In public discourse about Islam, “Wahhabi” is usually a synonym for intolerance, misogyny, and extremism.  Though this is sometimes true it is an over-generalization.  In this paper we contrast two very different forms of Wahhabi Islam focusing on education, religious pluralism and gender relations. The first is the Wahhabism of the Saudi state. Saudi Wahhabism couples this theological orientation with intolerance of all other forms of religion and a vision of moral order that includes severe restrictions on the role of women in public life, with gender segregation and discrimination being a central part of the Saudi Wahhabi moral vision.

The second is that of a mid-sized Wahhabi oriented pesantren (Islamic school) in Indonesia.  Though it is as firmly rooted in al-Wahab’s theological vision as any Saudi school, its brand of Wahhabism could not be more different from that practiced in Saudi Arabia. It allows for diversity in ritual practice on controversial issues, readily interacts with other Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities, and teaches that the state does not have the right to establish one religion or a single interpretation of Islam as “official.” It also is equally progressive on gender issues and does not define rigid gender segregation as a component of moral order.

We show that core Wahhabi religious teachings are as compatible with religious tolerance and gender equity as they are with religious exclusivism and misogyny.  Our larger purpose is to question conventional wisdom linking religious doctrine with specific modes of cultural, social and political practice.

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“If a group of people feels that it has been humiliated and that its honor has been trampled underfoot, it will want to express its identity.”                                                                                                                       – Abdolkarim Soroush

In a recent NY Times Op-Ed, Professor John W. Owen of the University of Virginia argues that the electoral success of Islamists after the Arab Spring is due to Islamism’s longstanding role as the dominant voice of political dissent. He writes: “Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow.” It’s an interesting perspective, but I think it misses the mark. Islamism is not about dissent, it’s about identity.

I explored the electoral success of Ennahda in Tunisia and the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt previously on COMOPS. If you haven’t read those blog entries, I encourage you to do so. I won’t repeat that material here. Rather, I want to look at the broader issue of identity, which I think lies at the heart of Islamism’s current popularity.

As readers know, Tunisia and Egypt are the only two countries of the historic Arab Spring to hold democratic elections so far. These countries are commonly designated as Arab states. However, there was a time when the “Arab world” was restricted to the Arabian Peninsula and the southern Levant. It was only after the rise of Islam in the seventh century and the subsequent conquest of North Africa that the lands we know today as Egypt and Tunisia started a gradual shift toward “Arabness.”

‘Who is an Arab’ is a far more complex question than you might guess. The simple answer (my apologies Arabist scholars) is twofold: An Arab is someone who speaks Arabic (there’s even a saying by the Prophet Muhammad that ‘Arabness’ is conferred by the tongue) and/or shares a genealogical or cultural-historical heritage with an Arabic speaking people. Despite certain stereotypical images about what an ‘Arab’ looks like, I assure you that Arabs come in every shade and color of the human family. The Arabic language (including its enormous variety of dialects) is the real root of Arab identity. But what does this have to do with Islamist parties?

The Arabic language arrived with the Muslim expansion across North Africa in the seventh century. Arabic gradually became the dominant language of the peoples in those lands over time. This means that Islam is irrevocably bound to Arab identity, despite the fact that millions of Arabs are Christians. The Qur’an is actually the foundation of literary Arabic as we know it. The Arab tribes of the Peninsula were an oral culture and largely illiterate, and the rise of Islam transformed those conditions.

When you add in the fact that national identities (e.g. American, Iraqi) are a modern innovation developed in the West and largely imposed in North Africa by Western colonial powers, we are left with the fact that Islam served as the primary reference point for identity formation for centuries before that time, along with tribal and ancestral ties.

Jump forward to the independence movements in the Arab world of the mid-twentieth century. The British are ousted in Egypt and the French are ousted in Tunisia. The two young nation-states are independent and can choose a system of governance, including a legal system, for themselves. The dominant trend in the twentieth century was to try to ‘catch up’ to the powers of the age and borrow or adopt European systems and ideologies; not only nationalism, but socialism, communism, even fascism. This sort of borrowing extended into culture (even the way people dressed), technology and education as well. The most radical example in the region was Turkey, a non-Arab state, but still a neighbor with strong cultural ties. Among the Arabs, Tunisia came closest to following Turkey’s radical example. As we know, the post-colonial ‘experiments’ in the Arab states of Tunisia and Egypt ultimately produced the authoritarian regimes that would fall during the Arab Spring.

When Tunisians and Egyptians went to cast their votes this past year, they weren’t too concerned with particular candidates (nor were the election systems set up as such). The elections were about people expressing identities and aspirations freely, perhaps for the first time. Judging by the election results, a large segment of Tunisians and Egyptians who cast votes (note the qualifier) believe that it is important to retain or affirm an Arab-Muslim identity. So far these elections have been about asserting that sense of identity more so than caliphates or a desire to implement medieval penal codes or ban wine.

