It did not take long for the images of the US Marines urinating on corpses of Taliban fighters to go viral. A moment of lapsed judgment will circulate as long as anyone is interested in seeing it, certainly long after short attention spans move on to other things and the fallout – including, presumably, disciplinary actions for the soldiers – settles.

Predictably, extremist sites have been all over this. In Indonesia, the story has run on Voice of al Islam, Hidayatullah, ar Rahmah, and others. Voice of al Islam made a clever play on words in their headline; they cited the Council on American-Islamic Relations by using its acronym CAIR, which means “liquid” in Indonesia. The headline “CAIR Kutuk Penodaan Mayat Anggota Taliban oleh Marinir AS” means “CAIR condemns the desecration of Taliban Corpses by US Marines,” but it could be read “Accursed Liquid Desecrates the Taliban corpses by US Marines.” The story itself is a pretty straightforward account of CAIR’s reaction – writing to secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, issuing a condemnation, and hoping for justice.

VOI’s subsequent post ratchets up the rhetoric, however. “Animals! American Marines Piss on Taliban Mujahidin.” The story quotes Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, who stated that “actions such as this make the Taliban want to continue to attack America.” For emphasis, the quote was highlighted and used as a pull quote in the text. The behavior is condemned as abominable, wild, and animalistic.

Ar Rahmah’s coverage invokes the Crusader master narrative, linking the act to centuries of perceived conflict and occupation. The headline quotes Taliban Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed’s statement that there are hundreds of similar unreported cases.

The story is also being repeated in the Arabic-speaking world. The bladialyoum blog embedded the video, and refers to the soldiers as barbarians, condemning the occupation of Muslims lands, and linking the act to other perceived acts of aggression against the Muslim world. In this post on Arabic.rt, comments condemn the act, and link it to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed denounced the act as “barbaric.”

That extremist sites are reporting this story should come as no surprise, nor should it be surprising that mainstream media outlets are covering it as well. In Indonesia, for example, both English language dailies – the Jakarta Post and the Jakarta Globe – ran stories, as did most Indonesian language outlets such as Kompas, which embedded a link to the video on its website. Al Jazeera has been following the story, and updating it as details emerge (such as this report about the identification of US soldiers). These mainstream outlets reach exponentially more readers, and their coverage is nearly identical to the extremists, minus the hyperbole and the explicit anti-Americanism.

Not to say that those interested in combating extremism shouldn’t be paying attention to the extremist sites, but the readers of the mainstream sites are important too. Most of those few who follow the extremist sites have already chosen sides, but many in the mainstream media audience are “middle ground” observers, who may not have a strong opinion about the conflict. Stories such as this may push them toward sympathizing or even supporting extremists.

The story also shows the importance of non-verbal communication in the digital age. The despicable act itself was communication, but seeing and hearing it for oneself has much more of an impact than simply reading about it. Will the images inspire copycats and image manipulators in the same way the infamous images from the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib did? Will they become memes? Cartoon parodies have popped up, in both liberal and (neo)conservative media.

Domestic reaction to the images is mixed. Public officials and military spokespeople are nearly unanimous in their condemnation. So are many among the commentators on mainstream new sites. But many other sources  are not, arguing, essentially, that it is “no big deal.” Floundering presidential candidate Rick Perry’ argued, essentially, that it was no big deal, and criticized President Obama’s (and just about every other public figure’s) reaction. Islamist sites duly reported Perry’s words, and continue to follow the story, reporting on new details such as the identification of the soldiers.

It is, however a “big deal.” The internet age has drastically changed strategic communication, which is why it’s unfathomable that these soldiers thought it was a good idea to film this. As Robert Wright in the Atlantic writes in “The Banality of Urination,” that the act itself was committed is not particularly surprising:

You send hordes of young people into combat, people whose job is to kill the enemy and who watch as their friends are killed and maimed by the enemy, and the chances are that signs of disrespect for the enemy will surface–and that every once in a while those signs will assume grotesque form.

It is, rather, the “transparency of war” and the danger that the act will spread hatred and revulsion among those who view it.

The attention surrounding this act gives the extremists symbolic ammunition and may make the “middle ground” readers forget about the Taliban’s horrendous atrocities, such as their bombings of weddings, volleyball games, and other events that kill Muslims, or training children to behead their enemies. It may appear that they have gained the “moral high ground” for a brief period. Swift and public disciplining of those responsible may help reduce the fallout, but as the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, this is another reminder why the US needs to go to great lengths to try to minimize negative perceptions in the Muslim world.

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In December, COMOPS was invited to participate in a question and answer forum with General Stéphane Abrial, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, hosted by Atlantic-Community.org. Atlantic-Community is a leading European online think tank focused on transatlantic relations. The Q&A reveals that General Abrial has an integrative, forward-looking conceptualization of the role of strategic communication in NATO.  A close read also suggests that NATO faces both internal, as well as external, strategic communication challenges.

As the head of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), General Abrial is one of two strategic commanders in the NATO organizational structure (Allied Command Operations or ACO is the other, led by Admiral James Stavridis), and is charged with leading and facilitating the continuous improvement of NATO capabilities to meet NATO missions, operations and goals now and into the future.  The online forum consisted of a video by General Abrial introducing the concept of “Smart Defense”, an initiative recently put in place by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and General Abrial’s thoughts on what Smart Defense means for ACT.

Members of Atlantic-Community were invited to submit questions to General Abrial, facilitated by the editors at Atlantic-Community, and over the course of two subsequent sessions General Abrial answered a selection of these questions.  The first set of questions addressed specific implementations of Smart Defense, including definitions and ACT implications as well as transparency and development concerns.  The second inquired about broader NATO issues such as maritime security, cultural obstacles to cooperation and strategic communication.  The complete question and answer session can be found here.

One of the underlying factors driving Smart Defense, emphasized both in General Abrial’s introductory video and his answers to multiple questions, is the increased pressure on defense budgets in the face of the current European debt crisis and severe recession in the United States.  Yet, the security challenges faced by NATO and member countries have not abated.  These fiscal conditions motivate a need to do more with less, or as the general puts it: “We need to spend better.”  General Abrial provides some interesting thoughts about cooperative procurement as a method to leverage economies of scale.  In addition, he suggests the coordination of each member-country’s unique strengths and capabilities would be more efficient than developing parallel capabilities across the Alliance.

