“If a group of people feels that it has been humiliated and that its honor has been trampled underfoot, it will want to express its identity.”                                                                                                                       – Abdolkarim Soroush

In a recent NY Times Op-Ed, Professor John W. Owen of the University of Virginia argues that the electoral success of Islamists after the Arab Spring is due to Islamism’s longstanding role as the dominant voice of political dissent. He writes: “Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow.” It’s an interesting perspective, but I think it misses the mark. Islamism is not about dissent, it’s about identity.

I explored the electoral success of Ennahda in Tunisia and the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt previously on COMOPS. If you haven’t read those blog entries, I encourage you to do so. I won’t repeat that material here. Rather, I want to look at the broader issue of identity, which I think lies at the heart of Islamism’s current popularity.

As readers know, Tunisia and Egypt are the only two countries of the historic Arab Spring to hold democratic elections so far. These countries are commonly designated as Arab states. However, there was a time when the “Arab world” was restricted to the Arabian Peninsula and the southern Levant. It was only after the rise of Islam in the seventh century and the subsequent conquest of North Africa that the lands we know today as Egypt and Tunisia started a gradual shift toward “Arabness.”

‘Who is an Arab’ is a far more complex question than you might guess. The simple answer (my apologies Arabist scholars) is twofold: An Arab is someone who speaks Arabic (there’s even a saying by the Prophet Muhammad that ‘Arabness’ is conferred by the tongue) and/or shares a genealogical or cultural-historical heritage with an Arabic speaking people. Despite certain stereotypical images about what an ‘Arab’ looks like, I assure you that Arabs come in every shade and color of the human family. The Arabic language (including its enormous variety of dialects) is the real root of Arab identity. But what does this have to do with Islamist parties?

The Arabic language arrived with the Muslim expansion across North Africa in the seventh century. Arabic gradually became the dominant language of the peoples in those lands over time. This means that Islam is irrevocably bound to Arab identity, despite the fact that millions of Arabs are Christians. The Qur’an is actually the foundation of literary Arabic as we know it. The Arab tribes of the Peninsula were an oral culture and largely illiterate, and the rise of Islam transformed those conditions.

When you add in the fact that national identities (e.g. American, Iraqi) are a modern innovation developed in the West and largely imposed in North Africa by Western colonial powers, we are left with the fact that Islam served as the primary reference point for identity formation for centuries before that time, along with tribal and ancestral ties.

Jump forward to the independence movements in the Arab world of the mid-twentieth century. The British are ousted in Egypt and the French are ousted in Tunisia. The two young nation-states are independent and can choose a system of governance, including a legal system, for themselves. The dominant trend in the twentieth century was to try to ‘catch up’ to the powers of the age and borrow or adopt European systems and ideologies; not only nationalism, but socialism, communism, even fascism. This sort of borrowing extended into culture (even the way people dressed), technology and education as well. The most radical example in the region was Turkey, a non-Arab state, but still a neighbor with strong cultural ties. Among the Arabs, Tunisia came closest to following Turkey’s radical example. As we know, the post-colonial ‘experiments’ in the Arab states of Tunisia and Egypt ultimately produced the authoritarian regimes that would fall during the Arab Spring.

When Tunisians and Egyptians went to cast their votes this past year, they weren’t too concerned with particular candidates (nor were the election systems set up as such). The elections were about people expressing identities and aspirations freely, perhaps for the first time. Judging by the election results, a large segment of Tunisians and Egyptians who cast votes (note the qualifier) believe that it is important to retain or affirm an Arab-Muslim identity. So far these elections have been about asserting that sense of identity more so than caliphates or a desire to implement medieval penal codes or ban wine.

These elections also come at a time when the United States (its military might aside) is a cultural superpower across the globe. People in many parts of the world, not only in Arab states (note the NY Times recent piece on China), fear the loss of ‘who they are’ in the face of American (or Western) cultural or socioeconomic hegemony.  In my home state of Arizona, we have witnessed the strange, sometimes militant, response of Anglo-Americans who fear Hispanic cultural encroachment and cast votes accordingly. Those are identity votes too. I see little difference between them and those people in Egypt or Tunisia who vote for parties that champion longstanding identities rooted in Islam.

_____________________________

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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President Obama has now made his second trip in office to the land where he spent four years of his youth, Indonesia, while on a trip to Asia and Australia. Although Obama’s time in Indonesia was brief, he was welcomed relatively warmly by most Indonesians, who appreciate his ties to the most populous Muslim country. There are, however, plenty of people who disapproved, including the usual suspects, the Islamist extremists.

The trip is part of a plan to shore up ties and increase the US presence in Southeast Asia in order to balance a rising China, and in response to the previous administration’s general neglect of the region (one of the reasons China made such significant inroads there in the last decade). Obama also announced plans to increase the US military presence in Australia, which irked China. The disputes in the South China Sea — the Spratly and Paracel Islands — and China’s increasing assertiveness are certainly part of the decision to increase the US presence there.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia staged a protest at the American embassy prior to his visit. Although their website listed the number of demonstrators as 20,000, other sources gave estimates from hundreds to 2500.

“Why Obama (must be) Shot” is the title of a story on the ar Rahmah extremist web site. The image accompanying the story is one they and others have used before — Obama as pharaoh, invoking a strong Islamist narrative of tyranny and injustice. The caption reads “Pharaoh of this time, demon predator of Muslims.” The article goes on to repeatedly refer to Obama as a “crusader,” another powerful narrative — although an explanation of how he can be both a pharaoh and a crusader at the same time is lacking.

The articlH cites Oscar Ortega Hernandez, the 21-year-old who fired shots at the White House last week. Although Pennsylvania police stated that he was mentally disturbed (he told friends that Obama is the anti-Christ, so I guess he does have more than one thing in common with the extremists), the “psychologists” at ar Rahmah give him a clean bill of health:

Funny thing is the Pennsylvania police who arrested Oscar alleged that he suffered mental illness and was reported missing by his family since last week. Yet if you look at the published photos of Oscar, of course anyone would argue that Oscar is not mentally handicapped, but rather very healthy and very aware of what he did, namely to shoot Obama!

Not sure what they will make his tattoo of the word “Israel” — his young son’s name — on Ortega’s neck, however.

According to ar Rahmah, the plan to station Marines in Australia is simply a pretext to begin a crusade against Indonesian Muslims. In agreement with the English extremist group Muslims Against Crusades (a group recently banned by the British government), the assassination of Obama is allowed because of his execution of two Muslim heroes: Osama bin Laden and Anwar al Awlaki.

Jailed extremist leader Abu Bakar Basyir concurs. In another story on ar Rahmah, Basyir argues that because he is the leader of a crusade started by his predecessor, Obama must be fought. Voice of Islam posted a story arguing that Obama was in Indonesia to attempt to “Christianize” the country.

While Obama was in Bali, there was a 5.3 earthquake. Ar Rahmah pinpointed the cause of the earthquake, however: when Obama greeted the Indonesian First Lady Ani Yudhoyono, he (“ferociously”) kissed her on the cheek. It’s another attempt to link a natural disaster with some kind of moral transgression, something Indonesian Islamist extremists do frequently, just as Christian extremists do here in the US.

