It did not take long for the images of the US Marines urinating on corpses of Taliban fighters to go viral. A moment of lapsed judgment will circulate as long as anyone is interested in seeing it, certainly long after short attention spans move on to other things and the fallout – including, presumably, disciplinary actions for the soldiers – settles.

Predictably, extremist sites have been all over this. In Indonesia, the story has run on Voice of al Islam, Hidayatullah, ar Rahmah, and others. Voice of al Islam made a clever play on words in their headline; they cited the Council on American-Islamic Relations by using its acronym CAIR, which means “liquid” in Indonesia. The headline “CAIR Kutuk Penodaan Mayat Anggota Taliban oleh Marinir AS” means “CAIR condemns the desecration of Taliban Corpses by US Marines,” but it could be read “Accursed Liquid Desecrates the Taliban corpses by US Marines.” The story itself is a pretty straightforward account of CAIR’s reaction – writing to secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, issuing a condemnation, and hoping for justice.

VOI’s subsequent post ratchets up the rhetoric, however. “Animals! American Marines Piss on Taliban Mujahidin.” The story quotes Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, who stated that “actions such as this make the Taliban want to continue to attack America.” For emphasis, the quote was highlighted and used as a pull quote in the text. The behavior is condemned as abominable, wild, and animalistic.

Ar Rahmah’s coverage invokes the Crusader master narrative, linking the act to centuries of perceived conflict and occupation. The headline quotes Taliban Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed’s statement that there are hundreds of similar unreported cases.

The story is also being repeated in the Arabic-speaking world. The bladialyoum blog embedded the video, and refers to the soldiers as barbarians, condemning the occupation of Muslims lands, and linking the act to other perceived acts of aggression against the Muslim world. In this post on Arabic.rt, comments condemn the act, and link it to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed denounced the act as “barbaric.”

That extremist sites are reporting this story should come as no surprise, nor should it be surprising that mainstream media outlets are covering it as well. In Indonesia, for example, both English language dailies – the Jakarta Post and the Jakarta Globe – ran stories, as did most Indonesian language outlets such as Kompas, which embedded a link to the video on its website. Al Jazeera has been following the story, and updating it as details emerge (such as this report about the identification of US soldiers). These mainstream outlets reach exponentially more readers, and their coverage is nearly identical to the extremists, minus the hyperbole and the explicit anti-Americanism.

Not to say that those interested in combating extremism shouldn’t be paying attention to the extremist sites, but the readers of the mainstream sites are important too. Most of those few who follow the extremist sites have already chosen sides, but many in the mainstream media audience are “middle ground” observers, who may not have a strong opinion about the conflict. Stories such as this may push them toward sympathizing or even supporting extremists.

The story also shows the importance of non-verbal communication in the digital age. The despicable act itself was communication, but seeing and hearing it for oneself has much more of an impact than simply reading about it. Will the images inspire copycats and image manipulators in the same way the infamous images from the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib did? Will they become memes? Cartoon parodies have popped up, in both liberal and (neo)conservative media.

Domestic reaction to the images is mixed. Public officials and military spokespeople are nearly unanimous in their condemnation. So are many among the commentators on mainstream new sites. But many other sources  are not, arguing, essentially, that it is “no big deal.” Floundering presidential candidate Rick Perry’ argued, essentially, that it was no big deal, and criticized President Obama’s (and just about every other public figure’s) reaction. Islamist sites duly reported Perry’s words, and continue to follow the story, reporting on new details such as the identification of the soldiers.

It is, however a “big deal.” The internet age has drastically changed strategic communication, which is why it’s unfathomable that these soldiers thought it was a good idea to film this. As Robert Wright in the Atlantic writes in “The Banality of Urination,” that the act itself was committed is not particularly surprising:

You send hordes of young people into combat, people whose job is to kill the enemy and who watch as their friends are killed and maimed by the enemy, and the chances are that signs of disrespect for the enemy will surface–and that every once in a while those signs will assume grotesque form.

It is, rather, the “transparency of war” and the danger that the act will spread hatred and revulsion among those who view it.

The attention surrounding this act gives the extremists symbolic ammunition and may make the “middle ground” readers forget about the Taliban’s horrendous atrocities, such as their bombings of weddings, volleyball games, and other events that kill Muslims, or training children to behead their enemies. It may appear that they have gained the “moral high ground” for a brief period. Swift and public disciplining of those responsible may help reduce the fallout, but as the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, this is another reminder why the US needs to go to great lengths to try to minimize negative perceptions in the Muslim world.

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Earlier this month (December 13-15) we were privileged to participate in a “The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media” sponsored by the Saudi sponsored Muslim World League (MWL, Rabita al-Alam al-Islami) and the Indonesian Ministry of Religion in Jakarta Indonesia.  Tension between the co-sponsors was evident in the selection of participants, the themes of formal presentations and in social interaction over the course of the conference. Differing perspectives on religious inclusivism, freedom of expression, social media and gender were especially apparent.

The conference theme was “The New Media and Information Technology.” Approximately 400 delegates and guests from 39 countries in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia were in attendance.  Jakarta was chosen as the conference venue because it was the site of the first conference that was held in 1980.  Many observers noted that the timing of the two conferences was not coincidental.  Both were held shortly after social and political upheavals that presented serious challenges to Saudi Arabia – the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Arab Spring of 2011.

Indonesian participants noted that the pairing of MWL and Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion was “peculiar” because of their very different orientations and agendas.  MWL is an international organization founded by the Saudi government in 1962 with the purpose of globalizing Saudi Wahhabism and countering other understandings of Islam and secularism. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion has a more inclusive understanding of Islam, and unlike MWL, actively promotes democracy and freedom of expression.

The Guest List

MWL selected conference delegates from the Middle East, Africa and Europe who share the leadership’s Wahhabi orientation. Efforts to secure a similarly sympathetic Indonesian contingent failed. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion delegated responsibility for inviting participants to academics in the Islamic University system, who invited Muslim scholars, journalists and activists with diverse religious views. The result was that while delegations from Middle Eastern, European and African countries supported the MWL agenda, the Indonesian contingent was less sympathetic. While participants included representatives of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, and other Indonesian organizations affiliated with MWL, none were invited to make formal presentations.

Most of the Indonesian participants were university lecturers with religious orientations very different from their Saudi hosts. This led to a marked contrast in the themes of formal presentations and a combination of humorous remarks and sometimes bitter comments about the implicit Saudi agenda.  Some found it ironic that Muslims who Wahhabis think of as kafir (unbelievers) because they engage in “deviant” forms of religious devotion including the veneration of saints, were invited at all. There were many sarcastic comments about the contrast between the pious pontificating of Saudi delegates and the burgeoning “temporary marriage”/sex tourism trade catering primarily to Saudis centered in Bogor, only a short distance from the conference venue. Others were angered by what they saw as Saudi arrogance and their exclusivist, self-referential use of the terms Islam and Muslim. One described Saudis as “colonialists,” echoing a theme discussed previously on this blog.