Acknowledging the fiscal challenges underpinning Smart Defense, my question to General Abrial centered on what sort of security dividend could be realized by emphasizing strategic communication as an additional tool for achieving NATO security objectives.  In other words, with the significant rise in insurgency and other irregular warfare situations, might non-kinetic solutions offer a cost-effective supplement to traditional kinetic military capabilities (and by implication, could successful non-kinetic solutions reduce the need for expensive weapons systems procurement and maintenance, if only slightly)?

General Abrial’s answer emphasized the role of strategic communication as part of a broad public diplomacy effort and cited a 2009 NATO Summit conclusion that strategic communication must be an integral part of both political and military objectives.  This dual role of strategic communication points to a significant challenge for conducting it effectively.  Which arm of NATO (or any government for that matter), the political or military, should lead strategic communication?

Thinking of strategic communication in terms of public affairs and information operations is too restrictive. It is a discipline that bridges both political and military domains and is intricately enmeshed with both political and military operations.  It requires careful planning and forethought, otherwise devaluing its strategic benefit.  General Abrial calls for “building a professional framework strategic communications related military disciplines” and I would argue that this framework should be overtly collaborative with the political dimension of the alliance’s functions.

General Abrial’s answer also got me thinking about two sides of strategic communication and the special challenges faced by NATO.  All countries when seeking to communicate their objectives and goals, and seeking to persuade an audience to cooperate in the achievement of those goals have two audiences, external and internal.  In its traditional definition—communication crafted and coordinated to support the achievement of a goal—strategic communication is often conceived as an externally focused process, and this is especially true when subcomponents of the discipline such as public diplomacy, information operations and psychological operations (psyops) are considered.  However, countries have domestic audiences that require information and need to understand what their government is trying to accomplish.

In NATO’s case, this internal audience presents a particular challenge:  28 member countries, each with its own unique security and diplomatic concerns, its own internal political turmoil, not too mention significant historical and cultural concerns.  Each country itself has both internal and external audiences.  General Abrial’s comments introducing Smart Defense indicates this need to address this internally-focused facet of strategic communication.

He observes that a question facing NATO is: “how do we best encourage groups of like-minded countries to reap economies of scale by working together more often?”  This sounds like a strategic communication issue, but not one suited to information operations or pysop campaigns.  Rather, it is about getting all the member countries to share the same vision of NATO’s future and the same vision about how they can contribute to that future.  In short, they need to participate in the same narrative.

This challenge illustrates how approaching narrative from a systemic perspective can be helpful, not only in terms of narrative analysis and understanding, but also in terms of strategic communication planning.  Smart Defense already articulates some fundamental themes: cooperation, fiscal prudence, balancing sovereignty and solidarity, etc.  As we’ve noted here at COMOPS Journal before (notably here and here), a narrative is (1) an explanatory organization of information; (2) is structured with a trajectory towards the resolution a conflict or satisfaction of a desire (and the events of this trajectory illustrate themes, values and ideals); and (3) is a system of stories.

Constructing a Smart Defense narrative, then, would consist of identifying a variety of stories that constitute the events in the overall narrative trajectory.  For an effective and coherent narrative that unites the alliance, these stories would ideally be sourced from the member countries and thus consistent with those narrative landscapes.  Next, they would contain within them actions and characters and events that, when collected together, place Smart Defense at the resolution of the conflicts or the satisfaction of  desires germane to each member country.  Of course, that’s easier said than done.

The most encouraging of all the general’s comments, though, was his assertion that strategic communication “must be incorporated into all operational planning, instead of being relegated to an after-the-fact attempt to explain, or build support for a decision that has already been taken.”  As my co-authors and I argue in our upcoming book Narrative Landmines, understanding the narrative landscape and incorporating that knowledge into the decision-making process at operational and strategic levels can make the difference between success or failure of civil affairs, public outreach, crisis management and other soft power enterprises.

We at COMOPS thank General Abrial and Atlantic-Community for the opportunity to engage in this dialogue, and look forward to following NATO’s efforts in implementing Smart Defense and ensuring both European and Transatlantic security in the years to come.

____________________________

*Dr. Scott W. Ruston is an Assistant Research Professor at the Center for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University. A specialist in narrative theory and media studies, he is the co-author of Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (Rutgers UP, available March 2012).  He is also an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve newly assigned to a NATO ACT reserve support unit.

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On Friday, October 22, Wikileaks released almost 400,000 documents on the Iraq War.  At first Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell seemed to downplay the release, claiming the documents were “essentially snapshots of events” and do not “tell the whole story.” But chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen condemned the release, tweeting: “Another irresponsible posting of stolen classified documents by Wikileaks puts lives at risk and gives adversaries valuable information.”  Appearing on the Diane Rheem Show, Morrell also took a more serious tone toward the release in line with Mullen:

Well, what I’m speaking of is our fear is that our enemies can look at these documents and see patterns of behavior, can connect the dots in terms of how we respond in — when we’re engaged with small arms fire, when — what are our — what is our standard operating procedure in the aftermath of an IED attack, how we cultivate sources on working with Iraqis or Afghans, the capabilities of our equipment, response times, things of this nature. These and — listen, we are dealing with — and have been for years — a knowing, thinking, adaptive enemy. of this nature. These and — listen, we are dealing with — and have been for years — a knowing, thinking, adaptive enemy. They are — they know that this is a treasure trove of information that they can mine and make them smarter and better fighters.

Others emphasize different outcomes or downplay the danger these releases pose to troops. Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, have called for a full investigation of the claims of abuse and torture found in the documents.  Daniel Ellsberg has been particularly outspoken in support of the release.  Appearing on the Larry King show, he responded to the issue of endangering troops by changing the subject:

KING: How do you respond to the White House assertion that this leak puts U.S. forces in danger?

ELLSBERG: You know, the people who put U.S. forces in harm’s way—100,000 men and women in Afghanistan—are the last two administrations, but particularly this one, with a decision to escalate the war. I think it takes a lot of –I don’t know what to say—chutzpah, effrontery, for people who made the reckless, foolish, and I would say irresponsible decisions to escalate a war that I’m sure they know internally is as hopeless as these new revelations reveal it to be.

So a crucial question seems to be: Are extremist groups really mining these leaked documents for information that could put our troops in danger, or is this threat being overemphasized, drawing attention away from issues of official misconduct?

To our knowledge nobody has taken a public look at this question, so we decided to address it by looking at web sites and message boards frequented by extremists, to see how the Wikileaks release is being discussed.  We discovered three “camps” that viewed the release in radically different ways.