As usual, ar Rahmah posted a link to their website on Facebook. In a country of around 240,000,000, with around 30,000,000 Facebook users (ranking second in the world), the article about the earthquake received 139 “likes,” 21 “shares,” and 39 comments, including one brave soul who cautioned that posting stories such as this one can make Muslims appear to be provocateurs. In a new democracy with newly found freedoms of press and expression, Indonesia’s extremists continue to test the boundaries. Calling for the assassination of a visiting head of state is apparently within those boundaries. Thankfully the number of supporters of this group are small, and none chose to act on the call to violence.

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Put him in power and see how wise he is.

- Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms

I have spent an inordinate amount of time studying Islamist ideologues and their ideas during my relatively short lifetime. I’ve never read War and Peace, but I have read Milestones and The Neglected Duty. In recent months, the Tunisian Islamist and leader of Ennahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, has occupied a good deal of my attention. And as regular readers of the Comops Journal may know, I recently returned from traveling around Tunisia. The election results have since been tallied there, and Ghannouchi’s party, Ennahda, won the most seats of any party in the 217 seat constituent assembly. The victory has resulted in a lot of talk about what the old Islamist will do now, and how his party will shape the future of the new Tunisia. In my view, Ennahda’s electoral victory is best understood as a reassertion of a long-marginalized Arab-Muslim identity, and should not be treated as a call for a so-called “Islamic state.” Indeed, I see Ennahda’s rise as a temporary one, and it will quickly return to the ranks of the other parties in future elections. For those interested, I previously wrote about the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in post-revolutionary Egypt.

If you have yet to review the results of the October 23rd election, Ennahda took 90 seats (42% of all seats), while the Congress for the Republic took 30 seats, Ettakatol took 21, Aridha Chaabia took 19 (currently disputed), and 17 seats went to the PDP. No other party won more than 5 seats. For all you Cold War enthusiasts, Tunisia’s Communist party took 3 seats. Overall, twenty-six parties total (including independent lists) won at least 1 seat (my thanks to Tunisia Live for great coverage).

Tunisia’s election, the first of the Arab Spring revolutions, went remarkably well (the Aridha Chaabia issue aside), and it will undoubtedly serve as a model for others in the Arab world, especially Egypt and Libya. These were not parliamentary or presidential elections though. They chose members of the assembly that will craft a new constitution and select a new interim president until the next round of elections (in a year or so). Voters chose from an enormous number (over 100) of “lists,” and based on the number of votes achieved for these lists, a certain number of seats were awarded. Due to this system, it was a given that a coalition would have to emerge and no single party could dominate via absolute majority. Nevertheless, Ennahda’s victory exceeded expectations.

During my time in Tunisia, my peers there thought that Ennahda would win no more than 30% of the seats. The numbers suggest that my colleagues may have been out-of-touch with the extent to which Tunisians profess an Arab-Muslim identity. Ennahda led in nearly every district, but only won an outright majority in the districts of Gabés (Ghannouchi’s hometown) and Tataouine, as well as among the expat community in Italy. Ennahda also had a particularly strong showing in Tunisia’s “second city,” Sfax.

Rachid Ghannouchi, now in his 70s, has not chosen to pursue a political office (as of yet). He appears content to serve as the leader and guide of Ennahda, but his political influence will still hold tremendous sway. History has provided numerous examples of terrible Islamist regimes that rise to political power, most obviously the Taliban. Those examples fail to tell the whole story however. Ghannouchi is certainly at the opposite end of the Islamist spectrum from Mullah Omar. He is definitely a social conservative and quick to condemn anything he deems offensive to his vision of Islam, but he has also repeatedly demonstrated a surprising degree of flexibility, pragmatism, and revision in his viewpoints throughout his lifetime. He is far closer to the teachings of Malik Bennabi (d. 1973) than he is to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328). His party’s willingness to participate in the democratic process and engage secular parties alone has put him at odds with the most hardline Islamists.

Islamism, I often tell students, thrives in abstraction, but it quickly shows its weaknesses and inadequacies when it comes to the dirty details of governance. It is one thing to tell the crowds that Islam is the solution to a country’s economic woes, and quite another thing to find people jobs and lead them out of poverty. Furthermore, pledges of support for “sharia” are often little more than populist fluff, albeit with potentially disastrous results. Even if one accepts the eternal applicability of the legal content scattered throughout Islam’s most sacred texts, the fact remains that those texts leave much to be desired when governing a 21st century nation-state. This fact generally presents a great dilemma for Islamists and it has even motivated some groups to drag their countries back to a more primitive time to try and resolve it.

Ghannouchi (center) greets Erdogan (right) in Tunis during a recent visit

Ghannouchi has repeatedly said that Turkey’s ruling AKP is the model that Ennahda will follow, and I have no reason, at this time, to doubt the sincerity of his words. Indeed, Turkey and Tunisia, despite the ethno-cultural distinctions, share a fair deal in common with regards to their modern histories. Former Tunisian President, Habib Bourguiba, has often been described as an “Arab Atatürk.” The AKP in Turkey has essentially been a reassertion of Turkey’s Muslim identity and heritage in the public sphere after it was forcefully cloistered away by Kemalists for decades. I see Ghannouchi and Ennahda in this same framework. The electoral success of Ennahda reflects the desire to reassert an Arab-Muslim identity in Tunisia after decades of being pushed into the private sphere by the secularist powers of the Neo-Destour/RCD. Ennahda’s rise has little or nothing to do with a desire to see headscarves forced onto women or hands of thieves amputated.

On a more mundane level, Ennahda’s victory also reflects the simple fact that the party has strong anti-RCD credentials, it was well organized, and it was widely known among the people. There were many new parties in the wake of the revolution (over 130 lists at one point) and few people knew anything about their platforms. Furthermore, many of the parties shared a center-left ideology, splitting those votes among multiple parties, while Ennahda essentially monopolized the religious identity vote.

Now that Ennahda has been granted political power, the people will expect them to resolve their problems and concerns, which are numerous. The economy in particular will loom large in the years ahead. It remains to be seen whether Ennahda can offer solutions beyond pious slogans and public displays of religiosity. In fact, I see a steady decrease in support for Ennahda over ensuing elections, barring a miraculous economic revival (pun intended).

Lastly, I wish to convey the idea that there is an important positive dimension to the election victory of Ennahda, as well as the earlier victories of the AKP in Turkey. Admittedly, I write this as someone who does not have to live under such parties, so keep that in mind. The silver lining here is that these parties offer a viable alternative for peoples who seek a greater public role for Islam in their societies, in contrast to the militant reactionary movements we are all too familiar with.

When Islamists point to Erdogan and the AKP as a model to follow, rather than Ayman al-Zawahiri or Mullah Omar and the “Islamic emirate” of Taliban-era Afghanistan, this is most certainly a positive. Dialogue and cooperation with such parties should be encouraged, not dismissed on the grounds of ideological allegiances. Indeed, if Western countries were to suddenly turn away from Tunisia on the basis of an Islamist party’s electoral success, it would only help the hardliners and further support the erroneous view that militancy and anti-Western sentiment is the best strategy for contemporary Muslim societies. Furthermore, power means responsibility and accountability, and Tunisians will now “see how wise” the old Islamist from Gabés really is.

