It was bound to happen: London’s Daily Mail reported yesterday that the face of Osama bin Laden appeared on a Londoner’s piece of toast. I have been fascinated with how the image of Osama bin Laden became a pop cultural phenomenon after 9-11 in some parts of the Muslim world (including Indonesia, where I do much of my work). The image was usually intended to shock rather than express true solidarity with the terrorist leader, and I liken it to college kids with Che Guevara posters or t-shirts, or even early punk rockers adopting nazi symbolism.

The punk rockers were not Nazi sympathizers, and the college kids aren’t communists. The imagery of Che Guevara has become cliché, however, and turned into an internet meme: witness Colonel Sanders or Homer Simpson as Che. It’s lost its ability to shock. Nazi symbolism, however, continues to shock – just think back to some recent events, such as Jesse James’ ex-girlfriend/stripper Michelle McGee wearing Nazi gear in photos, or Prince Harry appearing at a party in a Nazi uniform.

Which will be the eventual fate of Osama bin Laden imagery? In the west, with bin Laden dead, it’s clear that his image has lost much of its ability to shock, and is now, rather, simply viewed with derision. The Daily Mail story misses no opportunity for a pun: “From terror to toast!” “One sandwich short of a picnic!” “Worst thing since sliced bread!” Puns such as these were unthinkable in the weeks following 9-11.

As one would imagine, the story found its way onto Islamist websites (I found it first through looking at arrahmah.com, an Indonesian extremist site). The puns from the Mail story are lost in translation – likely right over the head of whoever translated the story. But the end of the Mail story, where the death of bin Laden is discussed, has been replaced with the following in the arrahmah.com posting:

Whether or not this matter is true, whether or not there is an element of purpose in the appearance of the “face” of Sheik Osama, as a Muslim there is only one thing we can acknowledge as truth, that is that during his lifetime Sheik Osama was known as a warrior in the fight against the enemies of Islam to enforce the profession of faith in Allah on earth.

One group’s joke becomes another’s call to arms and faith.

After showing my colleagues the story, we noted that in the image the beard does not quite join at the chin, giving the appearance of mutton chops, and bringing comparisons to a salty sea captain or a 1970s British pub dweller. In the west, I think it’s safe to say the image of bin Laden following his death is no longer shocking. People claim that images of Jesus Christ have appeared on a piece of toast, and later on all sorts of other things (an iron, a potato chip, a pancake). These images have become internet memes, copied and rearranged for a variety of figures. Where will the next image of bin Laden appear? And will it too spawn spoofs?

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A couple of weeks ago as I skimmed the news, I saw the freshly-released images of the Park51 Community Center (colloquially known as the “Ground Zero Mosque”). In the same sitting, I also performed my semi-regular check of a former professor’s co-authored blog, No Caption Needed. Perusing the two in such short succession inspired reflection on the nature of the image in strategic communication – and more specifically, the nature of the image in the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terror, as well as that conflict’s implications in contemporary American public culture. Strategically, images make claims concrete. Curiously, in the case of the Park51 project, even the mere promise of images was worthy enough to create front-page news.

Park51 Street View Concept

According to the Park51 Blog, on September 28, 2010, three “renderings” of the proposed community center were released. As of October 3, 2010, no architectural brainstorms had been added to this slim posting. The computerized images look light, airy, and labyrinthine. The colorless interior and exterior of the building form what appears to be the frame of an empty mosaic. Though interesting, the renderings are far from blueprints and there are very few of them. Why, then, did they command enough attention to be featured as one of CNN’s top stories on October 3, five full days after the images were posted? And is it mere coincidence that after the images were released, we began to hear stories break about the community center’s supporters being under threat?

There are several plausible explanations for the images’ catalyzing force. First, the “renderings” of Park51 move the center’s existence from the realm of the hypothetical to the realm of the eminently plausible. Although images can inspire dialogue, they do not require it – an image exists because someone thought to bring it into being, not necessarily because a group engineered its appearance. This has implications for the efficacy of strategic communication more broadly. Images can often signal quick forays into the public dialogue, and like all other forms of communication, they can take on a life all their own. In other words, by presenting a public with an image, that public is encouraged to discuss what they are seeing – and yet the creative processes behind the image’s genesis need not be the result of discussion itself.

Second, when used and regarded strategically, images evoke things they do not visibly picture. These preliminary sketches of the community center are not simply musings about a building. They represent an implied victory in a very prominent public conflict. With these images, plans for Park51 publicly move forward – in contrast with plans to rebuild the World Trade Center, which have repeatedly stalled. Apart from and intertwined with the controversy itself, the images evoke a residue of terror and anguish. Therefore, despite the largely unimpressive nature of the architectural plans themselves, Park51’s blog posting was quickly catapulted to national and international news levels.

Strategically, the use and analysis of imagery has tremendous potential to alter the ways we think about contested spaces. Fundamentally, many of the ideological conflicts we try to mitigate are spatial as well. In the case of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” for example, the issue of location plays an incredibly prominent role.  This conflict is not about the existence of an Islamic community center per se, but rather the center’s proximity to the World Trade Center site. Visual depictions of what the community center might look like are actually inserted into the Manhattan landscape. In terms of public debate, it hardly matters that the landscape is fictitious.

Acts of terror are also territorialized, and can be thought of as contests over space. Competing ideas of what should be done with different locations permeate much contemporary conflict, so we can think of space and imagery as (potentially) persuasive. Spaces can be engineered, manipulated, and captured graphically. That instance of manipulation can, with the split-second click of a mouse, be globally transmitted.

With reference to Park51 and the project’s ability to communicate strategically, the entry of images into the public conversation has certainly sped up the rate of dialogue. Though groups in conflict can quite notably use imagery to draw attention to their specific causes, images can also have messy and unintended consequences. Such images can call up intimations of the very phenomena they are trying to usurp, in this case, terrorism.

To clarify, I do not believe the community center bears any resemblance to an act of terror, but rather that even peaceful architectural sketches can implicate such far-removed phenomena as the former “Global War on Terror.” Images direct our minds rapidly and in many directions. They should be both used and analyzed with care.  In the case discussed here, it is necessary to question not only the images, but why they became so popular.  The questioning should take place in specifically public contexts, not just individually in the privacy of our own spaces.

