In public discourse about Islam, “Wahhabi” is usually a synonym for intolerance, misogyny, and extremism.  Though this is sometimes true it is an over-generalization.  In this paper we contrast two very different forms of Wahhabi Islam focusing on education, religious pluralism and gender relations. The first is the Wahhabism of the Saudi state. Saudi Wahhabism couples this theological orientation with intolerance of all other forms of religion and a vision of moral order that includes severe restrictions on the role of women in public life, with gender segregation and discrimination being a central part of the Saudi Wahhabi moral vision.

The second is that of a mid-sized Wahhabi oriented pesantren (Islamic school) in Indonesia.  Though it is as firmly rooted in al-Wahab’s theological vision as any Saudi school, its brand of Wahhabism could not be more different from that practiced in Saudi Arabia. It allows for diversity in ritual practice on controversial issues, readily interacts with other Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities, and teaches that the state does not have the right to establish one religion or a single interpretation of Islam as “official.” It also is equally progressive on gender issues and does not define rigid gender segregation as a component of moral order.

We show that core Wahhabi religious teachings are as compatible with religious tolerance and gender equity as they are with religious exclusivism and misogyny.  Our larger purpose is to question conventional wisdom linking religious doctrine with specific modes of cultural, social and political practice.

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The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has released a short monograph, De-Legitimizing al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach, by sociologist Paul Kamolnick, a professor at Eastern Tennessee State University. Kamolnick criticizes current US efforts to counter al-Qaeda’s messaging and recruitment strategies as ineffective, and proposes an alternative two-fold solution to marginalize and defeat al-Qaeda. However, Kamolnick’s proposed strategy is problematic for several reasons.

In the first component of his proposed strategy, Kamolnick suggests that since Islam (specifically Sunni Islam) is a religion of orthopraxy and law, American policy makers and strategists should determine how Islamic jurispru­dence, specifically discourses on jihad, “may be leveraged for, and not against, vital U.S. national security interests.” It is unclear what exactly this “leveraging” entails. But he does warn that the US government must do so in secret (deferring “open association” until a later time) so as not to taint the legitimacy of potentially helpful sharia scholars and their formulations.

These formulations should ideally come from “credentialed actors of immense statue and learning.” And these jurists would reaffirm how Islam and the sacred texts prohibit things such as killing non-combatants indiscriminately. He is particularly interested in what he calls “jihadi-realist” scholars, meaning militant Islamists (such as Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl) who have rejected terrorism as a strategy to bring about change. By “leveraging” this sort of work (how remains unclear) for “vital U.S. national security interests” the US can create a narrative (my wording, not his) that portrays the US as a country “on the side of the lawful and just” against those who violate sharia (i.e., al-Qaeda).

The truth is that there is no shortage of Muslim scholars, jurists, preachers, activists, and so on, who have condemned terrorism and al-Qaeda’s violent strategies – despite the bizarre yet common refrain in America that no one in the Muslim community has done so. The traditional rules of warfare in Islam, such as prohibitions against killing civilians or women and children, are also already commonly known among Muslims. Therefore, I’m not sure how having the US secretly “leverage” these condemnations will harm al-Qaeda. When it comes to fatwas (Islamic juridical rulings) it only takes one to justify a practice or behavior. And there have been plenty of bizarre and isolated fatwas out there justifying abhorrent behavior.

It must also be said that while sharia is important to Sunni Muslims, especially Salafi and other über devout people, Kalmonick’s emphasis on the resounding mass influence of sharia on the decisions people make, especially the youth, seems exaggerated. At the end of the day, someone bent on committing an act of violence won’t stop because someone gave a ruling that it was a sinful or bad idea. Aspiring perpetrators will either find a ruling to support them, make their own ruling, or dispense with a juridical ruling altogether and act anyway. They could even invoke a dream where the Prophet Muhammad told them to act – which is not as far fetched as it sounds.

Another issue on the topic of sharia and fatwas is that even seemingly clear-cut issues can be stretched, twisted, and overturned by using a range of well-established juridical principles. That’s why most everyone knows that killing civilians is forbidden, but al-Qaeda still manages to win some people over. For example, it is a well-established belief in Islam that suicide is forbidden. Suicide is a grave sin.

There are numerous hadiths that describe the truly horrific punishments that someone will receive in Hell if they commit suicide. We can also find countless rulings by Muslim jurists that prohibit suicide. These positions are well-known. So why do we have some Muslims committing suicide by strapping bombs to their bodies or crashing airliners into buildings for al-Qaeda? It could suggest that religio-legal justifications aren’t that important when it comes to people seeking vengeance or justice for outstanding sociopolitical grievances.

But more to the point, extremists also utilize concepts like niyya (intention), darura (necessity), and reciprocity, among others, to neutralize these prohibitions against suicide or whatever else goes against their preferred strategy or plan of action. For example, al-Qaeda might claim that a terrorist who blew himself up at a military outpost in Iraq did not commit suicide because his intention was to attack and inflict harm on the enemy. After all, the Prophet once said: “All actions are judged by intentions.”

For al-Qaeda, it only counts as suicide if the person was lost in despair and their intention was to end their life. That was not the intention though, it is argued, and thus the prohibition is nullified. Instead, the terrorist is a celebrated battlefield martyr. The core of the matter is that sharia is always the product of interpretive agents; meaning people devise the divine rules according to their own subjective human interests and goals. So I wouldn’t invest too much in the restrictive powers of Islamic law as a counter-terrorism strategy.

The second part of Kalmonick’s strategy is a radical shift in US foreign policy and military policy in order to fundamentally alter perceptions of US intentions in the Muslim world. No specifics are given. “No amount of spin or messaging matters,” he writes, “when daily life and its common-sense interpretation contradict official pretensions and pronouncements.” I can agree with this statement, but then again he doesn’t provide any specifics. And let’s get real. Given the various special-interest groups and ideological trends currently entrenched in the US political system, this part of Kamolnick’s strategy is probably even less plausible than his problematic covert sharia ideas.

Major changes in US foreign and military policies might help alleviate some of the serious grievances among Muslims that al-Qaeda invokes in its messaging against the US. And I think most scholars would agree with that. But Kamolnick does not specifically discuss what changes should be made – maybe a compelling US push to establish a two-state solution along the 1967 borders to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Nor does Kamolnick address how the memories of past events still influence the present. For example, ending the Crusades centuries ago hasn’t stopped it from being invoked (as a narrative system) at every opportunity.