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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Violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in the city of Ambon, Maluku Province, Indonesia on Sunday, September 11. Official sources state that an ojek (motorcycle taxi) driver named Darmis Saiman was killed in an accident on September 10. But rumors sent via text message spread the following day when he was buried claimed that the Muslim driver had been tortured to death by Christians.At last count, seven people have been confirmed dead and at least 60 wounded, and the government has sent between 200 and 400 Mobile Brigade (Brimob) forces to the region as back up. Although rational voices are pleading for calm, Indonesian Islamist extremists are using the conflict to stoke more violence, recalling the sectarian conflict that roiled the region between 1999 and 2002 and claimed some 9000 lives.

Islamists were quick to use the master narratives of the Crusades and martyrdom in their reports on the conflict.  That the incident occurred on the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the United States was not just a coincidence for the extremists. The extremist web site Voice of Islam reported that the attack was provoked by the United States as a way to portray Ambon as a hotbed for terrorists.  The site stated that if Islamist groups come to Ambon to help the Muslims fighting there, America will simply portray it as terrorism and thus use it as an excuse to kill Muslims.

Voice of Islam also covered Abu Bakar Basyir’s statement on the violence.  Basyir is the former spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and leader of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid, recently jailed for 15 years. He issued a fatwa for jihad in Ambon, and repeated the claims that the violence is a conspiracy to to bring attention to the region so that the “crusaders” can eliminate Islam there. Ar Rahmah, perhaps the most popular extremist web site in Indonesia, also invoked the crusader master narrative in its early reporting of the conflict, linking the violence to a coordinated attempt by Christians to wipe out Islam.

In another posting, ar Rahmah urged Ambonese Muslims to be at the ready. The site reported that the violent paramilitary group the Islamic Defenders Front is preparing to send jihad forces to Ambon, using the term “laskar jihad.” This is a loaded term, because Laskar Jihad was a group that formed Islamist militias to go to Ambon in 1999 during sectarian violence there. The group was subsequently disbanded under pressure from the government in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali Bombing.In the story, the FPI claimed that separatist members of the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS) are part of the Christian group, and that Jewish conspirators are behind the violence.

Although there are a few remaining supporters of the RMS in Ambon, and a fringe group called the Moluccan Sovereignty Front emerged during the 1999-2002 violence, separatism is not a serious threat. The RMS exists mostly as a government-in-exile in Holland, and has made recent statements that it is willing to accept Indonesian sovereignty in the region. Nonetheless, the “threat” of separatism — imagined or real — is frequently used to incite violence. A post on Suara Islam Online linked the violence to a supposed Christian military training camp in Bogor, West Java named Christ of Ambon.

Others chimed in to incite. The Council of Indonesian Ulama released a statement as well, claiming as factual that the death of Darmis Saiman was caused not by the accident but by stab wounds inflicted by Christians. They called for a reduction in influence of Christians in Ambon, as well as a call to arm Muslims to prepare for jihad.

Blogger Ghur4Ba invoked the Crusader narrative, and appealed to readers to pray for the warriors of jihad. Voice of Islam, in a subsequent post entitled “The Lessons from Ambon: Preparing Strength for Jihad is Important,” condemned the Crusaders and urged Musims to prepare to fight:

In conclusion, Muslims must begin to prepare for jihad, to begin physical training, preparing the means of war, and make efforts for the perfection of jihad fi sabilillah. That’s because the jihad, according to the basic beliefs Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama, will remain until the end of time.

Despite the rhetoric of the extremists, cooler heads are noting marked differences in the violence between 1999 and Sunday, such as the unwillingness of larger groups to join in, and the fact that the violence did not spread to other regions. In an article in the Jakarta Globe, Najib Azca, an expert on violence in Ambon and a researcher at Gadjah Mada University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, noted that some of the factors that stoked conflict a decade ago remained, such as poverty and religious segregation. Coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence Haris Azhar, however, argued that this wasn’t sectarian conflict, and noted the differences between Ambon then and now. The article noted how the violence remained contained, and that others in the religiously segregated communities worked to protect minorities in their midst.

Although it ran an alarmist headline, this Jakarta Post story noted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s desire to not repeat the mistakes of a decade ago, and included plans to reach out to local leaders. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Marshall (ret) Djoko Suyanto acknowledged the role of provocation-by-SMS, and the importance of providing factual information to counter instigation:

In the future, we need to reinforce the people’s resilience so that they are not so easily incited, including through SMS or twitters instigating anarchy. People should be able to filter information.

This brief interview by Radio Australia with International Crisis Group Southeast Asia Senior Advisor Sidney Jones describes the phenomenon of SMS instigation in Indonesia and elsewhere. Consistent with analysis by well regarded Indonesianist political scientists such as Gerry van Klinken, Jones notes that the political context is much different now. In the earlier conflict, in the context of a democratizing Indonesia, local actors in Ambon were jockeying for new political opportunities, which fueled the violence. Politically, things are much more stable now, and it appears that calm — albeit a nervous calm — was restored quickly and has thus far maintained.

Because of the potential for violence, police have been searching passengers for weapons on passenger ships bound for Ambon in Java’s major ports, and continue their efforts to find those who spread incitement via text messages.

Update, 9-21-11:

Reports of police sweeps of ships heading to Ambon noted that some “sharp weapons” were confiscated, but no firearms. The Jakarta Post reports that the police still don’t have a suspect in the sending of the text messages that stoked the violence. Although it is clear Ambon remains peaceful, there are understandably some underlying tensions that remain, as well as some internally displaced persons who have not returned to their homes. Islamist extremists, however, continue to spread disinformation in an attempt to stoke violence.

Islmaist site Ghur4Ba provided some updats on the situation in Ambon, included alerting its readers to where groups of armed Muslims are gathering in preparation for fighting. No fighting broke out, however.

English language site Prisoner of Joy (among others) questioned the police response to the riot, arguing that Muslims were the victim sof the rio, and so it is unjust that they are being targeted by security forces. Accounts of the violence, however, clearly point to Muslim provocateurs sending the original text messages, and starting the upheavals. Although a official account of the death of Darmis Saiman, the ojek driver, showed that he died of injuries sustained in the traffic accident, and that Christian onlookers attempted to help him after the accident, Islamist sites continue to insist that he was murdered and tortured by a group of Christians. Umar Abduh, an Indonesian convicted on terrorism charges but now free after serving a 10-year sentence, argued that the police in Indonesia support “the Crusaders” and, perhaps most astonishingly, that Christians, including those who opposed the Jakarta Charter (which would have made sharia the land of the law in Indonesia), are anti-Indonesia, separatist, and anti-pluralism. This belies a stunning ignorance of Indonesian history, a history in which Christian Indonesians played significant roles in the anti-colonial struggle and in the founding of the Indonesian state. Ar Rahmah posted a story quoting Umar Abduh that paints the violence as a governmnet conspiracy, and argues that the UN should try those responsible in the Indonesian government for the violence. The Islamic Defenders Front, a thuggish paramilitary group organized under the guise of protecting Islam, has given the Indonesian government an ultimatum of one month before they start sending jihadis to the region.

