This is the second of a four-part series of posts on foreign reactions to recent anti-Muslim rhetoric in the U.S. In Part I we looked at the Park51 project, also known as the “Ground Zero Mosque,” and found concern over growing anti-Muslim sentiment in the U.S. There were also claims about Zionist interests, creating a double-bind situation that would cast the U.S. in a negative light whether the project proceeds or not. At the same time there was an emphasis on diversity of opinion on the subject in the U.S. and an overall more muted reaction than observers here and abroad expected.

Today we consider the coverage of ”International Burn a Qur’an Day.” Given the attention that this story has been getting — one of the stated goals of the event — we can be sure that most people have heard of Gainesville, Florida’s Dove World Outreach Center Pastor Terry Jones’ plan to burn Qur’ans on September 11.

Compared to the other events we’re reviewing in this series, this one is of greatest concern because of its potential to inflame passions and incite violence. Yesterday, General David Petraeus, in an unusual public comment on a U.S. political issue, warned that the event:

could cause significant problems for American troops overseas. It could endanger troops and it could endanger the overall effort in Afghanistan.

In a Hardball interview with Jones the issue of the international reaction came up, but Pastor Jones dodged the question, focusing instead on his goal:

Matthews: What do you think the reaction will be as this goes on international television?

Jones: Well I hope it will send a very clear message.

Matthews: What would be the reaction, what would be the consequence?

Jones: Of Islam, that they should not try to do what they have done in Europe. You see in Europe as they took a lackadaisical attitude, as Europe did not move forward, you see that the Moslems in Europe, as they gained in population they also began to demand Sharia law, Sharia courts, which is a very violent form of punishment. And what we hope to accomplish by the burning of the Koran is to send a very clear–it is indeed a radical message but a clear and radical message to Moslems, to Sharia law, that that is not welcomed in America.

Jones also named former President Bush as a politician he respects, but said that he would still not stop the planned event if he were personally asked to do so by Bush.

Mainstream Reaction

Protests of the event have been organized in South Asia. The Nation Online in Pakistan reported on protests in Lahore on August 27. Earlier this week the Associated Press reported on a protest in Kabul involving “hundreds” of Afghans who condemned the planned event, burned U.S. flags, and demanded U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

On Sunday in Indonesia, there was also a protest involving 3000 people.  Here, non-Muslims and Muslim supporters of pluralism have been speaking out against the event since its announcement. Given Indonesia’s recent history of episodes of sectarian violence — in Poso, Ambon, the North Moluccas, Kupang — as well as recent church burnings and bombings, the fact that non-Muslims are on edge is understandable. Although the story is being used to make a broader condemnation of the United States, much of the communication about the proposed burning has been remarkably evenhanded, including noting the work of pluralist groups in Indonesia to head off retaliation there.

Elsewhere mainstream reaction uniformly condemned the event as reflecting religious intolerance, and many expressed concern that it would provoke violent reactions in the Muslim world. On August 24, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (an association of 56 Islamic states promoting Muslim solidarity in economic, social, and political affairs) called the event a “motivated act of hatred and religious intolerance” and expressed fear the event would provoke violence and unrest in the Muslim world. The Muslim World League, based in Saudi Arabia, also predicted the event would have an adverse impact on relations and co-existence of world nations.

Stories in Jordan from  Al-Ghad and khaberni.com incited negative reader reactions. Some readers called for God to “punish the evildoers,” “burn them as they burn His word,” and wished for “floods and earthquakes to strike Florida” on September 11. These readers saw the event as proof of anti-Muslim sentiment and America’s “war on Islam.”

An article on Ikhwan Web, the web site of the Muslim Brotherhood (there is debate about whether this website should be considered mainstream or extremist) described the reaction of Dr. Diaa Rashwan, Islamic movements’ expert at Egypt ’s Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, who:

described the intended burnings of the Quran as unreasonable and exceedingly dangerous, going beyond all reason and sensibility. He maintained that a serious crisis will arise and extremism will be initiated in the Muslim world stressing that it is imperative that the US administration and UN interfere before a vicious circle of violence and extremism is initiated.

Another post on Ikhwan Web said the event revealed the violent nature of Christian “terrorists” who fight ideas with violence rather than opposing ideas.

Finally, in August, a story in the Iranian Republic News Agency reported comments by Mehdi Mostafavi, head of Iran’s Islamic Culture and Communications Organization. He called the event “a totally Zionist gesture” and said it is a “war-seeking discourse” designed to promote religious strife:

While the world needs peace and cooperation of nations, such radical, irrational, and Zionist moves only aim to trigger chaos and seek division among followers of different religions.

Extremist Reaction

Zeb commented on a post about the event at U.S. based Revolution Muslim (the blog at the center of the recent South Park controversy) by claiming that Jones is a fire worshiper (i.e. Zoroastrian). He also linked to his own blog, Takht-e-Sulaiman. In that post, he said:

Now it seems like they’re up for another mega satanic ritual on September the 11th. As a church (as these devils are hiding behind a church this time) is gathering help to burn Muslim’s holy book. Let’s see where they take the world. I don’t know if Muslims now are this much gallant to protest against it with utmost force that it deserves, but if it happens (ALLAH forbid) then this act calls for a war. And I’d love to personally kill terry jones.

Two above-ground Islamist groups in Indonesia have spoken out against the Qur’an burning. Habib Rizieq, the leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), vowed retaliation in Indonesia against non-Muslims if the burning is carried out (in an English-language Jakarta Post story). He later “softened” his stance, arguing that those not involved in the burning should not be punished, that it is permissible (halal) to kill those who are directly involved, and that President Obama should step in to stop the act. These stories have been reported in Indonesian-language media as well.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, an organization that calls for a global caliphate, similarly condemned the proposed burning, calling Jones crazy. The announcement likened the event to igniting spilled oil with a cigarette lighter, and noted the unease with which non-Muslims in Indonesia are viewing the event. It also links the event to the controversy over the proposed Park51 project in New York City. Calling the United States “hypocritical,” it noted that this act is consistent with the actions of crusaders, and that former President George W. Bush himself has invoked the term “crusade.” It also asks why the Pope has not stepped in, perhaps showing as much ignorance about sects of Christianity as Westerners often show about Islam. (An Egyptian blog similarly missed this distinction, arguing that the event was to draw attention away from the Catholic Church’s ongoing sex scandals.) On the 27th of August, some 300 HTI protesters demonstrated in front of the American embassy, demanding that the burning must be stopped. Other branches of HTI continue to hold protests throughout Indonesia in the hope that the burning will not take place.

