“If a group of people feels that it has been humiliated and that its honor has been trampled underfoot, it will want to express its identity.”                                                                                                                       – Abdolkarim Soroush

In a recent NY Times Op-Ed, Professor John W. Owen of the University of Virginia argues that the electoral success of Islamists after the Arab Spring is due to Islamism’s longstanding role as the dominant voice of political dissent. He writes: “Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow.” It’s an interesting perspective, but I think it misses the mark. Islamism is not about dissent, it’s about identity.

I explored the electoral success of Ennahda in Tunisia and the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt previously on COMOPS. If you haven’t read those blog entries, I encourage you to do so. I won’t repeat that material here. Rather, I want to look at the broader issue of identity, which I think lies at the heart of Islamism’s current popularity.

As readers know, Tunisia and Egypt are the only two countries of the historic Arab Spring to hold democratic elections so far. These countries are commonly designated as Arab states. However, there was a time when the “Arab world” was restricted to the Arabian Peninsula and the southern Levant. It was only after the rise of Islam in the seventh century and the subsequent conquest of North Africa that the lands we know today as Egypt and Tunisia started a gradual shift toward “Arabness.”

‘Who is an Arab’ is a far more complex question than you might guess. The simple answer (my apologies Arabist scholars) is twofold: An Arab is someone who speaks Arabic (there’s even a saying by the Prophet Muhammad that ‘Arabness’ is conferred by the tongue) and/or shares a genealogical or cultural-historical heritage with an Arabic speaking people. Despite certain stereotypical images about what an ‘Arab’ looks like, I assure you that Arabs come in every shade and color of the human family. The Arabic language (including its enormous variety of dialects) is the real root of Arab identity. But what does this have to do with Islamist parties?

The Arabic language arrived with the Muslim expansion across North Africa in the seventh century. Arabic gradually became the dominant language of the peoples in those lands over time. This means that Islam is irrevocably bound to Arab identity, despite the fact that millions of Arabs are Christians. The Qur’an is actually the foundation of literary Arabic as we know it. The Arab tribes of the Peninsula were an oral culture and largely illiterate, and the rise of Islam transformed those conditions.

When you add in the fact that national identities (e.g. American, Iraqi) are a modern innovation developed in the West and largely imposed in North Africa by Western colonial powers, we are left with the fact that Islam served as the primary reference point for identity formation for centuries before that time, along with tribal and ancestral ties.

Jump forward to the independence movements in the Arab world of the mid-twentieth century. The British are ousted in Egypt and the French are ousted in Tunisia. The two young nation-states are independent and can choose a system of governance, including a legal system, for themselves. The dominant trend in the twentieth century was to try to ‘catch up’ to the powers of the age and borrow or adopt European systems and ideologies; not only nationalism, but socialism, communism, even fascism. This sort of borrowing extended into culture (even the way people dressed), technology and education as well. The most radical example in the region was Turkey, a non-Arab state, but still a neighbor with strong cultural ties. Among the Arabs, Tunisia came closest to following Turkey’s radical example. As we know, the post-colonial ‘experiments’ in the Arab states of Tunisia and Egypt ultimately produced the authoritarian regimes that would fall during the Arab Spring.

When Tunisians and Egyptians went to cast their votes this past year, they weren’t too concerned with particular candidates (nor were the election systems set up as such). The elections were about people expressing identities and aspirations freely, perhaps for the first time. Judging by the election results, a large segment of Tunisians and Egyptians who cast votes (note the qualifier) believe that it is important to retain or affirm an Arab-Muslim identity. So far these elections have been about asserting that sense of identity more so than caliphates or a desire to implement medieval penal codes or ban wine.

These elections also come at a time when the United States (its military might aside) is a cultural superpower across the globe. People in many parts of the world, not only in Arab states (note the NY Times recent piece on China), fear the loss of ‘who they are’ in the face of American (or Western) cultural or socioeconomic hegemony.  In my home state of Arizona, we have witnessed the strange, sometimes militant, response of Anglo-Americans who fear Hispanic cultural encroachment and cast votes accordingly. Those are identity votes too. I see little difference between them and those people in Egypt or Tunisia who vote for parties that champion longstanding identities rooted in Islam.

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* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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Put him in power and see how wise he is.

- Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms

I have spent an inordinate amount of time studying Islamist ideologues and their ideas during my relatively short lifetime. I’ve never read War and Peace, but I have read Milestones and The Neglected Duty. In recent months, the Tunisian Islamist and leader of Ennahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, has occupied a good deal of my attention. And as regular readers of the Comops Journal may know, I recently returned from traveling around Tunisia. The election results have since been tallied there, and Ghannouchi’s party, Ennahda, won the most seats of any party in the 217 seat constituent assembly. The victory has resulted in a lot of talk about what the old Islamist will do now, and how his party will shape the future of the new Tunisia. In my view, Ennahda’s electoral victory is best understood as a reassertion of a long-marginalized Arab-Muslim identity, and should not be treated as a call for a so-called “Islamic state.” Indeed, I see Ennahda’s rise as a temporary one, and it will quickly return to the ranks of the other parties in future elections. For those interested, I previously wrote about the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in post-revolutionary Egypt.

If you have yet to review the results of the October 23rd election, Ennahda took 90 seats (42% of all seats), while the Congress for the Republic took 30 seats, Ettakatol took 21, Aridha Chaabia took 19 (currently disputed), and 17 seats went to the PDP. No other party won more than 5 seats. For all you Cold War enthusiasts, Tunisia’s Communist party took 3 seats. Overall, twenty-six parties total (including independent lists) won at least 1 seat (my thanks to Tunisia Live for great coverage).

Tunisia’s election, the first of the Arab Spring revolutions, went remarkably well (the Aridha Chaabia issue aside), and it will undoubtedly serve as a model for others in the Arab world, especially Egypt and Libya. These were not parliamentary or presidential elections though. They chose members of the assembly that will craft a new constitution and select a new interim president until the next round of elections (in a year or so). Voters chose from an enormous number (over 100) of “lists,” and based on the number of votes achieved for these lists, a certain number of seats were awarded. Due to this system, it was a given that a coalition would have to emerge and no single party could dominate via absolute majority. Nevertheless, Ennahda’s victory exceeded expectations.

During my time in Tunisia, my peers there thought that Ennahda would win no more than 30% of the seats. The numbers suggest that my colleagues may have been out-of-touch with the extent to which Tunisians profess an Arab-Muslim identity. Ennahda led in nearly every district, but only won an outright majority in the districts of Gabés (Ghannouchi’s hometown) and Tataouine, as well as among the expat community in Italy. Ennahda also had a particularly strong showing in Tunisia’s “second city,” Sfax.

Rachid Ghannouchi, now in his 70s, has not chosen to pursue a political office (as of yet). He appears content to serve as the leader and guide of Ennahda, but his political influence will still hold tremendous sway. History has provided numerous examples of terrible Islamist regimes that rise to political power, most obviously the Taliban. Those examples fail to tell the whole story however. Ghannouchi is certainly at the opposite end of the Islamist spectrum from Mullah Omar. He is definitely a social conservative and quick to condemn anything he deems offensive to his vision of Islam, but he has also repeatedly demonstrated a surprising degree of flexibility, pragmatism, and revision in his viewpoints throughout his lifetime. He is far closer to the teachings of Malik Bennabi (d. 1973) than he is to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328). His party’s willingness to participate in the democratic process and engage secular parties alone has put him at odds with the most hardline Islamists.

Islamism, I often tell students, thrives in abstraction, but it quickly shows its weaknesses and inadequacies when it comes to the dirty details of governance. It is one thing to tell the crowds that Islam is the solution to a country’s economic woes, and quite another thing to find people jobs and lead them out of poverty. Furthermore, pledges of support for “sharia” are often little more than populist fluff, albeit with potentially disastrous results. Even if one accepts the eternal applicability of the legal content scattered throughout Islam’s most sacred texts, the fact remains that those texts leave much to be desired when governing a 21st century nation-state. This fact generally presents a great dilemma for Islamists and it has even motivated some groups to drag their countries back to a more primitive time to try and resolve it.

Ghannouchi (center) greets Erdogan (right) in Tunis during a recent visit

Ghannouchi has repeatedly said that Turkey’s ruling AKP is the model that Ennahda will follow, and I have no reason, at this time, to doubt the sincerity of his words. Indeed, Turkey and Tunisia, despite the ethno-cultural distinctions, share a fair deal in common with regards to their modern histories. Former Tunisian President, Habib Bourguiba, has often been described as an “Arab Atatürk.” The AKP in Turkey has essentially been a reassertion of Turkey’s Muslim identity and heritage in the public sphere after it was forcefully cloistered away by Kemalists for decades. I see Ghannouchi and Ennahda in this same framework. The electoral success of Ennahda reflects the desire to reassert an Arab-Muslim identity in Tunisia after decades of being pushed into the private sphere by the secularist powers of the Neo-Destour/RCD. Ennahda’s rise has little or nothing to do with a desire to see headscarves forced onto women or hands of thieves amputated.