Regardless, it is extremely unlikely that the US government will ever make major changes to address Muslim grievances, such as the annexation of East Jerusalem or Russian control of Chechnya. More importantly though, the intention or meaning behind any changes to US foreign policy are still entirely subject to interpretation, despite US intentions or what Kamolnick calls “common-sense interpretation.” Those interpretations, typically conveyed as narratives, can vary widely among different audiences.

For example, if the US withdraws from a country (e.g. Iraq) under the pretense that the mission was accomplished and it has no interest in occupying the country, al-Qaeda disseminates a narrative that the US withdrawal was a “retreat” and a victory for the mujahideen over the “Crusaders.” This is the business of narrative, and human beings, regardless of religion, love and live by their stories. And do not think for a second that “leveraging” condemnations of al-Qaeda by some credentialed Muslim jurists or “jihadi-realists” won’t fall victim to al-Qaeda’s narratives either. Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl, was dismissed by Zawahiri and other extremists as a sell-out and someone who gave into torture in prison. Extremists discredit and condemn Muslim scholars and jurists who oppose them as hypocrites, apostates, heretics, Zionist agents, even as the “magicians of the Pharaoh,” every day. And this sort of rhetoric existed long before al-Qaeda ever took shape in Afghanistan.

In the final evaluation, I did not find anything that is particularly new or plausible in Professor Kamolnick’s approach to dealing with al-Qaeda’s messaging and recruitment strategies. In fact, I fear that his dismissal of the importance of narrative and counter-narrative strategies would set the US back in this ongoing struggle and make his own strategy suggestions all the more untenable.

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The Arab Spring showed the world how social media can help organize mass political dissent. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, single issues coalesced online into far broader and diverse campaigns that toppled ruling regimes. Recently, outside of the Arab world, discriminatory government policies  in Iran against Afghans have come to light. Decried by critics as overt state-backed racism, it is a scandalous hot-button issue that the rulers of the “Islamic Republic” have little chance of defending.  Already a nascent but growing social media campaign has emerged to condemn it and may soon tap into broader popular grievances against the entire regime.

“We are all Afghans” is the new rally cry among Iranian and Afghan social media users, shocked by recent discriminatory Iranian government policies against the over two million Afghans living in Iran. A Facebook page with over 20,000 members now exists. And yes, there are protests planned. Iran’s recent Oscar-winning filmmaker, Asghar Farhadi, is speaking out too.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has hardly dispelled these growing charges of racism either. On the contrary, his recent speeches have contained overt declarations of Persian supremacy. The regime of the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” whose clerical leadership claims the mantle of the Prophet Muhammad (an Arab) and his family, is baring an increasing resemblance to the resurgent Neo-Fascist parties of Europe. And it is ironic that the hated Shah Reza Pahlavi regime, overthrown by the 1979 Revolution, was once fiercely condemned by Shiite clerics for emphasizing a Persian identity for Iran instead of an Islamic one.

The BBC reports that the deputy governor-general of Iran’s northern Mazandaran Province announced late last month that all Afghans must leave the province  irrespective of their legal status by July 2 (meaning it’s not an illegal immigration issue). The deputy governor has further warned the public that offering employment or any kind of assistance to Afghans is a crime “punishable by the full force of the law.” He also asserted the validity of a law passed in 2006 that made marriage between Iranian women and Afghan men illegal. Meanwhile, last month in Isfahan, Afghans were banned by officials from attending Nowruz (Persian New Year) celebrations in a public park because they “caused insecurity.”

One Iranian blogger, suggesting a more pervasive racism beyond Iranian government institutions, recently posted photos of signs in Iran that ban the use of facilities by Afghans or dictate segregated facilities for Afghans. Still another Iranian blogger compared recent events to the rise of Le Pen’s anti-immigrant Front National  party in France and lamented the racism in Iran by stating: “[We tell Westerners that] we are from the land of Cyrus the Great, but we think Afghans are murderers, Arabs are savages, Turks are naive and Blacks smell.”

Responses to the controversy from officials in Iran’s “Islamic” government have ranged from silence and denial to speeches glorifying the supremacy of the Persian people among the nations of the earth. Take, for instance, a recent speech (broadcast on state television) by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on April 11, 2012, in the province of Hormozgan. In the speech, he states:

Inside Iran, some ask me why I always speak about Iran. They say this is, I do not know, nationalism, ethnic racism, and so forth. Such talk is baseless. Iran is not an ethnos. Iran is a culture, vision, ethics, and ideology. . . . You look for people similar to our people in other countries. Look around the borders and compare with neighbors, and you will see the difference. There is a huge difference. This difference does not mean arrogance and vanity. It is first of all a divine gift, the glorification of the divine gift. It points to a mission [for our people].

Ahmadinejad goes onto boldly claim that: If you take away the share of the Iranian nation from human civilization, nothing will be left. In support of his ethnocentric narrative, Ahmadinejad sprinkles his speech with a range of anecdotal stories. In one instance, he recounts how extensively he has traveled, visiting more places in Iran than anyone else. Thanks to his travels, he claims, he has seen firsthand that “the best people of the world are living in Iran today.” He also lists some recent achievements of Iran, claiming in the vaguest terms that Iran has improved “nanotechnologies and biotechnologies,” making it “among the few top countries in the world.” And finally he recounts a story that seems to be a hadith from the Prophet Muhammad (again, an Arab), although I am personally unfamiliar with it. It relates that the Prophet once told his followers that “Iranians will [one day] guide and lead, and introduce the truth of Islam to the world.” This, Ahmadinejad says, proves that Iranians have a divinely decreed mission to lead the world (and they must act on it).

This rhetoric of racial or ethnic pride and supremacy goes entirely against Islamic ideals about the equality and universal brotherhood of all Muslims as a single ummah. And yes, I do mean ideals. On an everyday level, one can find examples of racism and prejudice in every Muslim country in the world, just as one can find it in any other country, including the United States of America. But what makes this case so peculiar is that most countries don’t claim to be an “Islamic Republic” or a righteous state representing God’s Mahdi on earth. Moral condemnation aside, it is a tremendous blunder for the theocratic regime to indulge in this sort of racist rhetoric and behavior. And I cannot see how the “Great Satan” or the “Zionist entity” can be blamed for this one. At the very least, Iran’s treatment of its Afghans, many of whom arrived as refugees during the Soviet invasion, will only further alienate its Sunni neighbors and produce further international isolation.