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Apparently I wasn’t the only one thinking about the diplomatic potential of Muslim hip-hop when I posted a blog about it for COMOPS Journal back in September of 2009. Recently we heard from Tyson Amir, one of the Muslim artists that I featured in the blog, and he had some interesting news to report. Amir is from San Jose, California, and currently performs with the Remarkable Current Musician Collective, founded by Anas Canon in 2001. As described on the group’s website, Remarkable Current is “an American artist collective consisting of musicians, writers, and producers who are bonded not only by their love for music and art, but also by their shared Islamic-American tradition.”

“Some of the artists that I work with,” wrote Amir, “have actually submitted a proposal very similar to what Jeffry Halverson articulated in [his] article to the US government.” Unfortunately, the government has thus far been unresponsive to the group’s overtures. Amir further added that: “We hoped the US government would be open to allowing us to utilize our art to try to bring about some type of change in the world.”

Tyson Amir in Morocco

In the meantime, Tyson Amir and his colleagues have been going forward without government support. They were on tour in Turkey in 2009, where they recorded a music video for a song entitled “Granada Rap,” a reference to the Andalusian city where Muslims, Christians, and Jews coexisted together in southern Spain before its downfall in 1492. And if you’d like to see the way American hip-hop can appeal to Muslim youths, just take a look at the Turkish kids in Amir’s video: LINK.

“The entire proposal,” Amir further explained, “was based on the State Department’s usage of Jazz musicians in the late 1950s for the purpose of diplomacy; the first artist they sent was Dizzy Gillespie.”

In 1956, the State Department under the Eisenhower administration sent Gillespie to bring the uniquely American art form of jazz to the Middle East, Southern Europe, and South Asia during the height of the Cold War. Other Jazz ambassadors soon followed, including Louis Armstrong, Benny Goodman, Duke Ellington, Thelonious Monk, and Miles Davis. As Dr. Curtis Sandberg of the Meridian International Center has noted: “In this battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the world’s peoples, the United States developed an unlikely but remarkably effective response to Soviet initiatives: building international friendships through jazz.”

As Tyson Amir sees it: “In the 1950s we used Jazz ambassadors, today we need hip-hop ambassadors.”

I couldn’t agree more.

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Meh!

Readers of this blog may have followed the story this week of death threats issued by the website Revolution Muslim against South Park creators Trey Parker and Matt Stone for their inclusion of supposed images of the Prophet Muhammad in part one of a cartoon first broadcast last week.  In response to the threats Comedy Central bleeped-out mentions of the Prophet’s name and made other changes to part two, broadcast this week.

Part one featured a group of “super best friends” (born in a previous episode that is mysteriously unavailable on the Comedy Central website) made up of other religious figures including Muhammad, Jesus, Buddha, Moses and Santa Claus.  When the group was shown, Muhammad’s image was covered by a black stripe and the word “censored”–presumably as a poke by Parker and Stone at Muslim sensibilities about showing His image.  He later “appeared” as the unseen occupant of a van and later a bear costume.

That episode resulted in a now-defunct website in New York, resolutionmuslim.com, issuing a thinly veiled death threat against the cartoon’s creators, including a picture of assassinated Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh with a knife sticking out of his chest (see what’s left of the post here, H/T Mark Stoudt).

In this week’s follow-up episode, all mentions of the Prophet’s name were bleeped out.  In what can only be regarded as shoddy reporting, the Guardian said this may have been the work of the creators of the series.  But later reports by AP and the LA Times made it clear that the changes were made by Comedy Central executives, without the consent of Parker and Stone.  Besides bleeping Muhammad references, Comedy Central also deleted a segment in which the character Kyle made a speech against intimidation and fear that didn’t even mention Muhammad’s name.

Comedy Central is refusing comment on the incident.  Too bad.  Among other things, I would like to know:

• If their concerns were for the sensibilities of religious communities in the US then why didn’t they censor the first episode?
• For for that matter why didn’t they censor the depictions/names of the other religious figures in the second episode, which were surely offensive to the Christian and Buddhist communities?
• Why did they censor a speech against intimidation and fear?  Because they support intimidation and fear?
• Why are they kowtowing to a Takfiri fringe group when peaceful Muslims in the US have not complained (as far as I am able to tell)?

Unsurprisingly, said fringe group seems to be emboldened.  Revolutionmuslim.com released a rambling statement on April 21 “clarifying” their position on the South Park episode.  As justification for their complaints about the episode it invokes the master narrative of the crusades and the rhetorical vision of Islam under withering assault from those who would see it destroyed.

Extolling the virtues of free speech they say:

the principle of free speech, as envisioned by the founding fathers of the United States and by wise men and women throughout the ages, is a universal principle that may protect citizens from political, economic, or religious persecution.

Of course they declined to apply this weapon against religious persecution five months ago when their comrades in Africa prayed “Oh Allah, allow the mujahideen to strike Jews, Christians and their apostate agents!” (from partiislamique.blogspot.com, 11/30/2009).

Undermining the claim that their original post was not a death threat, they say:

As for the Islamic ruling on the situation, then this is clear. There is no difference of opinion from those with any degree of a reputation that the punishment is death. Ibn Taymiyyah a great scholar of Islam says, “Whoever curses the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) -a Muslim or a non Muslim- then he must be killed…and this is the opinion of the general body of Islamic scholars.”

So here is a group that hides behind freedom of speech to promote violent ideology and make death threats against people, while denying the same right to others who engage in nothing more harmful than religious satire in an animated cartoon.  And Comedy Central hands them a victory, basically saying that they’re right.  Way to go guys.

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In his book Fighting the War of Ideas like Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists, J. Michael Waller argues that the United States already has a “secret weapon worse than death,” and it is cheap, readily available and easy to deploy. That weapon is ridicule.

Although the suggestion that ridicule and satire are legitimate tools of strategic communication might receive some – dare I say it – ridicule, Waller’s argument is a good one. Ridicule and satire have a long history in warfare, and they have been deployed both offensively and defensively. In the U.S., ridicule was used in the Revolutionary War, both to mock the British troops and to raise the morale of the American fighters. In WWII, domestic use of ridicule targeted Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. In a more contemporary example, Waller cites Team America: World Police as an example of effective parody of Islamic terrorists and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il.  While a movie that features graphic sex between puppets might not have universal appeal, Waller is correct in pointing out that prior to the movie, American audiences would likely not consider the Korean dictator someone to laugh at.