On a more mundane level, Ennahda’s victory also reflects the simple fact that the party has strong anti-RCD credentials, it was well organized, and it was widely known among the people. There were many new parties in the wake of the revolution (over 130 lists at one point) and few people knew anything about their platforms. Furthermore, many of the parties shared a center-left ideology, splitting those votes among multiple parties, while Ennahda essentially monopolized the religious identity vote.

Now that Ennahda has been granted political power, the people will expect them to resolve their problems and concerns, which are numerous. The economy in particular will loom large in the years ahead. It remains to be seen whether Ennahda can offer solutions beyond pious slogans and public displays of religiosity. In fact, I see a steady decrease in support for Ennahda over ensuing elections, barring a miraculous economic revival (pun intended).

Lastly, I wish to convey the idea that there is an important positive dimension to the election victory of Ennahda, as well as the earlier victories of the AKP in Turkey. Admittedly, I write this as someone who does not have to live under such parties, so keep that in mind. The silver lining here is that these parties offer a viable alternative for peoples who seek a greater public role for Islam in their societies, in contrast to the militant reactionary movements we are all too familiar with.

When Islamists point to Erdogan and the AKP as a model to follow, rather than Ayman al-Zawahiri or Mullah Omar and the “Islamic emirate” of Taliban-era Afghanistan, this is most certainly a positive. Dialogue and cooperation with such parties should be encouraged, not dismissed on the grounds of ideological allegiances. Indeed, if Western countries were to suddenly turn away from Tunisia on the basis of an Islamist party’s electoral success, it would only help the hardliners and further support the erroneous view that militancy and anti-Western sentiment is the best strategy for contemporary Muslim societies. Furthermore, power means responsibility and accountability, and Tunisians will now “see how wise” the old Islamist from Gabés really is.

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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There are a lot of questions and speculation about the Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood, or MB) and their role in the future of Egypt. The coverage of the organization in the U.S. media has been better than expected. However, I am still struck by some of the more ominous rhetoric emanating from select corners. This rhetoric seems to focus on two main points of concern: 1) MB ties to violence, and 2) the implementation of “undemocratic” Islamic law (sharia). In the following analysis, I discuss why I think these points of concern are flawed or unwarranted when given some broader perspective.

As many know by now, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was established in Egypt, specifically the town of Ismailia, in 1928, during British colonial rule (1882-1952). It’s founder and Supreme Guide (Murshid) was a primary school teacher named Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949). The history of the MB is long, complex, and deeply intertwined with modern Egyptian history. I will not recount that long story here, although I have discussed it in some detail in my book Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, as well as the “Muslim Brotherhood” entry I wrote for a recently published encyclopedia, Religion and Violence. In essence, the MB is a conservative (albeit reformist) and hierarchical Sunni Muslim social movement that envisions Islam as a complete system of life and sees the differentiation of religion from the state as a foreign (and “unIslamic”) innovation. Their primary aspiration is the implementation or alignment of the state’s law with sharia (or an interpretation thereof).

Umar al-Tilmisani

Analysts warning about the threat the MB poses typically condense time, eighty years of history, to formulate attitudes about the contemporary Muslim Brothers. This is a serious error. To help explain the historical evolution (or variations) of the MB, I think it is helpful to think of the MB in terms of five main periods. I have broken down those five periods below, along with woefully abbreviated summaries relating the MB’s orientation and some important events in each period:

1. Anti-Colonial Social Activism: Founded in 1928, Neo-Sufi (reformist) oriented and centered on the person of Hasan al-Banna as Murshid; devoted to missionary (or counter-missionary) activities. The MB registers as a charitable organization providing social services, including education. The MB enjoys rapid popular growth and increased activity in Egyptian politics with outspoken opposition to British rule.