More importantly though, recent events in mind, I have to wonder if the “We are All Afghans” movement might coalesce into something much more. After all,  there is no shortage of grievances among the Iranian populace. Iran’s nuclear program has yet to produce anything but international tensions and sanctions. And the tragic martyrdom of Neda Agha Soltan amidst the 2009 election scandal has yet to be forgotten, despite the regime’s best efforts. Sound far-fetched? Perhaps, but who would have thought that a fatal case of police brutality in Alexandria, Egypt, would have led to the “We are all Khaled Saeed” campaign that grew into a popular revolution that overthrew the US-backed Mubarak regime? Perhaps there’s a “Persian Spring” on the horizon after all.

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“If a group of people feels that it has been humiliated and that its honor has been trampled underfoot, it will want to express its identity.”                                                                                                                       – Abdolkarim Soroush

In a recent NY Times Op-Ed, Professor John W. Owen of the University of Virginia argues that the electoral success of Islamists after the Arab Spring is due to Islamism’s longstanding role as the dominant voice of political dissent. He writes: “Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow.” It’s an interesting perspective, but I think it misses the mark. Islamism is not about dissent, it’s about identity.

I explored the electoral success of Ennahda in Tunisia and the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt previously on COMOPS. If you haven’t read those blog entries, I encourage you to do so. I won’t repeat that material here. Rather, I want to look at the broader issue of identity, which I think lies at the heart of Islamism’s current popularity.

As readers know, Tunisia and Egypt are the only two countries of the historic Arab Spring to hold democratic elections so far. These countries are commonly designated as Arab states. However, there was a time when the “Arab world” was restricted to the Arabian Peninsula and the southern Levant. It was only after the rise of Islam in the seventh century and the subsequent conquest of North Africa that the lands we know today as Egypt and Tunisia started a gradual shift toward “Arabness.”

‘Who is an Arab’ is a far more complex question than you might guess. The simple answer (my apologies Arabist scholars) is twofold: An Arab is someone who speaks Arabic (there’s even a saying by the Prophet Muhammad that ‘Arabness’ is conferred by the tongue) and/or shares a genealogical or cultural-historical heritage with an Arabic speaking people. Despite certain stereotypical images about what an ‘Arab’ looks like, I assure you that Arabs come in every shade and color of the human family. The Arabic language (including its enormous variety of dialects) is the real root of Arab identity. But what does this have to do with Islamist parties?

The Arabic language arrived with the Muslim expansion across North Africa in the seventh century. Arabic gradually became the dominant language of the peoples in those lands over time. This means that Islam is irrevocably bound to Arab identity, despite the fact that millions of Arabs are Christians. The Qur’an is actually the foundation of literary Arabic as we know it. The Arab tribes of the Peninsula were an oral culture and largely illiterate, and the rise of Islam transformed those conditions.

When you add in the fact that national identities (e.g. American, Iraqi) are a modern innovation developed in the West and largely imposed in North Africa by Western colonial powers, we are left with the fact that Islam served as the primary reference point for identity formation for centuries before that time, along with tribal and ancestral ties.

Jump forward to the independence movements in the Arab world of the mid-twentieth century. The British are ousted in Egypt and the French are ousted in Tunisia. The two young nation-states are independent and can choose a system of governance, including a legal system, for themselves. The dominant trend in the twentieth century was to try to ‘catch up’ to the powers of the age and borrow or adopt European systems and ideologies; not only nationalism, but socialism, communism, even fascism. This sort of borrowing extended into culture (even the way people dressed), technology and education as well. The most radical example in the region was Turkey, a non-Arab state, but still a neighbor with strong cultural ties. Among the Arabs, Tunisia came closest to following Turkey’s radical example. As we know, the post-colonial ‘experiments’ in the Arab states of Tunisia and Egypt ultimately produced the authoritarian regimes that would fall during the Arab Spring.

When Tunisians and Egyptians went to cast their votes this past year, they weren’t too concerned with particular candidates (nor were the election systems set up as such). The elections were about people expressing identities and aspirations freely, perhaps for the first time. Judging by the election results, a large segment of Tunisians and Egyptians who cast votes (note the qualifier) believe that it is important to retain or affirm an Arab-Muslim identity. So far these elections have been about asserting that sense of identity more so than caliphates or a desire to implement medieval penal codes or ban wine.

These elections also come at a time when the United States (its military might aside) is a cultural superpower across the globe. People in many parts of the world, not only in Arab states (note the NY Times recent piece on China), fear the loss of ‘who they are’ in the face of American (or Western) cultural or socioeconomic hegemony.  In my home state of Arizona, we have witnessed the strange, sometimes militant, response of Anglo-Americans who fear Hispanic cultural encroachment and cast votes accordingly. Those are identity votes too. I see little difference between them and those people in Egypt or Tunisia who vote for parties that champion longstanding identities rooted in Islam.

_____________________________

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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President Obama has now made his second trip in office to the land where he spent four years of his youth, Indonesia, while on a trip to Asia and Australia. Although Obama’s time in Indonesia was brief, he was welcomed relatively warmly by most Indonesians, who appreciate his ties to the most populous Muslim country. There are, however, plenty of people who disapproved, including the usual suspects, the Islamist extremists.

The trip is part of a plan to shore up ties and increase the US presence in Southeast Asia in order to balance a rising China, and in response to the previous administration’s general neglect of the region (one of the reasons China made such significant inroads there in the last decade). Obama also announced plans to increase the US military presence in Australia, which irked China. The disputes in the South China Sea — the Spratly and Paracel Islands — and China’s increasing assertiveness are certainly part of the decision to increase the US presence there.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia staged a protest at the American embassy prior to his visit. Although their website listed the number of demonstrators as 20,000, other sources gave estimates from hundreds to 2500.

“Why Obama (must be) Shot” is the title of a story on the ar Rahmah extremist web site. The image accompanying the story is one they and others have used before — Obama as pharaoh, invoking a strong Islamist narrative of tyranny and injustice. The caption reads “Pharaoh of this time, demon predator of Muslims.” The article goes on to repeatedly refer to Obama as a “crusader,” another powerful narrative — although an explanation of how he can be both a pharaoh and a crusader at the same time is lacking.

The articlH cites Oscar Ortega Hernandez, the 21-year-old who fired shots at the White House last week. Although Pennsylvania police stated that he was mentally disturbed (he told friends that Obama is the anti-Christ, so I guess he does have more than one thing in common with the extremists), the “psychologists” at ar Rahmah give him a clean bill of health:

Funny thing is the Pennsylvania police who arrested Oscar alleged that he suffered mental illness and was reported missing by his family since last week. Yet if you look at the published photos of Oscar, of course anyone would argue that Oscar is not mentally handicapped, but rather very healthy and very aware of what he did, namely to shoot Obama!

Not sure what they will make his tattoo of the word “Israel” — his young son’s name — on Ortega’s neck, however.

