This morning I was forwarded an Op-Ed from the Chronicle of Higher Education written by Carlin Romano, a journalist and scholar of media theory at the University of Pennsylvania. Entitled “Of Minarets and Massacres,” the Op-Ed came across as an opportunistic diatribe against what Romano sees as the egregious hypocrisy of Muslims (and ‘self-hating’ Europeans and liberals) who have condemned the recent Swiss democratic vote (57% in favor) to ban the construction of minarets on mosques in the country.

AP Photo.

The ban will now be added to the Swiss Constitution. Only four mosques in Switzerland even have minarets, and two more were being planned prior to the ban. So the vote was not a reaction to some serious minaret problem impacting Swiss society (such as the cacophony of prayer calls one might hear in Cairo or Ankara). Rather, the vote was a manifestation of a deep-seeded irrational fear and it screams of xenophobic prejudice and paranoid fantasies that the Moslem [sic] hordes are on the march.

But Romano “does not weep,” as he put it, for the Swiss ban because he is “too busy weeping for the Armenians, the first people in their corner of the world to officially adopt Christianity, almost eliminated from history due to regular massacres by the Muslim Turks.” That’s right. Romano makes the astounding rhetorical leap from the November 2009 Swiss vote banning minarets all the way to the horrors of the Armenian genocide by Ottoman Turks one hundred years ago. There is no explicit connection between the two, save for the fact that the majority of Switzerland’s 400,000 Muslims are of Turkish and Albanian origin.

To be clear, I am not questioning the tragedy of the Armenian genocide.  But how does it justify Switzerland’s institutionalized discrimination against its Muslim citizens (and migrant workers) in the 21^st century? Doesn’t Western Europe pride itself on the righteous ideals of the Enlightenment, human rights, and international law?

Romano’s answer: “So long as Muslims anywhere keep their place in the House of Islam everywhere, they bear some responsibility for the actions of their fellow believers.” He further states:

If you steep yourself in the atrocities of the Armenian genocide, not to mention the many intolerances exhibited by majority-Muslim societies toward Christians, Jews, women, gays, and other non-Muslims, one’s conclusion is not an absolutist moral judgment, but a decision on who owes a greater apology to whom, a decision on how to allocate one’s moral energy. The day that Turkey apologizes and pays reparations for theArmenian genocide, that Saudi Arabia permits the building of churches and synagogues, that the Arab world thinks the homeland principles it applies to the Arabs of Palestine also apply to the Armenians of Turkey—on that day, I will find time to commiserate with the generally kind and hard-working Muslims of Switzerland.

I found his insistence on referring to Istanbul as “Constantinople” particularly amusing.  His dismissal of Serbian “persecution” of Bosnian Muslims was also charming.

If Romano were sincerely interested in tackling this subject, and not exploiting it as an opportunity to air his general dislike of Islam and recount the atrocities of the Young Turks and Turkish nationalists against the Armenians (not to mention the aggressive campaign to ‘Turkicize’ the Kurds – but they’re Muslims so Romano ignores them), a far more fruitful and appropriate discussion would have focused on a subject such as Egypt’s institutionalized restrictions against Church construction (as well as repairs and routine maintenance) for its Coptic Christian citizens (approx. 15% of the population).

Those restrictions are, however, rooted in medieval law and enacted in a country where the Constitution states that Islamic law (shariah) is the principle source of legislation. Deplorable yes, but has Switzerland reverted to medieval law like Egypt? Or is Romano suggesting that we in the West should regress to the Dark Ages out of spite?

Romano does admittedly preface his remarks by noting the “widened spectrum of ‘context’” for intellectual debates in the era of online commentaries. But rather than rectifying what he calls the “anarchy of cybercommentary,” he fully indulges in it and perpetuates the same fruitless level of discourse by engaging in something akin to a childish airing of historical grievances. In the process, he succeeds in painting himself as an “Islamophobe” and discredits his own academic credentials (which are completely unrelated to Islamic studies, history, or related disciplines to start).