2. Anti-Colonial Political Engagement: WWII heightens anti-British sentiment and there is increased disorder in Egypt. All major political factions create militia wings. By 1943, MB leadership bows to younger zealous members and establishes its militia, al-Nizam al-Khass (Special Order). At the same time, the British crack down on Egyptian dissent (as they did in other colonies, such as India). By end of WWII, MB pursues greater political role and runs in parliamentary elections, but British intervene and all MB candidates lose despite support. When partition occurs in the British Mandate of Palestine, members of the MB’s militia serves in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war under the authority of the Arab League. Defeat of the nationalist Arab forces by Israel results in increased discontent and opposition to the British and the Egyptian monarchy in Egypt, resulting in further crackdowns and orders to dissolve the MB. Mass arrests follow and a 23 year-old MB member assassinates Egypt’s Prime Minister in 1948. A failed bomb plot follows in January 1949. Shortly thereafter, MB Murshid Hasan al-Banna is assassinated in the streets of Cairo by Egyptian secret services.  MB is forced underground, but by now regional branches have emerged in most other Arab countries.

President Nasser with Castro

3. Repression under Nasser:  Egyptian courts rule that coup allegations against MB are “without foundation” and the MB is legally reconstituted. The second Murshid, Hasan al-Hudaybi is selected to lead the MB. He repudiates violence and orders the Special Order militia officially disbanded. At this time, demonstrations for independence from Britain are nationwide. That same year, Egyptian writer and educator, Sayyid Qutb, returns from study abroad in the U.S.A. and joins the MB. In January 1952, a military coup takes place by “The Free Officers.” It overthrows the monarchy and asserts Egyptian independence from Britain. The Officers have ties to the MB, but quickly grow apart and establish a one-party autocratic Pan-Arab socialist regime (e.g. Nasserism). Gamal Abdel-Nasser emerges as President of Egypt. Relations between MB and the Officers deteriorate and the MB is officially dissolved. A member of the MB allegedly tries to assassinate Nasser. It serves as pretext for the regime to destroy the MB.  Hudaybi, Qutb, and hundreds of others, are imprisoned and MB headquarters is burned. Six MB leaders are executed. Twenty-one are murdered in their prison cells in 1957. In response, Qutb writes increasingly extremist texts, such as Milestones (1965), that are smuggled out and published. Qutb is later executed for his writings in 1966. The following year, Nasser’s army is crushed by Israel in the Six-Day War and his revolutionary movement is discredited. Nasser dies in 1970.

4. Neo-Muslim Brotherhood of Tilmisani: Nasser is succeeded by centrist Anwar Sadat who brands himself as “the Believing President” and works against Leftist factions in Egypt. He later courts the USA and the MB to counter Leftist and Soviet influence. MB leader (Murshid) Hudaybi survives Nasser’s prisons but dies in 1973. He is succeeded by early member, Umar al-Tilmisani, as the third Murshid. After Nasser’s destruction, Tilmisani rebuilds the MB and reasserts its rejection of violence, including the extremist writings of Sayyid Qutb. Tilmisani asserts that Sayyid Qutb represented no one but himself. Some academics describe Tilmisani’s rebuilt MB as the “Neo-Muslim Brotherhood.” Tilmisani brings greater participation in party-politics and creates alliances to run in parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, tensions exist between MB and Sadat, and Tilmisani is imprisoned for his criticism of the regime, along with many others. Extremist Islamists, especially the Gamaat Islamiyyah and Tanzim al-Jihad, reject the MB’s strategies and call for revolutionary violence, and grow among the youth on university campuses. Extremists of al-Jihad infiltrate army and assassinate Sadat on Oct. 6 1981. Sadat is succeeded by his Vice-President, Hosni Mubarak, and relations between the regime and MB remain tense but sporadically tolerant – the MB remains officially outlawed.

Dr. Mohammed Badie, MB Murshid

5. Opposition and Reform: After Tilmisani’s death in 1986 (the first Murshid permitted to have a public funeral), the MB continues to be led by the “old guard,” privileging seniority over skill or charisma. In 2004, a member of the successor generation, Muhammad Mahdi Akef (b. 1928), is selected as Murshid, more commonly referred to as “Chairman” now. The MB acts as a leading opposition movement to Mubarak’s autocratic regime and it is critical of its relationship with the USA and Israel. Frequently the MB uses the language of human rights and cooperates with other non-Islamist opposition groups. In 2005, the MB fields a list of candidates as independents in parliamentary elections and wins 88 seats, despite voting irregularities, making it second only to Mubarak’s NDP (330 seats). However, failed promises of reform and repeated government crackdowns lead to a MB boycott of the 2010 elections, and only 1 seat is won. The NDP wins 420 seats. In January 2010, Akef stepped down (the first time a Murshid has done so) as Chairman of the MB. He is replaced by Dr. Mohammed Badie (b. 1943), a professor and specialist in veterinary medicine, as the eighth Murshid.