These elections also come at a time when the United States (its military might aside) is a cultural superpower across the globe. People in many parts of the world, not only in Arab states (note the NY Times recent piece on China), fear the loss of ‘who they are’ in the face of American (or Western) cultural or socioeconomic hegemony.  In my home state of Arizona, we have witnessed the strange, sometimes militant, response of Anglo-Americans who fear Hispanic cultural encroachment and cast votes accordingly. Those are identity votes too. I see little difference between them and those people in Egypt or Tunisia who vote for parties that champion longstanding identities rooted in Islam.

_____________________________

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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If you’ve read our book Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism then you already have a solid understanding of the major master narratives employed by Islamist extremists in their communications. For example, you’re able to recognize the significance of a Pharaoh reference when an extremist is condemning a world leader. Or you’re able to see the apocalyptic scheme articulated in Ahmadinejad’s praise of the “Lord of the Age” (which is not a reference to Allah). However, it becomes more difficult when the master narratives are implicit and the fragmentary references in an extremist text are more obscure. When this is the case, it can be much easier to miss them. Let’s look at a recent example.

On July 10, 2011, a statement was posted online announcing the creation of a new extremist website and forum (or “network”). The new website is called “Al-Fida Islamic Network.” The word al-Fida’ means “sacrifice” in Arabic. The announcement included the following passage:

O proud Islamic ummah: Even though the slaves of dirham and dinar allied with the servants of the Cross under the leadership of the brothers of apes and pigs in order to stifle and silence the voice of jihad, they will fail to do so because this religion is supported by the Lord of all creation.

In the above passage, there are three master narratives that stand out to me. Let’s go through each of the three and see how these implicit master narratives can be unpacked for further analysis.

We can see from the start that three distinct groups are being mentioned in relation to each other, as indicated by the words “slaves,” “servants” and “brothers.” It’s the modifiers tied to these three groups that reveal the master narratives.

1. Let’s take the easy one first: “the servants of the Cross.” As we know this is a reference to the Crusader master narrative, a really common framework used by extremists to quickly depict the United States or Western Europe for their audiences.

2. The second one is trickier: “the slaves of dirham and dinar.” This is a reference to the Arab or Muslim leaders (and their security forces) that are cooperating with the United States in military operations against the extremists. The specific choice of the currencies “dirham” and “dinar” could refer to specific countries, such as Morocco and Iraq, but this is unlikely and the phrase is likely a general one. The claim is that these “slaves” (i.e. Muslims) are not “true Muslims” and they betray the ummah for the sake of money and wealth (e.g. U.S. financial aid). To emphasize this point, the word abd or “slave” is used to describe these enemies, because a “true Muslim” is the abd of God (Allah) Almighty and serves no one and nothing but Him (recall the pious name Abdullah or “slave/servant of God”). The extremists are implicitly invoking the Hypocrites master narrative here, which consists of a ruse story form and includes an archetypal traitor and imposter, to characterize their troublesome adversaries within Arab and Muslim countries as disingenuous or false Muslims.

3. Finally, the third master narrative  is evident in the phrase: “under the leadership of the brothers of apes and pigs.” This is a direct reference to verses from the Qur’an, which states that God (Allah) punished a group of Israelites (i.e. Jews) for breaking His commandments, apparently those related to keeping the Sabbath and banning graven images (i.e. idols), by turning them into apes and pigs. Some Muslim exegetes interpret these verses in a metaphorical sense, meaning that the offenders were henceforth unclean and base creatures excluded from God’s grace.  However, that is not how the verses are typically understood by extremists (they usually read it literally). The reference (“brothers of apes and pigs”) is intended to denote “the Jews” and more specifically those Jews leading the “servants of the Cross,” which is a reference to the common “Zionist-Crusader Alliance” trope found throughout Islamist extremist texts. That last bit, expressing the relationship between these two groups in the statement, clarifies that this reference is about Zionism and therefore the Nakba master narrative and not the Khaybar master narrative (both of which relate negative Muslim experiences with Jews).

These are the three master narratives implicitly invoked through fragmentary references in a single sentence of this extremist text. In doing so, the extremists associated with al-Fida’ are positioning themselves within an existing scheme of a global conflict underway. Readers know precisely who al-Fida is opposing or fighting in their “internet jihad” without any further necessary exposition. The amount of master narratives condensed into a single sentence, presenting the three groups as a single alliance, also conveys a sense of urgency. In other words, the forces aligning against the “true ummah” are so vast and ominous that al-Fida‘ is a vital endeavor that others should become involved in immediately.

For further reading and more details about the different master narratives I mentioned in this analysis, I invite readers to consult chapters 9, 5, and 12 in Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism.

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The Karbala master narrative is one of the most rich and influential in the Islamic world, specifically among Shi‘a societies. We devoted an entire chapter to it in the book Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, and Kamran Scott Aghaie has penned a wonderful study of it in relation to the history of Iranian identity and nationalism. There is a terrific documentary too, examining the narrative in contemporary Iran and Iraq, which aired on PBS several years ago, called Pilgrimage to Karbala. Nevertheless, despite its prominence and the scholarly attention the narrative has received, I was very much surprised to see Ayman al-Zawahiri invoking this master narrative in his eulogy for Usama bin Laden.