Formal Presentations

The conference included formal remarks by political figures, academic papers, mostly by Indonesian scholars, triumphalist, self congratulatory presentations by representatives of WML sponsored Islamic television networks in the United Kingdom and South Africa, speeches by WML officials calling for Muslim unity in efforts to counter western moral decadence and the destabilizing effects of the “New Media.” There was a consensus that there are positive and negative sides to New Media, and that the negatives include its use as a tool for the dissemination of radical ideologies and pornography. Indonesian speakers tended to embrace New Media because it promotes democratic change and freedom of expression. WML speakers expressed concern about it for exactly the same reason.

The disconnect between Saudi and Indonesian perspectives was apparent throughout the conference.  An editorial in the December issue of MWL Journal, distributed at the conference, summarized the Saudi position:

If the changing dynamics of media are not understood in its proper perspectives and an effort is not made to discipline the youth, it can create havoc in the society, as is being witnessed in many places.

Indonesian Vice-president Boediono opened the conference with a speech in which he stated:

The emergence of social networking media has created  new social institutions, in the forms of new social networks that bypass social borders and strata, creating virtual horizontal relationships. This New Media also helps to strengthen civil society and allows everyone access to it, greater freedom of expression and freedom of speech, including direct and open criticism of the Government.

Governments that have not been willing to allow greater democratic   participation and failed to respond adequately and in a timely manner to democratic voices have found themselves in difficulties or even been forced out of power by popular movements, the people’s power. Government’s control over media, is no longer effective. Gadgets, small yet very high-tech devices that can provide any information at any time, are easily available everywhere. Information has become a public domain. This is the new reality that we all have to adjust to and live with.

Social networking media can produce enormous benefits for the society. This is the experience in this country. The practice of democracy in Indonesia has been enriched by the development of social networking media.

He also called on Muslim religious authorities to issue “contextual fatwa (legal opinions)” to counter the influence of Internet based extremism. In Indonesian Muslim discourse “contextual” refers to a mode of legal reasoning that uses general principles abstracted from sacred texts to arrive at solutions to contemporary problems. This discursive style is an anathema to Saudi scholars who insist on literal readings. These are very different understandings of Shari’ah. The conflict between these positions was evident throughout the conference.

MWL General Secretary At-Turki

Presentations by General Secretary Abdallah Ben Abdel Mohsen At-Turki and other MWL speakers reiterated the themes of the MWL Journal editorial. They emphasized the dangers that global news and entertainment media pose to “Islam and the Muslims.” They stressed the need for government to government cooperation in efforts to establish “Muslim” alternatives to both existing Old Media and New Media. One speaker proposed creating a “Muslim” alternative to Facebook. Several speakers were critical of (unnamed) individuals who have declared the Internet to be haram (forbidden). They stressed the point that technology is morally neutral and should be used to promote Islamic values. Several presentations focused on the importance of satellite television as a communications medium. They indicated that television is the preferred medium because it can be used to deliver standardized content in multiple languages.

In their formal presentations WML delegates tended to speak of “Islam,” “The Muslim Community” and “The West” in monolithic ways. There were frequent references to “genuine” and Islamic teachings and the need to “correct” deviant tendencies. These statements reflect WML’s concerns with establishing Wahhabi orthodoxy and combatting other forms of Islam, especially Sufism and the Shiah.  “The West” was described as being anti-Islamic and as a source of moral corruption. “Western media” were often mentioned as engaging in conspiracies to corrupt Muslim youth and ultimately to destroy Islam. In general, portrayals of the West were far more negative than those in WML English language publications.

WML delegates we interviewed seemed not to understand the dynamics of New Media. One spoke of establishing an on line international Muslim media clearing house complete with electronic versions of “authentic texts,” and encouraging young people to study Information Technology as strategies to counter “anti-Islamic forces and influences.”  He did not appear to grasp the point that New Media is user driven. One of the editors of MWL Journal stated that he used e-mail and that some of his children had Facebook pages but that he did not really understand it. Another expressed confidence that if they were given proper Muslim educations, young people would watch “Muslim” programs on satellite TV instead of the frivolous entertainment programing offered by conventional media.

Presentations by Indonesian delegates echoed Boediono’s embrace of the democratizing power of New Media.  Parni Hadi, one of the founding editors of the Indonesian Islamic daily Republika, spoke with great passion and idealism about the constructive role of the New Media. In his remarks he mentioned links between technology and democratization, pointing to the role New Media in the Arab Spring movements that led to the overthrown of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He called for the development of a “Prophetic” journalistic ethos and practice  based on freedom of expression with “no oppression by whosoever, government and religious authorities as well as media owners.” He called on journalists to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad in efforts to promote “dignity, devotion, tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect and non-violence.” He was also critical of government attempts to control print, broadcast and on-line media.

In general Indonesian participants were far more open to changes wrought by the New Media than their Saudi counterparts. They tended to emphasize the opportunities rather than the dangers of the emergence of citizen journalism. They were less inclined to paint monochrome portraits of either “The West” or “Islam.” They also had a more expansive visions of “Muslim” media. In his address Professor  Azyumardi Azra, Dean of the Graduate School at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, called for a pluralistic understanding of Islam. He later observed that Muslim media can, and should be more than sermons and that there was nothing “un-Islamic” about media coverage of the Manchester United football team, a perennial favorite in Indonesia.

The Social Dimension – Exclusivism and Gender

International conferences are complex social events in which cultures sometimes collide. Gender was an especially divisive issue at this conference. Men and women mix freely at conferences sponsored by Indonesian Islamic Universities. There are always women on the program. Seating is gender mixed, women and men converse freely and join each other for meals and coffee breaks.

Saudi and other MWL organizers were clearly uneasy about these aspects of Indonesian Muslim intellectual and cultural practice. There were no women in MWL sponsored delegations. Of the approximately 200 Indonesians invited by the Ministry of Religion, at least half were female, but in deference to Saudi concerns, none were asked to make presentations. Gender issues were not addressed in any of the formal presentations. The Indonesian organizers did not compromise on gender integrated seating and meals. Saudi and other WML sponsored delegates did not, however, speak with Indonesian women when they could avoid it, much less join them for coffee or lunch.

Inayah Rohmaniyah Occupying the Podium

Many Indonesians, men as well as women, found the absence of women from the program to be unprofessional and insulting. When Labibah Zain of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University raised the issue in a question and answer session, the Saudi response was that the question could not be answered. After the session ended, but with at least a hundred people still in the room, she and Inayah Rohmaniyah, Senior Lecture in the Department Quranic Exegesis and Hadith Studies at the same Islamic University “occupied” the podium to which they and other female scholars had been denied access.  The Saudi English language Arab News mentioned her “protest” but described her only as a blogger and social activist.  It did not mention the act of symbolic resistance that followed the non response to her question.

