “Don’ts” for other countries.  They argue the strategy was successful in shifting a concentrated international focus on Switzerland to a focus on Europe as a whole in which the Swiss case was seen as part of a larger set of issues involving migration and integration.

James Pamment, The Limits of the New Public Diplomacy, PhD thesis, 2011. In his thesis, available by pdf download, Pamment (Stockholm University) compares ways in which British, Swedish, and American diplomats plan and evaluate media campaigns. He argues that “old” and “new” public diplomacy models are not distinct categories in which the latter has replaced the former.  Using comparative empirical data, Pamment explores the extent to which the new public diplomacy is truly new, practical constraints that foreign ministries face in adapting to the new diplomacy, and the value of the “new public diplomacy” as an explanatory concept.

Christopher Paul, “Getting Better at Strategic Communication,” Statement Before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, US House of Representatives, July 12, 2011. In his statement, Paul (RAND Corporation) builds on his recent book, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (2011), and his earlier publications in the field.  His testimony examines tensions and conceptual issues in what scholars and practitioners mean by strategic communication as well as his own views on its “unassailable core.” He summarizes common themes in a decade of reports on strategic communication and public diplomacy discussed in his study Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations (2009).  Paul concludes with comments on finding the right balance between civilian and military capacity, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s SAGE effort to create a business plan for a civil society entity that will strengthen public-private partnership, and his seven recommendations for improving strategic communication.

Pew Research Center, China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower, Global Attitudes Project, July 13, 2011. Pew’s survey finds that in most regions of the world attitudes toward the United States continue to be more favorable than during the George W. Bush administration, but in 15 of 22 nations majority opinion holds that China has or will replace the US as the world’s leading economic power.  This view is particularly prevalent in Western Europe.  The survey also finds that global opinion is consistently negative regarding China’s capacity to match the US in military power.  Key findings are summarized in the report’s overview.

Lawrence Pintak, “Breathing Room: Toward a New Arab Media,” Columbia Journalism Review, May/June, 2011, 23-28. In CJR’s cover story, Pintak (Washington State University) looks at how journalists in the Arab world are “warily testing boundaries, adjusting to new realities, and daring to dream of the possibilities.”  He sees potential for independent, nationally focused television channels to challenge regionally focused channels, the possible the rise of an “Egypt effect” from more open Egyptian media, a redefinition of the role of Arab journalists, and more citizen journalism on the part of young Arabs skeptical of traditional media organizations.

Giles Scott-Smith, “The Heineken Factor? Using Exchanges to Extend the Reach of U.S. Soft Power,” AmericanDiplomacy.org, June 23, 2011. Scott-Smith (Leiden University and author of Networks of Empire, 2008) looks at the “continuing use-value of exchanges for favorably altering the opinions of international visitors coming to the United States.”  His article focuses on the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program and the use of exchanges in three case studies:  (1) overcoming diplomatic tensions with Iran, 2006-2009; (2) overcoming prejudices through the 1983 “Pluralism in U.S. Society” regional project; and (3) efforts to connect with second and third generation immigrants through the Muslim Incentive Program in Western Europe, 2003-2010.  Scott-Smith’s article and previous scholarship on exchanges is useful for its examination of the strengths, limitations, risks, lessons, and situational relevance of exchanges in public diplomacy.   Among his conclusions:  “Be wary of running exchange programs with an obvious connection to foreign policy goals.”

Mary Beth Sheridan, “Low-key U.S. Diplomat Transforms Syria Policy,” The Washington Post, July 12, 2011. Post reporter Sheridan profiles US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford’s trip to Hama, his greeting from cheering protestors, his Facebook page comments on Syria’s anti-demonstration policies. and his career-long interest in public outreach.

Geoffrey Wiseman, “Theorizing Diplomacy and Diplomats on Their Own Terms,” Review of Paul Sharp’s Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2009) in International Studies Review (2011), 13, 348-350. Wiseman (University of Southern California) provides a brief summary, probing questions, and generous praise for Sharp’s (University of Minnesota, Duluth) wide ranging study of diplomatic theory.  Wiseman commends the book to “international relations theorists and their graduate students” and to “reflective diplomats interested in theorizing themselves.”

Sharp’s Diplomatic Theory of International Relations was annotated in “Public Diplomacy: Books, Articles, Websites #50,” March 2, 2010.

Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2010). Wu (Columbia University and the New America Foundation) uses his sweeping history of modern telecommunications to raise central questions about the future of the Internet.  His well-written narrative focuses on the progression of the telegraph, the telephone, film, radio, and television from “somebody’s hobby to somebody’s industry” — from a freely accessible medium to control by large corporations and cartels in a process he calls “the Cycle.”  Wu’s book raises critical questions.  “Is the Internet really different?”  Is the “net neutrality” of the Internet, with its indifference to content, destined to replace single medium industries?   “Which is mightier:  the radicalism of the Internet or the inevitability of the Cycle?”