In fact, al-Zawahiri made an explicit analogy comparing Bin Laden to Imam Husayn. He stated:

[Usama bin Laden] departed to his God, stained with the blood of his martyrdom. He was the man, who did not surrender, until the last moment of his life. He was killed among his family and sons. Abu Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin was killed the same way Abu Abdallah al-Husayn [the grandson of Prophet Muhammad], may God be pleased with him, was killed among his family and children. Abu Abdallah al-Husayn cried in pride on the day he was slain in Karbala: “I will never show humiliation.” Abu Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin did the same in Abbottabad, when he cried: “I will never show humiliation to the United States, I will never show humiliation to the arrogance of the Crusaders, I will never show humiliation to the collaborative Pakistanis, and I will never give concessions on the ummah’s sanctities and dignity. (Ayman al-Zawahiri, June 8, 2011)

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s use of the Karbala master narrative is unusual for a number of reasons. The Shi‘a master narrative carries deep cosmic and redemptive significance. These sectarian notions run contrary to several core Sunni Muslim beliefs. Indeed, a common Sunni polemical argument against Shi’ism is that it deifies Husayn and the other Imams and thereby commits the unforgivable sign of shirk (idolatry). As such, Sunnis would reject much of the content found in Shi‘a accounts of the Battle of Karbala, such as those traditionally recounted or performed during Ashura.

These theological disagreements notwithstanding, the tragic death of Husayn at Karbala in 680 (CE) is certainly an acknowledged event in Islamic history that is lamented by Sunni Muslims. Reverence for Husayn as a wali or saint among Sunni Muslims is also particularly strong in Egypt, where an ornate shrine believed to contain his severed head serves as one of the two holiest Muslim sites in the country. The other is the shrine-tomb of Sayyida Zaynab, who was Husayn’s sister. I personally visited the shrine of Husayn, as well as Zaynab, in Cairo back in 2001 and saw the Sunni reverence for Husayn first hand. And as most everyone knows, Ayman al-Zawahiri is Egyptian.

The shrine of Sayyidna Husayn in Cairo, Egypt

Nevertheless, there is great irony in eulogizing Usama bin Laden, who was a Saudi Wahhabi, by comparing him to Imam Husayn. In 1802 (CE), Saudi Wahhabi zealots from Arabia (later “Saudi Arabia”) launched an attack under Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad bin Saud on the mosque-shrine of Husayn at Karbala in Iraq. The Wahhabis committed a massacre of the Shi‘a Muslim inhabitants in the holy city and proceeded to plunder and destroy Husayn’s sacred tomb-shrine. In their view, Shi‘ism was an infidel heresy and its idolatrous shrines, the foremost being those at Karbala and Najaf, needed to be destroyed under the banner of “true Islam.” They also carried out a similar attack against the mosque-shrine of Husayn’s father, Ali, at the holy city of Najaf in Iraq, and later in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

It must be profoundly disturbing for Shi‘a Muslims to hear a contemporary Wahhabi zealot being explicitly compared to Imam Husayn. If al-Zawahiri was trying to craft an ecumenical message that might unite Sunnis and Shi‘as against the “Crusader” United States, then he most certainly failed.

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There is a new narrative responsible for the success of the uprisings that spread from Tunisia through Egypt and now are heard in the streets of Syria, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere.  It is a secular narrative generated by young Muslims who recognize that older jihadist forms of “telling their resistance story” by linking them to Islamic Master Narratives were largely responsible for the binary oppositions that divide them, and Islam, from the West and modernity.

As Jacqueline O’Rourke, a communication consultant working in Qutar and writing in Z Magazine sees it:

This new communications plan is a direct attempt to create a counter-narrative to the predominant one which has dominated Western discourse for the past decade. That narrative runs roughly like this: Muslims are jealous of the freedom and technological advantages of the West. Their society has been in decline after their scientific advances of medieval Europe. Instead, they try to use the West’s technology against itself. Whether airplanes, viruses, or chemicals, Muslims have appropriated science for the purposes of terrorism.

As Thomas Friedman and others have pointed out, the existing “anti-technology/science” narrative is often coupled with Zionist-American conspiracy tales, and together they have fueled the extremist “New Jahiliyya” master narrative developed by Sayyid Qutb.  It depicts a Muslim world in chaos and disorder that can only be made righteous again by a vanguard of True Believers who rise up and seize power by any means necessary, and who essentially return their culture and people to a 7^th Century CE way of life.

Clearly that old religious narrative has been either silent or silenced in the face of these new uprisings by young Muslims throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  Not even the Muslim Brotherhood is calling for an Islamic state.  Instead, the young Muslims and their new leaders are pressing for reforms that offer more freedom, more opportunity, and more control over their own choices, not a return to Sharia law or the reestablishment of a Caliphate.  More importantly, their call for reform is accomplished without challenging the sanctity of the Five Pillars of Islam, which places obedience to God before any other duty or goal.  In this way, young Muslims have opened up a “Third Way” narrative that balances respect for religious traditions with progressive political reforms designed to improve their ability to live well and to compete in a global economy.