Final Thoughts – New Media, Media Events and the World Muslim League

The Muslim World League describes itself as a non-governmental organization. While this is technically correct, it functions as a public diplomacy arm of the Saudi Arabian State. Its publications depict the Saudi State, the king and the Saudi religious scholars as patrons and defenders of Islam and denounce their opponents.  It supports the spread of the Saudi version of Islam by funding schools, mosques and media outlets in many countries. It sponsors international conferences that usually unanimously endorse directives from the Saudi religious establishment. These conferences are as much media events, promoting Saudi claims to leadership of the global Muslim community, as they are forums for intellectual discussion and debate.  The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media was intended to further this agenda and to formulate strategies to control opposing voices in the New Media. The conference approved a resolution establishing a “code of honor” for Muslim journalists and media organizations emphasizing their responsibility:

…… to affirm a belief in the moral principles and values of Islam, to safeguard the Islamic identity from the negative effects of globalization and westernization and to ensure freedom that is responsible and disciplined by Shari’ah guidelines; confront atheism and all other anti-Islam tendencies that spread hatred against Islam and Muslims.

It was, however, clear that the Indonesian Muslim establishment, including the Ministry of Religion and the Islamic University system and many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals do not share the Saudi desire to control either the Old or the New Media or to counter the role of New Media in democratic change. They clearly do not share Saudi perspectives on gender. WML publications often include photos of conferences in which no women appear. There were no such “photo ops” at this conference. One account of the conference, including quotations from Parni Hadi’s address, can already be found by searching 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media on Facebook. There will, no doubt, be others.

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* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University.

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A few weeks ago I did a keynote speech at a public meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission in Public Diplomacy.  Later in the meeting I heard a presentation by Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).  The topic of his talk tied together several topics recently discussed on COMOPS Journal, and accordingly I want to share it with readers.

Presumably in response to the myriad calls to better coordinate U.S. government strategic communication, the CSCC was charged in a recent executive order to

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Among other things, the CSCC oversees the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which has been the subject of  previous posts on this blog, both appreciative and critical. Amb. LeBaron’s talk focused on a recent DOT effort that allows me to add another post in the appreciative category, and I don’t believe it is very well known.

The DOT recently produced three videos juxtaposing AQ’s ideology with facts-on-the ground in the Arab Spring protests.  The first features clips from an Ayman al-Zawahiri video where he insists that “apostate regimes” can only be overthrown by violent jihad and that change through peaceful means is hopeless.  The second is based on a rant against democracy by Abu Yahia al-Libi.  The third (and most hilarious) uses clips of captured video from bin Laden’s compound showing him watching videos of himself.  In all three cases the AQ clips are intercut with news footage of the Arab Spring protests.

In my opinion this is a superb effort for a number of reasons:

• They reinforce messages that have long been priorities for U.S. strategic communication in the counterterrorism arena, namely that violent jihad is not necessary for social change, and that the best change is democratic.
• They present these messages while side-stepping problems with U.S. credibility, by mashing-up AQ’s own video with clips from independent news reports.
• They are “prosumer” efforts, done by DOT members with desktop video editing software, rather than slick professional productions.  As such they embrace cutting-edge trends in social media.
• They effectively employ the principle of ridicule as strategic communication, poking the Bad Guys in the eye by making them seem silly and out of touch with reality, and contributing to their developing image as a toxic brand.

We have argued that on the rugged-landscape of counterterrorism communication more out-of-the-box efforts like this are needed.  So hats off to the DOT for taking the leap.

You can watch the DOT videos, with English subtitles, here:

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On Sunday, September 25, a lone suicide bomber detonated a bomb at a Protestant Church in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, as services were letting out. Along with the bomber, one congregant was killed and several wounded from the shrapnel composed of nails, bolts and buckshot. In the ensuing week there has been a struggle over how the event should be framed, with most Islamist groups denying responsibility.

The bomber has been identified as Pino Damayanto aka Yosepa Hayat Ahmad aka Abu Daud Raharjo, and was wanted by police in connection to the network that bombed a mosque in a police station in Cirebon, West Java, last April. Police have since announced that they are in pursuit of others suspected of being a part of the attack, who might have fled to East Java, as well as a number of bombs that are suspected to have been built. On Friday, Indonesia’s anti-terrorism squad Densus 88 captured Beni Ahmad Asri, wanted in conjunction with the Cirebon network, in West Sumatra.

Police announced that the bomber was a member of jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Basyir’s Jama’ah Ansarut Tauhid (JAT). This was quickly met with a denial by a JAT spokesman. It has been confirmed, however, that he studied at the Islamic boarding school run by Abu Bakar Basyir at Ngruki.

One immediate concern was whether this bombing was a reaction to the sectarian violence in Ambon three weeks ago. As my earlier post notes, extremist Islamist groups have stoked the flames of violence in Ambon, calling for jihad and continuing to portray Christians in the region as separatist members of the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas, or RMS). The RMS was defeated in the early 1950s, was supported then by both Christians and Muslims alike, has little support in the Moluccas, and has never been a significant threat to the state of Indonesia since its defeat.

The day of the Solo church bombing, there were three bombs found in Ambon, in front of churches.  A fourth was found a day later. Despite the location of the bombs, extremist sites such as Prisoner of Joy place the blame on Christians. Indonesian police have reported similarities in the construction of the bombs found in Ambon to those found and used in Cirebon and Solo. One extremist site, Ghur4ba,  proudly proclaimed its support for the church bombing, and linked it to the violence in Ambon, the general crusade of Christians against Muslims, the apostacy of the Indonesian government, and referred to the bomber as a martyr. The declaration has appeared on several other sites, and is attributed to Forum Islam al-Busyro.

On Saturday, the head of Indonesia’s anti-terrorism agency proclaimed that after investigation, the violence in Ambon was not tied to the bombing.

As the toll rose to two dead including the bomber and 22 injured, Detik.com and others reported that the suicide bomber had apparently left a bag containing a Qur’an, gloves and other items at a nearby internet cafe, where he used a computer just prior to carrying out the bombing. The day after the bombing, news site Surya published this story stating that the bomber had looked at the extremist site ar Rahmah before the bombing.

Eastern Indonesia’s flagship paper Pos Kupang gave a list of the stories that the bomber had viewed. The stories the bomber viewed were mostly about American and allied casualties in Afghanistan, with one about Osama bin Laden. The stories referenced powerful Islamist master narratives, notably the crusader master narrative and the martyr master narrative (the latter in reference to Osama bin Laden).

In the days following the Solo bombing, police and investigative journalists began to release details about the bombing, and extremists began issuing their predictable condemnations of the event – while continuing to valorize suicide bombings elsewhere and jihad in general. Mainstream Muslim groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah immediately condemned the bombings, and an NU spokesman asked that the government take down extremist sites.