Nor is humiliation merely a Western conception. In pre-Islamic society in the Middle East, law breakers were often mutilated – either whipped or dismembered – as much for purposes of humiliation as pain. They became living symbols of what befell criminals in the community. Ridicule was also used as a weapon of war in both pre-Islamic and early Islamic society and poets were often assassinated because of their power to create and spread ridicule. Today, Waller argues, “many extremists equate ridicule with pain or death.” Bin Laden himself has been quoted as saying he fears humiliation more than death. Well known strategic advice says ‘know your enemy.’ If your enemy fears humiliation over death – which would serve to make him a martyr – then the use of ridicule seems highly appropriate:

In nearly every aspect of society and across culture and time, ridicule works. Ridicule leverages the emotions and simplifies the complicated and takes on the powerful, in politics, business, law, entertainment, the media, literature, culture, sports and romance. Ridicule can tear down faster than the other side can rebuild. It can smash a theoretical or intellectual construct (p. 95).

Jarret Brachman makes a similar argument:

If there’s one thing I’ve learned about jihadis in my career it’s this: they are our secret weapon in the fight against jihadis… they are more than happy to point us in the directions of their weaknesses.

Brachman has coined the term ‘jihobbyists’ to refer to a growing number of armchair terrorists, who cheer on extremism from the web. The term, and the attitude that accompany it, have ‘stirred the pot’ in a most revealing way: “What you find by doing this is that the jihadis can’t not respond. And what they respond to is what they are most sensitive about.” And as Brachman points out, what really gets under the skin of these jihbbyists is not an insult to their ideology or religious beliefs, but the suggestion they still live in their mother’s basement. After all, it is very difficult to maintain a serious and terrifying self image when you get compared to this guy.

Waller’s suggestions regarding the strategic use of ridicule are an expansion of arguments he and others have made about the importance of language use in ‘the war of ideas.’ In ‘buying into’ terrorist’s language – especially by using terms such as jihad and mujahidin – Waller argues that the U.S. and its allies, “ceased fighting on our terms and placed our ideas at the enemy’s disposal” (p. 54). If this is a war of ideas, and words are weapons, then we need to be using the right ammunition, so to speak. More than that:

Being a declared adversary – even enemy – of the United States is a status symbol among the world’s terrorists, dictators, and political extremists. By taking that enemy too seriously, by hyping it up as a threat, the United States is unintentionally credentializing a heretofore insignificant individual or group, and giving it the stature it needs to rise above its own society, establish itself, attract recruits, and gain influence. Ridicule can cut the enemy down to size (p. 104).

According Waller (p. 109), ridicule is vital because:

• It sticks;
• The target can’t refute it;
• It is almost impossible to repress;
• It spreads on its own and multiplies with each re-telling;
• It boosts morale at home;
• Our enemy shows far greater intolerance to ridicule than we;
• Ridicule divides the enemy, damages its morale, and makes it less attractive to supporters and prospective recruits; and
• The ridicule-armed warrior need not fix a physical sight on the target. Ridicule will find its own way to the targeted individual. To the enemy, being ridiculed means losing respect. It means losing influence. It means losing followers and repelling potential new backers

While Al Qaeda and its ideological offshoots are certainly not insignificant, one recent event that would seem to support Waller’s case and would have been an excellent opportunity to ‘deploy’ ridicule is that of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, commonly known as the ‘underwear bomber.’ Although nothing these days drives the current 24-hour news cycle like the mention of terrorist activity, the facts are that the would-be bomber of the Christmas day flight quite literally sewed explosives into his underwear… and then couldn’t ‘get it off.’

Also, given Waller’s arguments, the appropriate response to Bin Laden’s (alleged) praise for the attack – nearly a month after the fact when intelligence analysis suggested that the video was an example of Al Qaeda struggling to maintain relevance – came not from major media outlets, but from The Daily Show. Snore indeed.  Another, more general example of ridicule that is aimed at the idea of the suicide bomber is a ventriloquist routine by comedian Jeff Dunham, titled Achmed the Dead Terrorist, an example Waller points to in his own blog.

This is not to suggest that the threat of terrorism is non-existent or a call to underestimate Al Qaeda’s ideological appeal or material capabilities, and Waller is quick to point out (correctly) that ridicule can be as dangerous as any kinetic weapon when improperly deployed. In the nine years since September 11, however, far more people in the United States have died of heart failure, diabetes, or car accidents than terrorist attacks. Given this, pointing out that Americans statistically have more to fear from a cheeseburger than a ‘guy in a cave’ is not only true, it’s good strategy.

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In the war of ideas for the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world, cultural diplomacy can go a long way. The US government may not be very popular abroad, but our cultural products certainly are. Many Muslims hate our policies, but they still love our movies, listen to our pop music, and cheer for our athletes. Extremists, on the other hand, actively try to disseminate monolithic images of “the other” to their audiences. Al-Qaeda loves to reduce Americans to the archetypal “Crusader” with a singular malevolent purpose. Our films, music, arts, and athletes, can profoundly disrupt and subvert such efforts.

In the age of twenty-four hour news networks, websites, blogs and YouTube, there is no shortage of information out there for inquiring minds to consume. To command a sizable audience amidst such a saturated media landscape (mediascape), many outlets have resorted to promoting outrageous opinions and personalities to garner public attention (i.e. ratings and readers). Thus, the outrageous polarized voices of inflammatory right-wing pundits and snarky left-wing cynics have become a daily fixture of our mediascape and the “old school” journalism of Walter Cronkite has been relegated to the News Hour on PBS.

Even a casual glance through the headlines of the major news sites and magazine stands reveals a disturbing preoccupation with stories about people with names like “Snookie” or “J-Lo.”  Judging by these sorts of headlines, one might not think there’s much going on in the world. But according to UNICEF, some 16,000 children die every day from hunger-related causes (1 every 6 seconds). The world spends well over $1 trillion dollars each year on military expenditures.  Every twenty minutes another species goes extinct. And despite the recent attention, people were suffering and struggling in Haiti long before the devastating earthquake on January 12, 2010. So why is the vapid cast of “Jersey Shore” still getting front page attention when the world has no shortage of urgent and horrific matters to report?