Given the historical complexities, it is an error to refer to an act of violence in the 1940s or the existence of the “Special Order,” dating from period #2, when speaking of the post-Nasser “Neo-Muslim Brotherhood” and the subsequent period. It is an error to take Sayyid Qutb’s extremist prison treatises as representative of the MB organization. It is also an error to conflate the Egyptian MB with all the various MB branches that sprung up in other Arab countries, most of which broke official ties to the Egyptian “parent organization” and exist completely independent of the MB. For instance, Hamas originated within a branch of the MB in the Gaza Strip as a religious alternative to Arafat’s secular-nationalist PLO, but it developed into a movement unto itself and it does not answer to Dr. Badie.  Admittedly, the MB has demonstrated great hesitation when it comes to criticizing Hamas and makes apologies for acts of terror as “legitimate resistance” to Israeli occupation. Then again, one would also find many outside of the MB who demonstrate the exact same tendencies in the Arab world.

Critics of the MB  seem to isolate negative or inflammatory comments by the organization’s current membership in order to collectively indict the Muslim Brothers. However, I find this no more persuasive than taking sound bites or statements from certain members of the Democratic and Republican parties and attributing a controversial view to all Democrats or Republicans. As NY Times columnist Scott Shane recently noted: “As the Roman Catholic Church encompasses leftist liberation theology and conservative anti-abortion advocacy, so the Brotherhood includes both practical reformers and firebrand ideologues.” In other cases, a text or statement dating from another period is cited as something reflective of the “true nature” of the MB, such as one of their traditional slogans (e.g. “The Qur’an is our constitution”). But this is equally unpersuasive, and has little relevance to the contemporary Muslim Brothers.

A recent column by Barry Rubin in the Israeli centrist-right English-language daily, The Jerusalem Post, provocatively entitled “Egypt’s Crisis Worst Disaster Since Iran’s Revolution,” warns that an anti-Israel and anti-American Islamist government allied with Iran may emerge in Egypt if Mubarak falls and the MB rises. Rubin cites “anti-Israel” and “anti-Semitic” comments made by MB members, such as parliamentarian Abdel Wahhab al-Messiri. But the fact is that the anti-Israel (or anti-Zionist) views that many in the West see as anti-Semitic are certainly not exclusive to certain MB members. These unfortunate views are widespread throughout the Arab world and Egyptian society, including secular-nationalists and communists. The “cold peace” preserved by Mubarak and the ruling NDP is not “pro-Israeli.” In fact, as of February 3, the NDP claimed that “pro-opposition” foreign journalists are actually “Israeli agents” (resulting in increased violence against journalists). The NDP takes a pragmatic stance designed to avert further war and facilitate economic prosperity backed by conditional U.S. aid that is dependent on the continuity of that peace, especially for the NDP elite. There will be no “pro-Israeli” government in Egypt, no matter who emerges in control. And in terms of U.S. relations, the MB is far less hostile to America, especially if America’s backing for Mubarak ends, and, most especially, if an Israeli-Palestinian peace were ever successful. Their issues with the U.S. generally stem from widely held political grievances, not from a cosmic conception of “fighting the infidels” as leaders of extremists like al-Qaeda see it. It is noteworthy to mention that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian ideologue of al-Qaeda (previously of Tanzim al-Jihad), has always been fiercely critical of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Likewise, the revolutionary Twelver Shi’ite leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini (d. 1989), once denounced Tilmisani and the MB as “CIA agents.”

Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey

Regarding the question of another disastrous Arab-Israeli war, the MB is no more inclined to another war than the NDP or the Nasserists or any other. After all, it was the secular Pan-Arab nationalist-socialists (i.e. Nasserists) that led Egypt into the conflicts of 1956 and 1967. It was the pro-American centrist, Anwar Sadat, who went to war in 1973. The MB is no more likely to begin a new war because of its Islamist politics than the socialists or nationalists. I do not see a MB government going to war with a nuclear-armed Israel anymore than I do Saudi Arabia, which has never signed a peace treaty with Israel. However, Israel would most certainly find itself without the same negotiating and strategic partner it has enjoyed under Mubarak. That period is simply over. As an example of the sort of relationship that might emerge with increased MB participation in Egypt’s government, I suggest one look to Turkish-Israeli relations under “Islamist” Erdogan and the AK Parti; however, the Arab nationalist context will act as a significant modifier absent from the Turkish context. Indeed, the MB has always had a strong Arab nationalist element – which again is indicative of its history and its anti-colonial origins.

If the prospects of an Egypt under sharia concerns Americans most, we should know that the Egyptian constitution (largely suspended by Mubarak’s ‘emergency measures’ for three decades) was amended by Anwar Sadat to state that sharia is the principal source of law for Egypt (it previously stated “a principal source”). Family law, such as marriage and divorce, are already governed by sharia in Egypt (yes, restricted polygamy is legal). Furthermore, if horrific images of the hands of thieves coming off, “heretics” being imprisoned and condemned to death, or adulterers being stoned, concerns us, then why is Saudi Arabia a close partner of the U.S.? The most rigid and disturbing interpretations of sharia have been implemented in Saudi Arabia throughout the Wahhabite kingdom’s history. The American government and U.S. businesses continue a close relationship to the kingdom unabated.  Many popular American brands, such as Apple, are owned in part by members of the ruling family. It seems hypocritical to condemn the MB on the grounds of sharia. Additionally, unlike the Saudi-backed Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the MB is not a group of uneducated tribesmen; they are medical doctors, lawyers, businessmen, professors and professionals, who are hardly averse to the modern world and they articulate a far more sophisticated and rich understanding of Sunni Islam than the Saudis or their “clients” abroad.

Overall, if the Muslim Brotherhood were to assume a leading role in the government of a post-Mubarak Egypt, I do not think it would result in a new “enemy state” or Iranian-style theocracy. Indeed, the Egyptian context is fundamentally different than the Iranian – perhaps that debate deserves a separate blog post. While concerns that the MB might curb democratic channels once in power are warranted, their base of support is not large enough to place them in such a position, nor has the current leadership demonstrated any such ambitions.  The MB will act as a conservative religious party within a coalition government, not unlike religious conservatives in the U.S. Congress.

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Facebook has been gaining ground in Indonesia, and in terms of absolute number of users, Indonesia is now ranked third in the world after the US and the UK. This is remarkable given the low rate of internet penetration in the country, but is explained by the high number of users of hand-held, internet accessible devices.  Facebook has been in the news in Indonesia lately, and there are two interesting examples. The first is a Facebook group with over 55,000 members that was formed to oppose the recently installed statue of US President Barack Obama in a public park in Menteng, Jakarta. The statue portrays Obama as a young boy, reflecting the years he spent living in Indonesia (1967-71). The Facebook users opposed the statue because they felt as though Obama had not done anything for Indonesia (although others point to his example that someone from modest means can achieve greatness). Eventually the government in Jakarta acquiesed to the demands of the Facebook group, and the statue was moved from the park to the elementary school that Obama attended. Obama will be visiting Indonesia in mid-March for the first time since his election.

The other Facebook-related phenomenon has to do with recent cases of rape, abduction and disappearances of young girls by predatory Facebook users. I drove past a large demonstration in Bandung protesting Facebook, organized by Muslim students. Of course this raises several questions. Is Facebook  itself somehow responsible for these criminal cases? Is there something inherently un-Islamic about Facebook, as the groups seem to claim? (Beyond the criminal behavior, some critics argue that Facebook allows un-Islamic behavior in the form of “hooking up” or no-strings sexual liaisons). Do these cases simply reflect the processes by which knowledge about online predation is disseminated and naive users eventually become more aware of the dangers of online behavior? Finally, it points to the presence of alternatives to Facebook, perhaps more Islam-friendly, by which these students must have organized the protest… because surely they couldn’t have used Facebook to organize the protest.