According to ar Rahmah, the plan to station Marines in Australia is simply a pretext to begin a crusade against Indonesian Muslims. In agreement with the English extremist group Muslims Against Crusades (a group recently banned by the British government), the assassination of Obama is allowed because of his execution of two Muslim heroes: Osama bin Laden and Anwar al Awlaki.

Jailed extremist leader Abu Bakar Basyir concurs. In another story on ar Rahmah, Basyir argues that because he is the leader of a crusade started by his predecessor, Obama must be fought. Voice of Islam posted a story arguing that Obama was in Indonesia to attempt to “Christianize” the country.

While Obama was in Bali, there was a 5.3 earthquake. Ar Rahmah pinpointed the cause of the earthquake, however: when Obama greeted the Indonesian First Lady Ani Yudhoyono, he (“ferociously”) kissed her on the cheek. It’s another attempt to link a natural disaster with some kind of moral transgression, something Indonesian Islamist extremists do frequently, just as Christian extremists do here in the US.

As usual, ar Rahmah posted a link to their website on Facebook. In a country of around 240,000,000, with around 30,000,000 Facebook users (ranking second in the world), the article about the earthquake received 139 “likes,” 21 “shares,” and 39 comments, including one brave soul who cautioned that posting stories such as this one can make Muslims appear to be provocateurs. In a new democracy with newly found freedoms of press and expression, Indonesia’s extremists continue to test the boundaries. Calling for the assassination of a visiting head of state is apparently within those boundaries. Thankfully the number of supporters of this group are small, and none chose to act on the call to violence.

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Put him in power and see how wise he is.

- Ernest Hemingway, A Farewell to Arms

I have spent an inordinate amount of time studying Islamist ideologues and their ideas during my relatively short lifetime. I’ve never read War and Peace, but I have read Milestones and The Neglected Duty. In recent months, the Tunisian Islamist and leader of Ennahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, has occupied a good deal of my attention. And as regular readers of the Comops Journal may know, I recently returned from traveling around Tunisia. The election results have since been tallied there, and Ghannouchi’s party, Ennahda, won the most seats of any party in the 217 seat constituent assembly. The victory has resulted in a lot of talk about what the old Islamist will do now, and how his party will shape the future of the new Tunisia. In my view, Ennahda’s electoral victory is best understood as a reassertion of a long-marginalized Arab-Muslim identity, and should not be treated as a call for a so-called “Islamic state.” Indeed, I see Ennahda’s rise as a temporary one, and it will quickly return to the ranks of the other parties in future elections. For those interested, I previously wrote about the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in post-revolutionary Egypt.

If you have yet to review the results of the October 23rd election, Ennahda took 90 seats (42% of all seats), while the Congress for the Republic took 30 seats, Ettakatol took 21, Aridha Chaabia took 19 (currently disputed), and 17 seats went to the PDP. No other party won more than 5 seats. For all you Cold War enthusiasts, Tunisia’s Communist party took 3 seats. Overall, twenty-six parties total (including independent lists) won at least 1 seat (my thanks to Tunisia Live for great coverage).

Tunisia’s election, the first of the Arab Spring revolutions, went remarkably well (the Aridha Chaabia issue aside), and it will undoubtedly serve as a model for others in the Arab world, especially Egypt and Libya. These were not parliamentary or presidential elections though. They chose members of the assembly that will craft a new constitution and select a new interim president until the next round of elections (in a year or so). Voters chose from an enormous number (over 100) of “lists,” and based on the number of votes achieved for these lists, a certain number of seats were awarded. Due to this system, it was a given that a coalition would have to emerge and no single party could dominate via absolute majority. Nevertheless, Ennahda’s victory exceeded expectations.

During my time in Tunisia, my peers there thought that Ennahda would win no more than 30% of the seats. The numbers suggest that my colleagues may have been out-of-touch with the extent to which Tunisians profess an Arab-Muslim identity. Ennahda led in nearly every district, but only won an outright majority in the districts of Gabés (Ghannouchi’s hometown) and Tataouine, as well as among the expat community in Italy. Ennahda also had a particularly strong showing in Tunisia’s “second city,” Sfax.

Rachid Ghannouchi, now in his 70s, has not chosen to pursue a political office (as of yet). He appears content to serve as the leader and guide of Ennahda, but his political influence will still hold tremendous sway. History has provided numerous examples of terrible Islamist regimes that rise to political power, most obviously the Taliban. Those examples fail to tell the whole story however. Ghannouchi is certainly at the opposite end of the Islamist spectrum from Mullah Omar. He is definitely a social conservative and quick to condemn anything he deems offensive to his vision of Islam, but he has also repeatedly demonstrated a surprising degree of flexibility, pragmatism, and revision in his viewpoints throughout his lifetime. He is far closer to the teachings of Malik Bennabi (d. 1973) than he is to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328). His party’s willingness to participate in the democratic process and engage secular parties alone has put him at odds with the most hardline Islamists.

Islamism, I often tell students, thrives in abstraction, but it quickly shows its weaknesses and inadequacies when it comes to the dirty details of governance. It is one thing to tell the crowds that Islam is the solution to a country’s economic woes, and quite another thing to find people jobs and lead them out of poverty. Furthermore, pledges of support for “sharia” are often little more than populist fluff, albeit with potentially disastrous results. Even if one accepts the eternal applicability of the legal content scattered throughout Islam’s most sacred texts, the fact remains that those texts leave much to be desired when governing a 21st century nation-state. This fact generally presents a great dilemma for Islamists and it has even motivated some groups to drag their countries back to a more primitive time to try and resolve it.

Ghannouchi (center) greets Erdogan (right) in Tunis during a recent visit

Ghannouchi has repeatedly said that Turkey’s ruling AKP is the model that Ennahda will follow, and I have no reason, at this time, to doubt the sincerity of his words. Indeed, Turkey and Tunisia, despite the ethno-cultural distinctions, share a fair deal in common with regards to their modern histories. Former Tunisian President, Habib Bourguiba, has often been described as an “Arab Atatürk.” The AKP in Turkey has essentially been a reassertion of Turkey’s Muslim identity and heritage in the public sphere after it was forcefully cloistered away by Kemalists for decades. I see Ghannouchi and Ennahda in this same framework. The electoral success of Ennahda reflects the desire to reassert an Arab-Muslim identity in Tunisia after decades of being pushed into the private sphere by the secularist powers of the Neo-Destour/RCD. Ennahda’s rise has little or nothing to do with a desire to see headscarves forced onto women or hands of thieves amputated.