People love (even worship) celebrities.

This is nothing new, of course. Some celebrities have even used their cultural deification for good in the world and lent their names and images to important causes. Some of them might adopt causes for publicity or to fix a sullied public image (e.g. Paris Hilton), but I like to believe that most do it out of real compassion for their fellow human beings and the environment they live in. I guess I have “faith” in a few of these “gods.”

Last month, I was part of a planning committee for a grant proposal that would create a major conference on our campus featuring keynote speakers from academia, government, journalism, and the wild world of celebrity-activism. The core idea behind the conference was making specialized academic expertise about Islam accessible to public policymakers and the public-at-large. The inclusion of a celebrity-activist in our proposal was a response to the public’s preoccupation with celebrity-culture and how “ivory tower” intellectuals struggle to get their ideas and perspectives out into the crowded mediascape. After all, how many Americans would even know where Darfur is located if George Clooney hadn’t traveled to see Sudanese refugees with a film crew following him? The “bread and circuses” of the first world are too distracting for most people.

Communicating to a large public audience seems to require the aid of a celebrity spokesperson, ideally one with some credentials and intellectual clout who cannot simply be dismissed for adopting a “pet project.” A lot of NGOs and charities understand this concept. So why doesn’t our government?

No matter how hard they try to be “stars,” congressmen, senators, governors, and other politicians, are not “real” celebrities – although some admittedly exist in both worlds (e.g. Schwarzenegger, Franken, Reagan). President Obama certainly has celebrity status. But if the United States is truly interested in reaching out to the everyday people of the Muslim world and subverting the “clash of civilizations” rhetoric of Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Awlaki, we need to bring out the big guns of celebrity firepower through cultural diplomacy.

Even people who hate the U.S. government and its policies love American cultural products, including our movies, music, and athletes. It’s easy for Bin Laden to talk about waging holy war on the land of the “Crusaders” George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, but it’s another thing to convince a kid in Cairo or Riyadh to wage jihad on Leonardo Dicaprio, LeBron James, Will Smith, and Johnny Depp. People in the Muslim world, many of which remain under authoritarian regimes, are understandably distrustful of governments and politicians. It’s easy for the Arab and Muslim street to dismiss the promises and claims of a Secretary of State or U.S. Ambassador reading a speech off of a teleprompter beside representatives of an unelected regime. An American movie star visiting a Muslim city with a charming smile and polite handshake would probably do a better job at disrupting the “Crusader” image constructed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates than a thousand government speeches and photo-ops. In 1971, we used table tennis or “ping-pong diplomacy” to improve U.S.-Chinese relations; what are we doing in the Muslim world today?

I propose a large-scale U.S. cultural ambassador program to university campuses and cities throughout the Muslim world. In 2007, the State Department conducted a program in China that featured Cal Ripken Jr. and organized youth baseball clinics in four cities. This was too brief to be truly effective. And as much as I love baseball, it is not a popular U.S. export to the Muslim world. So an extension of this program to a country like Syria or Jordan would likely be ill-advised. In terms of athletes, we’d be better off sending stars from the NBA – maybe the kids in Amman would enjoy seeing a dunk contest. Basketball is much easier to set-up and play than baseball – especially in crowded, impoverished and arid cities. Movie stars also need to be enlisted. American movies are everywhere. When I lived in Cairo, there were American movies on broadcast television a couple of times a week. The biggest obstacle might be convincing American movie stars to participate between awards ceremonies.

It is equally important to point out that this sort of cultural diplomacy needs to go both ways. There are a lot of people in the United States who – out of fear, ignorance, or anger – carry disturbing attitudes about Muslims that influence our public discourse and the conduct of our elected government (for the worse). These folks likely won’t listen to an informed professor down at the local university or pick up a copy of his or her over-priced academic hardcover at the bookstore, but they might show up to hear Natalie Portman talk about these issues and share her personal insights as someone who has worked and lived in the Middle East (Portman is Co-Chair of a village banking program with Queen Rania of Jordan). People might also sit down in a theater together to watch a play performed by American and Muslim actors, like the brilliant Ghassan Massoud of Syria. American audiences would undoubtedly find it hard to see the zealous jihadi of their fears in an actor creating a work of art on stage beside their fellow countrymen.

In all, the last thing America needs to do is allow U.S.-Muslim relations to be dictated by or restricted to the events on the battlefield when we are all a part of so much more than the characters imagined by both sides of the “War on Terror.”

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In an AP wire story picked up by numerous print and online media, Russell Contreras writes about discovering the “new movement” of Muslim-Hindu punk bands (including Boston’s the Kominas). The implication is that we are witnessing a new youth music movement that might serve as a challenge to religious fundamentalism and its extremist outcomes.  It’s a great bit of publicity for the band, but it reflects the author’s lack of prior awareness about the music rather than a description of a breaking music movement.  In fact Muslim punk is nothing new.

Punk rock was invented by New York’s The Ramones, who took a couple chords, played them loud and fast, and added lyrics that reflected their comic books and B-movies sensibilities. After the Ramones played an early show in London, with future members of seminal British punk bands the Clash, the Damned, and the Sex Pistols in the audience, the music and movement quickly bloomed there. It went through the first of many changes, however, as British punk was more political (reflecting the direr economic situation there), and people such as Malcom McClaren linked it to colorful, shocking fashion and art. Musical skills increased on both sides of the Atlantic, but in the United States the bands began to eschew what had become peacock-like fashion for a simpler look and sound that lost some of the pop tinges of of both the Ramones and British punk, and thus “hardcore” was born. Punk rock and hardcore branched out in all sorts of directions: new wave and post punk, straight edge (whose adherents foreswear sex, alcohol and drugs), vegan hardcore, Krishnacore, emo, pop-punk, grunge, crossover and thrash (punk fused with heavy metal), and even so-called Christian punk, to name just a few.

All of this occurred mostly under the radar of mainstream media, until the early 1990s (or, as some state more precisely, 1991, “The Year Punk Broke“). Bands such as Sonic Youth and Nirvana played punk-influenced music that was radio friendly, and hence radio stations played them and they became huge. There were plenty of earlier bands that got some limited radio airplay in the United States, most notably the Clash (albeit far past their prime); in the late 1970s British punk bands were all over the British charts. Most of punk remained underground (although subjected to more outside attention that usual), but plenty of bands formed to play radio friendly pop with a “punk” edge and look, and this genre of music is now well established. It was also around this time that “jocks” stopped beating up “punks” and joined them at concerts.