Camp 1: That’s nice but…

Members of the first camp exist in virtually all of the forums we surveyed.  They believe the WikiLeaks documents are beneficial.  The documents provide evidence that support their claims against Nouri al-Maliki. These include claims that Maliki has had a role in Shi’a attacks on Sunnis, Americans turn a blind eye to his abuses, Iranian militias are fighting in Iraq, and the civilian death toll in Iraq is far higher than the U.S. will admit.  In their eyes, the documents do not contain new information, but provide only further confirmation of their existing views.

This group considers the documents “half truths.” The contents are “not surprising,” and they “do not want to touch” the documents because they “do not point to the main killers nor their aides and lackeys inside and outside Iraq.” They emphasize that these reports can help expose the “true nature” of Maliki and the American occupation, but relate only a fraction of the atrocities that have occurred.  For some, including the spokesman of Jaish al-Fatiheen, that is enough to have “no desire to touch the documents” any further.

Camp 2: It’s a trap

Those in the second camp advocate staying away from the documents entirely. They are suspicious of them and argue that the documents are part of a conspiracy. In their view, there must be a reason for the leak or some sinister motive behind it. These voices are loudest on the Shumookh al-Islam Forum, which the Quilliam Foundation recently rated as “the second most popular al-Qaeda affiliated Jihadist forum.” It is also endorsed by al-Qaeda’s online logistical network al-Fajr.

One interesting conspiracy theory, promoted on the Shumookh Forum, argues that the Wikileaks documents are part of an American-Iranian plot to fool Sunni Arabs into thinking America is an ally, while Iran and America are actually in a secret alliance. The documents are designed to delude al-Qaeda into thinking Maliki is not a strong ally of the U.S. and decrease their interest in attacking Iraqi ministries and forces. Other conspiracy theories also exist, including the idea that there are new mysterious documents in the list that were not originally there.

Camp 3: Translations wanted

Those in the third camp do not share the suspicions of Camp 2. In fact, they are very interested in acquiring information from the leaked documents. To do so, they call for translations of the documents into Arabic and encourage others to analyze them to find information that can benefit the “mujahideen.”

This indicates a couple of things.  First, they recognize that the documents could support the extremist narrative by helping prove that the U.S. has acted criminally and inhumanly.  But second, this camp realizes that a complete translation might backfire against them, so selective work is advised.  If the documents are treated as credible (and they must be credible or why bother translating them?) and they indicate that the “mujahideen” have committed crimes or atrocities, it has the potential to weaken support for the extremists.

The third camp is found on multiple forums, but seem strongest on al-Hanin Forum, where a separate section of the forum titled “WikiLeaks” was created for users to post translations and discuss the documents. There is a significant amount of activity in the “WikiLeaks” section with one user in particular, named “Sword of the Samurai.” This user has contributed over thirty translations since the section appeared on the form around October 26. Another ongoing forum thread contains translations posted by a user named “Abu Yousef al-Bashir,” now at a length of seven pages with over 2,500 views since October 24.

Analysis

What do these sites tell us about the threat of the Wikileaks documents to national security?  The first camp sees the documents as irrelevant. If the leaked documents do not contain anything new, then nothing has changed.  Most of the posts coming from the second camp, regarding conspiracies, are found on one site, Shumoukh Forum, and those posts ceased after three days of activity.  This suggests that the second camp is probably the smallest and least significant of the three.

It is the third camp, which seeks translation of the documents, which should command our attention. In the hands of this group the Wikileaks documents could, at minimum, provide a strategic communication ammunition for the extremists.  The documents could support their “justification for hostilities” against Maliki and the U.S. and affirm what the extremists have said about U.S. motivations and activities all along.

This brings us to another concern: The documents could serve as a recruiting tool. Non-participants, who may have been skeptical or uninterested in extremist claims against the U.S., could become roused or active in response to new information, largely due to the source. That said, it is important not to overemphasize the scale of the threat here.  There is no shortage of grievances, being deployed by extremists against the United States, whether based in reality or on bizarre conspiracy theories. Further confirmation or expansion of those grievances, especially based on documentation of the past, does not present a unique or novel threat.

Overall, in the immediate sense and judging by the sites analyzed, the Wikileaks documents do not appear to pose a threat to national security in the way conceptualized by Mullen and Morrell. We found only minimal effort to mine the documents to learn more about American battle tactics and strategy on these web sites.  However, the documents may well pose a more significant threat from a strategic communication point of view, providing evidence of bad behavior by the U.S. and its allies.  The release of any such internal material that supports a negative narrative about U.S. involvement in the Middle East is most certainly counter to U.S. interests.

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Recent headlines revealed that video feeds from the Predator, the US unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used for surveillance and targeting in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have been intercepted by insurgents in Iraq.  Early follow up analysis focuses on whether the intercept of Predator video feeds qualifies as a “hack” or whether that term has over-sensationalized the situation.  This attention to semantics strikes me as a repeat of the “how are men in caves out-smarting us” debate with much hand-wringing about whether Islamic militants really have sophisticated skill and technology or not, and whether Iran must be involved supporting the militants with advanced technology.

The logic of this debate breaks down like this:  If it’s a “hack” then the insurgents have significant cyberwarfare skills and technology and are thus increasing their capability (and in a related version, they must be receiving Iranian support).  If it’s not a “hack” then they remain primitive fighters in caves, opening up criticism of the US military for allowing such an exploitable vulnerability to remain.

This attention to whether “hack” accurately describes the militants’ actions, loses sight of some important strategic communication ramifications of this intelligence breach.  Whereas I’m fully aware of the power of language to shape thoughts and perspectives, in this case the debate over terminology is just not an important issue.  Nor, really, is how the militants accomplished the intercept.  According to news report linked above, the Pentagon has indicated they’ve operated the Predator drone with unencrypted video feeds since the 1990s, assuming that unsophisticated opponents would not know about the vulnerability nor have the access to the technology (apparently a $29.95 box and some patience) to exploit it.  The same report indicates the DOD is already at work encrypting the video feeds, but I’ll address the apparent hubris evident here below.

While I think the “hack” or “not hack” debate is unimportant, I don’t mean to diminish the tactical importance of these intercepts.  Obviously, it is a huge intelligence coup for the insurgents (and reports indicate that it is not an isolated incident but rather an on-going activity of unknown scale).  But there is more here.  Beyond the ability for insurgent leaders to see what US and allied commanders were seeing, beyond the possibility of knowing where US attention was focused at any particular time, and beyond representing a minor cyberwarfare victory  for the insurgents, this situation points to two strategic communication victories for them as well.

