Recently, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been abuzz over the release of a video entitled “The Coming is Very Near,” a 28-minute production created by a group of Twelver Shi‘a devotees of the Hidden Imam al-Mahdi, known as the Harbingers of the Coming (perhaps associated with the Hojjatieh Society). It is believed that President Ahmadinejad’s chief-of-staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei is a member of the group. A report released by the Open Source Center estimates that there are 2 million copies of the video in circulation and there are rumors that a sequel is currently in production.

The video claims to show evidence of the imminent return of the Hidden Imam from his Occultation (ghaybat), which began in the ninth century (CE). In doing so, it casts several prominent Shi‘a leaders in the roles of characters in the Mahdi master narrative. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is known as a zealous devotee of the Hidden Imam, is depicted as the Mahdi’s deputy, Shuayb ibn Saleh, who will come from Khurasan (eastern Iran). The Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is cast as Seyyed-i Khorasani, who is tasked with appointing Shuayb to prepare the way for al-Mahdi. And Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, is cast as Yamani, who will lead the Mahdi’s army and march on the holy cities. Viewers are asked to see the recent events in the Middle East, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, as events foretold for the End Times.

Thankfully, many prominent Shi‘a voices have denounced the video, including the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and scholars from the Hawza in Qom. Criticism of the video has been intriguing. Some critics allege that the video is dangerous propaganda in support of Ahmadinejad, while others allege that the video is propaganda against Ahmadinejad. But regardless of the political intentions of the video (which appears to be strongly pro-Ahmadinejad), the emergence of the video and the controversy it has created is further confirmation of the active narrative landscape in Iranian politics.

Last year, I wrote a white paper discussing the use of the Karbala master narrative as a framework for anti-government sentiment in Iran. The paper, titled “A Counter-Narrative to Iranian Tyranny,” received some attention and a few detractors. For example, a professor from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the Army War College related her opinion of the paper by stating simply: “I don’t know which is a more horrifying sort of propaganda, this, or the effort to label dead terrorists homosexuals.” I certainly never envisioned the white paper as “horrifying propaganda.” Instead, my intention was to show how a powerful master narrative of Iranian Shi‘a culture, previously harnessed by the revolutionary regime itself, can actually be inverted against the regime. The white paper also called on readers to see the active narrative landscape that exists in contemporary Iranian politics, an assertion supported by the controversy over the recent “Coming is Very Near” video.

Messianic narratives, such as the Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism, are a common affair, but seldom are heads of state so intertwined with them as they are in Iran. Comparing or identifying certain similarities between contemporary events and the vague symbolic imagery of ancient “prophecies” is hardly unusual among followers of Abrahamic religions. Christians have a long history of seeing prophetic events underway and the imminent Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Sects such as the Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and a range of Pentecostal and Evangelical movements, have built their entire belief systems around the Second Coming. Televangelist programs, such as the bizarre Jack Van Impe Presents show, seem to see foretelling events in everything. And they always will, despite the fact that they are always wrong.

Messianic narratives remain popular because they provide solace to the suffering, offer explanations amidst perceived chaos, and present promises of triumphant rewards (“pie in the sky”)  in the end. The danger of such narratives lies in the intention or ability of certain devotees to mobilize military or violent action in order to bring the “prophetic” events into being, and this seems to be the case among some in the Iranian leadership. A greater awareness of the narrative frameworks at play in these matters can help to prevent foreign leaders from stepping into them and ideally disrupt or neutralize them. In doing so, the international community can better avoid any recourse to military intervention, a step which will inevitably fall into the narrative framework itself as an “apocalyptic battle” – an element that  figures so prominently in many messianic narratives.

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Recent events in Egypt have led some quarters to suggest we are witnessing a case parallel to the 1979 revolution in Iran. Back then, the fall of the Shah left a political vacuum that allowed religious hardliners to take control and create a new theocratic and stridently anti-western government.