HTI-sympathizing site Syabab similarly invokes George Bush’s use of the term “crusade” to describe the actions of the US and the West. The article enumerates past and recent perceived transgressions toward Islam, and accuses the United States of racism against Muslims. Interestingly, it appears as though Jones and some of the Islamists share some common ground. Jones argues that Islam is not compatible with democracy, the West, and human rights, and that Muslims do not accept Jesus Christ as their savior. The latter is not surprising, but the other three points are themselves made by Muslim extremists who condemn U.S. actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although it is a view not shared by a majority of the world’s Muslims, many extremists argue that since democracy formulates laws based on human opinion it is a form of shirk (idolatry), in contrast to divinely revealed Islamic law. Similar arguments are made about the West in general and human rights.

Although it is impossible to locate the original source of this rumor, a simple Google search for “Terry Jones arrested” shows a multitude of stories alleging that the pastor was arrested on child molestation charges, charges that are not true.

Selective Attention

One pattern we see in these stories is selective attention to the worst aspects of the controversy, perhaps in an effort to sensationalize it. For example, a couple of weeks ago reports surfaced that an armed Christian militia group, called Right Wing Extreme, offered to provide security at the Quran burning event. This story was reported in Al-Ghad on August 24. However, the group withdrew its planned support for the event because “after much thought and prayer the organization’s leadership determined this event does not glorify GOD in way that lead the lost to Jesus Christ.” We can find no evidence that this change of heart was reported in Al-Ghad or other foreign outlets.

Also receiving little coverage is the condemnation of the event by a prominent Christian organization in the U.S. As Jennifer Bryson noted, there has not been a groundswell of opposition. However, the National Association of Evangelicals, the largest evangelical group in the country, urged cancellation of the event, saying it would “show disrespect for our Muslim neighbors and would exacerbate tensions between Christians and Muslims throughout the world.” The Simon Wiesenthal Center has also condemned the event.  The Veterans of Foreign Wars also denounced the event this week, saying extremists would exploit it.

Yet, unlike the case of the Park51 project, there is little mention of this alternate stance in the foreign media.  This is ironic given that the congregation of the Dove World Outreach Center is reported to include about 50 people, a number that is dwarfed by the membership of the organizations that have registered opposition.

Conclusion

As might be expected, reaction to the Qur’an burning event was more negative and less balanced than coverage of the Park51 project. Mainstream sources uniformly condemned the act and said it reflected religious intolerance, especially toward Islam. These sources also expressed concern that the event, if it goes forward, would provoke violence, as the protests that have already occurred indicate. Though we could not find as many attempts to link the event with Jewish or Zionist interests as we found in the Park51 case, the Iranian government did attempt to make this connection.

Extremists are using the event to stoke tension and provoke violence. They are calling for war and death to those involved in the event. The extremists have also made efforts to tar all Christians with the actions of this group, arguing that it is somehow related to problems in the Catholic Church (even though the group involved is Protestant). They also frame the event with the Crusader narrative, implying that it is more evidence that the United States wants to destroy Islam.

Finally, we note that, unlike the Park51 case, there is little coverage of facts that contradict the basic negative storyline. The decision of the militia group to support the event was reported, but their later decision to withdraw for religious reasons was not. There has been no coverage of the condemnation of the event by prominent Christian, Jewish or Veterans’ groups, either.

Tomorrow, in Part III of this series, we examine foreign reaction to an assortment of “smaller” recent events involving attacks on Muslims and Muslim groups in the United States.

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Indonesian police have charged Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Basyir with supporting terrorism for his role in the the Jemaah Islamiyah training camp in Aceh. He has been accused of participating in planning and funding the project and ordering others to commit terrorist acts, and police reported finding progress reports and videos from the camp.

The training camp, led by Javanese who came to Aceh thinking they would find support, was broken up in February 2010. Its members were either arrested or killed by police (CSC blog post on the camp here).

Police arrested Basyir on August 9, but after seven days — the time allowed by Indonesian law for detention without charges — they requested and were granted a 40-day extension. Now that charges have been filed, the police are weighing whether to release him or continue to detain him until the trial begins. Baysir is old and frail, and police may assume that he would pose a minimal risk for flight.

Basyir served two brief jail terms for his involvement in the bombings of Christian churches in 2000 and for his role in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2003 attack on the Marriott hotel. In these trials, police were unable to make the most serious charges stick, and Basyir served relatively brief jail sentences. Indonesian media reports over the new charges, however, give detailed information regarding, for example, money transfers from Basyir to the Aceh group (such as this English language story in the Jakarta Post), which may indicate that the police have enough evidence to convict Basyir on more serious charges this time.

As is to be expected, extremist blogs and web sites jumped to his defense. Some argued that his arrest was engineered by the US government. A hacker calling himself Ashaburayatisud posted a defense of Abu Bakar Basyir and Mohammad Jibriel,  disrupting several web sites (including the official government site for the province of East Kalimantan; a list is included here). As of this writing, about half of the sites have returned to normal. Mohammad Jibriel was sentenced to five years in prison for supporting the July 2009 Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings.

The hacked web pages demand: “Free them, hey you enemies of Allah!” Followers of “human law” such as democracy, the Indonesian Constitution, and Pancasila – Indonesia’s state ideology — are condemned to hell as non-believers, polytheists, and godless. In an oddly polite twist, the hacker also promised that he did not damage any of the sites’ important information.

A “Free ABB” website has also emerged (http://freeabb.com/), as well as a facebook page (http://facebook.com/free.abb), which is ironic considering Islamists’ condemnations of Facebook for promoting “free sex.” Leaders of other Islamist groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Jamaat Ansharut Tawhid (a group Basyir co-founded), have also made statements condemning the arrest. Basyir’s pesantren (Islamic boarding school) al Mukmin posted a statement lamenting the arrest, and promised that it will not disrupt the pesantren’s activities.

Islamists claimed a minor victory, however, by declaring that their prayers had been answered and that Police Chief Bambang Hendarso Danuri fell ill because of the arrest of Basyir.

Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, issued a statement supporting the arrest.

The announcement of charges and the early indications of evidence bode well for the police and Indonesian governmnet’s case. Indonesia was embarassed by the inability to make charges against Basyir stick in his earlier trials, and was criticized by other governments, notably Australia and the United States. It would be another embarassment should Basyir be able to elude these latest charges. If convicted, however, it would be a significant victory for Indonesia’s anti-terrorism efforts.

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Efforts in European countries including France, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands to restrict or prohibit women from wearing burkah and nikab (face veil) are well known in Indonesia. Reports about these efforts in the Indonesian media are overwhelming negative.

There is no visible support for these efforts even among women who do not cover their hair. There is also growing concern among Muslim women who wear the hijab (headscarf) that they would not feel safe or welcome in European countries. Some students are now reluctant to consider studying in countries where headscarves have become politicized. Most Indonesian criticisms of European “veil policies” are written from Muslim perspectives and at least implicitly describe Europeans as “Islamaphobic.”