Why the brief history of punk? Because throughout this entire evolution, punk bands formed all over the world, including Hindu and Muslim countries, and including Hindus and Muslims — nominal and practicing — in the United States, consistent with the DIY (do-it-yourself) ethos of the movement (often there was a time lag, but always there were local musical and cultural elements). Maximum Rock and Roll, the standard bearing ‘zine for hardcore and punk (published since 1982, with roots to 1977), published “Scene Reports” from around the world that chronicled bands and the scenes that supported them. Muslims playing punk rock is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is the environment today (or post 9-11) that is new.

Popular and “underground” music has always had an air of rebellion; punk rock merely turned up the volume. Music has provided a space for young people to express themselves and their identities, to question the cultural assumptions of their environments and to push for social change (COMOPS Journal has already published blog posts on heavy metal and rap). Social commentary and criticism has a long history in American music (from slaves’ work songs to Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit” to punk tours such as Rock Against Reagan).

So what about the Kominas and the so-called “Taqwacore”? To my ears half of their music stands close to the radio friendly side of punk, with others a bit noisier (some songs can be heard on their myspace page). Their tunes blend funk and ska, and borrow heavily from their forebearers. “Sharia Law in the USA” is derived from the Sex Pistols “Anarchy in the UK,” for example, and “Suicide Bomb the Gap” echoes the Big Boys’ taste for funk (and Kool and the Gang). Some of their music blends South Asian elements, but this isn’t new (remember the Rolling Stones “Paint it Black” and the Beatles “Norwegian Wood”?).

The notion of Taqwacore is interesting, although this is still American music played in the United States. They may face derision from some Muslim members of their audiences, but they won’t face beheading for apostacy. With the expansion of new media and the ease of global communication, it would be interesting to see if the Kaminas had any influence on bands elsewhere — I’m sure they’ve got fans whose only connection to the band is the internet. What would be infinitely more interesting, however, would be to see how punk bands made up of faithful Muslims are faring in Muslim countries with oppressive social environments and strong pressure to conform. They do exist — I’ve seen them in Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1990s — but it’s much harder for westerners to gain access to their music or to be able to gauge their impacts.

Interesting though this may be from a cultural point of view, the fact is that Muslims punk has been around for years.  It’s doubtful that this latest spurt from the movement signals anything new with respect to resisting extremism or the religious establishment.

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Dwarfed by the stories of the earthquake tragedy in Padang, yesterday Indonesian media picked up a sensational statement issued at the Jakarta police headquarters. According to police spokesman Nanan Sukarna, police investigators have discovered evidence that the corpse of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Noordin Top showed signs of anal trauma consistent with sodomy, leading to speculation that he might have been bisexual.

The article (published by inilah.com) began curiously by differentiating investigatory police and police doctors, and stated that “information that the terrorist Noordin Top enjoyed relationships with men should not be spread to the public.” (All translations in this piece by the author). The story ended with a quote from Nanan: “This is the doctor’s secret. Indeed I do not know who was stating this. It has to be kept secret, it cannot be announced. There is a code of ethics, it is a problem of visum etrepesum (sic: repertum).”

Yet for whom was the article, which reported details of the investigation, intended if not the public? How many nods and winks were shared between reporter and spokesman, the understanding that this “news” would of course be disseminated? Disseminated it was, with slight variations. Surya online was more discreet, but quoted University of Indonesia forensic specialist Dr. Mun’im Idris as saying there were “peculiarities.” The flagship paper of eastern Indonesia, Pos Kupang, also quoted Dr. Mu’nim but more directly: “Yes, there is damage to Noordin’s anus.” Perhaps the best example of the nod-and-wink game is the reporting from Kompas, Indonesia’s most respected national newspaper. “Nanan: The Matter of Noordin’s Anus has to be Kept Secret” the headline blared. To its credit, Kompas got the Latin for autopsy report correct.

As to be expected, today the story was picked up and broadcast by blogs and other online sources, including those outside of  Indonesia. “Fact! Noordin was Frequently Sodomized!” screamed Malaysia’s Topix.com, which was the first response to the author’s Google search of “Noordin Dubur (anus).” Blog comments are multiplying rapidly, with sides being chosen. “Character assassination!” screamed one, as though being gay (or sexually deviant) was worse than being a murdering terrorist, and implying that Noordin had any character left to assassinate.

The latent conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia the author described in a previous blog post is surfacing. “Noordin Top Appears to be Homosexual (a Reflection of the [religious] Hypocrisy of Malingsia Society),” screams another Topix.com report. The author described the term “Malingsia,” combining the word for “thief” with Malaysia, in a previous post, but this news has brought to the fore another derogatory term for Indonesians to refer to Malaysians: “Magaysia.”

The story was also broadcast on television. Jakarta’s Metro TV reported the story with footage of Dr. Mun’im.  The report also stated that a spokesman for Noordin’s family in Malaysia, Badarudin Ismail, denied the report. In a Detik.com story, Badarudin argued that it simply was not possible; after all, Noordin had wives and children. The naivete in this statement boggles the mind.

Of course this kind of report does not necessarily mean that if it was indeed sex that caused the “irregularities” that it was necessarily sex between Noordin and another man. That being said, Dede Oetomo, among Indonesia’s best known and widely respected gay rights and political activists, has spoken to me about gay sex in the context of pesantren (Islamic boarding school) dormitories, arguing essentially that what else would one expect when pubescent boys are sequestered with other pubescent boys in tight quarters.

Homosexuality in Indonesia and Malaysia has a dual nature. On the one hand, transexuals and transvestites (“banci” or “waria”) are openly tolerated as they sing or play instruments and busk in public. On the other, however, discourse dominated by religious conservatives condemns homosexuality and has led to anti-gay violence. Gay activists, such as Dede, continue to struggle for their rights and recognition.

A report today by the English language Jakarta Globe speculated that the forensic results could have been caused by hidden explosives. Regardless, the tactics of the Jakarta police — to announce something publicly as a something that must be kept secret — shows how they are willing to use the information to further discredit Noordin and his terrorist ilk. True or not, this raises the question of whether he needed further discrediting following his heinous acts of terrorism.