First, it is well known that the insurgent and extremist spin machines, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but across the world where Islamic extremists seek to discredit the US, are adept at transforming news reports, images and videos of US actions into anti-US propaganda (or, for that matter non-US actions: here,  an Indonesia-based jihadist blames an Al-Qaeda bombing in Pakistan on Blackwater).  What better way to document the violent, brutish ways of the imperialist, crusading aggressor than to show the US military’s own tactical video?  Even seemingly innocuous surveillance video could easily feed the insurgent media machine.  Simple surveillance video of a village becomes  “Look how the Crusader targets civilians, women and children!”  Targeting video becomes proof of US violence.

Intercut some actual intercepted Predator surveillance video with some generic grainy footage of missile strikes easily obtained on YouTube or a thousand other sites, and an insurgent information operator has powerful, damning “evidence” of US violence killing righteous and/or innocent Muslims.  In a strategic communications environment where the US and its allies are struggling to close the say-do gap (for more see here and also here), having access to first hand video of US actions only fuels the insurgents’ abilities to exploit and perpetuate that gap.

Second, this intercept of Predator video is an act that fits into a broader narrative system.  It becomes a story as it circulates in the media and is retold by Western news media and insurgent mouthpieces.  In a recent post I discussed how  narrative works and what it does:

A narrative is a system of stories that hang together and provide a coherent view of the world.  People use narratives to understand how their world works.  Narratives contain patterns that fit the data of everyday life (events, people, actions, sequences of actions, messages, and so on), explaining how events unfold over time and how one thing causes another.

Osama Bin Laden has been telling stories of US imperialism and invasion, but also of US over-confidence and lack of resolve.  The stories of weakness include the 1993 defeat in Somalia, the bombing of the USS Cole, and 9/11, of course.  These stories all revolve around the central figure of the US as an over-confident monolithic force that is weaker in actuality than its image portrays.  I mentioned “hubris” above.  Here’s a quote from the Wall Street Journal report linked above:

The potential drone vulnerability lies in an unencrypted downlink between the unmanned craft and ground control. The U.S. government has known about the flaw since the U.S. campaign in Bosnia in the 1990s, current and former officials said. But the Pentagon assumed local adversaries wouldn’t know how to exploit it, the officials said.

This assumption belies a degree of US hubris, and even if the assumption was based on fairly solid intelligence it would play in the insurgents’ narrative system as a story of American over-confidence, arrogance and under-estimation of the skills of the militants.

Another key component of these stories is the clever and righteous mujahid warrior:

• In Somalia a combination of Al-Qaeda fighters and Somali militiamen defeated US Rangers and Special Operations forces.
• In the case of the USS Cole, clever fighters used an innocuous looking boat to approach the complacent warship.
• In the 9/11 story, the Al-Qaeda team crafted a creative plan to bring down a symbol of US decadence and excess.

With the number of these stories in circulation, a pattern develops creating the expectation in the intended audience that the US is weak and that clever mujahideen can, will and do defeat the Americans.  With the Predator drone representing as feared an asset as the Russian Hind attack helicopter was in the Soviet-Afghan war, this hack story fits the same pattern as the mujahideen defeating the Soviets with resolve, piety and righteousness (oh, and some Stingers).

Complementing these contemporary stories of clever Muslim soldiers defeating the American forces are older stories from Islamic traditions wherein a seemingly overmatched righteous warrior defeats a seemingly invincible power.  The David and Goliath story is one recognizable to Christians and Jews, but is also revered by Muslims.  The clever David eschews bulky armor and close-in weaponry, using speed, agility and an easily available supply of rock ammunition for his sling to defeat the over-confident and fear-inducing imperialist Goliath. The David and Goliath story establishes a pattern repeated with IEDs:  Clever warriors use unsophisticated and easily obtained weapons to defeat heavily armored warriors of a conquering government.

Another clever victory story by Muslims comes in the form of the Battle of the Trench.  Salman al-Farsi advises Muhammad to dig a trench around Medina to defend it against a massive Meccan confederacy of some 10,000 warriors.  The force of 3000 Muslims thwarts the Meccan assault and effectively ends the Meccan threat against the developing Islamic ummah.

Thus, these Predator video hack events contribute to a robust narrative system.  This system is made up of coherent and similar stories, across a range of time periods from the ancient to the contemporary.  In this consistent system there is a Crusading force, oppressing and/or invading the land of the innocent and righteous and pious.  Through a combination of righteousness, piety and cleverness, the oppressed (and after the Battle of the Trench this narrative system narrows its protagonists to Muslims) warriors defeat the overbearing, overconfident and seemingly all-powerful invaders.

So while we’re all paying attention to whether the video intercepts constitute a “hack” or not, we should be spending equal time, at least, in thinking through the strategic communication ramifications of this intelligence breech.  Commanders in the field should be screaming bloody murder about this counter-intelligence vulnerability, but so too should those charged with maintaining an effective strategic communication campaign.

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Thai-Buddhist colonialism? That is a strange concept, but it is reality as far as the Malay-Muslims of the “Deep South” of Thailand are concerned.

Edward Said noted that the representation of political- and military-subject people as less than fully human is among the basic elements of the culture and ideology of colonialism. He also observed that despite other differences, in this respect all colonialisms are the same. In the introduction to Culture and Imperialism he wrote:

Each great metropolitan center that aspired to global dominance has said, and alas done, many of the same things. There is always the appeal to power and national interest in running the affairs of lesser peoples. There is always the same destructive zeal when the going gets a little rough, or when the natives rise up and reject a compliant and unpopular ruler who is ensnared and kept in place by the imperial power; there is the horrifically predictable disclaimer that “we” are exceptional, not imperial. (p. xxviii)

Today, we generally think of colonialism as a Euro-American phenomenon. It took less than a day in Pattani in far south Thailand to learn that this is not the case, and that almost everything that has written about the insidious nature of colonialism applies to Thailand as much as it does to Britain, France and the United States.

Thailand is generally known as a Buddhist kingdom, but the south part of the country – which consists of three provinces—Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala—has an overwhelmingly Malay Muslim population. Every day they struggle to preserve and assert their cultural and religious identities in the face of more than a century of domination and marginalization by the Thai state.

Approaching a roadblock.

On a recent trip to the three provinces we realized that we had come to a strange and dangerous place as soon as we arrived in Narathiwat from Bangkok. Our cell phones showed “no network” and soldiers with AK-47 automatic rifles lined the airport entrance and exit. We did not learn until later that one could not activate a cell phone without approval from the Thai military and roadblocks every 5 km or so are rather common.