The article we discuss below is written from a different point of view. Its arguments resonate strongly with those made by Joan Scott in The Politics of the Veil. Scott suggests that  “anti-Burkahism” is deeply rooted in colonial discourse about sexuality and the control of women’s bodies. She argues that claims made by proponents of such legislation about “liberating” women are ironic, yet another example of the politicization of the female body in attempts to enforce sexual and cultural order.

On April 27th, the Jakarta daily Koran Tempo published an article entitled “Pelarangan Burqa: Membebaskan Perempuan?” (Prohibiting the Burkah: Liberating Women?). The author, Dr. Soe Tjen Marching, is a well-known feminist thinker and activist, and a staunch critic of Islamist causes. She holds a Ph.D. from Monash University in Australia and now teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. She is also an award-winning composer of avante guard piano pieces. She divides her time between Jakarta and London.

In this article Marching is critical of those who would require women to cover their faces but is concerned primarily with European attempts to outlaw the practice in the name of “freeing women who are trapped by religious fundamentalists.”

This argument closely resembles Scott’s. Marching begins with the observation that on a recent trip to London she found that laws and regulations concerning women’s clothing were a frequently debated topic. She observes that some people find the sight of women wearing either the burkah or hijab disturbing and even frightening. She also states that she found it ironic that in the Netherlands she encounters nineteenth and early twentieth century paintings of bare breasted Balinese women, produced at a time when women in “Puritan” areas of Europe were required to cover their ankles. By contrast, today in Indonesia one encounters local women who cover their hair, and bikini clad European women on the beaches.

Marching notes that some European secularists want to prohibit women from covering their faces and some Islamists want to require it for the same reason, to “safeguard” their honor and dignity. Indonesian Islamists and European secularists use similar language. Both speak of safeguarding women’s dignity and human rights. Islamists use these arguments to justify making women put on the veil. Some European secularists use the same arguments to make them take it off.  She compares these claims and counter claims to a football (soccer) match: “If this was only a game and what rolled back and forth was a ball, it would not be a problem. But it is women’s bodies that are being used as a ball by male dominated cultures and political leaderships and this is NOT funny!”

Perhaps the most important points she makes are that those who would outlaw the burkah and those who would require it engage in the same type of controlling discourse, attempting to use women’s bodies for their own purposes. Her argument that there is not a fundamental difference between opposing the practice of female face covering and prohibiting it is as profound as it is simple. By prohibiting the burkah the state makes women into puppets that it can manipulate at will for its own purposes. To oppose  face veiling is to attempt persuasion and employ coercion. In an irony of Orwellian proportions, she observes that burkah bans would make criminals out of women who refused to be coerced in the name of liberating them. Her argument is libertarian –- that the state can not legitimately require women to cover their faces nor prohibit them from doing so. Many Indonesian women who would never consider wearing a burkah themselves nevertheless oppose attempts to prohibit others from doing so.

*Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta Indonesia.

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While in Singapore for the ICA conference with colleagues from the CSC, interesting news kept coming in from Indonesia concerning its ongoing fight against terrorism. It was quite a contrast to what appeared to be the biggest story in Singapore: the conviction of a foreigner who spray-painted a train, a story that took up several pages of coverage and included a detailed step-by-step illustration recreating the crime. Such news seemed to drown out some of the more important regional goings-on (and brought back memories of the caning of American Michael Fay).

In Indonesia, the media continued its coverage of the trial of Mohammed Jibril, the continuing arrests and trials of Noordin Top’s accomplices and associates, and the arrest of terrorist Sunata.

Jibril was accused of seeking financial support for the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists who bombed the Ritz-Carlton and J.W. Marriott hotels in Jakarta last summer. He runs the jihadist Ar Rahmah website, where he has publicly denied wrongdoing. A court in Jakarta disagreed, and he was given a 5-year sentence.  Ar Rahmah continues to publish jihadist commentary and news.

The web of arrests connected to Noordin Top’s demise continues to expand, with police charging his father-in-law Baharudin Latif, Baharudin’s son Ata Sabiq Alim, and Noordin’s wife Arina Rahmah with knowingly giving refuge to a wanted terrorist. Last week, Putri Munawaroh, a survivor of the 17 September raid last year during which Noordin Top was killed, was sentenced to eight years for harboring him. Finally, this week brought an eight-year sentence to Saefudin Zuhri, also accused of aiding Noordin Top.

The arrest of Sunata continues to make headlines in Indonesia. He joined KOMPAK to fight Christians in Maluku in 1999, but was first arrested in 2005 for weapons possession and hiding Noordin Top. He was released after being considered a shining example of Indonesia’s deradicalization program, but returned to his old ways, plotting a Mumbai-style attack on Jakarta as well as the assassination of the Indonesian president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He was also linked to the recent arrests and killings of militants who created a training camp in Aceh, partly in an attempt to forge common ground between different militant groups. He will join Amir Abdillah in prison, sentenced earlier in June for his connection to the assassination plot.

The arrest of Sunata raises some important questions about Indonesia’s deradicalization program. The English-language broadsheet the Jakarta Globe interviewed Agus Nahrowi, the Senior Program Officer for Search for Common Ground, an NGO aimed at deradicalization in Jakarta’s prison following the arrest. Curiously, the interview doesn’t mention Sunata’s arrest, but rather paints a somewhat sunny picture of deradicalization. Sunata’s arrest raises serious doubts about its effectiveness. Both the CSC and the ICG have posted criticisms of the deradicalization program (here and here); this story should focus greater attention on the need for better efforts in this direction.

In Surabaya, police arrested three housemaids who were accused of stealing from their employers in order to support terrorism activities. While common theft is not a new tactic for JI, using maids to steal apparently is (and of course it raises questions about the judgment of people who let them into their homes in the first place).

And in above-ground political maneuvering, the Islamist PKS party is making some interesting moves. In Eastern Indonesia, it has been fielding Christian candidates in local elections, which some see as a sign of sell out. One of its Islamist competitors, the PBB, is hoping to capitalize on what it sees as the potential flight of supporters as the PKS tries to broaden its base. Yet at the same time, PKS-backed Information Minister Tifatul Sembiring recently compared the sex tape scandal of boy band Peter Pan’s vocalist Nazril Ariel Irham to the crucifixion of Jesus, infuriating Indonesian Christians. Ariel stated that it might be someone else on the tape, and some Muslims believe that Judas Iscariot — or someone else, or an angel – replaced Jesus before the crucifixion. Many have called for the minister’s resignation.