He deliberately constructs a historical narrative of the Armenian genocide as a binary Muslim slaughter of Christians, and pastes copious dates and data into his Op-Ed to dress his polemic with a facade of academic authority.  But his framework is erroneous.  He (intentionally?) overlooks the fact that while a Muslim empire ruled the region for centuries, the genocide of ethnic Armenians coincided with a wave of ethnic nationalism sweeping Europe and the broader region at the turn of the century.  The Turks were busy creating a Turkish homeland for themselves (not an “Islamic state”) as the old Ottoman Empire crumbled before them.

The Arabs were busy too, fighting and seceding from the Ottoman Turks (siding with the Christian British) to create their own ethno-nationalist nation-states (or as Romano would put it “Muslim fighting Muslim”). The Orthodox Christian Czars of the Russian Empire, long a bitter foe of the Ottoman Turks, claimed authority over the Orthodox Christian minorities (or millets) in the Ottoman Empire following the decline of its military power and submission to several humiliating treaties. The Young Turks, who were Turkish nationalists (not Islamic activists), allied the Ottoman Empire with the (Christian) Germans, but the Armenians were the natural allies of the Russians.  Some Armenian units actively fought for the Russians.

Religion, in this complex picture, was just one source of division and conflicting interests, not the motivating force for a horrific genocide. Thus, as Romano writes: “That year, 1915, saw the awful crescendo of the genocide as the CUP government forcibly deported Armenians eastward [to Syria, Iraq, and Russian territory], tortured, massacred, and starved them on death marches, confiscated their property, killed almost all of the arrested 250 leaders, and resettled Muslim [i.e. Turkish!] refugees on Armenian land.”

Also, we might note that the current Islamist-oriented government in Turkey recently established diplomatic relations with Armenia and President Abdullah Gul is the first Turkish leader to visit Armenia.

But, to get back to the point, as Romano suggests, “Let’s talk again about voting against two new minarets in Switzerland.” I paraphrase Romano’s argument as follows:

If Muslims do bad things to religious minorities, women, gays, and others in their countries, we in the Western countries, like Switzerland, should betray our own principles of justice and equality and hypocritically lower ourselves to the same level of injustice and discrimination. Then after this game of tit-for-tat, and only then, will we give equal rights to the Moslems [sic] that reside in our borders as tolerated aliens.

How was this nonsense printed in an “academic” publication like the Chronicle? This is the last sort of narrative discourse we ought to be perpetuating. It does not serve Western or global interests in the least. In fact, Islamist extremists would undoubtedly look upon these developments with delight. The “wicked Crusader West” is oppressing more Muslims in their own borders – perfect! What a wonderful recruiting opportunity for embedded terrorist cells.

Switzerland, and the rest of Europe, should remain true to their ideals and universally apply them to all those who legally reside within their borders. Hypocrisy is not an image we want to (further) project to the Muslim world, even if many in the Muslim world are guilty of the same sin themselves.

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Yesterday MEMRI released two dispatches on Middle East media coverage of President Bush’s just-completed visit. The Egyptian dispatch is mixed, harshly criticizing Bush but reaffirming the strategic importance of the U.S.-Egypt relationship.

But what really caught my eye was the dispatch from Qatar. Qatar is generally considered one of the more moderate Arab states, but you would never know it based on these commentaries. There is obviously great personal animosity toward bush, who columnist Hada Jad called “a liar, cheat, murderer, and, even more than that, an expert in barbaric state terrorism.”

The editorials sounded two other themes on which we have commented repeatedly in this blog. One is vanishing U.S. credibility due to a disconnect between words and deeds. An editorial in Al-Quds Al-Arabi says:

While urging our leaders to respect human rights and democracy, he violates human rights in the most heinous and aggressive manner [imaginable]. The jails and detention camps inside and outside the U.S. are teeming with Arab and Muslim prisoners, and the television screens in the U.S. and the world have witnessed these inhuman crimes.

Another theme is Middle East democracy, which columnist Husam Al-Dhawi writing in Al-Watan points out is unlikely to develop in the way the U.S. envisions:

We acknowledge that the Arab homelands are not sufficiently democratic. But we [also] know that democracy is not a product that can be imported and exported. [Moreover], there is no single model of democracy that should be emulated – [rather, democracy] is the result of internal political, cultural and social development. So it will not be the U.S. that will construct our democracy for us; any talk of this sort is nothing but a game of [empty] slogans. Bush talks a great deal, yet reality remains the same, and nothing changes.