When we arrived at the only 4-star hotel in Narathiwat, the atmosphere was almost eerie and dense with silence. We found that we were the only guests and that the staff was vaguely uncomfortable to see three obvious foreigners, two Malays (who are Muslim) and one white person.

In a region that is predominantly Muslim, there are portraits of the Thai royal family everywhere. Most road signs are in Thai and the Malays are expected to adapt the language in their daily lives. They are expected to accept the royal family as benevolent patrons.

During the span of four days, we spoke with local Muslim religious leaders and academics and quickly learned that the insurgencies that have plagued the provinces have little to do with “global jihadism” and everything to do with Thai political and cultural imperialism.

The Imam of the Al Furqan Mosque. His father, the previous Imam, was killed in the attack of June 8 attack while leading prayers.

On a visit to the Al Furqan mosque where close to thirty people were gunned down mafia-style during prayers on 8 June 2009, the air was thick with humidity and anxiety. Will there be masked men attacking us from the surrounding forests or will the imam of the mosque who carried a pistol underneath his sarong sprint into action? Questions like these flashed through our minds.

It is not clear who carried out the attack, though most villagers around the mosque suspected Buddhist paramilitaries financed and armed by the Queen Sirikit of Thailand—who the Thai government portrays as a model of Buddhist virtue—had something to do with it.

The Thai military informed us that most of the Buddhist populations of the region are people who have been resettled from poverty-stricken regions in Northeast Thailand to bring Buddhism and Thai culture to the south. Buddhist temples are nestled in the midst of army camps and some monks carry automatic weapons to protect Buddhism.

During a meeting with the Thai military, Lieutenant-General Keresri (who is in charge of civil, military and police affairs in the region) told us that the people of the region were not Malays, but Thai Muslims. He described majority of the residents are “simple people who do not know much about civilization and only want to pray in the mosque five times a day and sit in the village.” He described the Thai army’s mission as being to “win their hearts and minds.”

We could not take photos of the military base camp. It seemed like something from Oliver Stone’s Vietnam War story. The meeting with the General was a revelation. He insisted on using an official interpreter, though he speaks English well. It seemed not to occur to him that the conversation could just as well have been conducted in Malay.  Even if he did, he chose to use English. Language use is an element of domination.

Teaching Malay Muslims to raise chickens.

He then “invited” us to visit a training and re-education camp. An aide took us across the road and showed classes being conducted about raising chickens and farming fish. Malays domesticated chickens thousands of years ago and have been raising fish in ponds for centuries. He explained that the classes were intended to teach people about domestic production. When asked if these techniques could be used for commercial purposes the answer was: “These people are not interested in that. They just want to live in the village, if they have enough to eat, that is good enough for them.”

The general’s statement echoes the “the myth of the lazy native,” a phrase coined by Malaysian scholar Syed Hussein Alatas. It was one of the cornerstones of British colonial ideology in Malaysia. The Thais made the British myth their own when they annexed the Malay territory that is now the “Deep South”.

The real purpose of the camp soon became clear. Army officials would “visit” graduates and ask them about the activities of “criminal gangs.” When asked if the “criminal gangs” are jihadis, he said: “No, just criminals.” Thailand would not like to be associated with jihadism or to be known as a center of Islamist activism. Few of the people at the training camp asked to be there. Most were “invited” from villages nearby in which insurgents are known to be active.

Colonialism at its worst is a systematic attempt to colonize the ordinary residents and to devalue their culture, religion and language. This seems to be exactly what is happening in these three provinces.

The Malays, who have a long tradition of sophisticated Islamic scholarship, refuse to send their children to Thai government schools. They continue to send them to traditional “pondok” or small religious schools, many of which teach a combination of Islamic and “modern” subjects.  As Thailand emerged as a nation state in the early decades of the twentieth century, it has consistently attempted to impose Bangkok-centered religion, language and culture onto its border regions. The Malay Muslims of the Deep South have consistently resisted these efforts.

There are 3,400 mosques in Thailand and out of this, 2,300 of them are located in Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani. Because of this, Thailand’s Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva recently tried his best to back a suggestion by his Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak to grant autonomy in the region. However, when Mr Najib raised the sensitive issue in a recent interview with a Thai daily, he was countered by strong opposition from the hawks in the Thai establishment and armed forces.

The Malaysian government is doing its best to work together with the Bangkok administration to make the autonomy concept materialize in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. The shadowy insurgency, which operates in scattered semi-autonomous cells with no visible centralized leadership, wants the restoration of the old Pattani state.

The Islamic Sultanate of Pattani, which included Malaysia’s Kelantan and Kedah states, was once a thriving commercial and cultural hub. In 1902 all three provinces, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, were annexed by mainly Buddhist Thais. This sparked decades of tension that spiraled into a full-blown insurgency five years ago that has killed close to 4,000 people.

According to a Thai-based Wikipedia page, most Thais describe resistance fighters in the South as violent Muslim extremists but they are known as freedom fighters or jihadists by the Malay Muslims. With more than 60,000 Thai army troops now stationed in the three provinces, it is apparent that Said was quite right about colonialism, but failed to consider how his observations might apply to colonial states other than those in Europe and America.

________________________________________
*Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies at Gadjah Madah University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, both in Yogyakarta Indonesia. Mariani Yahya is a Journalism Lecturer at the Management Development Institute of Singapore. She holds a Master in Science Degree in International Relations.

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In the aftermath of the 17 July bombings at the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta, some interesting developments have emerged in Indonesia’s anti-terrorism efforts.

The incident has shattered the illusion that Indonesia was safe from the threat of terrorism following four years without a major terrorist incident.  It also led to some puzzling rhetoric from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in which he likened terrorists to vampires, speculated that some of his political rivals might have been behind the bombing, and claimed to have evidence of a plot to kill him.

The attack has also introduced challenges for Indonesia’s emerging democracy. Despite the best intentions of those wishing to eliminate terrorism, some of the ideas proposed to identify those people associated with terror may do more harm than good.  As in the United States following 9/11, the demand to respond to attacks is putting pressure on democratic institutions and civil liberties.

Here is a roundup of recent developments in Indonesia.

A Free Press?

Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahman

On 25 August, Indonesian police arrested Muhammad Jibriel Abdul Rahman, who maintains the website ar-rahmah.com. In the days since the arrest, the police have made statements linking him to jihadist training in Pakistan, membership in al Qaeda, and financing terror, specifically the 17 July bombings, among other charges.  Jibriel responded by threatening to sue the police for wrongful arrest.