On a more mundane level, Ennahda’s victory also reflects the simple fact that the party has strong anti-RCD credentials, it was well organized, and it was widely known among the people. There were many new parties in the wake of the revolution (over 130 lists at one point) and few people knew anything about their platforms. Furthermore, many of the parties shared a center-left ideology, splitting those votes among multiple parties, while Ennahda essentially monopolized the religious identity vote.

Now that Ennahda has been granted political power, the people will expect them to resolve their problems and concerns, which are numerous. The economy in particular will loom large in the years ahead. It remains to be seen whether Ennahda can offer solutions beyond pious slogans and public displays of religiosity. In fact, I see a steady decrease in support for Ennahda over ensuing elections, barring a miraculous economic revival (pun intended).

Lastly, I wish to convey the idea that there is an important positive dimension to the election victory of Ennahda, as well as the earlier victories of the AKP in Turkey. Admittedly, I write this as someone who does not have to live under such parties, so keep that in mind. The silver lining here is that these parties offer a viable alternative for peoples who seek a greater public role for Islam in their societies, in contrast to the militant reactionary movements we are all too familiar with.

When Islamists point to Erdogan and the AKP as a model to follow, rather than Ayman al-Zawahiri or Mullah Omar and the “Islamic emirate” of Taliban-era Afghanistan, this is most certainly a positive. Dialogue and cooperation with such parties should be encouraged, not dismissed on the grounds of ideological allegiances. Indeed, if Western countries were to suddenly turn away from Tunisia on the basis of an Islamist party’s electoral success, it would only help the hardliners and further support the erroneous view that militancy and anti-Western sentiment is the best strategy for contemporary Muslim societies. Furthermore, power means responsibility and accountability, and Tunisians will now “see how wise” the old Islamist from Gabés really is.

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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I recently traveled to Tunisia where I visited the ancient holy city of Kairouan. Elections for the constituent assembly to produce a new Tunisian constitution are less than two weeks away and there is a lot of discussion taking place about the nature of Tunisian identity and the role of Islam in Tunisian society. Islamists, both mainstream and radical, obviously envision a prominent role for Islam. However, my experiences in Kairouan, as well as other cities in Tunisia, gave me a tangible sense of the complexities involved and left me with the impression that Islamists, particularly the hardliners, face an uphill battle. Our colleague Mark R. Woodward has previously noted contested approaches to Islam in public life in Indonesia, albeit in very different cultural and historical circumstances.

Regionally, Kairouan is regarded as the fourth holiest city in Islam and the “spiritual capital” of the Maghreb (although folks in Fez, Morocco, may disagree). At the center of the city is the Grand Mosque of Uqba. It was originally constructed by the Umayyad Arab general Uqba ibn Nafi al-Fihri in 670 CE, but the present structure dates from the 9^th century when it was remodeled by the Aghlabid dynasty. It is considered an architectural masterpiece and highly influential on Islamic art throughout the region. What is most interesting though is how the mosque reflects or symbolizes in so many ways the multi-layered complexities of contemporary Tunisian identity.

Interior of the Grand Mosque

As was common at the time, empires often used precious building materials from previous structures and ruins to construct their own monuments and facilities. The construction of the Grand Mosque of Uqba in Kairouan was no different. Before the Arab conquest, Tunisia was the imperial domain of the Byzantines, the Romans, the Phoenicians (remember mighty Hannibal of Carthage?), and, of course, the native Berber tribes. When the Grand Mosque was constructed, it utilized building materials from prior Byzantine, Roman, and Phoenician structures. Those elements are still very much visible today and add to the unique architectural charm of the mosque.

Legend says that there are 600 pillars in the mosque and every single one is unique. I’ve read that the actual number is closer to 414 pillars, but the claim about every pillar being unique appears true. There are pillars from each of the different periods of Tunisia’s long history. In one corner of the mosque, I observed two pillars beside each other that one would never find in the holy cities of Saudi Arabia. On one pillar, perhaps from an earlier mosque or the pre-Aghlabid structure of the Grand Mosque, there are Qur’anic inscriptions carved into the stone. Just a step away there is another pillar, perhaps from an earlier Byzantine structure, featuring a large cross. It may surprise some to see such a clear and unhidden symbol of Christianity on the actual pillars of the holiest mosque in the country, but this is Tunisia.

Elsewhere, at the base of the enormous square minaret that overlooks the marble courtyard of the mosque, there are bricks featuring Latin inscriptions. I was quite interested to see that the stones had not been stashed in a dark corner, or chiseled away over the centuries. Here is a photograph I took of the bricks below:

Latin inscriptions

It is worth noting too, that as I toured the courtyard of the holy mosque, prayers were underway in the enclosed masalah, and my female colleague was not required to cover her hair. Later on, when we visited the el-Ghriba synagogue in the Jewish quarter of Djerba, she was required to wear a head scarf and I was asked to don a yarmulke. Such is Tunisia. I myself visited dozens of mosques in Egypt, including al-Azhar and Sayyidna Husayn, and I found Tunisian sensibilities around holy places far more relaxed and tolerant of others.

Like the Grand Mosque of Uqba, contemporary Tunisian identity is multi-layered and rich in history and lineage. Tunisians simply cannot be characterized in simple terms or labels, such as “Arab” and “Muslim.” The Tunisian identity (if I may speak of “the” identity) is a rich amalgamation of Mediterranean, Arab-Berber, African, Muslim-Christian-Jewish, Maghrebi, and Francophone cultural trends. One should not over-emphasize any sense of mutual kinship with “fellow Arab” or “fellow Muslim” states. Indeed, even the founder of the Islamist party Ennahda, Rached Ghannouchi, has written often of the uniqueness of Tunisia’s cultural heritage by utilizing the concept of al-khususiyah at-tunisiyah (“Tunisian specificity”). The Grand Mosque, down to its bricks and mortar, is a wonderful and telling symbol of this complexity. At the same time, as with Tunisian identity itself in the wake of the January 14th revolution, the mosque has become a contested symbol.

Among the resurgent religious parties in post-revolution Tunisia, the Islamist-Salafist group Ansar al-Shariah is among the most hard-line and vocal. The group recently established a media wing called al-Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF). As you may have guessed, the word “Qayrawan” is a variant transliteration of Kairouan. For Ansar al-Shariah, the Grand Mosque of Uqba is a symbol of a strictly Arab-Muslim identity and its aspirations for a Tunisian government that will impose their vision of “shariah” on society. The image at top left is a poster from the QMF promoting a lecture by an extremist shaykh, Abu al-Mundhir al-Shaqiti. Note the Grand Mosque. Below it, an image of myself at the Grand Mosque in September.