These comments by the press in a supposedly moderate Arab state underscore the poor position of the U.S. in public diplomacy, its inability to influence the conversation other than to reproduce a negative image, and the consequent need to do something that will change the game.

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Thanks to David Horowitz, American college students won’t forget about terrorism any time soon. From October 22-26, The David Horowitz Freedom Center coordinated with conservative groups on campuses nationwide to organize “Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week (IFAW).”

According to the Terrorism Awareness Project’s Website:

The purpose of this protest is as simple as it is crucial: to confront the two Big Lies of the political left: that George Bush created the war on terror and that Global Warming is a greater danger to Americans than the terrorist threat.

Horowitz planned for IFAW to be the largest conservative campus protest ever, with promises of participation from more than 200 schools. However, the final list of schools only included sixty-six. Arizona State University, a large university in a conservative state, was originally listed as a participant but had no actual events. Some campuses, like Liberty University, asked to be disassociated from the event altogether.

The week included speakers on terrorism and oppression of Muslim women. Predictably, the events met with opposition from Muslim student advocacy groups and the Muslim American Society who objected to the use of the term “Islamo-fascism” on the grounds that it equates the religion of Islam with fascism. Additionally, the event was picked up in the Middle East press, causing public diplomacy problems.

Horowitz says that it was not his intent to disparage all Muslims, but rather to bring attention to the violent extremists that he says pose a threat to the American way of life and, he claims, have sympathizers on American college campuses. He argues that the “liberal elite” on college campuses is so obsessed with political correctness that they are de facto supporters of the Jihadist agenda.

In fact, the reaction against IFAW has been labeled “fascist” by Horowitz and other conservative commentators.  This reaction includes students shouting down Horowitz during a speech at Emory University and various commentaries in student newspapers and other media.

Despite not reaching nearly as many campuses as planned, Horowitz hails it as a success. He applauded the students who helped organize IFAW for their courage against the opposition, including the fascist liberal elite, jihadi sympathizers and communists.

IFAW continues in the tradition of another Horowitz organization, Students for Academic Freedom, which purports to fight for academic integrity against the ideological indoctrination of America’s vulnerable college students by liberal college professors. SAF encourages students to covertly report on instructors who make unapproved political statements in the classroom so they can be added to a list compiled by SAF and targeted for further investigation.

Principles

Two communication principles can be applied to this event.  First, the fallout of IFAW can be seen as an example of Retrospective Sensemaking. According to Karl Weick et al (2005), organizations and individuals engage in retrospective sensemaking when they try to understand past events. For example, the 9/11 commission used retrospective sensemaking when it determined that there were in fact warning signs before the attacks that went unnoticed at the time.  Only in retrospect did those warning signs have meaning, or in other words, hindsight is 20/20.

Second, we can look to Kenneth Burke’s concept of the Terministic Screen.  In Language as Symbolic Action (1968), Burke explains that the language we use to define something also determines how we look at it.  The language we use creates a “frame,” or specific way of viewing a phenomenon that excludes other possible ways of viewing the same situation.  For example, the estate tax is often referred to as the “death” tax.  Using the term “death” in defining the tax effectively alters the way we view and talk about it.  Thus a “terministic screen” is created that eliminates, or “screens” out, other possible interpretations.

Analysis

Horowitz’s acclaim for the week as a success is an example of retrospective sensemaking because it shows how a preferred interpretation can be retrofit to events. If millions of college students had demonstrated against “Islamo-fascism,” it would have been obviously successful. But the reaction against IFAW provides Horowitz with another option in his retrospective sensemaking by reaffirming his belief that college campuses are bastions of liberal elites that support cadres of jihadi terrorists and communist conspirators.

Another possible interpretation is that the successful speaking engagements of many IFAW experts indicate that college campuses are places where diverse viewpoints are welcome. It reaffirms the principle of free speech that Horowitz and his allies were able to hold their protests and others were able to demonstrate against them.