These responses show that the Islamists are merely eager to stoke more violence in the region. It is particularly ironic to hear Islamists such as Umar Abduh accuse the small minority of Indonesian Christians of being against pluralism and diversity — clearly against their self-interest — as well as hear the cry for the UN to get involved, given Islamists history of antipathy toward the organization.

Update, October 4

The International Crisis Group has released its report on the violence in Ambon, available here. As usual, it is a well researched and documented report, and perhaps most notably it describes the presence of “peace provocateurs,” an interfaith group in Ambon who used social media to dispell and counter rumors that were circulating in order to stoke violence:

Their core group was about ten, each of whom had some ten or fifteen contacts around the city’s major flashpoints. They were on the phone with each other constantly, checking out stories and sending informationover Twitter and Facebook and by text messages. When a member of the network in one part of town heard the rumours about the Silo Church being destroyed, he called a member of the network stationed at the church totake a photograph with his phone and circulate it, to prove it was standing undamaged.

 The report also criticizes the government, police and military responses to the violence, and discusses some of the theories circulating about the causes of the violence.

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Unlike the protests of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, the campaigns underway against the Assad regime in Syria have a distinctly sectarian character. The Assad regime is dominated by the Alawites, a little-known esoteric Shi‘ite sect. However, the majority of Syria’s population is Sunni Muslim (approx. 75%). And caught in the middle of the conflict are Syria’s Christians (10% of the pop.), Druze, Twelver Shi‘ites, and others, including a small number of Jews. In July of 2011 alone, at least 30 people were killed in violent clashes between pro-regime Alawites and anti-regime Sunnis in the city of Homs.

Conflict between the two religious communities is nothing new. During the reign of Hafez Assad (d. 2000), the Alawite regime perpetrated an infamous massacre of Sunni Muslims in the city of Hama, just north of Homs, that claimed between ten thousand to forty thousand lives. And back during the reign of the Sunni Ottoman Empire in Syria, Alawites were not recognized as Muslims or People of the Book, but rather as heretics with no legal status. The history of conflict and tense relations between the Alawites and Sunnis in Syria is obviously long and complex. Yet, these complexities aside, the sectarian dimension of the Syrian conflict reveals much about the significance and power of narrative.

For those interested in politics, democratization, and international relations, looking at the role of narrative in the Syrian uprising is particularly informative. Indeed, by framing the conflict in Syria in sectarian terms (as I did above), we see the belligerents through their religious affiliations and the differences that exist between them and little else. The Alawites have different doctrines, rituals, practices, institutions, and so on, than do the Sunni Muslims. The variety of differences in the area of religion can be distracting and misleading though.

These differences, and the broader implications they have had, are actually all symptoms of a conflict of narratives, albeit profoundly shaped by the accidents and currents of world history. Without narrative, all of the doctrines, rituals, or institutions would be nothing beyond what is observed by a person that does not know the narratives involved, and they would carry no substantive meaning or significance. For example, without narrative, the act of wudhu or ritual ablutions by a Sunni Muslim becomes simply a hygienic act of washing.

To illustrate the conflicting narratives that exist between the Sunnis and the Alawites, I have radically paraphrased and structurally simplified the core underlying narratives at play in both sects.

Sunni Muslims: The One Deity revealed His Will to His Final Prophet and humanity must follow that revealed knowledge to select wise leaders, create a just and righteous society, and earn salvation after death in Heaven through steadfast effort and intention.

Alawites: The Triune Deity (think “Holy Trinity”), incarnated during the time of the Prophet, revealed esoteric knowledge of the true religion through the Family of the Prophet and select initiates, and, through this secret esoteric knowledge, initiates can attain salvation and their souls will transmigrate into more perfect forms.

[Note: Alawites historically practice taqiyya and avoid exposing their beliefs and practices to outsiders, thus scholars debate the actual tenants of the Alawites]

These serve as starting points for notions of identity, institutions, worldviews, and customs. Due to the particularly insular nature of the Alawite narrative,  and the Sunni rejection of them as fellow Muslims, the Alawites have existed as a minority in Syria (indeed, a more precarious minority than Christians, who are at least “People of the Book” as an Abrahamic pre-Islamic religion) and the Alawites have acted in ways  that support their interests, such as serving the French colonialists or supporting Baathism and crushing Sunni Islamism.

Religion, at its most skeletal level, is narrative. More specifically, I mean to say (tipping my hat to Bruce Lincoln) that “religion,” at its core, is a particular, communally-shared narrative (or narratives) attributed to a transcendent source (e.g. deity, ancestor, totem etc). This makes these particular narratives qualitatively different than those attributed to a mundane human author or folk culture (where anonymity may rule the day). Practices, community and institutions all start and take shape from there. Due to this exceptional attribution (“Allah revealed these stories to our leader on the mountain”), the narrative(s), and the beliefs or rituals or institutions that the narrative(s) supports, carries transcendent authority.

These two qualities distinguish religion, or (for the sake of convenience) a “religious narrative,” from all other narratives. This is one of the principal reasons why older religions, such as Judaism or Christianity, are privileged in our society over younger religions, such as Mormonism (LDS). The narratives of the older religions are protected by the ambiguities and gaps of the past, lost in history (as well as longstanding communities and institutions), and the rhetorical tricks that these obscurities of the past have allowed contemporary adherents and institutions to enjoy. But how does this business of religion and narrative relate to Syria?

When we look at the conflict between the Alawites and the Sunnis in Syria through the lens of narrative , we can see people following different or conflicting narratives. There is no empirical verifiable evidence to support the religious claims of either group (or any other religious sect for that matter); there are only the narratives (and that is what matters) that they tell to relate a certain depiction of the past, explain the origin and meaning of their communal identity, or rituals, or extol the authority of their texts and traditions and the ongoing authority of those texts and traditions in the 21^st century, et cetera. The rival conceptions of authority and identity that the Alawites and Sunnis profess put them at odds with each other and delineate them as two factions, consisting of individual human beings, engaged in hostilities throughout the years.

When we see the conflict through the lens of narrative, we can also see certain solutions. Namely, a narrative lens suggests that the key to a vibrant democratic-nationalist society in Syria, where citizenship displaces sect, is the formation and adoption of a resonant narrative that offers an alternative reference point for the formation of Syrian identity. As an example of one such successful narrative, one that has largely displaced religious (or sectarian) or ethnic narratives and fostered a democratic society, we can look to the United States of America. That said, the success of that narrative (as we know) in the United States has not been a simple or bloodless process at all, nor will that process be so in Syria (nor should we expect it to be). It is, however, an effort worth supporting.

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Recently, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been abuzz over the release of a video entitled “The Coming is Very Near,” a 28-minute production created by a group of Twelver Shi‘a devotees of the Hidden Imam al-Mahdi, known as the Harbingers of the Coming (perhaps associated with the Hojjatieh Society). It is believed that President Ahmadinejad’s chief-of-staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei is a member of the group. A report released by the Open Source Center estimates that there are 2 million copies of the video in circulation and there are rumors that a sequel is currently in production.