The fact that the hardline Islamists have laid claim to the Grand Mosque of Uqba in Kairouan is obviously not surprising. As already noted, it is among the most venerable Muslim cities in the region, if not the world. However, if the hardline Islamists seek to impose a narrow understanding of Tunisian identity, they will have to overlook the very foundations of the Grand Mosque itself.  The unique history and culture of Tunisia seems to me fertile territory for a vibrant pluralistic society, one in which the Islamists have their due place at the table, but fail to dictate a vision of the future to the exclusion of others. While conditions remain bleak and troubling in Egypt, as recent violence involving the Coptic minority has shown, Tunisia seems set on a different course and there is optimism for the future.

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

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On Sunday, September 25, a lone suicide bomber detonated a bomb at a Protestant Church in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, as services were letting out. Along with the bomber, one congregant was killed and several wounded from the shrapnel composed of nails, bolts and buckshot. In the ensuing week there has been a struggle over how the event should be framed, with most Islamist groups denying responsibility.

The bomber has been identified as Pino Damayanto aka Yosepa Hayat Ahmad aka Abu Daud Raharjo, and was wanted by police in connection to the network that bombed a mosque in a police station in Cirebon, West Java, last April. Police have since announced that they are in pursuit of others suspected of being a part of the attack, who might have fled to East Java, as well as a number of bombs that are suspected to have been built. On Friday, Indonesia’s anti-terrorism squad Densus 88 captured Beni Ahmad Asri, wanted in conjunction with the Cirebon network, in West Sumatra.

Police announced that the bomber was a member of jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Basyir’s Jama’ah Ansarut Tauhid (JAT). This was quickly met with a denial by a JAT spokesman. It has been confirmed, however, that he studied at the Islamic boarding school run by Abu Bakar Basyir at Ngruki.

One immediate concern was whether this bombing was a reaction to the sectarian violence in Ambon three weeks ago. As my earlier post notes, extremist Islamist groups have stoked the flames of violence in Ambon, calling for jihad and continuing to portray Christians in the region as separatist members of the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas, or RMS). The RMS was defeated in the early 1950s, was supported then by both Christians and Muslims alike, has little support in the Moluccas, and has never been a significant threat to the state of Indonesia since its defeat.

The day of the Solo church bombing, there were three bombs found in Ambon, in front of churches.  A fourth was found a day later. Despite the location of the bombs, extremist sites such as Prisoner of Joy place the blame on Christians. Indonesian police have reported similarities in the construction of the bombs found in Ambon to those found and used in Cirebon and Solo. One extremist site, Ghur4ba,  proudly proclaimed its support for the church bombing, and linked it to the violence in Ambon, the general crusade of Christians against Muslims, the apostacy of the Indonesian government, and referred to the bomber as a martyr. The declaration has appeared on several other sites, and is attributed to Forum Islam al-Busyro.

On Saturday, the head of Indonesia’s anti-terrorism agency proclaimed that after investigation, the violence in Ambon was not tied to the bombing.

As the toll rose to two dead including the bomber and 22 injured, Detik.com and others reported that the suicide bomber had apparently left a bag containing a Qur’an, gloves and other items at a nearby internet cafe, where he used a computer just prior to carrying out the bombing. The day after the bombing, news site Surya published this story stating that the bomber had looked at the extremist site ar Rahmah before the bombing.

Eastern Indonesia’s flagship paper Pos Kupang gave a list of the stories that the bomber had viewed. The stories the bomber viewed were mostly about American and allied casualties in Afghanistan, with one about Osama bin Laden. The stories referenced powerful Islamist master narratives, notably the crusader master narrative and the martyr master narrative (the latter in reference to Osama bin Laden).

In the days following the Solo bombing, police and investigative journalists began to release details about the bombing, and extremists began issuing their predictable condemnations of the event – while continuing to valorize suicide bombings elsewhere and jihad in general. Mainstream Muslim groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah immediately condemned the bombings, and an NU spokesman asked that the government take down extremist sites.

Responding to calls for shutting down extremist websites, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Information Titaful Sembiring stated that websites are likely not what push people to radicalism, but rather it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islam, which bans attacks on places of worship. While I agree with the latter part of the statement, there is mounting evidence that self-radicalization can occur via the internet.

Extremist sites such as ar Rahmah and Voice of al-Islam cited the minister’s speech in defense of their right to publish, and argued that they are the only ones exposing the true war against Islam in Indonesia, citing (once again!) the conflict in Ambon. Ar Rahmah plays the persecuted card, as though it is a victim of Islamophobia (and as though it doesn’t publish stories inciting violence in the name of twisted interpretation of Islam). Ar Rahmah published a story asking why the death of Christians warranted so much attention, when the deaths of Muslims in Ambon — according to them — did not.

As extremist groups began distancing themselves from the bombing, ar Rahmah published a story asking people not to link the bombing with jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Bashir. Conspiratorial thinking emerged as well — according to another story on ar Rahmah, intelligence analyst A. C. Manullang stated that the bombing may have been a pretext to crack down on radical groups in  Solo. In a story on Voice of al-Islam (which was subsequently removed), head of the paramilitary group Islamic Defenders Front Habib Rizieq claimed that the bombing was part of a “divide and conquer” tactic by the government.

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Last year, my colleagues Steven Corman, Jeffrey Halverson and I wrote a series of blog posts exploring Islamist reactions to anti-Islam and anti-Muslim events in the US, including the debate over the Park51 Islamic Center and an American pastor’s proposal to burn a Qur’an on 9/11, among others. One of the points we made in our final post was that these events fuel the extremist narrative that the US and its allies are at war with Islam, rather than counter the extremists’ messages. We also argued that the State Department could play a more proactive role in refuting the acts and rhetoric that damages the American message abroad, especially since the acts and rhetoric were mainly coming from private citizens, and not the government. What to do, however, when it is the government itself that is making the gaffes?

Last week a story about an FBI trainer gained a lot of traction in both the American mainstream media as well as various online outlets including blogs and news sites. William Gawthrop, who is an instructor at the American Military University and has held several positions in national security and intelligence, also trains law enforcement officials in counterterrorism. On June 8 he was discovered to have been continuing to conduct law enforcement training lectures that repeat messages about Islam and Muslims, even though the FBI claimed that the presentation was a one time affair that ended in April after fierce criticism of its content. Gawthrop’s analysis, which essentially states that the problem isn’t radical Muslims but Islam itself, was spread to a room full of law enforcement officials who likely trusted that their source of information was not only better informed that they were, but well informed. Gawthrop violated this trust, however, and delivered a lecture that demonized Islam.