But as good as this new secular narrative may sound to Western ears, O’Rourke explains the outcome is unlikely to be one that accepts Western “hypocrisy and condescension”:

One critical reality is that this revolution is not only a revolution against Arab dictators, but a revolution against the humiliation Muslims have been facing in the post-9/11 global landscape. The Arab/Muslim people are not just enraged with political, social, and economic oppression, they are also angry with their rulers’ complicity with imperialism, particularly American and Israeli. In short, the revolution has erupted from Muslim societies as a result of internal oppression and as a response to political, economic, and cultural imperialism, with which the post-9/11 youth are intricately familiar. In this regard, the international community must get the message that this revolution is as much against its hypocritical and condescending manner of dealing with Muslim societies as it is against Mubarak, Ben Ali, or Qadaffi.

One way to think about how all of these narrative tensions may play out is to consider that across this region people are not so much interested in trading one way of life for another, but instead creating a new way of life—a new language for governance—that avoids the pitfalls of either the old jihadi ideological worldview or one that values free market capitalism via oil revenues in exchange for continued support for dictators, particularly if the latter alternative carries with it unquestioning support of Israel.

What might that new narrative be?  One possible story is a hybrid combination of socialism designed to better distribute the wealth and opportunities afforded by revenues (however they are derived) with a progressive Islam dedicated to improving human rights and building communities that are based more on Islamic scholarship and nonviolence than on free market capitalism or extremism.

In this brave new narrative the system of stories would be all about more openness and tolerance, as well as more democratic reform, but there would be no good reason to expect that U.S. corporate or political interests would enjoy any special status in it.  There are other emerging markets—from China to India to the EU—and the political landscape that was once dominated by American foreign policy backed by an unlimited military budget is not what it once was nor do we have the will to wield power in the old fashioned way.

The speech given in Cairo by President Obama last year set in motion a storyline that may well have influenced young Muslims to go ahead with their uprisings.  The president’s late intervention in Libya—and that only with international backing and cooperation—further provided evidence that our intentions are no longer driven by revenge, as they have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead by a steely pragmatism that weighs in on the side of those fighting against oppression but leaves outcomes to those who must then forge a new society.

In general, this new secular narrative is all about accepting this post-uprising/revolution responsibility.  It is thankfully free of the old Islamist rant.  It is so far mostly free from violence, except in Libya.  We should begin to expand our conception of how secular narratives are producing political and social change and rethink our approach to strategic communication as a result.  We don’t want to make the old Pentagon mistake of preparing for the last war, in this case the jihad drawn from master narratives of Islamist extremism, while a whole set of new strategic communication challenges that has nothing to do with those old stories takes shape.

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In our work identifying and tracking the use of Islamist narratives here at the CSC, the second most frequently invoked among Islamist extremists in our research (after Nakba or Palestine) has been the Crusader master narrative. The use of this term among Islamists connotes religious war, subjugation by Western Christians, injustice, and eventual colonization. Its use in the West, however, connotes a much different meaning: a righteous cause, good triumphing over evil, a reclamation of holy lands. Hence perspective is key in the use of narratives, which is why they are so powerful and able to convey deep meanings with the invocation of a few key terms. The use of narrative to convey meaning is important, and it is equally important to understand how audiences perceive the use of these narratives.

Islamists the world over continue to use the term “crusade” to describe the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But when George W. Bush referred to the war in Iraq as a crusade, he was roundly (and rightly) criticized for playing into the Islamists’ narrative. While he may have wanted to convey the justness of the struggle to eliminate violent extremism, to Muslims worldwide he conveyed the meaning of religious war in order to dominate Muslim lands. The narrative slip is widely considered the gaffe that it was.

When NATO forces began to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya in an effort to prevent Muammar Qaddafi from bombing and strafing his own people, the opinions of observers – including allies and enemies of the United States – ran the gamut from full support to condemnation. Because it was an attack on a predominantly Muslim nation by predominantly Christian nations (Qatar an exception), Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized the effort and called it a crusade (Qaddafi also used the term). Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev, in a rare public difference on policy, condemned the use of the word in this context.

The Putin-Medvedev rhetorical dispute was covered in the mainstream press, including the New York Times, which carried a story with the connotation that Putin’s words were not well chosen (Christian Science Monitor story here). My colleague Jeffry Halverson wrote a Comops blog post about Putin’s comments here.

This is why it was particularly surprising and disturbing to read a front-page story on March 29 about the conflict in Libya that invoked the crusade narrative in referring to Samantha Power, President Obama’s advisor on human rights.