The web site was closed for several days, but is back online, and includes an essay by Jibriel in which he claims he is “enjoying” this test (along with a photo of him grinning). The police charges include funding terrorism, being a member of a terrorist organization, and possessing false identification papers.  Jibriel is claiming that it is a case of stifling a free press, a relatively novel concept in newly democratizing Indonesia.

Although he is accused of more serious crimes, this does raise questions about the limitations of freedom of the press in Indonesia. Is promoting jihad without advocating specific acts legal? Is a jihadist website covered under press laws? Jibriel’s claim that the police acted improperly and that he was covered under press freedom law was published on his father’s website, AbuJibriel.com, and he has appealed to the Indonesian Press Council for support. The police responded that he was being charged under anti-terrorism law. He has also claimed that he was tortured while in custody; the Human Rights Commission stated that it will investigate.

The story took an intriguing turn when former cinetron (soap opera) star Soraya Abdullah Balvas’ name became associated with Jibriel’s arrest and fueled speculation as to the nature of their relationship. She began wearing an abaya (see below) and following the teachings of Jibriel’s father in 2007, and has spoken out on his son’s behalf.  She is under suspicion for funding terrorism.

Monitoring Mosques, Abaya, Turbans, and… Beards?

In an effort to stem radicalization of Muslims during Ramadan, the Indonesian government proposed a program whereby Indonesian police would monitor Friday sermons at mosques throughout Indonesia. After an immediate, vocal, and understandable uproar, the plan was scrapped. There have been several other similar proposals, including searching women who wear abaya (alternatively, chador or burka, Islamic dress that covers the whole body, rare in Indonesia), banning backpacks from malls, and putting men who wear beards under suspicion. Perhaps they will also consider monitoring men with zebibah, a bruise or callous on the forehead from pressing one’s head forcefully while prostrate during prayer.  This is viewed as an outward display of piety for devout Muslims (zebibah literally means “raisin” in Arabic).

The Military and Domestic Terror

Another proposal that remains on the table is for the Indonesian military to play a role in combating domestic terrorism, revising the 2003 anti-terrorism law. Although it would expand the number of personnel working to eliminate terrorism, this plan is fraught with problems.

Indonesia’s armed forces, particularly its land forces, were focused on “internal” matters during the New Order (suppressing regional rebellions and eliminating dissent).  This is why the Indonesian Navy and Air Force are rather small in comparison to the Army, which is strange for an archipelagic country. The armed forces were also notoriously corrupt, and relied on military-owned private enterprises for most of their operating budgets. The military had an explicit role in government and social life, known as dwifungsi (dual function), and occupied seats in the parliament set aside for its members.

Human rights supporters are quick to point out that despite the increasing limitations on the military, it is still responsible for abuses in places such as West Papua. Analysts have connected the members of the military to Islamist groups such as Laskar Jihad during the conflict in Ambon in 1999-2001. Delegating more authority to the military could enable more abuses. The Indonesian army’s commander, General Djoko Santoso, may have just stoked these fears by arguing that “conflict areas,” including West Papua, may be susceptible to terrorism, implicitly lumping together the predominantly Christian West Papuan separatists (who have historically been abused) with extremists intent on creating an Islamic state.

Having just seen the military’s role reduced in the past decade, many are wary of delegating it more authority. A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report states:

Local police and community leaders in particular need to learn much more than they know now about the radical groups operating in their areas and what danger signs to look for. While there is a justification for greater information-sharing, there is none at all for giving more authority to the military or intelligence agencies to arrest or interrogate suspects. One of the great strengths of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism program is that it is a civilian law enforcement effort, not a war, and it should stay that way.

The strength and shape of JI

The aforementioned ICG report details the intricate web of connections that support terrorist Noordin Top, Jemaah Islamiyah, and related networks. These include family ties, pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), mosques and ulama (clerics) known for recruiting, foreign sponsors, and sellers of Islamic herbal remedies. As usual, the report shows the in-depth and well informed research typical of the Jakarta office of the ICG, and it underscores the importance of maintaining vigilance and avoiding complacency in Indonesia’s anti-terrorism efforts.

Noordin Top

The 17-hour shootout in Temanggung on August 8 was theater, but not very good theater. The mainstream press raised important questions in the days after the shooting.  Why didn’t the police try tear gas or other non-lethal forms of subduing the house’s resident?  Why had the police allowed a terrorist safehouse identified two years ago to remain a safehouse? These questions were repeated in jihadist websites such as Prisoner of Joy as proof of anti-Islam conspiracies and as evidence that Allah is protecting his mujahadin “slaves.”

A statement attributed to Noordin Top identified the man killed and stated that Noordin had been at the house two days prior. The fact remains that in full view of the media (and therefore the people of Indonesia) it took 17 hours and countless bullets to neutralize one suspect. In those 17 hours, and the several days it took to process DNA tests, the story that Noordin had been killed was repeated in the press. In fact, he remains on the loose, his whereabouts subject to speculation and unsubstantiated claims, and the threat from his Jemaah Islamiyah offshoot (and potentially others) is not diminished.

Terrorism remains appealing to a small segment of Indonesians. Those involved in trying to reduce terrorism by marginalizing or eliminating its supporters need to avoid alienating those who may be susceptible to terror’s message. The Indonesian government must take pains to implement plans that will be effective and palatable to not only mainstream Muslims but also staunchly conservative ones as well. It must also avoid the temptation to trample democracy and civil liberties to defeat those who threaten democracy and civil liberties.   In a war of ideas, tactics matter.

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Yesterday that the DoD Office of Inspector General released a report with the unparsimonious title “Organizational Structure and Managers’ Internal Control Program for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) and American Forces Information Service” (H/T WaPo).

It’s main conclusion has to do with the “Managers’ Internal Control Program established at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD[PA]) and the American Forces Information Service (AFIS).”  It’s “what we found” conclusion is that this

organizational structure did not provide the appropriate segregation of duties between the policy and oversight functions in the OASD(PA) and the operational functions that AFIS should perform

In particular the faulty structure allows inappropriate leakage between public affairs and info ops:

Without clearly defined strategic communication responsibilities, DoD may appear to merge inappropriately the public affairs and information operations functions. The OASD(PA) should only perform strategic communication responsibilities related to its public affairs mission. The strategic communications responsibilities for information operations should remain separate and under the oversight of the Under  Secretary of Defense (Policy)…Assigning the DASD for Joint Communication the responsibility for synchronizing public affairs and information operations allows for the improper integration of these functions.