In the legal realm, Indonesia is considering repealing its very restrictive blasphemy law in the name of free speech, consistent with its more open press and newly embraced democratic ideals. Resistance to this 1965 law has come, not surprisingly, from Islamist sources, including political parties and civil society groups. What is somewhat surprising, however, is who the Minister of Religious Affairs Suryadharma Ali decided to meet with in order to discuss the judicial review: representatives from the Islamic Defenders Front and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. The former is a group of thugs with ties to the Suharto-era quasi-legal, extrajudicial “enforcement” group Pemuda Pancasila, that currently operates territorial “protection” rackets in the name of Islam and frequently runs afoul of the law; the latter is the Indonesian branch of a worldwide Islamist organization whose goal is a global caliphate. Although Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia doesn’t openly advocate violence to achieve its goals, it is banned in some countries, but not in Indonesia — perhaps ironically based on the same freedom of speech doctrine cited by those wishing to overthrow the blasphemy law. In a letter to the Jakarta Post, one writer compared this meeting to a government official in the US meeting on race relations with members of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-nazi groups.

Another legal case is moving through the courts as well. I wrote about it previously in another post a few months ago, and now the case of Mohammad Jibriel is going to trial. He is being tried on charges of providing material support to those responsible for the July 17 bombing in Jakarta of the JW Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels. Prosecutors claim he visited the Middle East where he asked for and received funding for the operation.

And in other news… the Islamist Indonesian Mujahadeen Council (MMI) elected a new leader, Syawal Yasin, who is the son-in-law of terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah co-founder Abdullah Sungkar. The MMI was founded by JI’s other co-founder, Abu Bakar Bashir, although he has since left the Council. Completing the incestuous circle of jihad, the MMI’s deputy chairman is Abu Jibriel, Mohammad Jibriel’s father. The move by the MMI is viewed as move toward a more hardline approach, with the goal of implementing shariah throughout Indonesia. Syawal’s credentials are cemented by his experience training in Afghanistan to wage jihad on the Soviets, credentials shared with many — living and dead – from the top tier of Jemaah Islamiyah.

In brighter news in Indonesia, pluralism carried the day at Jogjakarta’s Islamic University of Indonesia, where two 1,100-year-old Hindu temples were uncovered by a construction crew building a library. The temples are well preserved, thought to be the result of layers of ash covering them after a volcanic eruption, and contain a statue of Ganesha as well as linga and yoni, objects that represent male and female, and the Hindu deities Shiva and Shakti, respectively. As with pre-Islamic religious symbols most everywhere else in the Islamic world, the temples are to be restored and will remain on the universities campus.

Finally, the Philippine government is preparing for more retributive attacks from al Qaeda-linked terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf after the Armed Forces of the Philippines killed six members of the group in a raid, including a senior rebel leader Albader Parad, in February on the island of Jolo. Parad was suspected of playing a major role in recent kidnappings carried out by AS, and his death is considered a serious blow to the organization. On February 27th, suspected AS members surrounded a village and killed 11 and and wounded around 20 people in Basilan. The attack was viewed as revenge for Parad’s death, as well as retribution for the rescue of two Chinese citizens earlier that day in Basilan.

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On September 30th, an earthquake struck Padang, Indonesia. It measured 7.6 on the Richter Scale, killed over 1,100, and injured around 2000.  Following the quake some religious leaders moved quickly to blame the victims, a familiar tactic of exploiting natural disasters to advance extremist agendas.

Located in the Pacific “Ring of Fire,” Indonesia is no stranger to devastating seismic and volcanic events that frequently lead to tremendous losses of life, livelihood and property. The September 30th earthquake near Padang was the most recent of such events.

Padang has long been called a “tragedy waiting to happen” because of its location and the city’s proximity to the sea. These warnings multiplied after the Boxing Day 2004 Tsunami that devastated Aceh in North Sumatra. Had a Tsunami followed the Padang quake, the death toll would surely have been much higher, considering the city’s large population (around 750,000).

By now we understand that the earthquake in Padang was caused by plate tectonics, a naturally occurring phenomenon (for some cool animations, look here). Padang was struck because of its location in relation to shifting tectonic plates.

But as is the case with any natural disaster, traumatized survivors ponder questions such as why the event happened or why he or she survived when others did not. Psychological conditions can include Survivor Guilt, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Acute Stress Disorder. People frequently seek solace in their religious faith as a means of coping.