Responding to calls for shutting down extremist websites, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Information Titaful Sembiring stated that websites are likely not what push people to radicalism, but rather it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islam, which bans attacks on places of worship. While I agree with the latter part of the statement, there is mounting evidence that self-radicalization can occur via the internet.

Extremist sites such as ar Rahmah and Voice of al-Islam cited the minister’s speech in defense of their right to publish, and argued that they are the only ones exposing the true war against Islam in Indonesia, citing (once again!) the conflict in Ambon. Ar Rahmah plays the persecuted card, as though it is a victim of Islamophobia (and as though it doesn’t publish stories inciting violence in the name of twisted interpretation of Islam). Ar Rahmah published a story asking why the death of Christians warranted so much attention, when the deaths of Muslims in Ambon — according to them — did not.

As extremist groups began distancing themselves from the bombing, ar Rahmah published a story asking people not to link the bombing with jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Bashir. Conspiratorial thinking emerged as well — according to another story on ar Rahmah, intelligence analyst A. C. Manullang stated that the bombing may have been a pretext to crack down on radical groups in  Solo. In a story on Voice of al-Islam (which was subsequently removed), head of the paramilitary group Islamic Defenders Front Habib Rizieq claimed that the bombing was part of a “divide and conquer” tactic by the government.

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Violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in the city of Ambon, Maluku Province, Indonesia on Sunday, September 11. Official sources state that an ojek (motorcycle taxi) driver named Darmis Saiman was killed in an accident on September 10. But rumors sent via text message spread the following day when he was buried claimed that the Muslim driver had been tortured to death by Christians.At last count, seven people have been confirmed dead and at least 60 wounded, and the government has sent between 200 and 400 Mobile Brigade (Brimob) forces to the region as back up. Although rational voices are pleading for calm, Indonesian Islamist extremists are using the conflict to stoke more violence, recalling the sectarian conflict that roiled the region between 1999 and 2002 and claimed some 9000 lives.

Islamists were quick to use the master narratives of the Crusades and martyrdom in their reports on the conflict.  That the incident occurred on the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the United States was not just a coincidence for the extremists. The extremist web site Voice of Islam reported that the attack was provoked by the United States as a way to portray Ambon as a hotbed for terrorists.  The site stated that if Islamist groups come to Ambon to help the Muslims fighting there, America will simply portray it as terrorism and thus use it as an excuse to kill Muslims.

Voice of Islam also covered Abu Bakar Basyir’s statement on the violence.  Basyir is the former spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and leader of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid, recently jailed for 15 years. He issued a fatwa for jihad in Ambon, and repeated the claims that the violence is a conspiracy to to bring attention to the region so that the “crusaders” can eliminate Islam there. Ar Rahmah, perhaps the most popular extremist web site in Indonesia, also invoked the crusader master narrative in its early reporting of the conflict, linking the violence to a coordinated attempt by Christians to wipe out Islam.

In another posting, ar Rahmah urged Ambonese Muslims to be at the ready. The site reported that the violent paramilitary group the Islamic Defenders Front is preparing to send jihad forces to Ambon, using the term “laskar jihad.” This is a loaded term, because Laskar Jihad was a group that formed Islamist militias to go to Ambon in 1999 during sectarian violence there. The group was subsequently disbanded under pressure from the government in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali Bombing.In the story, the FPI claimed that separatist members of the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS) are part of the Christian group, and that Jewish conspirators are behind the violence.

Although there are a few remaining supporters of the RMS in Ambon, and a fringe group called the Moluccan Sovereignty Front emerged during the 1999-2002 violence, separatism is not a serious threat. The RMS exists mostly as a government-in-exile in Holland, and has made recent statements that it is willing to accept Indonesian sovereignty in the region. Nonetheless, the “threat” of separatism — imagined or real — is frequently used to incite violence. A post on Suara Islam Online linked the violence to a supposed Christian military training camp in Bogor, West Java named Christ of Ambon.

Others chimed in to incite. The Council of Indonesian Ulama released a statement as well, claiming as factual that the death of Darmis Saiman was caused not by the accident but by stab wounds inflicted by Christians. They called for a reduction in influence of Christians in Ambon, as well as a call to arm Muslims to prepare for jihad.

Blogger Ghur4Ba invoked the Crusader narrative, and appealed to readers to pray for the warriors of jihad. Voice of Islam, in a subsequent post entitled “The Lessons from Ambon: Preparing Strength for Jihad is Important,” condemned the Crusaders and urged Musims to prepare to fight:

In conclusion, Muslims must begin to prepare for jihad, to begin physical training, preparing the means of war, and make efforts for the perfection of jihad fi sabilillah. That’s because the jihad, according to the basic beliefs Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama, will remain until the end of time.

Despite the rhetoric of the extremists, cooler heads are noting marked differences in the violence between 1999 and Sunday, such as the unwillingness of larger groups to join in, and the fact that the violence did not spread to other regions. In an article in the Jakarta Globe, Najib Azca, an expert on violence in Ambon and a researcher at Gadjah Mada University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, noted that some of the factors that stoked conflict a decade ago remained, such as poverty and religious segregation. Coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence Haris Azhar, however, argued that this wasn’t sectarian conflict, and noted the differences between Ambon then and now. The article noted how the violence remained contained, and that others in the religiously segregated communities worked to protect minorities in their midst.

Although it ran an alarmist headline, this Jakarta Post story noted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s desire to not repeat the mistakes of a decade ago, and included plans to reach out to local leaders. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Marshall (ret) Djoko Suyanto acknowledged the role of provocation-by-SMS, and the importance of providing factual information to counter instigation:

In the future, we need to reinforce the people’s resilience so that they are not so easily incited, including through SMS or twitters instigating anarchy. People should be able to filter information.

This brief interview by Radio Australia with International Crisis Group Southeast Asia Senior Advisor Sidney Jones describes the phenomenon of SMS instigation in Indonesia and elsewhere. Consistent with analysis by well regarded Indonesianist political scientists such as Gerry van Klinken, Jones notes that the political context is much different now. In the earlier conflict, in the context of a democratizing Indonesia, local actors in Ambon were jockeying for new political opportunities, which fueled the violence. Politically, things are much more stable now, and it appears that calm — albeit a nervous calm — was restored quickly and has thus far maintained.

Because of the potential for violence, police have been searching passengers for weapons on passenger ships bound for Ambon in Java’s major ports, and continue their efforts to find those who spread incitement via text messages.

Update, 9-21-11:

Reports of police sweeps of ships heading to Ambon noted that some “sharp weapons” were confiscated, but no firearms. The Jakarta Post reports that the police still don’t have a suspect in the sending of the text messages that stoked the violence. Although it is clear Ambon remains peaceful, there are understandably some underlying tensions that remain, as well as some internally displaced persons who have not returned to their homes. Islamist extremists, however, continue to spread disinformation in an attempt to stoke violence.

