At a conference two and a half years ago I met Sami Hajjar. He was born in Lebanon, and has served in a number of diplomatic posts in the Middle East. Later he was on the faculty at the U.S. Army War College and a member of its Strategic Studies Institute. At the conference he told me his theory that a key to peace between Israel and its neighbors was a disputed region called Sheba’a Farms.

The area was captured by Israel in 1967 during the Three Day War. Israel has considered the territory to be part of Syria, though Lebanon claims it is part of their country. Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 did not include this area. For this reason Hezbollah believes Israel is still occupying Lebanon, and says it is engaging in guerrilla resistance against an invader, not terrorism, when it attacks Isreal.

According to Sami, this is the string which, if pulled, can unravel the entire knot of conflict between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. In a 2002 monograph, he says:

The Sheba’a issue is more than a legal question involving the right of sovereignty over the disputed area; it is the hook used by Lebanon and Syria to link the Lebanon-Israel track to the Syrian-Israel track in the Middle East peace process. It involves the larger question of a peace settlement to end the Israeli occupation of Lebanese and Syrian lands leading to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Hizballah is the tactical instrument contributing to that end. Understanding the complexities of these relationships is critical to finding a resolution of what the United Statesand Israel regard as Hizballah’s terrorism.

Ambiguity about the borders between the three countries has given Syria leverage in peace negotiations with Israel, and it has resisted settlement of the border issues in the area for that reason. The border issue is quite complicated and is explained in detail in the monograph.

Sami argues that the fixing of the borders and the withdrawal of the Israelis would have a number of beneficial effects. First it would deny Hezbollah its main justification for continued attacks on Israel, and put pressure on the Lebanese government to reign them in as a regularized, unarmed political party. Second it would remove the last remaining territorial dispute between Israel and Lebanon. Third, because of this it would simplify negotiations between Syria and Israel by removing the “Lebanon card,” and allow those talks to focus on return of the Golan Heights.

When I first met Sami and heard this theory, he was very frustrated that nobody in the Bush administration would listen to his argument, which to me (an interested onlooker but non-expert in the Israel-Arab conflict) seemed pretty plausible. Now it appears that something has changed, probably owing to the Bush Administration’s 11th hour effort to make progress on Middle East peace.

Today ynet Israel News reports that the U.S. is backing an Israeli withdrawal from Sheba’a Farms:

Sources in Lebanon were quoted by Al-Hayat as saying that Israel’s possible withdrawal from the Shebaa Farms area, which was captured by Israel from Syria during the Six Day War in 1967, was one of the focal points during the recent meetings US President George W. Bush held with German, Italian, British and French leaders while touring Europe.

The sources said Washington was more understanding of Lebanon’s position on the issue, which is supported by the Arab League, the European Union and UN chief Ban Ki-moon, and did not rule out the possibility that the US would press Israel to withdraw from the Shebaa Farms.

Also today, MEMRI quotes Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Al-Miqdad as saying the Sheba’a Farms is “completely Lebanese,” and indicating a willingness to work with Lebanon to fix the borders.

If Sami’s theory is right, this “significant turnaround in the United States’ position” (as Lebanese officials described it in the ynet article) could be a Hail Mary pass from the Bush administration with an actual chance of a last-second touchdown.

UPDATE:  Today (17 June 08) MEMRI reports that Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu Al-Gheit is behind the Sheba’a Farms initiative.

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by Matthew B. Morris 

John McCain gave what was billed as a major foreign policy speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on March 26. In the speech he described himself as a “realistic idealist:”

I am an idealist, and I believe it is possible in our time to make the world we live in another, better, more peaceful place, where our interests and those of our allies are more secure, and American ideals that are transforming the world, the principles of free people and free markets, advance even farther than they have. But I am, from hard experience and the judgment it informs, a realistic idealist. I know we must work very hard and very creatively to build new foundations for a stable and enduring peace. We cannot wish the world to be a better place than it is.

Hillary Clinton took advantage of McCain’s speech on foreign policy philosophy to link McCain to Bush policies:

Like President Bush, Senator McCain continues to oppose a swift and responsible withdrawal from Iraq. Like President Bush, Senator McCain discounts the warnings of our senior military leadership of the consequences of the Iraq war on the readiness of our armed forces, and on the need to focus on the forgotten front line in Afghanistan. Like President Bush, Senator McCain wants to keep us tied to another country’s civil war, and said “it would be fine with me” if U.S. troops were in Iraq for 50 or even 100 years. That in a nutshell is the Bush/McCain Iraq policy.

The response from the Obama campaign was similar, with the added argument that Obama represents a real contrast to McCain’s philosophy in his emphasis on issues like “poverty and genocide, climate change and disease” as major international foci for an Obama presidency, along with the threat of terrorism.

McCain framed his foreign policy speech in terms of his lifelong experience with war, emphasizing that his personal disdain for war is shaped by his service in Vietnam. Throughout the speech he expresses his hatred of war, perhaps in an attempt to discredit the image that has been perpetuated about him as a supposed war-monger.