In his New Republic article, Abbas Milani, co-director of Stanford’s Iranian Democracy Project, views the situation in Egypt as precarious. He cites numerous similarities with Iran, including the actions of the United States, the presence of ambitious Islamist political forces, and the importance of the two states in the political economy of the Middle East. Fareed Zakaria voiced similar concerns in a Washington Post essay. Meanwhile, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, too, has claimed that Iran set the example for the Egyptian revolution.

While the similarities between Egypt and Iran should be recognized, there are important differences in the domain of narrative, which has unusual power to shape the course of events. A narrative is a system of stories with shared themes, participants and events. Some narratives rise to the level of master narratives, becoming deeply embedded in a culture and reproduced over time. The “American story” is an example of a master narrative in the United States. Such narratives provide an important framework for events and strategic answers to questions of identity among members of a culture.

The Shia master narratives that set the symbolic stage for the emergence of a hardline theocracy in Iran are missing in Egypt’s Sunni culture. Revolutionary Shi‘ism is based on the Mahdi master narrative, which recounts the ninth-century disappearance and future return of the Twelfth Imam to usher in a new age. Unlike Sunni Muslims, Twelver Shi‘ites believe governments are illegitimate in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. But because they are a necessary evil, a just and pious jurist (a Shi’ite cleric trained in Islamic law) can rule in the absence of the Twelfth Imam until his return as the Mahdi. This principle of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) was enshrined in Iran’s 1979 constitution and formalized by the Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini when he created the office of Supreme Leader.

A Sunni variant of the Mahdi concept does exist, but it is less prominent and very different than the Shi‘ite Twelfth Imam. There is no Sunni doctrine of velayat-e faqih. Accordingly, while Shia revolutionaries are part of a clerical hierarchy, Sunni Islamists like the Muslim Brothers are lay figures. For example, the current Murshid of the Muslim Brotherhood is a professor and specialist in veterinary medicine.

Another Shia master narrative also reveals important differences between Iran and Egypt. The Battle of Karbala tells how the third Holy Imam, Husayn ibn Ali, and a party of his supporters and family, were unjustly attacked and martyred in 680 by the forces of the illegitimate tyrant Yazid, the reigning Caliph in Damascus. The narrative establishes a fundamental conflict in the world and conveys the idea that it is better to die than to live under the tyranny and injustice of worldly infidel powers.

The Karbala master narrative is so pervasive and ingrained in Iranian culture that many scholars see it as the basis for modern Iranian nationalism. The prominence of this master narrative for Iran is reflected in its confrontational, suspicious, and defiant attitude toward outside governments and power structures. In contemporary analogies, the United States and Israel assume the role of Yazid. This attitude even extends toward neighboring Sunni countries, whose belief system is (for the Shia) inherently corrupt. After all, Yazid was a Sunni (or proto-Sunni).

For Sunni Muslims, Karbala is little more than a tragic event in Islamic history when the pious grandson of the Prophet and his family were killed. Egyptian Sunnis, in particular, are aware of the tragedy of Husayn at Karbala, but the narrative is not a significant part of Egypt’s theological or political lexicon. There, negative attitudes toward the United States and Israel are rooted in ongoing political grievances (such as Israel-Palestine) and not in notions of a cosmic battle between Good and Evil, where malevolent governments have their way until the apocalyptic reappearance of the Mahdi.

So while there are some political similarities between Egypt and Iran, their master narratives reveal many differences in the likely role of political Islam in the two states. Revolutions are by nature unpredictable and anything could happen, but the narrative rationality that paved the way for theocratic rule in Iran is simply missing in Egypt. This, combined with generational differences noted by Olivier Roy, makes the creation of a hostile Islamic state in Egypt seem unlikely.  Even if such a government did come to pass, the narratives suggest that it would probably bear little resemblance to revolutionary Iran.

For more on master narratives, visit the Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism website by the CSC.