Gem from the Past

Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, (Anchor Books paperback edition, 1981, originally published in 1976). The scholarship of American anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1914-2009) and his insights into intercultural relations and nonverbal communication have long been useful for diplomats, foreign aid professionals, Peace Corps volunteers, and other practitioners.   Beyond Culture — which sits on the shelf with The Silent Language The Hidden Dimension, and other works — examines culturally influenced “unconscious” attitudes that shape thoughts, emotions, communication, and actions.  In Beyond Culture, Hall developed his views on high context cultures (where many things are left unsaid and are explained by the cultural context) and low context cultures (where words and verbalization are more important to communication).   Hall taught at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute from 1950-1955.

*Brice Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

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If you’ve read our book Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism then you already have a solid understanding of the major master narratives employed by Islamist extremists in their communications. For example, you’re able to recognize the significance of a Pharaoh reference when an extremist is condemning a world leader. Or you’re able to see the apocalyptic scheme articulated in Ahmadinejad’s praise of the “Lord of the Age” (which is not a reference to Allah). However, it becomes more difficult when the master narratives are implicit and the fragmentary references in an extremist text are more obscure. When this is the case, it can be much easier to miss them. Let’s look at a recent example.

On July 10, 2011, a statement was posted online announcing the creation of a new extremist website and forum (or “network”). The new website is called “Al-Fida Islamic Network.” The word al-Fida’ means “sacrifice” in Arabic. The announcement included the following passage:

O proud Islamic ummah: Even though the slaves of dirham and dinar allied with the servants of the Cross under the leadership of the brothers of apes and pigs in order to stifle and silence the voice of jihad, they will fail to do so because this religion is supported by the Lord of all creation.

In the above passage, there are three master narratives that stand out to me. Let’s go through each of the three and see how these implicit master narratives can be unpacked for further analysis.

We can see from the start that three distinct groups are being mentioned in relation to each other, as indicated by the words “slaves,” “servants” and “brothers.” It’s the modifiers tied to these three groups that reveal the master narratives.

1. Let’s take the easy one first: “the servants of the Cross.” As we know this is a reference to the Crusader master narrative, a really common framework used by extremists to quickly depict the United States or Western Europe for their audiences.

2. The second one is trickier: “the slaves of dirham and dinar.” This is a reference to the Arab or Muslim leaders (and their security forces) that are cooperating with the United States in military operations against the extremists. The specific choice of the currencies “dirham” and “dinar” could refer to specific countries, such as Morocco and Iraq, but this is unlikely and the phrase is likely a general one. The claim is that these “slaves” (i.e. Muslims) are not “true Muslims” and they betray the ummah for the sake of money and wealth (e.g. U.S. financial aid). To emphasize this point, the word abd or “slave” is used to describe these enemies, because a “true Muslim” is the abd of God (Allah) Almighty and serves no one and nothing but Him (recall the pious name Abdullah or “slave/servant of God”). The extremists are implicitly invoking the Hypocrites master narrative here, which consists of a ruse story form and includes an archetypal traitor and imposter, to characterize their troublesome adversaries within Arab and Muslim countries as disingenuous or false Muslims.

3. Finally, the third master narrative  is evident in the phrase: “under the leadership of the brothers of apes and pigs.” This is a direct reference to verses from the Qur’an, which states that God (Allah) punished a group of Israelites (i.e. Jews) for breaking His commandments, apparently those related to keeping the Sabbath and banning graven images (i.e. idols), by turning them into apes and pigs. Some Muslim exegetes interpret these verses in a metaphorical sense, meaning that the offenders were henceforth unclean and base creatures excluded from God’s grace.  However, that is not how the verses are typically understood by extremists (they usually read it literally). The reference (“brothers of apes and pigs”) is intended to denote “the Jews” and more specifically those Jews leading the “servants of the Cross,” which is a reference to the common “Zionist-Crusader Alliance” trope found throughout Islamist extremist texts. That last bit, expressing the relationship between these two groups in the statement, clarifies that this reference is about Zionism and therefore the Nakba master narrative and not the Khaybar master narrative (both of which relate negative Muslim experiences with Jews).

These are the three master narratives implicitly invoked through fragmentary references in a single sentence of this extremist text. In doing so, the extremists associated with al-Fida’ are positioning themselves within an existing scheme of a global conflict underway. Readers know precisely who al-Fida is opposing or fighting in their “internet jihad” without any further necessary exposition. The amount of master narratives condensed into a single sentence, presenting the three groups as a single alliance, also conveys a sense of urgency. In other words, the forces aligning against the “true ummah” are so vast and ominous that al-Fida‘ is a vital endeavor that others should become involved in immediately.

For further reading and more details about the different master narratives I mentioned in this analysis, I invite readers to consult chapters 9, 5, and 12 in Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism.

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