Islmaist site Ghur4Ba provided some updats on the situation in Ambon, included alerting its readers to where groups of armed Muslims are gathering in preparation for fighting. No fighting broke out, however.

English language site Prisoner of Joy (among others) questioned the police response to the riot, arguing that Muslims were the victim sof the rio, and so it is unjust that they are being targeted by security forces. Accounts of the violence, however, clearly point to Muslim provocateurs sending the original text messages, and starting the upheavals. Although a official account of the death of Darmis Saiman, the ojek driver, showed that he died of injuries sustained in the traffic accident, and that Christian onlookers attempted to help him after the accident, Islamist sites continue to insist that he was murdered and tortured by a group of Christians. Umar Abduh, an Indonesian convicted on terrorism charges but now free after serving a 10-year sentence, argued that the police in Indonesia support “the Crusaders” and, perhaps most astonishingly, that Christians, including those who opposed the Jakarta Charter (which would have made sharia the land of the law in Indonesia), are anti-Indonesia, separatist, and anti-pluralism. This belies a stunning ignorance of Indonesian history, a history in which Christian Indonesians played significant roles in the anti-colonial struggle and in the founding of the Indonesian state. Ar Rahmah posted a story quoting Umar Abduh that paints the violence as a governmnet conspiracy, and argues that the UN should try those responsible in the Indonesian government for the violence. The Islamic Defenders Front, a thuggish paramilitary group organized under the guise of protecting Islam, has given the Indonesian government an ultimatum of one month before they start sending jihadis to the region.

These responses show that the Islamists are merely eager to stoke more violence in the region. It is particularly ironic to hear Islamists such as Umar Abduh accuse the small minority of Indonesian Christians of being against pluralism and diversity — clearly against their self-interest — as well as hear the cry for the UN to get involved, given Islamists history of antipathy toward the organization.

Update, October 4

The International Crisis Group has released its report on the violence in Ambon, available here. As usual, it is a well researched and documented report, and perhaps most notably it describes the presence of “peace provocateurs,” an interfaith group in Ambon who used social media to dispell and counter rumors that were circulating in order to stoke violence:

Their core group was about ten, each of whom had some ten or fifteen contacts around the city’s major flashpoints. They were on the phone with each other constantly, checking out stories and sending informationover Twitter and Facebook and by text messages. When a member of the network in one part of town heard the rumours about the Silo Church being destroyed, he called a member of the network stationed at the church totake a photograph with his phone and circulate it, to prove it was standing undamaged.

 The report also criticizes the government, police and military responses to the violence, and discusses some of the theories circulating about the causes of the violence.

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The next chapter in the saga of Abu Bakar Basyir, called the spiritual leader of terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, came to an end on June 16. The court in South Jakarta pronounced its verdict of guilty to the charges of inciting terrorism related to the Jemaah Islamiyah training camp in Aceh — which was broken up amidst arrests and killings of militants in February 2010 — and sentenced the cleric to 15 years. The more serious charge of funding the camp was thrown out for lack of evidence. For Basyir, aged 72 and in frail health, this is almost certainly a life sentence, unless he is granted a pardon or a significant remission (a tradition in Indonesia on August 17, Independence Day, and one that Basyir has benefited from in the past).

Indonesian police arrested Basyir last August and held him for several months before formally leveling charges related to the camp. More than once police had to file for an extension of his imprisonment before they charged him, fueling speculation about the strength of the case against him.

Some of the trial highlights — or lowlights I suppose, depending on your perspective — include the accusation of hypocrisy leveled at Basyir (also spelled Bashir) for wearing American-made Crocs shoes, Basyir’s attempted justification of the camp despite claiming he had no ties to it, and the build up of security forces as the announcement of the verdict approached. The Indonesian police bolstered their presence in the area, and the Indonesian military offered its assistance. The police closed roads near the court, and many businesses were shuttered. Retributive violence, however, has thus far been avoided.

Basyir rejected the sentence as thaghut, or invalid because it is based on human law handed down by infidels and not divine law (never mind that divine law must be interpreted through humans); this, however, won’t stop his imprisonment. What happens in prison, however, is ripe for further speculation.

Norimitsu Onishi, writing today in the New York Times, is guardedly optimistic:

The ruling puts an end for now to the activities of Mr Bashir, whom the Indonesian authorities had often appeared reluctant to prosecute for fear of antagonizing Islamic extremists.

Yet Indonesian prisons do not have a good history of deradicalizing Islamist extremists — as this International Crisis Group report notes, raising the question as to how Basyir will shift his strategy from behind bars. At this stage in the game it is fair to argue that Basyir is beyond deradicalization; he is, after all, considered the emir or spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. Cause for concern, however, is the potential for Basyir to recruit more extremists while in jail, as well as his ability to continue to influence or direct Jemaah Islamiyah operations from inside prison.

Islamist extremists are predictably condemning the verdict as tyrannical, demanding Basyir’s release and issuing a vague warning to the lawyers, judges, police and government they view as responsible. They are also beginning to refer to Basyir as a martyr. There is no doubt that some kind of retaliatory attacks will be planned, although what form they may take is unknown. Jemaah Islamiyah appears to have begun adopting new tactics, shying away from expensive bombing campaigns that kill indiscriminately and toward more focused attacks, especially on police, and including drive-by shootings.

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In our work identifying and tracking the use of Islamist narratives here at the CSC, the second most frequently invoked among Islamist extremists in our research (after Nakba or Palestine) has been the Crusader master narrative. The use of this term among Islamists connotes religious war, subjugation by Western Christians, injustice, and eventual colonization. Its use in the West, however, connotes a much different meaning: a righteous cause, good triumphing over evil, a reclamation of holy lands. Hence perspective is key in the use of narratives, which is why they are so powerful and able to convey deep meanings with the invocation of a few key terms. The use of narrative to convey meaning is important, and it is equally important to understand how audiences perceive the use of these narratives.

Islamists the world over continue to use the term “crusade” to describe the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But when George W. Bush referred to the war in Iraq as a crusade, he was roundly (and rightly) criticized for playing into the Islamists’ narrative. While he may have wanted to convey the justness of the struggle to eliminate violent extremism, to Muslims worldwide he conveyed the meaning of religious war in order to dominate Muslim lands. The narrative slip is widely considered the gaffe that it was.

When NATO forces began to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya in an effort to prevent Muammar Qaddafi from bombing and strafing his own people, the opinions of observers – including allies and enemies of the United States – ran the gamut from full support to condemnation. Because it was an attack on a predominantly Muslim nation by predominantly Christian nations (Qatar an exception), Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized the effort and called it a crusade (Qaddafi also used the term). Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev, in a rare public difference on policy, condemned the use of the word in this context.