Counterterrorism experts have widely criticized Gawthrop, yet he continues to misinform law enforcement. From a Wired article (with a video clip of the presentation), here is Aki Peritz, a former analyst with the National Counterterrorism Center:

This is mind-numbingly stupid and dangerous. If we were to follow his idea to a logical extension, that means we have individuals in every single government agency, at top levels, from CIA to the Defense Department to members of Congress, that are part of this cabal to destroy Western civilization. If you truly believe that, then this is McCarthyism on steroids.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s plays right into the terrorists’ narrative. First, some of what Gawthrop said.

Gawthrop’s assertion that Islam was 17 percent religion and 83 percent ideology might have seemed charitable when compared to Dutch Islamophobe Geert Wilder’s assertion that the proportion are more like 5 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Both comments cry out for an explanation, however; how in the world did Gawthrop come up with that number? He doesn’t say. Most offensive, however, is his general demonization of Islam, comparing Muslims to iron filings and stating that Islam is like a magnet determining their movement, and whose “force is exerted against you” — a room full of New York City police officers. Most dangerous is his claim that instead of focusing our counterterrorism efforts on groups such as al Qaeda, we should instead focus them on the “ideology” of Islam. Gawthrop cites Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which has been widely criticized for its lack of depth and understanding and broad generalizations of the “civilizations” that Huntington purports are destined to fight each other.

This kind of disinformation about Islam is unfortunate because it spreads incorrect and dangerous ideas to American law enforcement, and increases tension between them and the American Muslim community. This tension causes distrust, and makes law enforcement more difficult. Yet it is not simply a domestic problem.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s ideas are consistent with Islamist extremists’ narrative. It plays directly into the hands of Islamist extremists the world over, and bolsters their message that America’s desire to end Islamist terrorism is really a war on the religion of Islam itself. This message could be effective at drawing recruits to terrorism. But is the message really spreading? Is the Muslim world paying attention?

The answer is a definite yes. In Southeast Asia, Islamist extremists have picked up the story about Gawthrop and spread it, including on social media cites such as Facebook. Posted Wednesday, September 21, the ar Rahmah story on Gawthrop’s lecture had nearly 3000 hits by Thursday afternoon, and the link was recommended by 811 people on Facebook. On their Facebook posting of the same story, it was “liked” by 101 people, and 30 comments. Comments range from the hope that non-believers will find one day find Islam to agreeing that this is proof that the United States is at war with Islam. Some of these comments include violent rhetoric. Does this mean everyone who posted comments will take up arms against the United States? Of course not. But will they spread the message that Americans are admitting that they are at war with Islam? Almost certainly, and this can lead to radicalization. In the Arab-speaking world, the story spread as well; Islamist Ansar al Jihad, for example, has posted it. The story has also been reported in mainstream news outlets in the Muslim world.

This is similar to a flap that occured last week, when an FBI manual was found to contain similar anti-Islam sentiments. In one graph, the manual argued that the more devout a Muslim was, the more likely the Muslim was to be violent. This story was also reported in the Muslim world, for example here on al Jazeera (this is the English language version), an here on Islamist site Islamic Awakening.

The United States Government has repeatedly acknowledged that it needs to work on its message to the Muslim world. This latest flap shows that it also needs to work on its message to Americans, because the wider Muslim world continues to pay attention.

 UPDATE, January 26, 2012

In another example of a messaging gaffe on the part of the American law enforcement, the film “The Third Jihad,” an anti-Muslim film that purports to show the threat to the United States from American Muslims, continued to be shown to law enforcement oficers despite widespread condemnation and statements that it was no longer shown, according to the New York Times and other sources.

The film is another example of anti-Muslim scare tactics that do not reflect reality, but rather complement the Islamist extremists’ messages that the US is at war with Islam. “This is the true agenda of much of Muslim leadership here in America… A strategy to infliltrate and dominate America… This is the war you don’t know about,” warns a narrator. Using this kind of misinformation to train law enforcement is not only mind boggling, but it creates clear difficulties and mistrust between law enforcement and the Muslim community.

The New York city Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly is featured in the film, but a police spokesman initially denied that he participated, stating that his presence in the film was based on old interviews. The film’s website, however, contradicts that claim and states that the Commissioner sat for an exclusive 90-minute interview. Yesterday the New York Times printed a story describing Kelly’s acknowledgement and regret at having participated in the film.

The film shows inflammatory images such as an Islamic flag flying over the White House. Images such as these are easily obtained from Islamist extremist sites, but to portray them as common ideas among American Muslims is grossly misleading. Furthermore, in a statement defending the film, its producer Raphael Shore argues that it is based on information provided by terrorism experts, including Kelly and Rudolph Giuliani. These two may have tactical knowledge regarding how to deal with terrorism, but I question the depth of their knowledge of Islam as a religion, or even Islamist movements in general, based on their statements. And despite what the Islamist extremists and the anti-Islam propagandists want us to believe, the two are very different subjects.

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Violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in the city of Ambon, Maluku Province, Indonesia on Sunday, September 11. Official sources state that an ojek (motorcycle taxi) driver named Darmis Saiman was killed in an accident on September 10. But rumors sent via text message spread the following day when he was buried claimed that the Muslim driver had been tortured to death by Christians.At last count, seven people have been confirmed dead and at least 60 wounded, and the government has sent between 200 and 400 Mobile Brigade (Brimob) forces to the region as back up. Although rational voices are pleading for calm, Indonesian Islamist extremists are using the conflict to stoke more violence, recalling the sectarian conflict that roiled the region between 1999 and 2002 and claimed some 9000 lives.

Islamists were quick to use the master narratives of the Crusades and martyrdom in their reports on the conflict.  That the incident occurred on the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the United States was not just a coincidence for the extremists. The extremist web site Voice of Islam reported that the attack was provoked by the United States as a way to portray Ambon as a hotbed for terrorists.  The site stated that if Islamist groups come to Ambon to help the Muslims fighting there, America will simply portray it as terrorism and thus use it as an excuse to kill Muslims.

Voice of Islam also covered Abu Bakar Basyir’s statement on the violence.  Basyir is the former spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and leader of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid, recently jailed for 15 years. He issued a fatwa for jihad in Ambon, and repeated the claims that the violence is a conspiracy to to bring attention to the region so that the “crusaders” can eliminate Islam there. Ar Rahmah, perhaps the most popular extremist web site in Indonesia, also invoked the crusader master narrative in its early reporting of the conflict, linking the violence to a coordinated attempt by Christians to wipe out Islam.