The Times fell into a narrative trap that it set for itself. The issue of human rights in the Muslim world – and elsewhere in Asia and Africa – is contentious. Dictators – in Africa, Latin America, and Asia – have often portrayed western ideals of human rights as an imposition of foreign values on these countries, and claim that democracy, for example, is inconsistent with their cultures (here is a recent essay on the topic from the Chinese embassy in the US).  This is belied, of course, by these countries’ grassroots human rights and pro-democracy movements – including those in Libya (although it remains to be seen exactly what would hold the rebels together if they should achieve their goal of ousting Qaddafi). Sharp observers of those condemning “western” human rights point out that this criticism is made frequently by those for whom human rights and democracy are a threat – such as Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, Indonesia’s Suharto, and more recently Syria’s Bashar al Assad.

When the Times refers to a human rights promoter as a “crusader,” however, it plays into the historical notion of human rights as a foreign, western concept, and provides rhetorical ammunition for Qaddafi and his supporters, as well as opponents of democracy and human rights elsewhere. It is as if the United States is suggesting that human rights are an imposition of western or foreign or even Christian values, similar to the crusades, and it is a particularly curious and troublesome choice of words on the part of the Times. It sends an unfortunate message that undermines its intent when viewed from a Muslim perspective. Many Muslims have beliefs about human rights that are mostly consistent with international norms. We need to engage and empower these people, not alienate them.

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In his book Fighting the War of Ideas like Real War: Messages to Defeat the Terrorists, J. Michael Waller argues that the United States already has a “secret weapon worse than death,” and it is cheap, readily available and easy to deploy. That weapon is ridicule.

Although the suggestion that ridicule and satire are legitimate tools of strategic communication might receive some – dare I say it – ridicule, Waller’s argument is a good one. Ridicule and satire have a long history in warfare, and they have been deployed both offensively and defensively. In the U.S., ridicule was used in the Revolutionary War, both to mock the British troops and to raise the morale of the American fighters. In WWII, domestic use of ridicule targeted Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. In a more contemporary example, Waller cites Team America: World Police as an example of effective parody of Islamic terrorists and North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il.  While a movie that features graphic sex between puppets might not have universal appeal, Waller is correct in pointing out that prior to the movie, American audiences would likely not consider the Korean dictator someone to laugh at.

Nor is humiliation merely a Western conception. In pre-Islamic society in the Middle East, law breakers were often mutilated – either whipped or dismembered – as much for purposes of humiliation as pain. They became living symbols of what befell criminals in the community. Ridicule was also used as a weapon of war in both pre-Islamic and early Islamic society and poets were often assassinated because of their power to create and spread ridicule. Today, Waller argues, “many extremists equate ridicule with pain or death.” Bin Laden himself has been quoted as saying he fears humiliation more than death. Well known strategic advice says ‘know your enemy.’ If your enemy fears humiliation over death – which would serve to make him a martyr – then the use of ridicule seems highly appropriate:

In nearly every aspect of society and across culture and time, ridicule works. Ridicule leverages the emotions and simplifies the complicated and takes on the powerful, in politics, business, law, entertainment, the media, literature, culture, sports and romance. Ridicule can tear down faster than the other side can rebuild. It can smash a theoretical or intellectual construct (p. 95).

Jarret Brachman makes a similar argument:

If there’s one thing I’ve learned about jihadis in my career it’s this: they are our secret weapon in the fight against jihadis… they are more than happy to point us in the directions of their weaknesses.

Brachman has coined the term ‘jihobbyists’ to refer to a growing number of armchair terrorists, who cheer on extremism from the web. The term, and the attitude that accompany it, have ‘stirred the pot’ in a most revealing way: “What you find by doing this is that the jihadis can’t not respond. And what they respond to is what they are most sensitive about.” And as Brachman points out, what really gets under the skin of these jihbbyists is not an insult to their ideology or religious beliefs, but the suggestion they still live in their mother’s basement. After all, it is very difficult to maintain a serious and terrifying self image when you get compared to this guy.

Waller’s suggestions regarding the strategic use of ridicule are an expansion of arguments he and others have made about the importance of language use in ‘the war of ideas.’ In ‘buying into’ terrorist’s language – especially by using terms such as jihad and mujahidin – Waller argues that the U.S. and its allies, “ceased fighting on our terms and placed our ideas at the enemy’s disposal” (p. 54). If this is a war of ideas, and words are weapons, then we need to be using the right ammunition, so to speak. More than that:

Being a declared adversary – even enemy – of the United States is a status symbol among the world’s terrorists, dictators, and political extremists. By taking that enemy too seriously, by hyping it up as a threat, the United States is unintentionally credentializing a heretofore insignificant individual or group, and giving it the stature it needs to rise above its own society, establish itself, attract recruits, and gain influence. Ridicule can cut the enemy down to size (p. 104).