On a lighter note, I viewed the film “Obama, Anak Menteng” (“Obama, Menteng Kid”) on its opening day in Bandung. It’s a children’s movie, so one can’t read too much into it. It’s full of the usual positive messages (accept diversity, play fair, work and study hard) that are about as subtle as a Mack truck, but it also has some typically ugly stereotypes. Obama’s childhood nemesis is darker skinned than he is — he’s from eastern Indonesia — reinforcing the light-skinned-is-better bias. There is a money-grubbing ethnic Chinese bookie, a particularly ugly stereotype. One of Obama’s family’s helpers is a flamboyantly gay, overwrought, cross-dressing diva with a heart of gold; this role is so overacted as to be a caricature. The character wins acceptance, which is a positive message, but I wonder when homosexuals will play regular roles where they don’t have to act in over-the-top stereotypes. The film avoided discussion of some of the serious issues of the time — Obama’s stepfather was recalled to Indonesia in the wake of a massacre of hundreds of thousands, if not more, suspected communists, and was sent to West Papua, where a separatist insurgency was gaining steam — but I suppose that’s to be expected from a children’s film. Trailer here.

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The Consortium for Strategic Communication has released a new white paper by Mark Woodward, Ali Amin, and Inayah Rohmaniyah entitled Lessons from Aceh Terrorist De-Radicalization.  The full white paper can be downloaded here.

The executive summary is as follows:

Although the International Crisis Group’s reports on radicalism in Indonesia are extremely detailed and well informed, their recommendations tend to be short-term solutions aimed at preventing terrorist acts in the near term. This report argues the value of a longer term approach to both prevent radicalization as well as to rehabilitate jihadis who have been identified and arrested. Although the “soft” approach to imprisoning arrested jihadis is more successful than harsher approaches, this approach still has counterproductive shortfalls, such as allowing unrepentant radicals the opportunity to preach to inmates and guards. Allowing ustad and imam with similar theological backgrounds but without sympathies for terrorism would be an effective way to counter radicalism in prisons as it would not represent a major shift in theological views of terrorists but rather in how they act with respect to terrorism.

This report also shows that although there appear to be three different groups that have emerged from Jemaah Islamiyah, their goals remain the same and they differ only with regard to which tactics to employ. Thus, disengagement efforts aimed at shifting perceptions of operational or tactical matters may be more effective than attempts at de-radicalization that require the transformation of worldviews and identities. However further research is needed on the cognitive restructuring processes involved in these kinds of transformations.

Inayah Rohmaniyah

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Indonesian police have continued to make arrests of those with suspected ties to terrorism, including 14 people in the last week. Remarkably, many of those arrested have direct ties to firebrand cleric Abu Bakar Basyir and the organization he founded in 2008, Jemaah Anshoru Tauhid (JAT, the Supporters of Monotheism). According to the Jakarta Post, Basyir, who has been imprisoned twice in Indonesia, issued a statement stating that he is ready to be  questioned by the police.  He stressed that the JAT had no ties to terrorism, but I suspect that is a connection best left investigated by police.

Of course the JAT issued a statement denying any ties to terrorism (on the jihad-friendly Ar-Rahmah website, whose owner remains on trial for his purported connections to terrorism funding in connection to the Ritz Carlton and J. W. Marriott bombings in Jakarta last summer). This statement cited Basyir as claiming that the arrests amount to kidnapping, that the JAT was not causing problems in the neighborhood, and that god will punish those responsible.

Mainstream media source detik.com reported that Basyir is known to have visited those arrested and to have led them in prayer. Its article also stated that those arrested are suspected of having ties to Dulmatin, the Jemaah Islamiyah leader and Bali Bomb plotter was was killed by Indonesia’s anti-terror police squad Densus 88 in March. Of course Basyir commented on Dulmatin’s death, but it was more of the intricate dance of words that Basyir has become adept at in order to remain out of prison: he was not a terrorist, he was a martyr, he defended Muslims overseas, etc.

Those arrested are suspected of having ties to the failed plot to train jihadists in Aceh (see prior post here). Although it is easy to become overly optimistic when reports such as these surface, they do show that the Indonesian authorities are not resting on their laurels but rather continue to try to root out extremists. One can also safely assume that their intelligence gathering has been successful, whether through assistance by civilians (as in the Aceh case), through interrogations, or through rehabilitated former extremists.

During the Suharto era, extremists such as Basyir and fellow Jemaah Islamiyah co-founder Abdullah Sungkar were forced to leave Indonesia for Malaysia when they faced prosecution. Following the messy and chaotic beginning of Indonesia’s transition to democracy in the late 1990s, Basyir was able to return and Jemaah Islamiyah increased its activities. Although the irony of the JAT making appeals to democratic principles such as due process — when they promote a system of shariah that would eliminate personal choices for many — should not be lost on anyone, it appears as though Indonesia may be rebuking the conventional wisdom that it’s harder to quash terrorism in a democratic environment. Perhaps with the latest wave of arrests and killings of terrorists in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore will become appealing once again as places from which to lead their operations.

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The International Crisis Group has issued another report on terrorism in Indonesia, concerning the recent arrests and killings in Aceh, Indonesia (the report is available here). As with most ICG reports, it is thorough and informative, and includes much detailed description obtained through extensive interviews. The report emphasizes some important elements of the fight against terror in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Most importantly, perhaps, is the ability of jihadists to adapt to changing security situations and adopt new methods. It also shows the divisions among supporters of terror over tactics, and the groups that emerge that reflect these divisions (for example, whether it is permissible to use bombing as a tactic despite the risk of killing innocent Muslims). The report’s executive summary and recommendations are spot on.

One of the remarkable aspects of the Aceh-based group — which contributed to its discovery and elimination — is its assumption that Aceh would prove a fertile ground for recruiting as well as a safe place to train. The report alludes to the deep-seated feelings of nationalism held by the Acehnese that all but ensured a lack of support for the terrorists. Acehnese pride themselves on their independent spirit and religious devotion, which is reflected in the autonomy agreement between the Acehnese and the Indonesian central government. Signed in 2005 following decades of armed rebellion against Jakarta, it allows considerable authomoy for Aceh as well as permiting the enforcement of Shari’ah (Islamic) law in the region. Despite claims made to the contrary by Indonesia (especially after 9-11), the Acehnese refused assistance from terrorist groups operating in the region such as Jemaah Islamiyah. The Aceh group clearly miscalculated.

The report mentions the work of local police in the initial prosecution of the group, but also highlights the work of the national anti-terror force Densus 88. A source who just returned from northern Sumatra told me that the attention given to Densus 88 caused some resentment among local police in Aceh, who felt as though they weren’t getting enough credit for their initial investigation. Hopefully this won’t hamper any cooperation in the future between local police and Densus 88. (In a statement that emphasized the role of Densus 88 and the police’s mobile brigade (Brimob) but said little about local police efforts, National Police Chief Bambang Hendarso Danuri also emphasized that the military was not involved as terrorism was within the “realm of law enforcement”).