The video claims to show evidence of the imminent return of the Hidden Imam from his Occultation (ghaybat), which began in the ninth century (CE). In doing so, it casts several prominent Shi‘a leaders in the roles of characters in the Mahdi master narrative. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is known as a zealous devotee of the Hidden Imam, is depicted as the Mahdi’s deputy, Shuayb ibn Saleh, who will come from Khurasan (eastern Iran). The Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is cast as Seyyed-i Khorasani, who is tasked with appointing Shuayb to prepare the way for al-Mahdi. And Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, is cast as Yamani, who will lead the Mahdi’s army and march on the holy cities. Viewers are asked to see the recent events in the Middle East, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, as events foretold for the End Times.

Thankfully, many prominent Shi‘a voices have denounced the video, including the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and scholars from the Hawza in Qom. Criticism of the video has been intriguing. Some critics allege that the video is dangerous propaganda in support of Ahmadinejad, while others allege that the video is propaganda against Ahmadinejad. But regardless of the political intentions of the video (which appears to be strongly pro-Ahmadinejad), the emergence of the video and the controversy it has created is further confirmation of the active narrative landscape in Iranian politics.

Last year, I wrote a white paper discussing the use of the Karbala master narrative as a framework for anti-government sentiment in Iran. The paper, titled “A Counter-Narrative to Iranian Tyranny,” received some attention and a few detractors. For example, a professor from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the Army War College related her opinion of the paper by stating simply: “I don’t know which is a more horrifying sort of propaganda, this, or the effort to label dead terrorists homosexuals.” I certainly never envisioned the white paper as “horrifying propaganda.” Instead, my intention was to show how a powerful master narrative of Iranian Shi‘a culture, previously harnessed by the revolutionary regime itself, can actually be inverted against the regime. The white paper also called on readers to see the active narrative landscape that exists in contemporary Iranian politics, an assertion supported by the controversy over the recent “Coming is Very Near” video.

Messianic narratives, such as the Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism, are a common affair, but seldom are heads of state so intertwined with them as they are in Iran. Comparing or identifying certain similarities between contemporary events and the vague symbolic imagery of ancient “prophecies” is hardly unusual among followers of Abrahamic religions. Christians have a long history of seeing prophetic events underway and the imminent Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Sects such as the Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and a range of Pentecostal and Evangelical movements, have built their entire belief systems around the Second Coming. Televangelist programs, such as the bizarre Jack Van Impe Presents show, seem to see foretelling events in everything. And they always will, despite the fact that they are always wrong.

Messianic narratives remain popular because they provide solace to the suffering, offer explanations amidst perceived chaos, and present promises of triumphant rewards (“pie in the sky”)  in the end. The danger of such narratives lies in the intention or ability of certain devotees to mobilize military or violent action in order to bring the “prophetic” events into being, and this seems to be the case among some in the Iranian leadership. A greater awareness of the narrative frameworks at play in these matters can help to prevent foreign leaders from stepping into them and ideally disrupt or neutralize them. In doing so, the international community can better avoid any recourse to military intervention, a step which will inevitably fall into the narrative framework itself as an “apocalyptic battle” – an element that  figures so prominently in many messianic narratives.

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There is a new narrative responsible for the success of the uprisings that spread from Tunisia through Egypt and now are heard in the streets of Syria, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere.  It is a secular narrative generated by young Muslims who recognize that older jihadist forms of “telling their resistance story” by linking them to Islamic Master Narratives were largely responsible for the binary oppositions that divide them, and Islam, from the West and modernity.

As Jacqueline O’Rourke, a communication consultant working in Qutar and writing in Z Magazine sees it:

This new communications plan is a direct attempt to create a counter-narrative to the predominant one which has dominated Western discourse for the past decade. That narrative runs roughly like this: Muslims are jealous of the freedom and technological advantages of the West. Their society has been in decline after their scientific advances of medieval Europe. Instead, they try to use the West’s technology against itself. Whether airplanes, viruses, or chemicals, Muslims have appropriated science for the purposes of terrorism.

As Thomas Friedman and others have pointed out, the existing “anti-technology/science” narrative is often coupled with Zionist-American conspiracy tales, and together they have fueled the extremist “New Jahiliyya” master narrative developed by Sayyid Qutb.  It depicts a Muslim world in chaos and disorder that can only be made righteous again by a vanguard of True Believers who rise up and seize power by any means necessary, and who essentially return their culture and people to a 7^th Century CE way of life.

Clearly that old religious narrative has been either silent or silenced in the face of these new uprisings by young Muslims throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  Not even the Muslim Brotherhood is calling for an Islamic state.  Instead, the young Muslims and their new leaders are pressing for reforms that offer more freedom, more opportunity, and more control over their own choices, not a return to Sharia law or the reestablishment of a Caliphate.  More importantly, their call for reform is accomplished without challenging the sanctity of the Five Pillars of Islam, which places obedience to God before any other duty or goal.  In this way, young Muslims have opened up a “Third Way” narrative that balances respect for religious traditions with progressive political reforms designed to improve their ability to live well and to compete in a global economy.

But as good as this new secular narrative may sound to Western ears, O’Rourke explains the outcome is unlikely to be one that accepts Western “hypocrisy and condescension”:

One critical reality is that this revolution is not only a revolution against Arab dictators, but a revolution against the humiliation Muslims have been facing in the post-9/11 global landscape. The Arab/Muslim people are not just enraged with political, social, and economic oppression, they are also angry with their rulers’ complicity with imperialism, particularly American and Israeli. In short, the revolution has erupted from Muslim societies as a result of internal oppression and as a response to political, economic, and cultural imperialism, with which the post-9/11 youth are intricately familiar. In this regard, the international community must get the message that this revolution is as much against its hypocritical and condescending manner of dealing with Muslim societies as it is against Mubarak, Ben Ali, or Qadaffi.

One way to think about how all of these narrative tensions may play out is to consider that across this region people are not so much interested in trading one way of life for another, but instead creating a new way of life—a new language for governance—that avoids the pitfalls of either the old jihadi ideological worldview or one that values free market capitalism via oil revenues in exchange for continued support for dictators, particularly if the latter alternative carries with it unquestioning support of Israel.

What might that new narrative be?  One possible story is a hybrid combination of socialism designed to better distribute the wealth and opportunities afforded by revenues (however they are derived) with a progressive Islam dedicated to improving human rights and building communities that are based more on Islamic scholarship and nonviolence than on free market capitalism or extremism.

In this brave new narrative the system of stories would be all about more openness and tolerance, as well as more democratic reform, but there would be no good reason to expect that U.S. corporate or political interests would enjoy any special status in it.  There are other emerging markets—from China to India to the EU—and the political landscape that was once dominated by American foreign policy backed by an unlimited military budget is not what it once was nor do we have the will to wield power in the old fashioned way.

The speech given in Cairo by President Obama last year set in motion a storyline that may well have influenced young Muslims to go ahead with their uprisings.  The president’s late intervention in Libya—and that only with international backing and cooperation—further provided evidence that our intentions are no longer driven by revenge, as they have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead by a steely pragmatism that weighs in on the side of those fighting against oppression but leaves outcomes to those who must then forge a new society.