The Putin-Medvedev rhetorical dispute was covered in the mainstream press, including the New York Times, which carried a story with the connotation that Putin’s words were not well chosen (Christian Science Monitor story here). My colleague Jeffry Halverson wrote a Comops blog post about Putin’s comments here.

This is why it was particularly surprising and disturbing to read a front-page story on March 29 about the conflict in Libya that invoked the crusade narrative in referring to Samantha Power, President Obama’s advisor on human rights.

The Times fell into a narrative trap that it set for itself. The issue of human rights in the Muslim world – and elsewhere in Asia and Africa – is contentious. Dictators – in Africa, Latin America, and Asia – have often portrayed western ideals of human rights as an imposition of foreign values on these countries, and claim that democracy, for example, is inconsistent with their cultures (here is a recent essay on the topic from the Chinese embassy in the US).  This is belied, of course, by these countries’ grassroots human rights and pro-democracy movements – including those in Libya (although it remains to be seen exactly what would hold the rebels together if they should achieve their goal of ousting Qaddafi). Sharp observers of those condemning “western” human rights point out that this criticism is made frequently by those for whom human rights and democracy are a threat – such as Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, Indonesia’s Suharto, and more recently Syria’s Bashar al Assad.

When the Times refers to a human rights promoter as a “crusader,” however, it plays into the historical notion of human rights as a foreign, western concept, and provides rhetorical ammunition for Qaddafi and his supporters, as well as opponents of democracy and human rights elsewhere. It is as if the United States is suggesting that human rights are an imposition of western or foreign or even Christian values, similar to the crusades, and it is a particularly curious and troublesome choice of words on the part of the Times. It sends an unfortunate message that undermines its intent when viewed from a Muslim perspective. Many Muslims have beliefs about human rights that are mostly consistent with international norms. We need to engage and empower these people, not alienate them.

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Events rapidly accelerated in Egypt on Friday, January 28, as expected. On Thursday night, the regime shut down internet access. This startling graphic by Craig Labovitz shows the precipitous drop in online traffic. Over the course of the day, the U.S. government repeatedly modified its official stance after making questionable remarks during the two days prior. Meanwhile, a Time Magazine article quoted a member of Netanyahu’s government in Israel expressing support for Mubarak and stating: “I’m not sure the time is right for the Arab region to go through the democratic process.”

By late Friday night – after the Egyptian military asserted its presence in the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities – Hosni Mubarak finally appeared on state television. Mubarak warned about the threat of chaos and nominally acknowledged the concerns of the protesters. But he claimed that a plot was underway to destabilize the country and that time was needed to “fix” the economy and to help the poor and he would appoint a new government to do so. Of course, he (Mubarak) would appoint and lead this new government. As one might guess, the protesters on the streets were not satisfied and they continued with renewed energy into the weekend.

On Saturday, January 29, Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman as his Vice-President. This marked the first time in Mubarak’s rule that he has appointed a Vice-President, which is the office that Mubarak previously held under Anwar Sadat. It is rumored that Egypt’s First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, played a role in preventing the appointment of a Vice-President prior to this, in order to position her son, Gamal, as the one to succeed his father. Obviously, that is no longer a possibility, and it is appears (so far) that Suleiman will likely be the one who leads a transitional military government until national elections can occur (scheduled for September). This appointment has not satisfied the protesters though. As Mohamed ElBaradei astutely put it: “This is a mere change of people, and we are talking about a change of regime. The Egyptian people are saying one word: ‘The Egyptian president has to leave’.”

Throughout the “chaos” (as so many news outlets have called it) the UK daily, The Guardian, has had among the most outstanding coverage of developments in Egypt all week. And on Friday afternoon, The Guardian noted the sudden increased U.S. media interest in the protests, as it became the story of the moment, and commented that:

The exception has been Fox News, where coverage has been more muted. ‘You probably don’t give a lot of time thinking about Egypt,’ a Fox News presenter suggested about an hour ago, before explaining that ‘groups linked to al-Qaida’ were in danger of taking over the government in Cairo.

This is the narrative that I warned about in my previous entry. Portraying the protests as an “Islamist uprising” or “revolution,” especially one associated with al-Qaeda, is exactly the sort of narrative Mubarak’s regime and other anti-democracy forces want to promote.

In a statement made on Sunday night, Mubarak claimed that: “Their demonstrations have been infiltrated by a group of people who use the name of religion who don’t take into consideration the constitution rights and citizenship values.” This message seems designed to unsettle the West and to divide the protesters into factions that will weaken opposition to the ruling regime. The threat of Islamist extremists on a global scale is certainly real, but the threat is constantly exploited by regimes in the Arab world in order to curb U.S. pressure for democratic reform and win substantial aid, especially military aid, that helps compensate for corrupt and incompetent economic policies.

Thus far, the Egyptian protests have maintained a distinctly nationalist and patriotic character. Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei joined the protests in Cairo after participating in Friday prayers and faced a confrontation with security forces. He was arrested and placed under house arrest, giving Egypt the dubious distinction of joining China in the group of countries imprisoning their Nobel Peace Prize winners. ElBaradei later issued the statement that:

The Egyptian people will be the ones who will make the change – we are not waiting for help or assistance from the outside world. But what I expect from the outside world, is to practice what you preach – is to defend the rights of the Egyptians for the universal values.

But by Sunday, the regime had pulled police forces from the city and ElBaradei was free to rejoin the protesters. He arrived in Tahrir Square and addressed the crowd – some cheered him, others jeered him as a political opportunist. Either way, it was a significant moment. He has since been appointed as the chief negotiator or representative of the various opposition parties and factions, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera satellite TV was taken off the air in Egypt, but Egyptian state television continued. The state coverage appeared to focus on images of chaos and disorder, promoting a climate of fear that gangs of armed thugs were roaming the city. This is likely a tactic to keep citizens off the streets, or more ominously a strategic attempt to promote the idea of the necessity of the despot to control the chaos. Indeed, the regime ordered the police off the streets prior to this outbreak.

The U.S. government, as the primary Western patron of Mubarak’s regime, is in a difficult position.  Will we practice what we preach and support democratic transformation in Egypt? Or will our (and/or Israel’s) strategic interests override those ideals, widening that say-do gap in the Middle East?

One final note: As many news outlets have reported, the tear gas being used on the protesters in Egypt is American-made, and the words “Made in the U.S.A.” appear on the canisters. Not a good message in an environment where many people already blame the U.S. for propping up a dictatorial regime.

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The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia last week beget further democracy uprisings in Egypt and Yemen this week, as well as protests in Jordan and Mauritania.  If the protesters are finally successful in Egypt and President Hosni Mubarak is forced out, this eruption of game-changing scenarios inspired by deep conflicts between the people and their leaders, and enabled by the velocity and spread of social media, poses a whole new set of communication and policy challenges for the United States.