Some other important elements of the ICG report include the call to more closely monitor the role of prisons in facilitating the spread of jihadist teaching, the cooperation (albeit somewhat limited and less than well coordinated) cooperation between Indonesian terrorists and those of Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, and family ties between jihadists who marry into their fellow jihadists’ families thus creating a dense web of support. The report also shows the tangible ties to quasi-legal groups such as the Islamic Derfender’s Front, a group of thugs who operate protection rackets in the name of Islam and who have a proclivity for breaking the law in the name of Islam (and who seldom face law enforcement). Finally, the report shows some of the weaknesses within the Indonesian police structure, including the willingness for some police to take bribes or sell weapons to terrorists, and sometimes lax law enforcement that allowed, for example, a wanted terrorist to walk away from arrest because the police felt sorry for him as he had recently been in a motorcycle wreck (!).

The terrorists may have picked something up from their dealings with the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) membes who they did contact (only a couple were recruited, and their ties to GAM are questioned in the report): Detik.com reported that the Aceh-based terrorists were planning on hijacking ships in the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s busiest and most important waterways.

Finally, as to be expected, Indonesian jihadist websites have been publicizing the deaths of the militants and lauding them as martyrs (due to the supposedly fresh smell of their corpses and that the corpses were smiling, proof of martyrdom in Islam).

Indonesia has been able to kill or arrest some of the most significant figures in terrorism in the region in the past year or so, and no doubt has significantly weakened their networks. The question that remains is in what form they will next emerge, and which tatics will they adopt? Only time will tell, but continued vigilance on the part of the police — and civilians such as those who reported the suspicious activity — will remain a necessary element in Indonesia’s continuing battle against extremists.

Related posts:

1. Recent Developments in Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Efforts by Chris Lundry In the aftermath of the 17 July...
2. Police Power, Soft Power and Extremist Sub-culture in Indonesia by Mark Woodward, Ali Amin and  Inayah Rohmaniyah* In recent...
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In recent months, Indonesian security forces, including the US-trained Detachment 88, have proven to be increasingly effective in locating, capturing or killing suspected terrorists. But police power alone will never defeat a deeply entrenched extremist sub-culture.  Soft power is a crucial component as well, perhaps even more important than enforcement.

The deaths of Noordin Top on September 17, 2009 and Dulmatin on March 9 of this year, raids on a training camp in Aceh on February 23rd, and continuing operations in that province are examples of the Indonesian authorities increasing operational capabilities. Reuters described Dulmatin’s death as a “fresh blow to Indonesian militants.” Western media reports have focused largely on his role in the 2002 Bali bombings and have suggested that his death may have crippled Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other Indonesian militant groups because of the entirely unsubstantiated claim that he was the sole remaining operative with the skill to construct large bombs.

It is undoubtedly true that militant groups have suffered significant losses over the past few months. But it is also true that “decapitating” militant organizations and breaking up training centers will not solve the problem of Islamist violence in Indonesia or elsewhere. Some terrorism experts have expressed concern that the existence of the Aceh camp is a sign that radical Islamists are regrouping and that evidence points to the continued existence of Indonesian and trans-national networks providing weapons, funding and ideological-religious support.

These concerns are probably well founded. At the same time they are myopic and rooted in the naive assumption that “taking out” critical nodes in radical networks will resolve the problem of extremist political violence. Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group, who is the foremost authority on Indonesian Islamist militant groups, has warned against over estimating the significance of Dulmatin’s death. She is almost certainly correct.

Almost every time a leading terrorist operative is killed or captured the media, government officials and some terrorism experts proclaim that the movement has been crippled or its capacity to conduct operations diminished. This has not proven to be the case. Despite the apprehension or killing of several leaders, Indonesian extremists have proven to be remarkably resilient. The source of this resilience is not international links or financing. It is that fact that JI, Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) and other extremist groups have very small, but highly dedicated and well organized support bases.

Most of these supporters have never engaged in terrorist or other criminal activities. They live seemingly normal lives and include people who are everything from farmers and petty traders to business executives. Even if they could be indentified, only a government that aggressively pursued repressive security measures unacceptable in a democratic society such as Indonesia could detain them. NII and other extremist groups also have centralized leadership structures that make replacing “fallen comrades” relatively easy. They are based on bureaucratic not charismatic authority.

The cell structure of Indonesian militant organizations isolates both the leadership and rank and file members. Structurally it is similar to the segmentary lineage systems well known to anthropologists and multilevel marketing schemes. Typically rank and file and mid-level militants know only members of their own groups and their immediate superiors. They also swear oaths of eternal loyalty and obedience. The structure of these networks is such that not even high-ranking leaders are not fully aware of their size or structure.

Some Indonesian extremist organizations are of relatively recent origin and have ideological ties to Middle Eastern Jihadi organizations including al-Qaeda. Others, especially NII, have deep historical roots. The fact that some Indonesian groups appropriate the name al-Qaeda and a handful of leaders may have once met with bin Laden or his associates does not imply anything like a centralized command and control system or that Indonesian and other Southeast Asian organizations are “al-Qaeda franchises.”

Indonesian extremist groups have received funds from Middle Eastern extremists. The Saudi government spends a lot of money in efforts to promote an exclusivist, intolerant version of Islam that contributes to the development of extremist sub-cultures. There is a shared perception that Muslims the world over face a common threat from an aggressive Western alliance. Many non-violent and even entirely non-political groups and individuals share this view.

NII is the largest underground Islamic extremist movement in Indonesia. It is the grandfather of JI and the “splinter groups” led by Noordin Top and Dulmatin. There are probably others of which authorities are not yet aware. NII has always been a nationalist Islamic movement concerned only tangentially with affairs outside Indonesia.

Kartosuwirjo and other Islamic leaders who rejected the secular orientation of mainstream Indonesian nationalism founded NII in the 1940s. Their goal was the establishment an Islamic state based on Shari’ah. During the Indonesian Revolution (1945-1949), NII rejected negotiations with the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic. It proclaimed an Islamic state (Darul Islam; DI) on August 7, 1949. The movement was instrumental in fomenting ethic and Islamic separatist movements in the 1950s and early 1960s. In the mid 1950s it controlled much of West Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh. Indonesian forces broke its military strength after the declaration of martial law in 1957. The movement went underground and has persisted for generations.

A 2005 report by the International Crisis Group stated that:

Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI’s history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life. If the pattern outlined in this report holds, Indonesia will not be able to eradicate JI or its jihadist partners, even if it arrests every member of the central command but, with more attention to a few key measures, it ought to be able to contain them.

The measures ICG suggested included the resolution of ethnic conflict, better control of the arms trade, improved law enforcement capability and recognition that prison terms do not lessen the commitment of DI militants. The fact that all but one of the Bali Bombers was completely unrepentant even facing execution supports this view. The Indonesian government might well have spared their lives had they expressed remorse and regret for their actions. They preferred death and martyrdom.