Religious extremists exploit these conditions to advance their agendas.  For example:

• On a visit to Padang, former rock singer turned Islamist firebrand Hari Moekti* stated that the imposition of shari’ah would be the only thing that would allow the city to recover. Moral lapses are what caused the earthquake, he argued, a punishment from God.  This story was published by Hizbut Tahrir, a group that promotes the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia, and quickly spread over the Internet.
• In another post, Hizbut Tahrir blamed the quake on “deaf, dumb and blind” leaders who are stupid and do not think. They compared these leaders to the Pharaoh of the Qur’an, whom God killed for his tyranny and obstinacy.
• In a third Hizbut Tahrir post on the subject, the author invokes Imam Nawawiy and his collection of hadith, in which (pious Muslim) victims of natural disasters can be considered martyrs.
• Abu Jibriel, the father of suspected terrorism financier Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahman (see previous post), wrote that the disaster was the result of sins and immorality, people trading in the law of God for the law of Jahiliyyah, and following the traditions of their ancestors over the traditions of the Prophet.
• Hidayatullah posted an essay claiming that disasters such as this are tests by God, similar to people being tested in life with stupidity, poverty or physical defects. If people pass the test, they may look forward to heaven, and survivors may view this test as a call to get closer to God. The passage later condemns immorality on television, men who dress like women, women who think they are equal to men, homosexuality, and an upcoming visit by Japanese porn star Miyabi to make a (non-pornographic) film in Java.

Most of these authors wear their Islamist extremist credentials on their sleeves. For instance they tend to use  the Arabic term for disaster (musibah) rather than the indigenous Indonesian term (bencana). Only the Hidayatullah article mentions alternative explanations by “secularists”  such as earthquakes being a normal, natural occurrence, and it does so only to discredit them.

Religion is by its nature based on faith, and therefore not accountable to scientific logic, rationality, or even disproof.  But here is an irony, even within a religous frame: Padang is one of the (comparatively) few Indonesian cities with “shari’ah-based bylaws” on the books. School girls and female civil servants must wear jilbab (hijab).  Civil servants have alms (donations to mosques and charities) deducted from their salaries, and high school students are required to study the Qur’an. If the earthquake in Padang is a punishment from God, why is it that regions that are “less Islamic” weren’t struck? Why didn’t the earthquake strike “infidel” regions of Indonesia, like  Hindu Bali or predominantly Christian eastern Indonesia?

This tactic of blaming victims to advance your agenda isn’t limited to Indonesia.  In the wake of Hurricane Katrina,  anti-abortion activist Steve Lefemine claimed it was divine judgment: “In my belief, God judged New Orleans for the sin of shedding innocent blood through abortion.” Hal Lindsey likened the event to a coming “judgment day,” and Fred Phelps (whose followers protest at soldier’s funerals with signs such as “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for Dead Soldiers”) argued that the hurricane was God’s punishment for permissiveness to homosexuality.

Because exploitation of disasters by extremists is so predictable, there is an opportunity to think in advance about how these attempts could be resisted in the future. Countering their messages on scientific grounds seems futile. Without the need for logical arguments based on evidence, religious justifications can be manipulated to suit the goals of the messenger. More likely, arguments from within a religious frame, delivered by people with religious credentials, would be the most effective.

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* All translations from Indonesian are by Lundry.

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Today the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams, said in a radio interview that the adoption of some aspect of Sharia law in the UK is “unavoidable.” A BBC story quotes him as saying the idea that

there’s one law for everybody and that’s all there is to be said, and anything else that commands your loyalty or allegiance is completely irrelevant in the processes of the courts – I think that’s a bit of a danger. There’s a place for finding what would be a constructive accommodation with some aspects of Muslim law, as we already do with some other aspects of religious law.

The last part of the quote refers to an provision in British law that allows people to settle some disputes before an agreed third party, which is already applied in some cases for Muslims and Orthodox Jews. Though he doesn’t advocate wholesale adoption of Sharia law, he cites the example that Muslims might be allowed to settle divorces in a Sharia court rather than in conventional legal proceedings.

His comments have already set off a firestorm of criticism, and some have called for his ouster. Reaction is especially harsh in right-wing quarters of the UK, who believe that British culture is being eroded by its growing Muslim minority.

They cite cases like that of Bishop of Rochester Dr. Michael Nazir-Ali, who reportedly received death threats after criticizing extremist Muslims in Brittan for creating defacto “no-go” areas for people of other faiths and cultures. Nazir-Ali, who was raised in Pakistan, blamed the country’s policy of multiculturalism for for creating division in society. The Telegraph reports that his comments were denounced by the Muslim Council of Britain as “frantic scaremongering.”

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