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In the September 10 cover story on ForeignPolicy.com Jarret Brachman warns the Obama administration to pay careful attention to al-Qaeda’s new Libyan-born media darling, Abu Yahya al-Libi. He writes:

Whether he’s shown traipsing through valleys, target shooting with his buddies, reciting poetry on a mountaintop, or breaking bread with his students, Abu Yahya seems to have made al-Qaeda ‘cool’ for a younger generation. . . A lifelong student with an easy smile and a gift for gab, Abu Yahya sees the world quite differently. For him, al Qaeda’s fight is not just about unseating Arab governments or pushing U.S. troops out of the Middle East. In this paradigm, al Qaeda is first and foremost an intellectual and religio-ideological insurgency — not just a terrorist group. Its goal is to capture the imagination of Muslims worldwide. . . Abu Yahya’s goal is nothing short of remaking Islam from the inside out, and he does so in a candid, compelling, and inherently populist fashion. In other words, what we know about how al Qaeda does business is about to completely change.

If these ominous predictions prove true, then the Obama administration will need to employ a new strategy to respond to al-Libi’s efforts. Brachman suggests that the administration’s immediate response should be an expansion of U.S. intelligence agencies that includes better funding and staff, especially for the translation and analysis of terrorist communiqués. “We must combat Abu Yahya’s al-Qaeda today,” he warns, “before it takes us by surprise tomorrow.”

But I’m not so sure that pumping more money into the CIA, NSA, and other intelligence agencies for further expansion is an adequate response (although there’s no question that more linguists are needed). That seems like business as usual. It’s been eight years since September 11, 2001.  They still can’t seem to locate that old Egyptian vlogger Zawahiri, or his tall Saudi friend with kidney problems. Perhaps we should think outside of the conventional anti-terrorism box for a fresh approach to responding to someone like Abu Yahya al-Libi.

A good approach would be to support hip-hop.

That’s right.  We should turn to the urban music genre born among disenfranchised African-Americans in the city of New York three decades ago.  It now rakes in hundreds of millions of dollars every year for folks with names like Jay-Z, Eminem, Lil’ Wayne, and the Black Eyed Peas. It’s one of America’s most popular exports around the world, including the Muslim world.

In the age of iTunes, a new hip-hop track can be recorded in Chicago, converted to an MP3, and sent across the world to listeners in Pakistan in hours. But before you start sending off your copy of Eminem’s Relapse to your penpal in Ramallah, let me clarify the strategy I’m presenting. I’m not talking about the sort of hip-hop you’d typically find playing at a house party in LA or an underground club in the Bronx. I’m talking about a particular sub-genre called “Muslim hip-hop.”

Given the history of Islam among African-Americans (principally in the form of Elijah Muhammad’s N.O.I. movement and its more orthodox Sunni successors) it shouldn’t be a surprise to anyone that hip-hop is a popular vehicle for Muslim religious expression. When you also consider that poetry has been one of the most prized art forms in the Muslim world going back to the time of the Prophet, and that drums are one of the few instruments that even ultra-conservative Muslims tolerate, the popularity of hip-hop seems natural.

In its most basic form, Muslim hip-hop is Muslim poetry set to drum beats. Add in the emotional parallels between the plight of African-Americans and, for example, impoverished Algerians living in ghettos outside of Paris or Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and the analogy becomes even clearer. The frustration and lyrical protest evident in many hip-hop albums (e.g. Black Star, Public Enemy) resonates among Muslim youth both here in the United States and abroad. I myself have listened to the late Tupac Shakur while sitting in a Cairo internet café.

Muslim hip-hop can be divided into a number of sub-groups. There are Muslims who produce mainstream hip-hop albums that may only contain the occasional religious song or lyrics (e.g. Mos Def, Napoleon, Everlast, Q-Tip). Then there are Muslim artists that are more deliberately “Islamic” in orientation, but their religious lyrics are blended with pop culture and reflect mainstream music trends. This means they may contain the occasional impious curse word or lustful confession (e.g. Brother Ali, Kumasi). Then we have the “pious” Muslim artists (e.g. Native Deen, Loon, Khalil Ismail) that typically exclude curse words or improper subjects (e.g. sexuality).

Within this broad swathe, we’re also going to find a range of quality among Muslim hip-hop artists. On one end of the spectrum we have a multi-millionaire superstar like Mos Def. Then in the middle of the spectrum we have a little known underground artist like Tyson Amir with legitimate talent. And then on the opposite end we have the “garage band” type artists who are truly terrible, but who may find an audience due to their special Muslim niche and the free marketing avenues provided by the internet.

Won’t these artists rap about poppin’ caps into the kuffar?  As with mainstream hip-hop, some artists express controversial positions.  But much Muslim Rap delivers messages that the U.S. can get behind.  Let’s take a look at some lyrics by Muslim hip-hop artist Tyson Amir from his song “Deen Tight” (the music video is here):

I see hip-hop potentially winning the hearts

Of men and women throughout the globe

Hoping our children grow into folks

Who show love and respect

That know themselves

And protect the rights of others

Wanting for themselves what they want for their sisters and brothers

A beautiful thing, man, this dream can come true

Peace spread to the edge of the earth

Ain’t no reason for me to fight you

Instead I invite you

To listen to these words, meditate, and learn

Because for something like this to happen

We all gotta work.

Prior to the election of Barack Obama, the U.S. government was a common subject for criticism and derision among hip-hop artists of all stripes. But there has been a fundamental change since the election of President Obama. For evidence, see Will.i.am’s now famous “Yes We Can” video supporting Obama’s campaign (it has over 19 million views), or the joy expressed in the opening of Brother Ali’s song “Mr. President.”

The idea of hip-hop artists engaging in an outreach campaign to Muslim youth around the world during the Bush administration would have been unthinkable. Not anymore. So if terrorism analysts like Brachman are worried about Abu Yahya making al-Qaeda look “cool” to Muslim youth, then let’s respond with one of America’s coolest exports: hip-hop.

Honestly, do you think Muslim youths would rather listen to Abu Yahya or Mos Def? Would they rather run around in the hills of Afghanistan in a turban, or rock a NY Yankees hat as they drive to a mosque in downtown Cairo? Young Muslims need channels to express their frustrations, emotions, and angst, just like youths anywhere else in the world. Extremists have seized on this fact and channeled Muslim youths toward violence and militant rebellion. Let’s give them a “cool” alternative.