The Indonesian government has had a fair measure of success in attaining the first three objectives. The fact that the US-trained counter-terrorism unit Detachment 88 seems to be inclined to kill – rather than capture – terrorist suspects may indicate that they are taking this last recommendation seriously. Some Indonesian human rights advocates are concerned that the police are now taking the law into their own hands, killing suspects who should be and could be captured and brought to trial. Some understand this as resurgence of the brutal and oppressive policies of the military regime of former President Suharto (1965-1998).

Despite these measures, NII, JI and other militant groups have not vanished. It is naive to expect that Dulmatin’s death will diminish their conviction and capacity. There may be no further incidents for a year – or five – but there is no reason to believe that they will not strike again where and when they feel ready. The suggestion that eliminating one or even a group of key figures can cripple the movement is wishful thinking.

So is the idea that neutralizing one explosives expert seriously diminishes the operational capacity of militant groups. Hundreds if not thousands of Indonesians were trained in the use of weapons ranging form small arms and improvised explosive devises to surface-to-air missiles and heavy artillery in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the war against Soviet occupation forces. While they have not had the opportunity to use sophisticated weaponry on the home front, knowledge of simpler but no less deadly technologies has been passed on to younger generations in camps such as the one recently discovered in Aceh.

These operations do not require extensive foreign or domestic funding. Indonesian government sources state that the Aceh camp had a funding stream of approximately $50,000 (US). It was a remarkably cost effective operation. Firearms are difficult to obtain in Indonesia, but the Philippines is awash with them, many stolen or purchased illegally from the armed forces. The Philippine-Indonesia boundary is porous and unsealable because it is open seas.

Religious Extremism or Culture of Radicalism?

Hendropriyono (many Indonesians have only one name), the former chief of Badan Intelijen Negara (BIN; the Indonesian state intelligence agency) recently stated that:

Terrorism is analogous to the stem and the leaves while the fundamentalism is the root, which should be removed.

Former militants we have spoken with over the past several months share this view. They often say that if the authorities capture or kill one terrorist anywhere from three to a hundred will take his place.

Hendropriyono’s statement that the government should act against fundamentalism and “inflammatory sermons” is more problematic because these concepts are extremely difficult to define in ways that do not infringe on freedom of speech and religion. Political violence cannot be unambiguously linked with any theological position. His suggestion that people who hate people of other religions is the root of the terrorist problem is equally naive because Islamist militants are as concerned with other professed Muslims as they are with people of other faiths.

JI is linked to the extremist Salafi understandings of Islam characteristic of most other contemporary Sunni Islamist groups; NII is not and never has been. Its goal is the establishment of an Islamic state, not the promotion of a particular theological agenda. Some leaders and supporters of the movement do hold religious views similar to those of Saudi Wahhabis. Others have more traditional views and engage in religious practices including pilgrimage to holy graves that many contemporary Islamist and other Indonesian Muslim organizations, including the modernist Muhammadiyah, that are not linked to violence in any way, consider to be “unbelief.”

The defining characteristics of the ideologies of NII, Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia and other extremist groups are commitment to the idea of the Islamic State. They denounce  those who do not share this commitment as kafir (unbelievers) and regard the taking of their blood and property as halal (permissible). This is a critical point because there is an increasing tendency in Indonesia and elsewhere to link Muslim political violence to Wahhabi understandings of monotheism and ritual practice. As is stated in a previous posting, this is a serious and potentially dangerous mistake.  NII’s position is that Muslims who embrace the teachings of al-Wahab on religious matters, but who reject jihad and accept the legitimacy of the Indonesian state, are also kafir.

While political violence cannot be linked directly to a single variant of Islam, there is what can be called a subculture of extremism. It defining characteristics are principled opposition to secularism and the secular state along with the belief that violent jihad is a legitimate form of political action. This is often coupled with belief that only those who share these views are truly Muslims and stand for the glorification of martyrdom. This subculture is now several generations old.

Militant groups are usually endogamous. That is, young members are only allowed to marry others committed to the cause or at least to “bring in” their spouses. Marriages are often arranged without the knowledge or consent of young couples’ families. These practices build in-group cohesion at the cost of cutting family ties that are of central importance in Indonesian societies. Children from NII and other militant families are raised with the belief that they are different from others and quickly learn to be suspicious of political and religious authorities. Many are sent to camps for “basic training” and formally initiated into extremist organizations as adolescents.

Others are recruited in secular secondary schools, colleges and universities or in local mosques, including campus mosques at secular universities, and undergo similar training and indoctrination, with or without a para-military component. Some recruits live double lives, keeping their membership in extremist associations secret even from close friends and family members. It is not possible to say how large this subculture of extremism is. Most members of these communities are not currently engaged in terrorist activities. They are, however, a pool from which violent activists can be readily recruited.

Dulmatin’s funeral provides insight into the characteristics if not the extent of this culture of radicalism. Dulmatin was buried in his native village of Loning in Central Java on March 12. Several hundred mourners had gathered, not only from his home town, but from as far away as Bayuwangi in East Java and Banten in the west, both hundreds of miles away.  Some came as soon as they learned of Dulmatin’s death. His supporters, including Islamist cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, maintain that he is a martyr not a “terrorist.”

Ba’asyir is generally considered to be the spiritual leader of JI. In his sermons he denounces Indonesian leaders and most other Indonesian Muslims as kafir. In a sermon delivered in a Yogyakarta mosque during Ramadan last year, he stated that more than 90 percent of the Indonesians who call themselves Muslims actually are not. He calls for jihad against the United States and its western allies but publicly rejects violence in Indonesia, always referring to it as “mistaken” or “misguided.”

In a statement reminiscent of his eulogies for the Bali Bombers executed last year, Ba’asyir stated that Dulmatin was a martyr who had died in the struggle for Islam, but that he may have erred by conducting violent operations inside Indonesia. As proof of Dulmatin’s martyrdom Ba’asyir stated that at the time of his burial Dulmatin looked as if he was still alive, his body smelled sweet and blood continued to flow in his veins. Rumors spread throughout the country that as he was carried to his grave the words “Allah Akbar” (God is Great) appeared in the sky, confirming the chants of the mourners. A banner erected in front of his family home stated that he was not a terrorist but a mujahid (freedom fighter).

Counter-Exclusivism as Counter-Extremism

Indonesia’s security forces have proven that they are capable of locating, killing or capturing known terrorists. This alone will not bring an end to Islamist political violence. Given the fact that there is a well established and well organized subculture of violent extremism it is to reasonable to conclude that there are no quick fixes. This does not mean that the country must or should resign itself to the institutionalization of violence of the type that has occurred in India and Pakistan, where Muslim on Muslim, Hindu on Muslim, Hindu on Christian and Muslim on Hindu violence have become almost politics as normal.