According Waller (p. 109), ridicule is vital because:

• It sticks;
• The target can’t refute it;
• It is almost impossible to repress;
• It spreads on its own and multiplies with each re-telling;
• It boosts morale at home;
• Our enemy shows far greater intolerance to ridicule than we;
• Ridicule divides the enemy, damages its morale, and makes it less attractive to supporters and prospective recruits; and
• The ridicule-armed warrior need not fix a physical sight on the target. Ridicule will find its own way to the targeted individual. To the enemy, being ridiculed means losing respect. It means losing influence. It means losing followers and repelling potential new backers

While Al Qaeda and its ideological offshoots are certainly not insignificant, one recent event that would seem to support Waller’s case and would have been an excellent opportunity to ‘deploy’ ridicule is that of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, commonly known as the ‘underwear bomber.’ Although nothing these days drives the current 24-hour news cycle like the mention of terrorist activity, the facts are that the would-be bomber of the Christmas day flight quite literally sewed explosives into his underwear… and then couldn’t ‘get it off.’

Also, given Waller’s arguments, the appropriate response to Bin Laden’s (alleged) praise for the attack – nearly a month after the fact when intelligence analysis suggested that the video was an example of Al Qaeda struggling to maintain relevance – came not from major media outlets, but from The Daily Show. Snore indeed.  Another, more general example of ridicule that is aimed at the idea of the suicide bomber is a ventriloquist routine by comedian Jeff Dunham, titled Achmed the Dead Terrorist, an example Waller points to in his own blog.

This is not to suggest that the threat of terrorism is non-existent or a call to underestimate Al Qaeda’s ideological appeal or material capabilities, and Waller is quick to point out (correctly) that ridicule can be as dangerous as any kinetic weapon when improperly deployed. In the nine years since September 11, however, far more people in the United States have died of heart failure, diabetes, or car accidents than terrorist attacks. Given this, pointing out that Americans statistically have more to fear from a cheeseburger than a ‘guy in a cave’ is not only true, it’s good strategy.

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In a comment on my recent post “Why ‘Moderate Islam’ is the Wrong Language,” Mel repeats the shopworn claim that Islam is a religion of violence. He suggests that I should “do my homework” and read the Qur’an. He implies that reading Sayyid Quttb’s writings can provide insight into the basic nature of Islam.

I am not surprised to read this. Some Christians have been denouncing Islam as a religion of violence for more than a thousand years when it suits their purposes. Post-Christian secular Westerners have continued this discourse. Some Muslims have been denouncing Christianity as a violent religion too–for more than a thousand years–when it suits their purposes. Both have, at times, denounced Judaism as a religion of violence. Religious and secular Jews have denounced both Islam and Christianity as violent regions. None of this is hard to do.

I can assure Mel that I have read the Qu’ran and Qutb, the Bible, the Bhagavad Gita, and lots of other religious texts too. What I have learned is that it is very easy to find passages from the sacred texts of almost any religion that justify or even glorify horrific acts of violence. One can find religious thinkers of almost any faith who have constructed theologies of violence. It is also easy to find examples of horrific acts of violence perpetrated in the name of almost any religion in history.  People tend to forget this when they’re focused on religious violence on the front pages of today’s, or yesterday’s (or unfortunately tomorrow’s) newspaper.

In the introduction to the most recent edition of my World Religions textbook I wrote:

Most people think of their own religion as being peaceful. Jews, Christians and Muslims all speak of the “Peace of God.” Hindus, Jains and Buddhists teach ahimsa or nonviolence. There is, unfortunately, a tendency to describe other people’s religions as cruel and violent. This is a mistake, and one that helps to promote and perpetuate cycles of violence. People of almost all religions have been victimized because of their beliefs. Most, or almost all have been perpetrators of religious violence. Almost any religion can be used as an excuse or justification for violence.

It is tempting to say that this strategy of demonization grows out of ignorance. Unfortunately this is not always the case. Very learned scholars have engaged in this type of discourse for centuries. Indeed, the more knowledgable the practitioners of the discourse of demonization are, the more dangerous they can be. A bigoted discourse accompanied by quotations and references appears more reasonable that one put in simple, direct terms.

It is sadly ironic that at a point in human history at which peace and nonviolence are normative values, people of all religious and political persuasions continue to employ the rhetorical strategy of “demonization” of “enemy others” to justify their own violence. The argument would seem to be: “They are violent and evil people so it is okay to kill them.”

The worst possible response to demonization combines apologetics and counter-demonization. I am not going to do that because it is pointless and because it only fans the flames of hatred. Instead I point out that in conflict situations people have a regrettable tendency to justify their own violent acts by portraying their opponents as irrational, inherently violent, archetypes of evil. (For an excellent recent example of this, see the post on Gadahn’s latest video–Editor).

I am a political realist and understand that the use of force is sometimes necessary. Nonviolent action would not have stopped Hitler and it will not stop Osama bin Laden. Nor would I claim that Islam, or any other religion, is inherently peaceful. To claim that any religion is “the religion of peace” is the other side of the demonization coin. It allows people to portray themselves as innocent victims or martyrs and deny culpability for acts of violence that they, or others, have committed in the name of religion.

The bottom line is that there is very little evidence that religion causes violence. On the other hand, it is abundantly clear that religion is frequently used to justify and promote conflict. Because the demonization of others helps to perpetuate conflict, the appropriate communication strategy is to refuse to engage in it, even if it is politically expedient.