(Editor’s note:  For a related story on another seemingly unlikely art form for reaching Muslim youth, see this earlier COMOPS Journal post)

UPDATE: May 5, 2010 – I corrected the transcription of the lyrics for the song “Deen Tight” by Tyson Amir.

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Over the last year it has become increasingly apparent to progressive Indonesian Muslim intellectuals and political leaders that there is a clear association between the spread of Wahhabi religious teachings and political extremism. In the weeks following the Ritz-Carlton and J. W. Marriott bombings in Jakarta, discourse about the dangers of Wahhabism has intensified because it is now clear that Wahhabi-oriented Indonesian extremists carried out the attacks.

It is also clear that only a small minority of the Indonesian Muslims who accept Wahhabi religious teachings are violent extremists. Most practice the austere, puritanical and religiously intolerant version of Islam, not for political reasons, but because they believe that this is what God intended Islam to be.[1] It is equally clear that almost all violent extremists in Indonesia, and most of the rest of the Sunni Muslim world, justify violence on the basis of Wahhabi teachings.[2]

In a previous posting I described efforts by the Saudi Arabian state, foundations and wealthy individuals to use economic enticements to spread Wahhabism as a new form of colonialism, the goal of which is to radically transform most aspects of Indonesian cultures. I did not invent the term “Wahhabi Colonialism.” I first heard it nearly a year ago from a horse cart driver who used it to describe Saudi attempts to link disaster relief with the acceptance of Wahhabi religious teachings.

In the last year this perception has become increasingly common. “Wahhabi” is now a derogatory term among those who reject political extremism and puritanical religious teachings. It is frequently associated with political extremism, religious bigotry and violence. Saidiman (many Indonesians have only one name) from the Liberal Islam Network made the point very clearly:

Many observers argued that almost every militant Islamic movement today is part of, or at least influenced by, Wahhabism. Where trouble is found, Wahhabism may thrive. Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaida, which have been launching several terrors across the world for years, have officially adopted this ideology. Wahhabi extremism and terrorism continue to plague Indonesia, although its real supporters in this country are few in number.

Those who accept some or all Wahhabi religious teachings but who reject political extremism are increasingly defensive. Even the leaders of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperity Party, PKS), the Islamist political party with strong ties with Wahhabi religious teachings and the political agenda and tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood, now emphatically deny that they are Wahhabis.

In March 2009, PKS founder and former presidential candidate Hidayat Nurwahid called charges that PKS is Wahhabi “slanderous.” His reasoning was that the charge could not possibly true because PKS is a political party, and political parties are forbidden in Saudi Arabia. Nurwahid received a Ph.D. in Dakwah (propagation of the faith) the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia in 1992. He could not have better Wahhabi credentials. Very few Indonesians, other than PKS cadres, found his statement credible.

I described PKS’s tepid, almost defensive, response to the Jakarta bombings in a previous posting. There are aspects of the struggle against Wahhabism that are, for many Indonesians, more important than politics, and even bombings, because they are about very basic religious matters. They are not about life and death, but rather, life after death.[3]  These struggles are not overtly political but have political implications. One of the factors that limits the appeal of PKS and other Islamist groups is that they share the Wahhabi view that religious practices most Indonesian Muslims regard as basic elements of Islam are actually forbidden (haram) and that people who participate in them are destined for the fires of hell.

Indonesian Muslims take this issue very seriously. PKS leaders avoid public discussion of these issues, probably because they are aware that publicizing the party’s Wahhabi positions would limit its electoral appeal. The condemnation of traditional Islam and the teaching that “PKS Islam is the only Islam” play important roles in “in group” discussions and cadre training. Most politically aware Indonesians know about the party’s Wahhabi religious orientation. Many find PKS claims to be “pluralistic” unconvincing and believe that were it to come to power, it would move rapidly towards the formation of an authoritarian Islamic state based on a Saudi model, at least as far as religious and legal matters are concerned.

These issues have led the religiously conservative, but politically progressive, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) to become the most articulate opponent of political Islamism and Wahhabi religious views linked to it. Denunciation of devotional practices concerning the veneration of saints and prayers for dead has always been at the core of the Wahhabi religious agenda. The Saudis are literally despised by the majority of the world’s Muslims because they have desecrated the tombs of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca and Medina. NU was founded in 1928 in part as a protest against what traditional Indonesian Muslims consider to be Wahhabi sacrilege.

Pilgrimage to the graves of saints, especially the nine legendary Wali (saints) believed to have been responsible for the spread of Islam in Java (Indonesia’s most populous island) is an important component of the type of Islam NU expounds. Tens of thousands of Indonesian Muslims visit the tombs of the Walis, and lesser-known tombs of local saints, every day. They range from villagers, including the horse cart driver from whom I first heard the expression “Wahhabi colonialism” to many of Indonesia’s most prominent political and intellectual figures. They do not like to be told that they are going to hell.

Debates about religious practice are now closely associated with, and are indeed a part of, those concerning Indonesia’s political future. The intensity of this conflict was driven home to me today (August 16) when I attended a “Muslim Fair” supported by PKS and other Islamist organizations. PKS was actually one of the more moderate groups taking part in the event.

The fair featured booths selling Islamist and jihadi books, jihadi videos depicting the Taliban and bin Laden as “heroes of Islam,”  “Muslim” clothing, herbal medicines which many Islamists believe to be more effective than “Jewish” western medicines, and a speech by the Islamist cleric Abu Bakar Basyir, who only a few days ago offered prayers at the funerals of the Jakarta suicide bombers. Basyir is the spiritual leader of the violent Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah that was responsible for a series of attacks on western targets in Indonesia beginning with a foiled attempt to blow up airliners in flight over the Pacific Ocean in 1995 and including the 2002 “Bali bombings.”

In his Yogyakarta address Basyir was circumspect. He was only mildly critical of the bombers stating that, in his opinion, jihad is not an appropriate strategy for Indonesian Islamists at the present time. Almost in the same breath he described the Jakarta suicide bombers as martyrs; martyrs go directly to heaven when they die. Basyir also wrote a laudatory introduction to a series of posthumously published books by the three men executed for planning and carrying out the Bali attacks in which he described them as martyrs, who, of course, go directly to heaven.