In general, this new secular narrative is all about accepting this post-uprising/revolution responsibility.  It is thankfully free of the old Islamist rant.  It is so far mostly free from violence, except in Libya.  We should begin to expand our conception of how secular narratives are producing political and social change and rethink our approach to strategic communication as a result.  We don’t want to make the old Pentagon mistake of preparing for the last war, in this case the jihad drawn from master narratives of Islamist extremism, while a whole set of new strategic communication challenges that has nothing to do with those old stories takes shape.

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Recent events in Egypt have led some quarters to suggest we are witnessing a case parallel to the 1979 revolution in Iran. Back then, the fall of the Shah left a political vacuum that allowed religious hardliners to take control and create a new theocratic and stridently anti-western government.

In his New Republic article, Abbas Milani, co-director of Stanford’s Iranian Democracy Project, views the situation in Egypt as precarious. He cites numerous similarities with Iran, including the actions of the United States, the presence of ambitious Islamist political forces, and the importance of the two states in the political economy of the Middle East. Fareed Zakaria voiced similar concerns in a Washington Post essay. Meanwhile, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, too, has claimed that Iran set the example for the Egyptian revolution.

While the similarities between Egypt and Iran should be recognized, there are important differences in the domain of narrative, which has unusual power to shape the course of events. A narrative is a system of stories with shared themes, participants and events. Some narratives rise to the level of master narratives, becoming deeply embedded in a culture and reproduced over time. The “American story” is an example of a master narrative in the United States. Such narratives provide an important framework for events and strategic answers to questions of identity among members of a culture.

The Shia master narratives that set the symbolic stage for the emergence of a hardline theocracy in Iran are missing in Egypt’s Sunni culture. Revolutionary Shi‘ism is based on the Mahdi master narrative, which recounts the ninth-century disappearance and future return of the Twelfth Imam to usher in a new age. Unlike Sunni Muslims, Twelver Shi‘ites believe governments are illegitimate in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. But because they are a necessary evil, a just and pious jurist (a Shi’ite cleric trained in Islamic law) can rule in the absence of the Twelfth Imam until his return as the Mahdi. This principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) was enshrined in Iran’s 1979 constitution and formalized by the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he created the office of Supreme Leader.

A Sunni variant of the Mahdi concept does exist, but it is less prominent and very different than the Shi‘ite Twelfth Imam. There is no Sunni doctrine of velayat-e faqih. Accordingly, while Shia revolutionaries are part of a clerical hierarchy, Sunni Islamists like the Muslim Brothers are lay figures. For example, the current Murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood is a professor and specialist in veterinary medicine.

Another Shia master narrative also reveals important differences between Iran and Egypt. The Battle of Karbala tells how the third Holy Imam, Husayn ibn Ali, and a party of his supporters and family, were unjustly attacked and martyred in 680 by the forces of the illegitimate tyrant Yazid, the reigning Caliph in Damascus. The narrative establishes a fundamental conflict in the world and conveys the idea that it is better to die than to live under the tyranny and injustice of worldly infidel powers.

The Karbala master narrative is so pervasive and ingrained in Iranian culture that many scholars see it as the basis for modern Iranian nationalism. The prominence of this master narrative for Iran is reflected in its confrontational, suspicious, and defiant attitude toward outside governments and power structures. In contemporary analogies, the United States and Israel assume the role of Yazid. This attitude even extends toward neighboring Sunni countries, whose belief system is (for the Shia) inherently corrupt. After all, Yazid was a Sunni (or proto-Sunni).

For Sunni Muslims, Karbala is little more than a tragic event in Islamic history when the pious grandson of the Prophet and his family were killed. Egyptian Sunnis, in particular, are aware of the tragedy of Husayn at Karbala, but the narrative is not a significant part of Egypt’s theological or political lexicon. There, negative attitudes toward the United States and Israel are rooted in ongoing political grievances (such as Israel-Palestine) and not in notions of a cosmic battle between Good and Evil, where malevolent governments have their way until the apocalyptic reappearance of the Mahdi.

So while there are some political similarities between Egypt and Iran, their master narratives reveal many differences in the likely role of political Islam in the two states. Revolutions are by nature unpredictable and anything could happen, but the narrative rationality that paved the way for theocratic rule in Iran is simply missing in Egypt. This, combined with generational differences noted by Olivier Roy, makes the creation of a hostile Islamic state in Egypt seem unlikely.  Even if such a government did come to pass, the narratives suggest that it would probably bear little resemblance to revolutionary Iran.

For more on master narratives, visit the Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism website by the CSC.

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There are a lot of questions and speculation about the Ikhwan al-Muslimun (The Muslim Brotherhood, or MB) and their role in the future of Egypt. The coverage of the organization in the U.S. media has been better than expected. However, I am still struck by some of the more ominous rhetoric emanating from select corners. This rhetoric seems to focus on two main points of concern: 1) MB ties to violence, and 2) the implementation of “undemocratic” Islamic law (sharia). In the following analysis, I discuss why I think these points of concern are flawed or unwarranted when given some broader perspective.

As many know by now, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was established in Egypt, specifically the town of Ismailia, in 1928, during British colonial rule (1882-1952). It’s founder and Supreme Guide (Murshid) was a primary school teacher named Hasan al-Banna (d. 1949). The history of the MB is long, complex, and deeply intertwined with modern Egyptian history. I will not recount that long story here, although I have discussed it in some detail in my book Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam, as well as the “Muslim Brotherhood” entry I wrote for a recently published encyclopedia, Religion and Violence. In essence, the MB is a conservative (albeit reformist) and hierarchical Sunni Muslim social movement that envisions Islam as a complete system of life and sees the differentiation of religion from the state as a foreign (and “unIslamic”) innovation. Their primary aspiration is the implementation or alignment of the state’s law with sharia (or an interpretation thereof).

Umar al-Tilmisani

Analysts warning about the threat the MB poses typically condense time, eighty years of history, to formulate attitudes about the contemporary Muslim Brothers. This is a serious error. To help explain the historical evolution (or variations) of the MB, I think it is helpful to think of the MB in terms of five main periods. I have broken down those five periods below, along with woefully abbreviated summaries relating the MB’s orientation and some important events in each period:

1. Anti-Colonial Social Activism: Founded in 1928, Neo-Sufi (reformist) oriented and centered on the person of Hasan al-Banna as Murshid; devoted to missionary (or counter-missionary) activities. The MB registers as a charitable organization providing social services, including education. The MB enjoys rapid popular growth and increased activity in Egyptian politics with outspoken opposition to British rule.

2. Anti-Colonial Political Engagement: WWII heightens anti-British sentiment and there is increased disorder in Egypt. All major political factions create militia wings. By 1943, MB leadership bows to younger zealous members and establishes its militia, al-Nizam al-Khass (Special Order). At the same time, the British crack down on Egyptian dissent (as they did in other colonies, such as India). By end of WWII, MB pursues greater political role and runs in parliamentary elections, but British intervene and all MB candidates lose despite support. When partition occurs in the British Mandate of Palestine, members of the MB’s militia serves in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war under the authority of the Arab League. Defeat of the nationalist Arab forces by Israel results in increased discontent and opposition to the British and the Egyptian monarchy in Egypt, resulting in further crackdowns and orders to dissolve the MB. Mass arrests follow and a 23 year-old MB member assassinates Egypt’s Prime Minister in 1948. A failed bomb plot follows in January 1949. Shortly thereafter, MB Murshid Hasan al-Banna is assassinated in the streets of Cairo by Egyptian secret services.  MB is forced underground, but by now regional branches have emerged in most other Arab countries.