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* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies at Gadjah Madah University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, both in Yogyakarta Indonesia

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The terminology used in English and other European languages to discuss Islam, and especially Muslim political movements, shifts constantly. There is a general consensus, shared by many in the Muslim world, that “radical” and “extremist” are appropriately characterize individuals and movements that advocate and/or employ violence to accomplish their political ends.

Beyond this the waters are much murkier. What language should we use to refer to the huge majority of the world”s Muslims who oppose radical extremist violence? What terms should be used to distinguish this group from others who advocate values including democracy, human and women”s rights, cultural and religious pluralism?

These are especially vexing questions in light of the fact that terminology used in the “Western” press is instantly globalized. Today’s Op-Ed in the New York Times is known and talked about in villages here in Indonesia, and everywhere else in the Muslim World within hours. When pundits make misleading statements about Islam or call for an “Islamic Reformation” they are heard on the streets of Cairo and Jakarta at least as clearly as they are in Washington and New York.

Western commentators often use “Moderate” and “Liberal” to refer to Muslims and Muslim organizations that oppose violence and who, they think, share “Western” values. These are the worst possible choices. In many Muslim circles “Moderate” and “Liberal” are terms of derision, especially when used in conjunction with the word Islam.

“Islam” refers to various understandings of belief, practices and life ways rooted ultimately in the Qur’an which Muslims believe–no not believe, know–to be the word of God. To say that someone is a “moderate” Muslim is to suggest that she or he is insufficiently pious and does not take God”s word seriously.

“Liberal” is even worse. The term has been captured by extremists in the Muslim world as much as it has been in the United States. It suggests not only impiety but also moral laxity. For many here it means accepting, if not actively promoting, things like drinking alcohol, “free sex” and even “gay marriage.”

Secular Muslim? Don”t even think about it. To call a Muslim “secular” is almost the same as to call him or her an apostate. That means she or he is going to Hell. Religious Muslims take this very seriously. A more appropriate usage would be “Secular people from Muslim backgrounds.”

Using the term “fundamentalist” to refer to “extremists” is equally unwise. Translated into Arabic, Indonesian, Urdu or any other Muslim language, the word means something like: “one who adheres to the basic principles of Islam.” I know many people who not only embrace the concepts of democracy, human and women”s rights and religious tolerance who are proud to call themselves Islamic Fundamentalists and who consider the “extremists” to be religiously deviant.

To be sure there are some Muslims who describe themselves as “moderate,” “liberal,” or even “secular.” I know a few. They are a very small minority. I suspect that these terms are more commonly used by Muslims in the West to locate themselves within Western political discourse than they are by Muslims in Muslim societies.

Calls for an “Islamic Reformation” are entirely misguided. They are often understood as telling Muslims how to think about Islam. I do not know any Muslims who think that non-Muslims have the right to do this. The call is based in Protestant Christian triumphalism, rooted in the questionable assumption that the Protestant Reformation is responsible for democracy, concern for human rights and the other more positive elements of “Western” progressive thought. But those who so blithely call for an “Islamic Reformation” seem to forget or not to know that the 16th Century Northern European Protestant Reformation sparked nearly a century of devastating and extremely bloody religious warfare.

A few months ago I attended a seminar at which a German Professor told a group of young Muslim intellectuals from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore that they needed to find an “Islamic Martin Luther.” This did not go over well.  Most in the audience were familiar with the history of the Protestant Reformation and knew that Luther was virulently anti-Muslim, anti-Semitic and of course anti-Catholic. One friend remarked: “A Protestant Reformation is exactly what we don”t need, that kind of thinking is what produced bin Laden.” Proposing a de-confessionalized version of the principles of the Second Vatican Council would perhaps be more reasonable.

Inter-religious and intercultural dialog can only begin with the acceptance of difference and a commitment to building common understandings on issues of mutual concern. Attempts to conduct such a conversation predicated on the assumption that “you” must become more like “us” will fail. Calling for a Protestant Reformation in Islam dredges up the worst sort of colonial memories. This may not be obvious to Americans. It is painfully obvious to Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders.

Using “moderate,” to say nothing of “liberal,” in a political sense is equally misguided. It suggests that Daniel Pipes is correct that “Islam” and “Muslim” are synonyms for bigotry and violence. It also says that extremists are in control of Muslim religious and political discourse, as Thomas Friedman suggested in a recent New York Times Op-Ed.

These views are simply false. Here in Indonesia the word on the street and in the mosques is that people who plant bombs in the name of Islam are too “extreme” and that even in times of war deliberately targeting civilians is “un-Islamic.” Friedman, Pipes and others hear extremist voices because they want to. Yet, their voices are heard here, with a mixture of anger and sorrow. Anger that people would say such things about Islam and Muslims without distinguishing between the tiny minority that actual do hold extremist views, and the overwhelming majority who believe that the violence advocated by extremists is sinful. Sorrow that there are actually Muslims who do hold such views.

Many Muslim intellectuals here believe that Pipes, Friedman, and others like them think in the same exclusivist, bigoted ways that Muslim extremists do. I think they are correct. Portraying the “other” as an archetype of evil drives ethnic and religious violence.