Basyir is careful not to implicate himself in the planning or conduct of terrorist attacks. His statements and actions make it very clear that he endorses them, while at the same time doing nothing to give security forces “probable cause” that he is involved in planning them. Indonesians who have met him say this is in keeping with his usual practice. When people who are planning attacks seek his blessing, he generally does not respond directly, but his facial expressions clearly indicate approval or displeasure.

In addition to jihadi materials, there were books denouncing traditional Muslim devotional practices as unbelief. Some of these were Indonesian translations of standard Arabic Wahhabi texts. Others were more explicit attacks on traditional Indonesian Islam, including one describing pilgrimage to the tombs of the Nine Walis as unbelief and as shirk.[4]  Shirk is the association of other beings or powers with God. It is often translated as “polytheism.” It is a very serious sin that God will not forgive. People who practice it go to hell.

I chatted for a time with a group of PKS cadres who told me that this was a very good book because it applied general “Islamic” principles in an Indonesian context. I ask them whether people who visit tombs will go to hell. They replied in the affirmative. I bought a copy of the book and other research materials including a small collection of jihadi videos, had lunch some students from one of Yogyakarta’s secular universities and listened while they explained that re-establishing the Caliphate was the solution to Indonesia’s, and the world’s, problems.[5] They also provided me with a recording of Basyir’s sermon.

With the exception of Basyir’s speech, this Muslim Fair was a very unremarkable Islamist event similar to many others I have attended in the last 18 months. There were books on childcare, business management, the TOEFL exam and large numbers of children’s books and videos. This was entirely reasonable as most in attendance were young people in their twenties and thirties, many of whom brought small children with them. For many, the fair was a “family outing.” This speaks to the extent that a distinctive sub-culture of Islamist extremism has developed in Indonesia. Because substantial numbers of children are being raised in this sub-culture, the struggle against extremism will continue for generations. It is for this reason that Islamists are strongly natalist and promote polygamy as a strategy for producing more Islamist children. Many Islamist leaders, including those of PKS practice polygamy. Most progressive Muslims oppose it. I encountered several polygamous families at the fair.

Returning home, I checked my e-mail and found messages from an NU mailing list directing me to the organization’s Indonesian language website.  Several articles spoke of the need to combat political extremism. One explained that suicide bombers are definitely not martyrs. Because suicide is a very serious sin, it is, therefore, likely that they will go to hell. This is the strongest possible Islamic critique of suicide bombings.

Another message directly confronted Islamic critiques of traditional religious practice. It described a ceremony commemorating the death of the founder of one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic schools. Nuril Huda, the chairman of the NU dakwah committee, addressed the issue of Wahhabism very politely, but very firmly. He stated, “it is very disturbing that groups with the same basis as Wahhabis” are spreading propaganda according to which religious practices such as visiting graves “are not in accordance with Islamic guidance.” He continued that if members of these groups did not understand or had questions about these rituals, that they should, “seek guidance and clarification from NU scholars and teachers.” He concluded:

We will provide them with detailed religious proofs concerning all of the rituals we perform. We are not stupid people. As far as the Holy Books are concerned, we know very much more about them than people who can only read them in translation.

Huda’s concluding remark is stronger than it might appear. Fluency in Classical Arabic is an almost universally acknowledged as being essential for those would claim religious authority. Very few Indonesian Islamists, including PKS cadres, have this knowledge. All NU scholars and leaders do. At the same time his rhetorical style is the antithesis of that of Wahhabi activists. Huda did not refer to his opponents as kafir (unbelievers) but rather suggested that they are ignorant, deluded and in need of proper religious guidance.

This style is in keeping with Javanese and other Indonesian cultural values of politeness and rhetorical moderation and with the common Islamic theological view that only God can know who is a Muslim and who is not. It is dakwah in the sense that it is a call or invitation for errant believers to return to the straight path of Islam. It was also a very charitable offer, because Islamic law holds that a Muslim who calls a Muslim a kafir, becomes a kafir him/herself. It is a very serious sin, which if not recanted, will also lead to hell.

An NU student commented on line: “Looks like war, ya?” That is exactly what it is. The struggle against political extremism is also a struggle against the religious ideologies used to support and maintain it. Islamists seek to undermine traditional religious authorities who oppose political violence by propagating a version of Islam that holds traditional Muslim devotions to be “unbelief.” NU has now made it clear that it will engage forcefully in this struggle.

This is a theological war that can only be waged by Muslims, wielding theological weapons of their own making. The out come of this struggle will, however, significantly impact political struggles contested by progressive and extremist Muslim groups and are of greater interest and importance for the global community.

* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University. He is Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, both in Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

Notes

[1] On Wahhabism see, N. DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, for a sympathetic perspective and H. Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, New York: Islamic Publication International, 2002, for a more critical view. The term Wahhabi is used in many different ways. In a strict historical sense it refers to Muslims who subscribe to the teachings of the Arabian Hanbalite jurist Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92) who sought to purge Islam of what he believed to be unlawful innovation in matters of religious practice. In contemporary Indonesia the term is used to refer to Muslims and Muslim organizations that use contemporary Saudi Arabian Islam as a model for belief and practice and condemn other forms of Islam and local cultures as unbelief.

[2] The evidence linking Wahhabi religious teachings with violent extremism is extensive and irrefutable. It is also important to keep in mind the fact that this is correlation, not causation. Some advocates of theological positions very similar to those of Wahhabis concerning religious practice are apolitical. Others are politically progressive and advocate human rights, religious and cultural pluralism, democracy and gender equality. A blanket denunciation of Wahhabi religious teachings as a cause of violence would be an irresponsible and reprehensible witch-hunt.

[3] I have included references to the consequences of human action for the after life in this paper because it is an issue of paramount importance in Indonesia and other Muslim societies. Because this issue is of such importance, an analysis that fails to consider it is necessarily incomplete.

[4] I. Muhammad Ali, Penjelasan Gamblang Seputar Hukum Ziarah Wali Songo, Bekasi Barat: Pustaka Al-Ummat, 2007.

[5] Students at Islamic universities are much less inclined towards extremist political or religious views because they have much more sophisticated understanding of Islamic texts and teachings.

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