For most Americans these developments are news items that we watch until we tire of the images on the screen and turn the channel or click onto another website or decide to check our email or post a change to our Facebook status.  I doubt many of us could locate Tunisia on a world map.  I know most of my students can’t.  But beneath that surface of relatively uninformed curiosity about the unfolding rebellion lies a deeper empty well of cultural ignorance.  Put simply, most of us couldn’t say why, or how, the words “Pharaoh” and “tyrant” used to describe Mubarak are such powerful narrative IEDs dropped into an already turbulent environment.

Here’s a brief version of the backstory, which you can read more about in a new book, Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, to be released next week.  (Full disclosure: I am one of the authors.)  The Pharaoh, a tyrant believed by many Muslims to be Ramses II, rejected the Word of God despite being repeatedly being shown signs through Moses who was acting as God’s agent, was drowned in the sea with his army while pursuing the Israelites.  Just before death, the Pharaoh accepted the God of Moses but it was too late.  God did not save him.  Instead, God promised to preserve the tyrant’s body for all time, so all could see what fate awaited those who reject God’s signs.  The body of Ramses II is, in fact, remarkably well preserved and on display in Cairo today.

That is where the Old Testament/Qur’anic story ends, but it is not the end of the story.  Master narratives derive their enduring cultural power over time and across geographies.  So it was that the story of the Pharaoh was used to discredit Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and to cast him as a tyrant.  As we recount it in the book:

On October 6, 1981, President Anwar Sadat was reviewing a military parade commemorating Egypt’s ‘victorious’ campaign in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  While television cameras captured the event, four men emerged from a truck and approached the viewing stand. When Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, the leader of the assassination plot finished firing his weapon at Sadat, he cried out: “I have killed the Pharaoh!” Sadat was shot thirty-seven times. Thereafter, videotapes of the bloody televised spectacle fetched huge prices on the black market and it remains readily accessible online today.

Similar tyrant/Pharaoh accounts and images exist on the Internet and are distributed in pamphlet form for other perceived tyrants, including Ariel Sharon, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.  In each case, the master narrative is appropriated as a sign of history repeating itself and used to influence perceptions of the targeted leader/ruler.  It doesn’t matter that there may be no direct correlation between the Pharaoh, who was not an elected official, and today’s leaders.  Nor does it matter that thus far no Moses has appeared before the cameras to claim he or she is acting as God’s agent.  What does matter is that once a leader is branded a “tyrant” and called “the Pharaoh,” the details of the old story matters less than the idea that an injustice of historic proportions exists and must be remedied by true believers.

For those of you who may be thinking, “but this democracy uprising has nothing to do with radical Islam or even with religion in general,” that fact doesn’t make the interplay of a powerful set of rhetorical figures well known within and across cultures any less viable.  If anything, it only broadens the appeal.  For it is not just Muslims who are in the streets of Cairo or Tunis, but a diverse array of Arabs, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, who all know the old story of the tyrant known as “the Pharaoh” who dared to challenge the God of Moses.

In the case of Egyptian dictator Mubarak the comparison is made more relevant by his refusal to yield to the will of his people.  And it is underscored by his friendship with U.S. leaders and our continuing support of his regime.  Regardless of religion, the overt support of the U.S. is often associated with the use of our military and economic power to influence events and protect our interests in the region.  The irony, of course, is that while we officially endorse democracy everywhere in the world, this democratic uprising places our official position in conflict with the support of a major ally in the region.  Do we side with the people who are organizing for democracy, or with a stubborn dictator well past his sell-by date who has been tarnished with the tyrant label?

As Reuters reporter Amr Abdallah Dalsh on the scene in Cairo put it yesterday:

The Administration is caught in a bind, but it’s more strategic than just moral: Supporting tyrants loathed by their own people but willing to do Washington’s bidding in international matters is a decades-old U.S. tradition in the Middle East, as well as in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The problem with Mubarak is not simply that his methods are at odds with professed U.S. values; it’s that his brittle autocracy appears to have entered a period of terminal decline, with the U.S. potentially on the wrong side of history.

Being “on the wrong side of history” is a narrative we can little afford.  Yet no matter what we may or may not do in response to this and other popular uprisings, the perceived lack of U. S. support for the protesters and continuing support for Mubarak does evoke another historical parallel.  Aladdin Elaasar is the author of The Last Pharaoh: Mubarak and the Uncertain Future of Egypt in the Obama Age, and in a op-ed piece published today, he writes ominously of Egypt’s uncertain future:

It is possible to find parallels in Egypt to pre-revolutionary Iran. Given the social ills engendered by extended unemployment, especially among the qualified young; aggravated social polarization in which ill-gained wealth, insolently displayed, stood out against the growing misery of the rural and urban population; and generalized corruption spreading right up to the highest levels of society and state. Indeed, many U.S. analysts acknowledge Egypt’s instability. “It will rock the world,” wrote Michele Dunne, a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scholar. “Octogenarian Mubarak, will leave office, either by his own decision or that of providence.” Instability in Egypt may become an international security concern. There is no clear chain of command or civil society base to facilitate the transfer of power to the next president.

Does the reference to “providence” call up the association of divine will bringing an end to the rule of a tyrant? Perhaps.  But dictators rarely die peacefully in their sleep.

The irony of the U.S. response is not lost on the rest of the world.  As Richard Grenell, Spokesperson for the United Nations, put it in an article earlier today:

[Vice President] Biden’s support for Mubarak in the face of his falling regime sends a powerful and unfortunate message to the Arab world that their freedoms are negotiable. While American interests in the Middle East must obviously be protected, America’s credibility to support democracy for everyone everywhere is crucial. WikiLeaks have already shown American ambassadors and foreign service officers criticizing governments privately but publicly saying very little. How can VP Biden ever talk about the importance of fighting for freedom and democracy again if he chooses to support a corrupt dictatorship at the very time its being so strongly challenged from within? The vice president’s absolute show of support for Mubarak is unfortunately being heard throughout the Arab world. The people of Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Cuba and North Korea are listening. It’s too bad that Vice President Biden can’t find a way to support everyday Egyptians’ pleadings for more freedoms.

Finally, with the master narrative in the backstory and the label of tyrant firmly in the foreground of published reports used to describe Mubarak, there can be no doubt about the message of the looters who broke into the Egyptian Museum last night and “destroyed” two Pharaonic mummies.