There are at least three factors that can lead to the diminution of violence:

• Islamic Education. The more people know about Islam, the less attractive they find extremist ideologies. Extremists rely on simplistic religious ‘proofs’ for their political positions. Muslims with more than rudimentary understanding of the Qur’an and Hadith (traditions concerning the Prophet Muhammad and his companions) recognize the simplicity and banality of these ‘proofs.’ This is not conjecture; former NII recruiters have told us that people with little religious education are the easiest targets and those from pesantren (traditional Islamic boarding schools) the most difficult.
• War Weariness. Violent Islamist ideologies offer the promise of “victory or martyrdom.” Indonesian Islamists have engaged in what they think of as jihad for nearly seventy years. They are no closer to victory than they were in the 1940s and much further than they were at the height of their power in the mid-1950s. Some have come to see the Islamic State as a lost cause and have turned to peaceful strategies to bring about political and religious change. Aceh, in North Sumatra, was once a rallying point because the Acehnese waged jihad against first the Dutch, then the Japanese and finally the Indonesian government for more than a century.  The Acehnese provided a heroic example for others in much the same way that the Palestinians do on a global scale. Aceh now shows that there is an alternative to violent struggle and that peace and reconciliation are possible. A 2005 peace accord between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM; the Acehnese independence movement) and the Indonesian government granted the province a high level of self-government. In return, the Acehnese stopped the jihad. Today, peace has returned to the province for the first time in a century. When you travel to Aceh, people speak of two things: their sorrow about loved ones lost in the 2004 Tsunami and how overjoyed they are to be able to do simple things such as going out to dinner or to a coffee shop or to a fruit market in the evening. Those things were not possible during the long years of war. This is not to say that all is well in Aceh. In a rush to establish its Islamic credentials and assert its independence the provincial government has implemented draconian Shari’ah legislation that negatively impacts women. The equation of Islam with gender-based discrimination is an alarming tendency not only in Indonesia but in other regions of Indonesia and neighboring Malaysia that have used the concept of local autonomy to promote Islamic identity.
• Takfiraphobia. Takfir is the practice of declaring professed Muslims to be kafir. It is a common element in Islamist ideologies. In the abstract it is not difficult to refer to people with whom one strong disagrees as kafir, especially if they are geographically and socially distant. It is an entirely different matter to accept the fact that your relatives and friends are kafir who are going to hell. This is one of the things that violent Islamist organizations demand of recruits. It is very hard to accept the fact that your mother is going to hell, if you believe in it – and most Indonesians do. This limits the ability of extremist groups to recruit new members. Takfiri rhetoric may strengthen solidarity and collective identity in instances where there are clearly discernable lines of conflict. This is not the case in contemporary Indonesia.

The Case for Soft Power

No reasonable person would deny that it is necessary to use police power to combat violent extremists who believe that they have religious obligations to kill other people. Police power is a necessary but not sufficient component of an ongoing effort to counter violent extremists. But as long as they are ideologically and socially intact and are able to reproduce themselves, these networks will endure. In Indonesia, some have endured for generations.

The use of police power confronts extremists where, culturally and ideologically speaking, they are least vulnerable. Jihad and martyrdom are among the key organizing principles of the extremist sub-culture. Dead extremists become heroes and martyrs for surviving members. It is entirely possible that Dulmatin and other JI fighters who have been killed or executed are more influential dead than they were alive. This is certainly true of the Bali Bombers who were unknown to most Indonesians prior to the 2002 attacks but whose funerals attracted sympathetic media coverage despite the horrendous nature of their crimes. They are now the posthumous authors of best sellers that can be found in bookstores throughout Indonesia.

Building strategies rooted in Islamic education, and concepts such as war weariness and takfiraphobia has an important role to play in the struggle against extremism. Such efforts strike extremists where they are sociologically, psychologically and theologically most vulnerable. Properly implemented, they can expose the banality of Islamist theologies, offer hope of life without fear and escape from the psychic trauma of imagining loved ones enduring the torments of hell.

____________________________

* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University. Ali Amin is Academic Director at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta Indonesia. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta Indonesia.

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Facebook has been gaining ground in Indonesia, and in terms of absolute number of users, Indonesia is now ranked third in the world after the US and the UK. This is remarkable given the low rate of internet penetration in the country, but is explained by the high number of users of hand-held, internet accessible devices.  Facebook has been in the news in Indonesia lately, and there are two interesting examples. The first is a Facebook group with over 55,000 members that was formed to oppose the recently installed statue of US President Barack Obama in a public park in Menteng, Jakarta. The statue portrays Obama as a young boy, reflecting the years he spent living in Indonesia (1967-71). The Facebook users opposed the statue because they felt as though Obama had not done anything for Indonesia (although others point to his example that someone from modest means can achieve greatness). Eventually the government in Jakarta acquiesed to the demands of the Facebook group, and the statue was moved from the park to the elementary school that Obama attended. Obama will be visiting Indonesia in mid-March for the first time since his election.

The other Facebook-related phenomenon has to do with recent cases of rape, abduction and disappearances of young girls by predatory Facebook users. I drove past a large demonstration in Bandung protesting Facebook, organized by Muslim students. Of course this raises several questions. Is Facebook  itself somehow responsible for these criminal cases? Is there something inherently un-Islamic about Facebook, as the groups seem to claim? (Beyond the criminal behavior, some critics argue that Facebook allows un-Islamic behavior in the form of “hooking up” or no-strings sexual liaisons). Do these cases simply reflect the processes by which knowledge about online predation is disseminated and naive users eventually become more aware of the dangers of online behavior? Finally, it points to the presence of alternatives to Facebook, perhaps more Islam-friendly, by which these students must have organized the protest… because surely they couldn’t have used Facebook to organize the protest.

In the legal realm, Indonesia is considering repealing its very restrictive blasphemy law in the name of free speech, consistent with its more open press and newly embraced democratic ideals. Resistance to this 1965 law has come, not surprisingly, from Islamist sources, including political parties and civil society groups. What is somewhat surprising, however, is who the Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali decided to meet with in order to discuss the judicial review: representatives from the Islamic Defenders Front and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The former is a group of thugs with ties to the Suharto-era quasi-legal, extrajudicial “enforcement” group Pemuda Pancasila, that currently operates territorial “protection” rackets in the name of Islam and frequently runs afoul of the law; the latter is the Indonesian branch of a worldwide Islamist organization whose goal is a global caliphate. Although Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia doesn’t openly advocate violence to achieve its goals, it is banned in some countries, but not in Indonesia — perhaps ironically based on the same freedom of speech doctrine cited by those wishing to overthrow the blasphemy law. In a letter to the Jakarta Post, one writer compared this meeting to a government official in the US meeting on race relations with members of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-nazi groups.

Another legal case is moving through the courts as well. I wrote about it previously in another post a few months ago, and now the case of Mohammad Jibriel is going to trial. He is being tried on charges of providing material support to those responsible for the July 17 bombing in Jakarta of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. Prosecutors claim he visited the Middle East where he asked for and received funding for the operation.