Second, Horowitz’s use of the term “Islamo-fascism” functions as a terministic screen, limiting the debate over terrorism by equating it with fascism. This is problematic from a strategic communication standpoint because of the connection of the word “Islam,” which describes a major world religion, to the word “fascism,” which typically is used to describe state control over the individual.

Although Al-Qaeda and similar terrorist groups do seek to impose their own violent interpretation of Islam on the Middle East, their existence as a terrorist group and not as a state entity makes the word “fascist” an inaccurate description. The use of this terministic screen is clearly an attempt to equate our enemies in the GWOT with other fascist groups such as the Nazis.

However, doing so has several disadvantages for American public diplomacy:

1. Al-Qaeda is not Nazi Germany and our war against them involves more of an ideological struggle than the type of military triumph that brought us success in WWII.
2. Tying the words Islam and Fascism is offensive to many Muslims, and whether that is the intent or not, the interpretation of it as such risks hurting ties with important allies in the Muslim world.
3. Calling “Islamo-Fascism” a threat to freedom in the same way Fascism was during WWII gives the terrorists more credit than they deserve.

If college students are now more aware of terrorism than they were two weeks ago does this constitute a victory in the GWOT? Or on the other hand, does dedicating a week to “awareness” of terrorism not invoke terrorism itself by reminding us that we need to be afraid? By not giving the students an effective course of action, it is possible that this week could have just resulted in increased anxiety about terrorism, which is what gives terrorists their power.

If terrorism is a threat to the American way of life, what better testament to American values could college students have than going about their regular routines without fear of vague threats?

Further Reading

• Burke, K. (1968) Language as Symbolic Action: Esssays on Life, Literature and Method. Berkley, CA: University of California Press
• Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the Process of Sensemaking. Organization Science. 16(4), 409-421.

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In the Red Sea resort town of Sharm El-Sheik, several Middle Eastern nations and the US met to discuss Iraq. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice went to the resort town to debate the future of Iraq, particularly the flow of foreign fighters and debt relief. Among the more exciting pieces of the conference were discussions between the United States and Syria.

In 2005, President Bush withdrew the ambassador to Syria after claiming Damascus’ involvement in the assassination of a former Lebanese Prime Minister. In the two years since then, President Bush accused Syria of allowing foreign fighters into Iraq, tacitly supporting the Iraqi insurgency, and sponsoring terrorism with Hezbollah and Hamas. The Sunni/Arab state of Syria ties itself to Shia/Persian Iran through support to Hezbollah. The US diplomatic strategy for Iran and Syria are similar. US diplomats refuse to engage either nation in formal, direct negotiations. The current strategy of the Bush Administration is to isolate the Syrian regime to force change.

Because Iran, Syria, and the US all have interests in a stable Iraq, the three foes have a similar interest. At the conference, Secretary Rice talked with Foreign Minister Walid Moallem, her Syrian counterpart, in a side room separated from the main conference. The Syrian press claims the pair discussed “bilateral relations” and wants to improve the Syrian-US relationship. Syrian President Bashar Assad asserts that it is “too early to see if the conference is a breakthrough,” citing fears that Syria would be scapegoated for the poor situation in Iraq. Secretary Rice maintains that Syria has failed to act in the past but hopes the current situation in Iraq will encourage them to stop the flow of foreign fighters across their borders.

Principles

Conflicts between parties are common in communication. Most conflicts move through stages. A latent conflict becomes an emergent conflict as grievances become intolerable to one side. The conflict continues to escalate as both sides begin to invest more in a conflict. High-investment conflict increases the stakes, prompting defensive and coercive behavior (see Burgess & Burgess in Further Reading). As defensive behavior and coercion rise, distrust between parties also increases, making negotiations difficult (see Tomlinson & Lewicky in Further Reading). The distrust builds a hurting stalemate or intractable conflict.