President Nasser with Castro

3. Repression under Nasser:  Egyptian courts rule that coup allegations against MB are “without foundation” and the MB is legally reconstituted. The second Murshid, Hasan al-Hudaybi is selected to lead the MB. He repudiates violence and orders the Special Order militia officially disbanded. At this time, demonstrations for independence from Britain are nationwide. That same year, Egyptian writer and educator, Sayyid Qutb, returns from study abroad in the U.S.A. and joins the MB. In January 1952, a military coup takes place by “The Free Officers.” It overthrows the monarchy and asserts Egyptian independence from Britain. The Officers have ties to the MB, but quickly grow apart and establish a one-party autocratic Pan-Arab socialist regime (e.g. Nasserism). Gamal Abdel-Nasser emerges as President of Egypt. Relations between MB and the Officers deteriorate and the MB is officially dissolved. A member of the MB allegedly tries to assassinate Nasser. It serves as pretext for the regime to destroy the MB.  Hudaybi, Qutb, and hundreds of others, are imprisoned and MB headquarters is burned. Six MB leaders are executed. Twenty-one are murdered in their prison cells in 1957. In response, Qutb writes increasingly extremist texts, such as Milestones (1965), that are smuggled out and published. Qutb is later executed for his writings in 1966. The following year, Nasser’s army is crushed by Israel in the Six-Day War and his revolutionary movement is discredited. Nasser dies in 1970.

4. Neo-Muslim Brotherhood of Tilmisani: Nasser is succeeded by centrist Anwar Sadat who brands himself as “the Believing President” and works against Leftist factions in Egypt. He later courts the USA and the MB to counter Leftist and Soviet influence. MB leader (Murshid) Hudaybi survives Nasser’s prisons but dies in 1973. He is succeeded by early member, Umar al-Tilmisani, as the third Murshid. After Nasser’s destruction, Tilmisani rebuilds the MB and reasserts its rejection of violence, including the extremist writings of Sayyid Qutb. Tilmisani asserts that Sayyid Qutb represented no one but himself. Some academics describe Tilmisani’s rebuilt MB as the “Neo-Muslim Brotherhood.” Tilmisani brings greater participation in party-politics and creates alliances to run in parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, tensions exist between MB and Sadat, and Tilmisani is imprisoned for his criticism of the regime, along with many others. Extremist Islamists, especially the Gamaat Islamiyyah and Tanzim al-Jihad, reject the MB’s strategies and call for revolutionary violence, and grow among the youth on university campuses. Extremists of al-Jihad infiltrate army and assassinate Sadat on Oct. 6 1981. Sadat is succeeded by his Vice-President, Hosni Mubarak, and relations between the regime and MB remain tense but sporadically tolerant – the MB remains officially outlawed.

Dr. Mohammed Badie, MB Murshid

5. Opposition and Reform: After Tilmisani’s death in 1986 (the first Murshid permitted to have a public funeral), the MB continues to be led by the “old guard,” privileging seniority over skill or charisma. In 2004, a member of the successor generation, Muhammad Mahdi Akef (b. 1928), is selected as Murshid, more commonly referred to as “Chairman” now. The MB acts as a leading opposition movement to Mubarak’s autocratic regime and it is critical of its relationship with the USA and Israel. Frequently the MB uses the language of human rights and cooperates with other non-Islamist opposition groups. In 2005, the MB fields a list of candidates as independents in parliamentary elections and wins 88 seats, despite voting irregularities, making it second only to Mubarak’s NDP (330 seats). However, failed promises of reform and repeated government crackdowns lead to a MB boycott of the 2010 elections, and only 1 seat is won. The NDP wins 420 seats. In January 2010, Akef stepped down (the first time a Murshid has done so) as Chairman of the MB. He is replaced by Dr. Mohammed Badie (b. 1943), a professor and specialist in veterinary medicine, as the eighth Murshid.

Given the historical complexities, it is an error to refer to an act of violence in the 1940s or the existence of the “Special Order,” dating from period #2, when speaking of the post-Nasser “Neo-Muslim Brotherhood” and the subsequent period. It is an error to take Sayyid Qutb’s extremist prison treatises as representative of the MB organization. It is also an error to conflate the Egyptian MB with all the various MB branches that sprung up in other Arab countries, most of which broke official ties to the Egyptian “parent organization” and exist completely independent of the MB. For instance, Hamas originated within a branch of the MB in the Gaza Strip as a religious alternative to Arafat’s secular-nationalist PLO, but it developed into a movement unto itself and it does not answer to Dr. Badie.  Admittedly, the MB has demonstrated great hesitation when it comes to criticizing Hamas and makes apologies for acts of terror as “legitimate resistance” to Israeli occupation. Then again, one would also find many outside of the MB who demonstrate the exact same tendencies in the Arab world.

Critics of the MB  seem to isolate negative or inflammatory comments by the organization’s current membership in order to collectively indict the Muslim Brothers. However, I find this no more persuasive than taking sound bites or statements from certain members of the Democratic and Republican parties and attributing a controversial view to all Democrats or Republicans. As NY Times columnist Scott Shane recently noted: “As the Roman Catholic Church encompasses leftist liberation theology and conservative anti-abortion advocacy, so the Brotherhood includes both practical reformers and firebrand ideologues.” In other cases, a text or statement dating from another period is cited as something reflective of the “true nature” of the MB, such as one of their traditional slogans (e.g. “The Qur’an is our constitution”). But this is equally unpersuasive, and has little relevance to the contemporary Muslim Brothers.

A recent column by Barry Rubin in the Israeli centrist-right English-language daily, The Jerusalem Post, provocatively entitled “Egypt’s Crisis Worst Disaster Since Iran’s Revolution,” warns that an anti-Israel and anti-American Islamist government allied with Iran may emerge in Egypt if Mubarak falls and the MB rises. Rubin cites “anti-Israel” and “anti-Semitic” comments made by MB members, such as parliamentarian Abdel Wahhab al-Messiri. But the fact is that the anti-Israel (or anti-Zionist) views that many in the West see as anti-Semitic are certainly not exclusive to certain MB members. These unfortunate views are widespread throughout the Arab world and Egyptian society, including secular-nationalists and communists. The “cold peace” preserved by Mubarak and the ruling NDP is not “pro-Israeli.” In fact, as of February 3, the NDP claimed that “pro-opposition” foreign journalists are actually “Israeli agents” (resulting in increased violence against journalists). The NDP takes a pragmatic stance designed to avert further war and facilitate economic prosperity backed by conditional U.S. aid that is dependent on the continuity of that peace, especially for the NDP elite. There will be no “pro-Israeli” government in Egypt, no matter who emerges in control. And in terms of U.S. relations, the MB is far less hostile to America, especially if America’s backing for Mubarak ends, and, most especially, if an Israeli-Palestinian peace were ever successful. Their issues with the U.S. generally stem from widely held political grievances, not from a cosmic conception of “fighting the infidels” as leaders of extremists like al-Qaeda see it. It is noteworthy to mention that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian ideologue of al-Qaeda (previously of Tanzim al-Jihad), has always been fiercely critical of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Likewise, the revolutionary Twelver Shi’ite leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhullah Khomeini (d. 1989), once denounced Tilmisani and the MB as “CIA agents.”