Rhetorically, this serves to set up his experience as the framework within which he would like his philosophy and policies to be viewed. This may serve to distance McCain from Bush, in that while their policies may have some similarities, the experiences that inform their philosophies are very different.

From a strategic communication perspective, there are two issues in McCain’s speech that are especially interesting: public diplomacy and ideology.

Steve Corman has made the case in a previous CSC journal article that credibility is a key issue candidates must deal with in public diplomacy. McCain sees a hasty withdrawal from Iraq as the most dangerous thing America could do to our credibility:

We have incurred a moral responsibility in Iraq. It would be an unconscionable act of betrayal, a stain on our character as a great nation, if we were to walk away from the Iraqi people and consign them to the horrendous violence, ethnic cleansing, and possibly genocide that would follow a reckless, irresponsible, and premature withdrawal. Our critics say America needs to repair its image in the world. How can they argue at the same time for the morally reprehensible abandonment of our responsibilities in Iraq?

McCain’s main public diplomacy effort seems aimed at reinvigorating our alliances:

We need to listen to the views and respect the collective will of our democratic allies. When we believe international action is necessary, whether military, economic, or diplomatic, we will try to persuade our friends that we are right. But we, in return, must be willing to be persuaded by them.

This represents a possible move by McCain toward a more sophisticated understanding of communication, beyond the transmission model of communication that emphasizes delivering messages to the audience towards a more transactional model. In order to improve on this, it is important to consider whose voices will be heard within this international dialog.

What this and many other comments within the speech show is that his willingness to negotiate extends primarily to those who share our own ideology. The frequent links between “freedom,” “democracy” and “free markets” throughout McCain’s speech show that the underlying assumption behind his philosophy is that neo-liberal late capitalism equals freedom.

While McCain says that America needs to stop supporting the corrupt regimes in the Muslim world, a primary al Qaeda demand, he also indicates that his goal in doing so is to expand the regime of “freedom,” understood as neo-liberal late capitalism. This ideological system excludes a large portion of the world’s population as part of the international discourse, perhaps contributing to the recourse to alternative discourses (such as terrorism) as a means for those outside the hegemonic ideology to send us messages.       

Although it is a difficult task, allowing for freedom of ideological perspective among discursive partners is an important part of opening American public diplomacy beyond being able to communicate with those who think the way we do. It would be interesting to see the candidates take this into account, and show their faith in their own ideological perspective by allowing for the possibility of it being called into question.  

-mm

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According to a weekend story in The Guardian, Jonathan Powell, former chief of staff to Tony Blair, called for dialog with al Qaeda:

There’s nothing to say to al-Qaida and they’ve got nothing to say to us at the moment, but at some stage you’re going to have to come to a political solution as well as a security solution. And that means you need the ability to talk.

The article attributes Powell’s position to his experience in negotiations with the Irish Republican Army, where he is said to have played a central role.

The Guardian’s prediction that his remarks would be “highly controversial” was a safe one. One commenter on Free Republic replied: “Talk with al Qaeda, eh? How did that work out in Munich for Great Britain in 1938, Jonathan?”

Of the reasoned objections to Powell’s call, most arguments centered on the idea that the IRA is a bad analogy for al Qaeda. While in the Ireland situation the terrorists were a relatively well-organized group with clear political demands, this is not the case with al Qaeda. Blogger Tom Freeman put it this way:

‘al-Qaeda’ is not a single entity. First, there’s the group centred on Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, fugitives in the Afghan-Pakistani border regions. Their contact with wider groups is much diminished since 9/11, and in any case they have no interest in compromise. They’re also pretty hard to find.

Second there is the broader network of sympathetic “franchise” groups. So who would we communicate with?

Critics also point out that there is no basis for expecting concessions on either side. To be sure, bin Laden and his associates present a consistent set of demands to the West, like removing every last Westerner from the Arabian Peninsula, stopping support for Israel and “apostate regimes” in the Middle East, stopping efforts to lower oil prices, and converting to Islam. Could either side be expected to give in on any of these demands?

In short, the dispute between al Qaeda and the West shows most of the signs of intractable conflict:

1. In terms of actors, intractable conflicts involve states or other actors with a long sense of historical grievance, and a strong desire to redress or avenge these.
2. In terms of duration, intractable conflicts take place over a long period of time.
3. In terms of issues, intractable conflicts involve intangible issues such as identity, sovereignty, or values and beliefs.
4. In terms of relationships intractable conflicts involve polarized perceptions of hostility and enmity, and behavior that is violent and destructive.
5. In terms of geopolitics, intractable conflicts usually take place where buffer states exist between major power blocks or civilizations.
6. In terms of management, intractable conflicts resist many conflict management efforts and have a history of failed peacemaking efforts.

Transformation of an intractable conflict requires communication, so does Powell have a point? His critics have good arguments about the improbability of negotiations (a point that Powell himself acknowledges). But we should recognize that in five years of trying we haven’t had much luck stopping the radical islamist movement by killing its members. If that strategy isn’t working, and talking to them isn’t acceptable, and we’re not willing to accept perpetual conflict, what should we do instead?

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