The introduction adds (ominously?) “This is the first in a series of audits addressing the concerns of the ASD(PA).”

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The Advanced Research and Assessment Group of the Defense Academy of the United Kingdom has just released a new primer on Strategic Communication.  The executive summary says:

This paper attempts to address a perceived gap in UK defence thinking which currently has little documentation, on the emerging and cross governmental art of Strategic Communication. After defining the term this paper attempts to locate its utility within the defence community, considering its relationship with Media and Information Operations. The paper notes that at its core, Strategic Communication can only be successful when three processes are clearly understood: the role of strategic communication in campaigning, the actual cognitive process of communication and the empirical analysis of target audiences. The dangers of over-reliance upon polling are considered concurrently. The paper concludes with the place of Strategic Communication within UK military operations, the need for robust measurements of effectiveness and a short assessment of the challenges of emerging and new media.

The text of the report has many things that will be of interest to COMOPS Journal readers, including a recognition that in some scenarios that “military instrument” (which I take to be the “kinetic” part) will take a back seat to the exercise of soft power via strategic communication.

Speaking of strategic communication, the report wades into the troubled waters of defining that term:

In the US, strategic communication is often regarded as being 80% actions and 20% words. A presumption exists that Strategic Communication is aimed at external audiences. This is incorrect; Strategic Communication is as important to internal audiences as it is to external ones. Strategic Communication is a cross governmental, strategic activity in which the military is but one participant. It should however be an intrinsic part of the overall campaign plan. It typically over-arches traditional civilian public diplomacy activities6 and traditional military effects.

Thus the UK primer finds itself in disagreement with US thinking about the extent to which strategic communication is about verbal messages and whether strategic communication encompass public diplomacy or vice versa.

In other highlights, the report

• Makes insightful use of some principles from our soapbox in arguing for a more realistic, complex systems view of the communication process.
• Argues that “narratives are the foundation of all strategy.”
• Explores key asymmetries in the message landscape.
• Places strategic communication at the “heart of operations.”

If there is one drawback to the report, it is that the “target audience analysis” section seems to fall back from the complex systems view advocated earlier in the report to a more traditional OODA-loop concept of how communication campaigns should be executed.  As we have argued elsewhere, a more evolutionary approach would be more befitting of the rugged landscape described in the earlier parts of the primer.

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This is the third post in a series about the one-year anniversary of the State Department’s Dipnote blog. In Part 1 we focused on reviewing DipNote management and processes. In Part 2 we looked at what the State Department bloggers were writing about. In this post, we focus on our analysis of all the readers’ comments in response to the 344 DipNote posts that existed as of early October. We were able to gather 4,057 comments and place them into 13 emergent categories.

Recall from Part Two that 99 of the blog posts were not authored posts, but were links to Today’s Top Issues. Therefore, the following analysis omits those 99 entries, leaving us with 245 DipNote posts for comment analysis. Likewise, the corresponding 99 analyzed “No Comments” were removed resulting in 3,959 comments for analysis.

On average, each post received 16.2 comments. The graph on the above shows the distribution of number of comments per post. Across all categories, the most popular post in the blog’s history was the October 23, 2007 Question of the Week, Does the UN Successfully Fulfill Its Mission?, which brought in a total of 542 comments by itself. This one post accounts for just over 13.7% of all analyzed comments. Other extremely popular posts included the original September 25, 2007 Welcome to DipNote post by Sean McCormack, with 314 comments (7.9%), and the November 6, 2007 post Letter From Iraq to My Overwrought Colleagues by John Matel, with 221 comments (5.6%). So, these three posts are responsible for over 25% of all comments written on DipNote.

Given the three popular posts, the average number provided above does not represent the full picture in this case because they skew the average upward. Removing those three posts yields an average of 11.9 comments per post. The graph below shows the distribution of the number of comments per post with those three outliers removed. Without the outliers, the distribution becomes easier to see.

Next, the frequency chart below shows the overall distribution of comments as classified by type of comment. The largest category by a significant margin is Question of the Week Answer which represents comments by readers on the Question of the Week posts (1,277 or 32.3% of the 3,959 comments analyzed). This result is not too surprising given that the Question of the Week appeared weekly and, therefore, had the greatest opportunity for comments. The DipNote editors were anecdotally aware that this was their most popular feature, and the number of comments confirms this impression. Still, it is worth noting the effort by the State Department to generate interest and conversations in foreign affairs appears to be working.

The second largest category consists of Responses to Others’ Comments (21.4% of the total comments). This finding is significant because it provides further evidence the State Department has succeeded in creating a social media space that fosters interaction among readers. Burgess, Foth & Klaebe (2006) noted that engaged citizenship can be practiced through social media that offers opportunities for community building, so fostering interaction can be seen as an important sign of effective public affairs communication.

A related finding is the relatively small number of direct interactions between the blog authors and commenters. Only 5.4% of comments were addressed to blog authors, and only 2.1% consisted of responses by blog authors to commenters. It seems DipNote commenters are creating a community that exists independent of the specific blog authors. Perhaps this is a result of the number and variety of blog authors (see the Part 2 analysis), as well as the limited responsiveness of authors. Thus, although the DipNote blog represents a two-way asymmetrical form of communication between the State Department and readers, with limited dialogue between the organization and its constituents, the resulting space allows for “multi-way” communication to emerge through conversations in the comments.

The third largest category is Critique which makes up 15.1% of the comments. This category includes comments that critique U.S. domestic or foreign policy, foreign countries, or individuals. After that, Positive Feedback is the fourth largest category, making up 10.4% of comments. This category contains complimentary comments regarding policy, government, or even the individual blogger. Taken together, it is encouraging to see that 25% of the comments to DipNote posts are remarks, either positive or negative, about the issues presented to them. This is further evidence that DipNote is promoting discussion and creating dialogue within its community of readers. The State Department has succeeded in creating a space where readers feel comfortable expressing a broad spectrum of opinions.

The remaining nine categories make up 23% of comments. These categories are Direct Question to Blogger (5.4%), Policy Suggestions (4.9%), Link to Outside Article (3.1%), Policy Questions (2.4%), Blogger’s Response to Comment (2.1%), Off Topic (1.9%), No Comments (0.6%), Hostile Comments (0.5%), and Other (0.1%). It is nice to see that approximately 5% of comments are Policy Suggestions. Critique comes easily to most people, but identifying alternatives requires considerably more effort–the kind of effort people typically exercise when they believe the outcome is worthwhile and they will be heard. It is also worth noting that less than 0.5% of the comments were Hostile Comments. While this finding is evidence of a civil dialogue, it may be artificial and not reflective of the universe of blog readers: DipNote comments are moderated to some extent such that hateful and overly hostile messages are removed by the editor. Therefore, it is not possible to completely interpret this finding based on these data alone.