Democracy has proven to be a many-splintered thing in the Middle East and elsewhere, whether it arrives with an invasion that forces a regime change or by the will of angry mobs who threaten to topple a dictator. Regardless of method, the U.S. should pay greater attention to the language used to define the conflict and what the meaning of terms such as “Crusader,” “tyrant,” and “Pharaoh” conjure up for populations who are schooled to respect their histories.  The use of the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter, is not the reason the people have taken to the streets.  These devices are only distributors—and effective ones—of messages that are deeply rooted in culture and time.  What moves people to action is not the technology of rebellion, but the narrative that shapes it and the words used to define it.  Master narratives are powerful because they provide answers to essential questions of identity as well as what it takes to live a just and meaningful life.  As such, they serve as calls to action.  Because, to paraphrase the philosopher Alistair MacIntyre, in order to answer the question “what am I to do?” requires first being able to explain what narratives we are part of.

The Pharaoh is a master narrative throughout the region and most of the world.  We would do well to remember that when we begin formulating what our next move will be.

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President Barack Obama concluded his brief visit to Indonesia yesterday, fulfilling his promise to travel there despite having cancelled three prior trips to the land where he spent time as a young boy (between 1967-71). The cancellations had provoked much discussion there and among those who study Indonesia, some of whom were worried that that the President had irrevokably strained relations by not following through on his trips.

The naysayers were mostly proven wrong, however, as by all accounts the President was warmly welcomed by most Indonesians. Despite the admonition not to protest from Taufik Kiemas, the Head of Indonesia’s parliament (among other leaders), there were demonstrations throughout the archipelago, but these were mostly small and carried out by Islamist Hizbut Tahrir (more on this below).

The trip didn’t seem to bring much by way of serious negotiations or deals between Indonesia and the United States — and some Indonesians, including parliamentarian Priyo Budi Santoso, expressed disappointment — although the President stated that he’d like the United States to become Indonesia’s #1 trading partner (it’s #3 now). And there were some some items of discussion that were seemingly off the table, perhaps to keep the friendly tone of discussion from deteriorating (see below). The President also visited the region where he lived in Jakarta as a boy, and impressed and pleased his hosts by using some Indonesian terms that he remembered (or relearned).

Critics, however, fired shots from all directions, both in the US and abroad. In the US, controversy over the trip increased last week when Minnesota Congresswoman Michele Bachmann repeated misinformation propagated by Fox News that the trip would cost US taxpayers $200 million per day, and require one-tenth of the US Navy fleet. Despite the ridiculous nature of the figure — more per day than it costs to prosecute the war in Afghanistan — it continued to bounce around in some conservative echo chambers. The rumor made news in Indonesia as well, although as this article in the Tribun Timur points out, the coverage contained the White House denial of the figure.

The President’s trip to Indonesia also included a trip to Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta, the largest mosque in Southeast Asia. Conforming to custom, First Lady Michelle Obama wore a scarf over her head. For those Americans who already believe that Obama is a Muslim – around 20 percent overall, and around one-third of all conservative Republicans, according to a Pew poll – the visit worked them into further frenzy as it was proof positive that the President is a secret Muslim. This is simply not true, but no amount of evidence will dissuade the conspiracy theorists.

The mainstream Indonesian media was, for the most part, kind to the President. Stories captured the minute details and goings-on of his trip, what he ate, what she wore, where they visited, what he said, etc.

But the visit also spurred demonstrations and protests around the archipelago, for a variety of reasons. Some protested the US role in Afghanistan and Iraq, or US support for Israel. Some were against US economic policy. Some, however, seemed so anxious to protest the President that they didn’t articulate for themselves a clear message in their protest.

Take, for example, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). Widely considered something of a fringe cult in Indonesia, HTI is the Indonesian branch of a global organization that supports shariah law and the establishment of a global caliphate. It’s banned in some countries, but because it does not openly espouse violence or overthrowing the state except through democratic means, it is a legal, above ground organization in Indonesia, although its appeal is very limited. Perhaps part of the limit of its appeal is in its confused messages.

One post on its website attempted to debunk the myth that Barack Obama is a Muslim — because he is “100% Jewish.” The article continues to invoke two powerful narratives of the Islamic world by calling him a Pharaoh and the leader of a Crusade. Confused? Didn’t Medievel Christians also target Jews? Didn’t the Pharaoh try to kill Moses, an Israelite whose people later became Jews (and then Christians, and the Muslims)? A group called sharia4Indonesia distributed  posters depicting Obama a pharaoh–a reference to a story in the Qur’an about a tyrannical leader who suffers the wrath of God.

A Hizbut Tahrir spokesperson in Makassar — far from Obama’s visit — protested that the President’s visit was to solidify economic domination over Indonesia. Other Hizbut Tahrir posts compared the President to Mt. Merapi, a volcano in Central Java that continues to erupt and that has killed nearly 200 people. I can’t imagine that endeared them to the tens of thousands of evacuees from the volcano, or other rational thinkers in Indonesia.

"Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia with the ummat rejects Obama, president of the colonial country"

Another flap emerged when Minister of Communication and Information Tifatul Sembiring,  a staunchly conservative Muslim from the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party, shook the hand of Michele Obama in a receiving line. Realizing he would be criticized by constituents for having been in physical contact with a woman to whom he is not related, he attempted to stave off criticism with a lamely worded Twitter post about how he tried to prevent touching hands with the First Lady but that she held her hands too closely to him. Video footage clearly shows him enthusiastically stretching out two hands to First Lady Obama, and he has been vilified as a liar and munafik (hypocrite) on Islamist websites and blog posts.

Indonesia’s anti-terrorism police force Densus 88 was on alert in case President Obama faced any threats, perhaps in reaction to recent news that Jemaah Islamiyah leader Abu Bakar Basyir mentioned “taking advantage of” President Obama’s upcoming trip. The statement was made in January about President Obama’s trip that was originally scheduled for March, but was cancelled. Basyir remains in jail on terrorism charges.

The subject of US support for Densus 88 was one that was apparently not broached, at least not in public. Densus 88 is the only arm of the Indonesian police that gets consistently positive reviews from the Indonesian people for its successes in capturing or killing suspected terrorists. It has recently, however, been accused of violations of human rights in the archipelago, and for its apparent “shoot first” approach to terrorists.Despite domestic Indonesian criticism of the group, it appears that the Indonesian government does not want to take action against Densus 88, and the US appears not to want to discuss it either (although the US did secretly cancel ties to an arm of Densus 88 in Ambon over human rights concerns).

Last summer the US renewed ties to the Indonesian military special forces Kopassus, which will mobilize its own anti-terror unit. Critics point out that the problems within Kopassus that brought the cancellation of ties have not been remedied, including gross human rights violations in trouble spots such as West Papua. A recent video of soldiers torturing West Papuans caused an outcry, including from American activists who disagree with the reinstatement of the ties.

American activists have called on the US government to cut ties, as have Australian activists. Despite recent arguments (such as this by American academic Bill Liddel — response by Head of the Global Nexus Institute Christianto Wibosono here) that Indonesia remains relatively politically weak, especially with regard to its relationship with the United States, it appears as though Indonesia still holds some cards when it comes to the two countries’ relationship.

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