The definition of “intractable conflict” is difficult because conflicts are not linear processes. As reconciliation takes place, an eruption of violence could return the conflict to an escalation. One key component is the idea of a “hurting stalemate,” a point where neither side is able or willing to overcome the other but both parties remain committed to the conflict. Ongoing conflict begins to damage both parties and increases the fear and distrust each party has for the other. The mixture of distrust, an emotional state, with policy- or action-based problems can increase the complexity of a conflict. Long-term stalemates also increase the importance of polarizing communication to each group’s identity. Conflicts with strong negative emotions, policy/action problems, and identity threats are likely to become intractable.

While intractability is undesirable in conflicts, the hurting stalemate still has potential. Both sides recognizing that a stalemate is mutually harmful can foster a sense of “ripeness.” As parties view the polarized, distrustful, and destructive environment of a conflict as negative, they are willing to find different methods of conflict resolution. Peter T. Coleman compares this state to an addict “hitting bottom” and becoming willing to make major changes in his/her life. Ripeness is the willing of both sides to make a course correction, not only in one area but in all parts of a conflict.

Analysis

The Iraq Study Group Report recommended discussions with Iran and Syria as methods of solving the current crisis in Iraq. Because the two nations share borders with Iraq and have an interest in a secure neighbor, the US has a mutual interest with both nations. In the case of Syria, a stream of foreign fighters running through the country is bad for the security of the nation, and diplomatic isolation could harm the country. Syria wants good relations with the West, the US in particular.

And yet, a hurtful stalemate seems to be in effect. Syria continues to threaten Lebanon, and President Assad escalates their conflict. Statements by the Bush Administration have threatened the identity of Syria, and the security situation in Iraq continues to decline. Stalemates such as this one are fostered by the view that parties have no options except destruction. Refusing to negotiate with Syria forces the US to use coercive language and military force to solve problems with Syria. If the US continues to strategically ignore Syria, it could allow the conflict between Syria and Lebanon to become intractable and violent. Hostilities between the US and Syria could also force Syria to join sides with Iran, already a major intractable conflict partner with the US in the region. A stalemate with Syria could further spoil our relations with Iran and our ability to act in the Middle East will decline.

However, Secretary Rice’s ability to address a specific concern with Syria, border security, is a start to fostering ripeness. The sense of common interest in Iraqi stability could decrease US/Middle Eastern polarization. Syria’s increased border security also fosters a greater sense of trust, an important aspect of overcoming hurtful stalemates. It may not be necessary to absolve Syria of all allegations now, but preventing an adversarial relationship with the Syrian government is critical to our diplomatic strategy in the region. Toning down the harsh rhetoric could help as well, and following up with rewards for successful border security will increase the trust between Syria and the US. Fostering ripe relationships will allow for more negotiation as an alternative to military force, an alternative more likely to end an intractable conflict than more violence.

Further Reading

• Beyond Intractability Project (2003). Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado.
• Burgess, Heidi and Guy M. Burgess (2003). What Are Intractable Conflicts? Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder.
• Coleman, P. T. (2000). Fostering ripeness in seemingly intractable conflict: An experimental study. International Journal of Conflict Management (1997-2002), 11, 300.
• Tomlinson, E. C., & Lewicki, R. J. Managing distrust in intractable conflicts. Conflict Resolution Quarterly, 24(2), 219-228.

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Despite the rapid growth of satellite TV in Egypt, terrestrial television remains a popular source for information and entertainment. USAID developed an Egyptian version of Sesame Street in 2000, and it remains popular. But, the success of the progressive Sesame Street is something of an anomaly. More typical are shows by Egyptian state TV, where preachers from the Ministry for Religious Endowment control the programming. For example, in 2006, two different preachers hosted programs to teach hatred of the Jews and the value of martyrdom.

On the Al Nas network, a state-run station, Sheikh Muhammad Sharaf Al-Din told a story to a group of children about a Jewish woman who invited the Prophet Muhammad to her home in an attempt to poison him. To escape the poison, Muhammad (the Prophet) invoked Allah for protection. Al-Din asked the children “what did this story teach you?” A voice rang out “the Jews are a people of treachery and betrayal.” Muhammad exclaimed delight by saying

Allah Akbar! Say Allah Akbar! What did Ruqiya say? The Jews are the people of treachery and betrayal. May Allah give you success. We want mothers who teach their sons jihad, the love of Allah and His Messenger, sacrifice for the sake of Islam, and love for the countries of the Muslims. Loving the country of the Muslims. May Allah bless you, Ruqaya. That is the most beautiful thing I have heard – that the Jews are the people of treachery, betrayal, and vileness.