In another posting, ar Rahmah urged Ambonese Muslims to be at the ready. The site reported that the violent paramilitary group the Islamic Defenders Front is preparing to send jihad forces to Ambon, using the term “laskar jihad.” This is a loaded term, because Laskar Jihad was a group that formed Islamist militias to go to Ambon in 1999 during sectarian violence there. The group was subsequently disbanded under pressure from the government in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali Bombing.In the story, the FPI claimed that separatist members of the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS) are part of the Christian group, and that Jewish conspirators are behind the violence.

Although there are a few remaining supporters of the RMS in Ambon, and a fringe group called the Moluccan Sovereignty Front emerged during the 1999-2002 violence, separatism is not a serious threat. The RMS exists mostly as a government-in-exile in Holland, and has made recent statements that it is willing to accept Indonesian sovereignty in the region. Nonetheless, the “threat” of separatism — imagined or real — is frequently used to incite violence. A post on Suara Islam Online linked the violence to a supposed Christian military training camp in Bogor, West Java named Christ of Ambon.

Others chimed in to incite. The Council of Indonesian Ulama released a statement as well, claiming as factual that the death of Darmis Saiman was caused not by the accident but by stab wounds inflicted by Christians. They called for a reduction in influence of Christians in Ambon, as well as a call to arm Muslims to prepare for jihad.

Blogger Ghur4Ba invoked the Crusader narrative, and appealed to readers to pray for the warriors of jihad. Voice of Islam, in a subsequent post entitled “The Lessons from Ambon: Preparing Strength for Jihad is Important,” condemned the Crusaders and urged Musims to prepare to fight:

In conclusion, Muslims must begin to prepare for jihad, to begin physical training, preparing the means of war, and make efforts for the perfection of jihad fi sabilillah. That’s because the jihad, according to the basic beliefs Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama, will remain until the end of time.

Despite the rhetoric of the extremists, cooler heads are noting marked differences in the violence between 1999 and Sunday, such as the unwillingness of larger groups to join in, and the fact that the violence did not spread to other regions. In an article in the Jakarta Globe, Najib Azca, an expert on violence in Ambon and a researcher at Gadjah Mada University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, noted that some of the factors that stoked conflict a decade ago remained, such as poverty and religious segregation. Coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence Haris Azhar, however, argued that this wasn’t sectarian conflict, and noted the differences between Ambon then and now. The article noted how the violence remained contained, and that others in the religiously segregated communities worked to protect minorities in their midst.

Although it ran an alarmist headline, this Jakarta Post story noted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s desire to not repeat the mistakes of a decade ago, and included plans to reach out to local leaders. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Marshall (ret) Djoko Suyanto acknowledged the role of provocation-by-SMS, and the importance of providing factual information to counter instigation:

In the future, we need to reinforce the people’s resilience so that they are not so easily incited, including through SMS or twitters instigating anarchy. People should be able to filter information.

This brief interview by Radio Australia with International Crisis Group Southeast Asia Senior Advisor Sidney Jones describes the phenomenon of SMS instigation in Indonesia and elsewhere. Consistent with analysis by well regarded Indonesianist political scientists such as Gerry van Klinken, Jones notes that the political context is much different now. In the earlier conflict, in the context of a democratizing Indonesia, local actors in Ambon were jockeying for new political opportunities, which fueled the violence. Politically, things are much more stable now, and it appears that calm — albeit a nervous calm — was restored quickly and has thus far maintained.

Because of the potential for violence, police have been searching passengers for weapons on passenger ships bound for Ambon in Java’s major ports, and continue their efforts to find those who spread incitement via text messages.

Update, 9-21-11:

Reports of police sweeps of ships heading to Ambon noted that some “sharp weapons” were confiscated, but no firearms. The Jakarta Post reports that the police still don’t have a suspect in the sending of the text messages that stoked the violence. Although it is clear Ambon remains peaceful, there are understandably some underlying tensions that remain, as well as some internally displaced persons who have not returned to their homes. Islamist extremists, however, continue to spread disinformation in an attempt to stoke violence.

Islmaist site Ghur4Ba provided some updats on the situation in Ambon, included alerting its readers to where groups of armed Muslims are gathering in preparation for fighting. No fighting broke out, however.

English language site Prisoner of Joy (among others) questioned the police response to the riot, arguing that Muslims were the victim sof the rio, and so it is unjust that they are being targeted by security forces. Accounts of the violence, however, clearly point to Muslim provocateurs sending the original text messages, and starting the upheavals. Although a official account of the death of Darmis Saiman, the ojek driver, showed that he died of injuries sustained in the traffic accident, and that Christian onlookers attempted to help him after the accident, Islamist sites continue to insist that he was murdered and tortured by a group of Christians. Umar Abduh, an Indonesian convicted on terrorism charges but now free after serving a 10-year sentence, argued that the police in Indonesia support “the Crusaders” and, perhaps most astonishingly, that Christians, including those who opposed the Jakarta Charter (which would have made sharia the land of the law in Indonesia), are anti-Indonesia, separatist, and anti-pluralism. This belies a stunning ignorance of Indonesian history, a history in which Christian Indonesians played significant roles in the anti-colonial struggle and in the founding of the Indonesian state. Ar Rahmah posted a story quoting Umar Abduh that paints the violence as a governmnet conspiracy, and argues that the UN should try those responsible in the Indonesian government for the violence. The Islamic Defenders Front, a thuggish paramilitary group organized under the guise of protecting Islam, has given the Indonesian government an ultimatum of one month before they start sending jihadis to the region.

These responses show that the Islamists are merely eager to stoke more violence in the region. It is particularly ironic to hear Islamists such as Umar Abduh accuse the small minority of Indonesian Christians of being against pluralism and diversity — clearly against their self-interest — as well as hear the cry for the UN to get involved, given Islamists history of antipathy toward the organization.

Update, October 4

The International Crisis Group has released its report on the violence in Ambon, available here. As usual, it is a well researched and documented report, and perhaps most notably it describes the presence of “peace provocateurs,” an interfaith group in Ambon who used social media to dispell and counter rumors that were circulating in order to stoke violence:

Their core group was about ten, each of whom had some ten or fifteen contacts around the city’s major flashpoints. They were on the phone with each other constantly, checking out stories and sending informationover Twitter and Facebook and by text messages. When a member of the network in one part of town heard the rumours about the Silo Church being destroyed, he called a member of the network stationed at the church totake a photograph with his phone and circulate it, to prove it was standing undamaged.

 The report also criticizes the government, police and military responses to the violence, and discusses some of the theories circulating about the causes of the violence.

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