How to Get it Right?

Finding the right language is not easy in a global information environment. It is necessary to search for terms that, at least, do not offend a larger portion of the intended or unintended audience. At the same time the terms used in local reportage and political discourse must be intelligible to local audiences.

The first step is to stop using terms like moderate, liberal and fundamentalist. Using the term “mainstream” to refer to the huge majority of Muslims who reject extremist violence is a good idea for two reasons: First, it accurately reflects the climate of Muslim opinion. Second, it resonates strongly with the notion of consensus, which is among the basic sources of Islamic Law.

“Progressive” is perhaps the best term to use for those Muslims who advocate democracy, human and women”s rights, religious and cultural pluralism. This term resonates strongly with ijtihad or individual, context sensitive interpretation of Islamic scripture and is also among the accepted sources of Muslim jurisprudence. Many of my Muslim friends, with whom I share these values, also like the term.

To be a “mainstream, fundamentalist, progressive Muslim” is a very good thing. The world could use more of them.

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* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies at Gadjah Madah University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, both in Yogyakarta Indonesia

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Dwarfed by the stories of the earthquake tragedy in Padang, yesterday Indonesian media picked up a sensational statement issued at the Jakarta police headquarters. According to police spokesman Nanan Sukarna, police investigators have discovered evidence that the corpse of Jemaah Islamiyah’s Noordin Top showed signs of anal trauma consistent with sodomy, leading to speculation that he might have been bisexual.

The article (published by inilah.com) began curiously by differentiating investigatory police and police doctors, and stated that “information that the terrorist Noordin Top enjoyed relationships with men should not be spread to the public.” (All translations in this piece by the author). The story ended with a quote from Nanan: “This is the doctor’s secret. Indeed I do not know who was stating this. It has to be kept secret, it cannot be announced. There is a code of ethics, it is a problem of visum etrepesum (sic: repertum).”

Yet for whom was the article, which reported details of the investigation, intended if not the public? How many nods and winks were shared between reporter and spokesman, the understanding that this “news” would of course be disseminated? Disseminated it was, with slight variations. Surya online was more discreet, but quoted University of Indonesia forensic specialist Dr. Mun’im Idris as saying there were “peculiarities.” The flagship paper of eastern Indonesia, Pos Kupang, also quoted Dr. Mu’nim but more directly: “Yes, there is damage to Noordin’s anus.” Perhaps the best example of the nod-and-wink game is the reporting from Kompas, Indonesia’s most respected national newspaper. “Nanan: The Matter of Noordin’s Anus has to be Kept Secret” the headline blared. To its credit, Kompas got the Latin for autopsy report correct.

As to be expected, today the story was picked up and broadcast by blogs and other online sources, including those outside of  Indonesia. “Fact! Noordin was Frequently Sodomized!” screamed Malaysia’s Topix.com, which was the first response to the author’s Google search of “Noordin Dubur (anus).” Blog comments are multiplying rapidly, with sides being chosen. “Character assassination!” screamed one, as though being gay (or sexually deviant) was worse than being a murdering terrorist, and implying that Noordin had any character left to assassinate.

The latent conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia the author described in a previous blog post is surfacing. “Noordin Top Appears to be Homosexual (a Reflection of the [religious] Hypocrisy of Malingsia Society),” screams another Topix.com report. The author described the term “Malingsia,” combining the word for “thief” with Malaysia, in a previous post, but this news has brought to the fore another derogatory term for Indonesians to refer to Malaysians: “Magaysia.”

The story was also broadcast on television. Jakarta’s Metro TV reported the story with footage of Dr. Mun’im.  The report also stated that a spokesman for Noordin’s family in Malaysia, Badarudin Ismail, denied the report. In a Detik.com story, Badarudin argued that it simply was not possible; after all, Noordin had wives and children. The naivete in this statement boggles the mind.

Of course this kind of report does not necessarily mean that if it was indeed sex that caused the “irregularities” that it was necessarily sex between Noordin and another man. That being said, Dede Oetomo, among Indonesia’s best known and widely respected gay rights and political activists, has spoken to me about gay sex in the context of pesantren (Islamic boarding school) dormitories, arguing essentially that what else would one expect when pubescent boys are sequestered with other pubescent boys in tight quarters.

Homosexuality in Indonesia and Malaysia has a dual nature. On the one hand, transexuals and transvestites (“banci” or “waria”) are openly tolerated as they sing or play instruments and busk in public. On the other, however, discourse dominated by religious conservatives condemns homosexuality and has led to anti-gay violence. Gay activists, such as Dede, continue to struggle for their rights and recognition.

A report today by the English language Jakarta Globe speculated that the forensic results could have been caused by hidden explosives. Regardless, the tactics of the Jakarta police — to announce something publicly as a something that must be kept secret — shows how they are willing to use the information to further discredit Noordin and his terrorist ilk. True or not, this raises the question of whether he needed further discrediting following his heinous acts of terrorism.

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