On the topic of martyrdom, Sheikh Muhammad Nassar used the same program on a different day to tell the children a story of a child martyr who abandoned his home to join a jihad against the infidels. He killed three before his own death. The friends of the young martyr buried the boy but, as they buried him, the earth shook and the corpse rose from the ground. Martyrs, Nassar explained, are revived by Allah, and Allah will not abandon his troops. He explained on a later program that weapons of infidels, like splitting the atom, will not harm Muslims because Allah will open the earth to swallow them whole.

Principles

In both these examples, the clerics use polarization as a communication strategy. Polarization is a method of finding two extremes and debating the merits of each. This creates two opposing entities and a strong division between the two. By limiting the middle ground, a polarizing argument snuffs multiple options in the mind of an audience. With only two options, the polarizing arguer needs to defend his position against only one alternative. Presenting an argument with two options, and one superior to the other, is called argument by dilemma.

An either/or view of life is effective because people are “cognitive misers.” As human beings, we are faced with thousands of choices each day. We generally like having options but find too many options difficult, even overwhelming. Our mental energy is finite, and we like to save our thinking power. To make life a little easier, we take shortcuts as thinkers. We make these shortcuts by convincing ourselves that certain options are beyond the scope and focusing on a few options. Having fewer options make us more satisfied in our decisions and allows us to mentally move on.

Polarization and dilemmas work because they are simple arguments for cognitive misers. A simple argument requires less mental energy to understand, so polarization arguments work well when the audience has fewer mental resources to apply to the problem. Children are common audiences for polarizing arguments because they are relatively inexperienced. Polarization is popular on children’s television because it teaches concepts without a lot of explanation. Grover, the blue monster, breathlessly illustrated the concept of near and far on Sesame Street. Likewise “love Muslims, hate Jews” works because children can polarize familiar people with unfamiliar people. Children thus learn fundamental cultural constructs by polarization.

Analysis

Interestingly, polarization does fail in certain cases with children. A Palestinian/Israeli version of Sesame Street launched in 1998 and, in the progressive spirit of the show, claimed that the borders between the Palestinians and Israelis were artificial inventions rather than natural boundaries . Parents objected to the direction of the show, and the second season began to treat the borders as impassible objects. With walls on every street, including streets populated by Big Bird, the adults were satisfied, yet the children disliked the change in the show and wanted the old Sesame Street back. Children watching Sesame Street in Jerusalem or the Gaza Strip weren’t born with the idea of their border as natural. They may not understand the complex differences between ethnic and religious groups (similar to many adults), but they do feel safe with what they know. Children recognized a difference in the second season and disliked the imposition of a polarized view.

The point is that the polarization arguments to children may be effective but we should be wary in polarizing children. Children learn how to polarize early. Hatred is taught and dilemmas are inherited. Unless presented with an alternative, a child trained in polarization early will continue to think in a polarized way. Therefore, although the current project of creating an alternative news outlet for adults in the Middle East is a good idea, the creation of an alternate form of children’s educational programming is even more vital, because people that advocate intolerance are reaching children with a polarization strategy while we are attempting to sway adults who have been enculturated for years into polarized thinking.

The Egyptian version of Sesame Street promotes education for all people, girls in particular. The Middle East craves children’s programming, and programming that teaches acceptance by complicating polarizations could fill that void. The Middle East of the future will be shaped by war and technology but also by preachers and puppets. His appearance aside, Big Bird is the best diplomat we have to teach acceptance to children in a polarized world.

Further Reading

Benoit Godin (1999). Argument from consequences and the urge to polarize. Argumentation Volume 13 No. 4

Middle East Media Research Institute (2006). Egyptian government preacher incites children to martyrdom. Special Dispatch Series – No. 1197

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