As a final note, excluding the Today’s Top Issues posts, only 9.0% of DipNote posts went without comment. Thus, almost every post sparked at least one response from a reader. We judge this to be an impressive success rate given that this is only the first year of the blog’s operation.

In the next post in this series, we look at how the State Department, and DipNote in particular, is using other social media to enhance their efforts to create greater transparency and increased dialogue.

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The Global War on Terror has been accurately described by some as a global counterinsurgency against the groups and individuals that promote the ideology of violent Islamic extremism. Unlike traditional counterinsurgency campaigns, however, there is no single host-nation (HN) in this fight; the enemy is disparate, networked, transnational, and bound together by a destructive and intolerant religious ideology.

In recent weeks and months, the difficult issues surrounding this global counterinsurgency have been highlighted in Pakistan. There is a wide range of problems including, but not limited to, the complexity of the tribal networks and absence of security in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), a lack of cooperation from the Pakistani government, and perhaps too much cooperation from the military and the ISI towards elements of the Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP). We also find conflicts in the region among different groups of militants, and a resurgence of al-Qaeda and Taliban control. As if this weren’t complicated enough, the mere presence of U.S. forces is unacceptable to many parties, and U.S. incursions into Pakistan tend to delegitimize the Pakistani government and threaten its sovereignty.

The primary objectives of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are to facilitate a legitimate political system within the HN, and to provide security and stability to the population. This makes military operations and political developments inextricably linked. In Pakistan, however, we face the challenge of waging a COIN operation without the use of our military. So, how do you fight a counterinsurgency without boots on the ground?

One way is to fight the insurgency through strategic communication operations. Last year, in the Marine Corps Gazette, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (Ret. USMC) wrote an article entitled “The Message is the Insurgency.” He asserts that “modern insurgency has become essentially a strategic communications campaign supported by military action rather than a military campaign supported by effective strategic communications.” Due to the complicated nature of the situation in Pakistan, a rigorous strategic communication campaign may be one of the most effective operations that the U.S. can engage in.

Although this is an extremely complex and dynamic issue, there are three key points to consider when implementing a strategic communication operation aimed at Pakistan.

Multiple Messages

Pakistan is the definitive rugged landscape; there needs to be at the very least two primary messages–don’t drink the lemonade, and trust your local leaders.

The Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Jim Glassman, describes the process of communicating an alternative to the extremist ideology:

Think of America’s values and political system as orange juice; think of the al-Qaeda system of violent extremism as lemonade. Our job for the short term is not to put all of our efforts into getting people to drink orange juice, but to get them not to drink lemonade. They can drink anything else they want: milk, ginger ale, tomato juice, Coke. We are confident that, ultimately, they will come around to orange juice or something close to it, but in the meantime, we want them to stay away from lemonade.

If we’re enticing people to stay away from extremists, there needs be alternatives out there. It is clear that Pakistan doesn’t effectively govern the tribal areas, so what exactly can they offer their citizens to drink?

In a classic counterinsurgency, promoting the legitimacy of the Pakistani government would be of utmost importance. However, the legitimacy of the Pakistani government may not even be relevant in the tribal areas. These areas are largely autonomous, and have been for decades; the national government doesn’t have much influence.

The aim of a strategic communication campaign in these areas needs to be towards empowering local non-militant tribal leaders. Pakistani officials might even be on the right track: During the anti-terrorism operation in Bajaur province, currently underway, they’re dropping leaflets that encourage individuals to trust their local tribesman, instead of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. Also, there was a one-day workshop in Islamabad last week, comprised of Pakistani officials, about initiating a strategic communication campaign in the FATA that acknowledges the importance of these tribal networks.

However, the U.S. Defense Department’s Afghanistan/Pakistan strategic communication plan for the NWFP and FATA doesn’t focus on the fact that citizens in the tribal areas are much more likely to support their local leaders than officials of the national government. Although official COIN strategies emphasize the need for citizens to support their national government, it is clear that the unique situation of the tribal areas in Pakistan warrants a new interpretation of these tactics.

Stick to Principles

Our strategic communication operations in the region need to be coordinated, streamlined, and implemented from the lowest levels all the way up to the highest. They need to be a priority in this global counterinsurgency, and the border regions need to be treated as the central front in the fight against extremism.

There are several COIN information operations (IO) principles (as outlined in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency) that are particularly relevant to Pakistan. They include engaging the media to provide accurate information about the COIN operation, actively countering the propaganda disseminated by militant groups (in a timely manner), pointing out the successes of the HN government and quickly admitting mistakes, and focusing on the present – making promises that might not ever happen decreases the legitimacy of both the HN and the COIN forces. Other tactics, like initiating a dialogue with the opposition, are much more precarious, and unlikely.

Although the results of a strategic communication campaign will likely be slow to materialize, it is necessary to be persistent in implementing these principles. At the moment, since U.S. troops can’t (and shouldn’t) be on the ground, this may be one of the only options in stopping the spread of violent extremism in this region.

Afghanistan is Key

Success in Afghanistan is crucial. If the tribal regions on the Afghan side of the border can be stabilized, and the Karzai government and local non-militant tribal leaders can be recognized as legitimate, then the news of progress will spread to the Pakistan side of the border.

Even in Afghanistan, where we have a dominant force in place, IO efforts are struggling. The difficulties the U.S. faces in its strategic communication campaign in Pakistan are directly tied to the resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.

An editorial in a mainstream Pakistani daily newspaper about the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan goes so far as to claim that the residents of the tribal areas now consider their past lives under the Taliban as “golden” in comparison to their current life under the Afghan government and the ISAF, and that any kind of dialogue with Karzai’s government regarding the stability of the tribal areas in Afghanistan was a “waste of time.”

Positive developments in Afghanistan need to be widely publicized in order to counter extremist propaganda about the negative influence of the ISAF. If the ISAF is able to make significant and sustainable progress in Afghanistan, it’s likely that the positive effects will be well-received in Pakistan. In order to combat violent extremism in Pakistan, the U.S. needs to convince Pakistanis that the grass is greener on the other side of the Durand line.

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