And in other news… the Islamist Indonesian Mujahadeen Council (MMI) elected a new leader, Syawal Yasin, who is the son-in-law of terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah co-founder Abdullah Sungkar. The MMI was founded by JI’s other co-founder, Abu Bakar Bashir, although he has since left the Council. Completing the incestuous circle of jihad, the MMI’s deputy chairman is Abu Jibriel, Mohammad Jibriel’s father. The move by the MMI is viewed as move toward a more hardline approach, with the goal of implementing shariah throughout Indonesia. Syawal’s credentials are cemented by his experience training in Afghanistan to wage jihad on the Soviets, credentials shared with many — living and dead – from the top tier of Jemaah Islamiyah.

In brighter news in Indonesia, pluralism carried the day at Jogjakarta’s Islamic University of Indonesia, where two 1,100-year-old Hindu temples were uncovered by a construction crew building a library. The temples are well preserved, thought to be the result of layers of ash covering them after a volcanic eruption, and contain a statue of Ganesha as well as linga and yoni, objects that represent male and female, and the Hindu deities Shiva and Shakti, respectively. As with pre-Islamic religious symbols most everywhere else in the Islamic world, the temples are to be restored and will remain on the universities campus.

Finally, the Philippine government is preparing for more retributive attacks from al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf after the Armed Forces of the Philippines killed six members of the group in a raid, including a senior rebel leader Albader Parad, in February on the island of Jolo. Parad was suspected of playing a major role in recent kidnappings carried out by AS, and his death is considered a serious blow to the organization. On February 27th, suspected AS members surrounded a village and killed 11 and and wounded around 20 people in Basilan. The attack was viewed as revenge for Parad’s death, as well as retribution for the rescue of two Chinese citizens earlier that day in Basilan.

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Mahathir bin Mohamad

File away another patently offensive remark by former Malaysian Prime Minister (1981-2003) Mahathir bin Mohamad, who once again spewed anti-semitic and anti-Western conspiratorial claptrap. In Beirut last week for the 7th annual Conference for Al Quds, an organization that opposes what they view as Israel’s occupation of Palestine, Mahathir let fly with his invective. He argued that if the US could make Avatar, it could also have faked the 9-11 attacks (there’s the conspiracy!). And he argued that despite occasional massacres, Jews have thrived and hold some governments  “to ransom,” including the “Jewish lobby” in the United States. The Jakarta Globe story is here.

Anyone remotely familiar with Mahathir and Malaysian politics is familiar with these kinds of statements. It was Mahathir, after all, who blamed the 1997 East Asian financial crisis first on Jews, then on George Soros. The Anti-Defamation League has a brief compilation of some of Mahathir’s anti-semitic slurs here, dating to 1970. Offending Jews and others has long been Mahathir’s modus operandi, but since stepping down as Prime Minister, it seems as though he is after more attention (and adoration). But first let’s view his statements.

The “Avatar” argument is just silly. Aside from the conspiratorial element of the argument (which I realize still has many adherents, in the Muslim world but also here in the US), it is simply not logical. Avatar was produced in 2009 (although its roots are deeper; director James Cameron felt that the technology wasn’t ready for the film until 2005). The 9-11 attacks occured in 2001, eight (or four) years prior. This argument doesn’t makes sense temporally or logically… unless one buys whole hog into the conspiracy and leaves the real world behind. I suppose that is one of the great things about conspiracies: Logic doesn’t have to play much of a role in the thinking, and arguments that contradict the conspiracy are trotted out as proof of deeper conspiracy in a rapidly degenerating downward spiral. At least in subsequent statements Mahathir acknowledged that it was true the Twin Towers had fallen, but that the American/Zionist conspiracy remains.

Mahathir’s remarks about Jews, which seemingly condone the killing of Jews as a means to control their supposed influence, are simply a continuation of his ugly anti-semitic history. Although well regarded political scientists John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Kenneth Walt (Harvard) wrote a book in 2007 describing not a Jewish Lobby but an Israel Lobby (there is a significant difference), the book was only about the alleged Lobby’s effects — supposedly detrimental — to both American and Israeli foreign policy. The book caused much controversy, as the authors expected, and accusations of anti-semitism, which they flatly denied; more here.

Controversial academic writing is one thing, but one doesn’t usually expect this level of wacky conspiratorial thinking from the former leader of a state on friendly terms with the US. Mahathir’s explanatory statements on his comments at al Quds and a subsequent explanation of the explanation are in English here and here. I recommend reading the comments below the former PM’s posts; he’s got no shortage of sycophants who seemingly eat up his every word. Mahathir has attracted an audience outside of Malaysia as well, who are equally conspiratorial in their thinking. One of my favorite comments is from someone with a western name who feels sorry for Mahathir, who, like Iran’s Holocaust-denying President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has been “unfairly” labelled an anti-semite. That’s great company for the ex-PM to keep, but I thought that Ahmadinejad’s anti-semitism has been established by the words of Ahmadinejad himself, just as the responsibility for 9-11 has been admitted by al Qaeda.

I can’t comment as to whether Mahathir really holds these offensive beliefs. Trained as a medical doctor and skilled in politics, there is no doubt that he is an intelligent man. But events in Malaysia may help explain Mahathir’s ridiculous rants.

After developing a dislike for the policies of Anwar Ibrahim, the man he was grooming to take over as PM, Mahathir fabricated charges of sodomy in 1998 and had Anwar imprisoned. He chose who he thought would be a safe replacement, and then stepped down in 2003, handing the reigns to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Badawi pursued his own policies, at times rankling Mahathir, who found himself sidelined by his party, UMNO (after clearly hoping for a position similar to Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, who after stepping down as Prime Minister took the position of Mentor Minister, and who still plays a significant role in Singaporean politics). Despite trying to elbow his way back into the room, Mahathir remained marginalized. So he turned to the one outlet where he could still appear to be a player, the blogosphere, and where he became an armchair critic of the Badawi administration. Najib Tun Razak succeeded Badawi as PM in 2009.

It’s more than a little ironic that Mahathir, who controlled the Malaysian press with an iron grip during his rule, has turned to the kind of criticism that he would have jailed people for making during his own rule. But in this context it’s perhaps easier to understand why Mahathir would publish such rubbish in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence (remember that “overhwelming contradictory evidence” is often cited by conspiracy theorists as evidence of the conspiracy). The poor man still craves the attention (and adoration) he felt as Prime Minister, and has found his realm. Judging by the comments on his blogs, he has found like minded company that will remain, along with him, marginalized.

I almost feel bad responding as it gives Mahathir more attention. But when the former leader of an important state such as Malaysia makes comments such as these, it’s better to try understand his thinking. It’s clear he has his fans in Malaysia and elsewhere, but it’s also clear that they will remain a fringe element for whom logic does not apply.

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