Prime Minister Erdogan of Turkey

Regarding the question of another disastrous Arab-Israeli war, the MB is no more inclined to another war than the NDP or the Nasserists or any other. After all, it was the secular Pan-Arab nationalist-socialists (i.e. Nasserists) that led Egypt into the conflicts of 1956 and 1967. It was the pro-American centrist, Anwar Sadat, who went to war in 1973. The MB is no more likely to begin a new war because of its Islamist politics than the socialists or nationalists. I do not see a MB government going to war with a nuclear-armed Israel anymore than I do Saudi Arabia, which has never signed a peace treaty with Israel. However, Israel would most certainly find itself without the same negotiating and strategic partner it has enjoyed under Mubarak. That period is simply over. As an example of the sort of relationship that might emerge with increased MB participation in Egypt’s government, I suggest one look to Turkish-Israeli relations under “Islamist” Erdogan and the AK Parti; however, the Arab nationalist context will act as a significant modifier absent from the Turkish context. Indeed, the MB has always had a strong Arab nationalist element – which again is indicative of its history and its anti-colonial origins.

If the prospects of an Egypt under sharia concerns Americans most, we should know that the Egyptian constitution (largely suspended by Mubarak’s ‘emergency measures’ for three decades) was amended by Anwar Sadat to state that sharia is the principal source of law for Egypt (it previously stated “a principal source”). Family law, such as marriage and divorce, are already governed by sharia in Egypt (yes, restricted polygamy is legal). Furthermore, if horrific images of the hands of thieves coming off, “heretics” being imprisoned and condemned to death, or adulterers being stoned, concerns us, then why is Saudi Arabia a close partner of the U.S.? The most rigid and disturbing interpretations of sharia have been implemented in Saudi Arabia throughout the Wahhabite kingdom’s history. The American government and U.S. businesses continue a close relationship to the kingdom unabated.  Many popular American brands, such as Apple, are owned in part by members of the ruling family. It seems hypocritical to condemn the MB on the grounds of sharia. Additionally, unlike the Saudi-backed Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the MB is not a group of uneducated tribesmen; they are medical doctors, lawyers, businessmen, professors and professionals, who are hardly averse to the modern world and they articulate a far more sophisticated and rich understanding of Sunni Islam than the Saudis or their “clients” abroad.

Overall, if the Muslim Brotherhood were to assume a leading role in the government of a post-Mubarak Egypt, I do not think it would result in a new “enemy state” or Iranian-style theocracy. Indeed, the Egyptian context is fundamentally different than the Iranian – perhaps that debate deserves a separate blog post. While concerns that the MB might curb democratic channels once in power are warranted, their base of support is not large enough to place them in such a position, nor has the current leadership demonstrated any such ambitions.  The MB will act as a conservative religious party within a coalition government, not unlike religious conservatives in the U.S. Congress.

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A couple of weeks ago as I skimmed the news, I saw the freshly-released images of the Park51 Community Center (colloquially known as the “Ground Zero Mosque”). In the same sitting, I also performed my semi-regular check of a former professor’s co-authored blog, No Caption Needed. Perusing the two in such short succession inspired reflection on the nature of the image in strategic communication – and more specifically, the nature of the image in the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terror, as well as that conflict’s implications in contemporary American public culture. Strategically, images make claims concrete. Curiously, in the case of the Park51 project, even the mere promise of images was worthy enough to create front-page news.

Park51 Street View Concept

According to the Park51 Blog, on September 28, 2010, three “renderings” of the proposed community center were released. As of October 3, 2010, no architectural brainstorms had been added to this slim posting. The computerized images look light, airy, and labyrinthine. The colorless interior and exterior of the building form what appears to be the frame of an empty mosaic. Though interesting, the renderings are far from blueprints and there are very few of them. Why, then, did they command enough attention to be featured as one of CNN’s top stories on October 3, five full days after the images were posted? And is it mere coincidence that after the images were released, we began to hear stories break about the community center’s supporters being under threat?

There are several plausible explanations for the images’ catalyzing force. First, the “renderings” of Park51 move the center’s existence from the realm of the hypothetical to the realm of the eminently plausible. Although images can inspire dialogue, they do not require it – an image exists because someone thought to bring it into being, not necessarily because a group engineered its appearance. This has implications for the efficacy of strategic communication more broadly. Images can often signal quick forays into the public dialogue, and like all other forms of communication, they can take on a life all their own. In other words, by presenting a public with an image, that public is encouraged to discuss what they are seeing – and yet the creative processes behind the image’s genesis need not be the result of discussion itself.

Second, when used and regarded strategically, images evoke things they do not visibly picture. These preliminary sketches of the community center are not simply musings about a building. They represent an implied victory in a very prominent public conflict. With these images, plans for Park51 publicly move forward – in contrast with plans to rebuild the World Trade Center, which have repeatedly stalled. Apart from and intertwined with the controversy itself, the images evoke a residue of terror and anguish. Therefore, despite the largely unimpressive nature of the architectural plans themselves, Park51’s blog posting was quickly catapulted to national and international news levels.

Strategically, the use and analysis of imagery has tremendous potential to alter the ways we think about contested spaces. Fundamentally, many of the ideological conflicts we try to mitigate are spatial as well. In the case of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” for example, the issue of location plays an incredibly prominent role.  This conflict is not about the existence of an Islamic community center per se, but rather the center’s proximity to the World Trade Center site. Visual depictions of what the community center might look like are actually inserted into the Manhattan landscape. In terms of public debate, it hardly matters that the landscape is fictitious.

Acts of terror are also territorialized, and can be thought of as contests over space. Competing ideas of what should be done with different locations permeate much contemporary conflict, so we can think of space and imagery as (potentially) persuasive. Spaces can be engineered, manipulated, and captured graphically. That instance of manipulation can, with the split-second click of a mouse, be globally transmitted.

With reference to Park51 and the project’s ability to communicate strategically, the entry of images into the public conversation has certainly sped up the rate of dialogue. Though groups in conflict can quite notably use imagery to draw attention to their specific causes, images can also have messy and unintended consequences. Such images can call up intimations of the very phenomena they are trying to usurp, in this case, terrorism.

To clarify, I do not believe the community center bears any resemblance to an act of terror, but rather that even peaceful architectural sketches can implicate such far-removed phenomena as the former “Global War on Terror.” Images direct our minds rapidly and in many directions. They should be both used and analyzed with care.  In the case discussed here, it is necessary to question not only the images, but why they became so popular.  The questioning should take place in specifically public contexts, not just individually in the privacy of our own spaces.

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