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The CSC has released a new white paper by Jeffry Halverson entitled A Counter-Narrative for Iranian Tyranny.  The executive summary is below, and you can find the full paper here.

The ruling regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran is increasingly known for a militant foreign policy posture, abuse of the human rights of its citizens, and a suspected nuclear weapons program that threatens to destabilize the Middle East region. It is in the interests of all parties involved, save for the Iranian regime itself, to bring about the radical reform of Iran’s political system, especially in light of its increasing militarization. Any military effort to bring about such change would however be fraught with risks and extremely dangerous. Accordingly, soft power achieved through strategic communication is a much more attractive alternative.

An effective counter-narrative to further delegitimize Iran’s regime among its remaining supporters in Iran and abroad–especially among Shi’ite Muslim communities–may be a highly effective tool of “soft power” for promoting such change. The revolutionary Twelver Shi’ism articulated by Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989) forms the basis of the regime in Iran. It contains a set of legitimizing narratives. In particular, the powerful Karbala master narrative provides a useful reservoir for antigovernment sentiment, opposition to tyranny, and religious mobilization that can be redirected at the leaders of the regime.

The Karbala narrative conveys an archetypal struggle between good and evil.  The hero, Imam Husayn, sacrificed his life in battle against the army of the evil tyrant, the Caliph Yazid. Through his sacrifice, Husayn teaches his followers that it is better to die for freedom than to live under tyranny. In Shi’ite tradition, nearly all of the Twelve Imams were martyred at the hands of tyrannical rulers, most by poisoning. The Shah of Iran was identified with Yazid prior to his overthrow in 1979. The authoritarianism of the current Iranian regime has left it equally susceptible to the Karbala narrative, despite its explicit efforts to co-opt Islam as an instrument of the state.

The late Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Shirazi (d. 2001), revered by some as Imam, was an outspoken critic of the Iranian regime and its conception of the Islamic state. Shirazi, his family, and followers were actively persecuted. When he died in 2001, many of his followers accused the regime of his murder, perhaps by poisoning. These accusations were bolstered by the conduct of the regime after his death, when soldiers stormed the funeral procession and stole his body. The events fit into the narrative structure and archetypes of the Karbala narrative. As such, Shirazi could occupy the pious role of Imam Husayn in the mobilization of a narrative against the Iranian regime of the tyrant Ali Khamenei.

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by ZS Justus

A recent audio recording from al-Qaeda #2 Zawahiri sends a series of “messages” to President-elect Barack Obama. News outlets have quickly grabbed one of the more provocative excerpts from the recording, Zawahiri’s labeling of Obama as a “house negro.” Several blogs have followed suit including hotair, gateway pundit, commentary magazine, the moderate voice, and right voices among others. I suppose the desire to label someone a “racist” is just too much to resist, but I want to urge readers to move beyond the obvious in considering the content of Zawahiri’s message. After all, are there really people out there who thought that Zawahiri was a-okay, but now that he has been exposed as a racist they are reconsidering their views? This idea that Zawahiri is a racist is not exactly news seeing as how his organization is interested in killing as many ethnic Jews as possible.

What seems to be lost on the mainstream media and many bloggers alike is that Ayman al-Zawahiri’s condemnation of Obama is based largely on policy considerations in Afghanistan. For instance, Zawahiri comments, “what you’ve announced about how you’re going to reach an understanding with Iran and pull your troops out of Iraq to send them to Afghanistan is a policy which was destined for failure before it was born.” The significant take-away from Zawahiri’s message is that he appears completely out of touch with most Muslim’s who overwhelmingly favored Obama in the last election (three to one in Palestine among those responding). Granted, some key areas like Pakistan, expressed disinterest in the election, but reporting populations in five different Muslim nations all favored Obama.

This is a strategic communication blunder by Zawahiri. The strongest arguments made by al-Qaeda have always relied on the concrete actions of the United States. Misguided as they were, these arguments were persuasive to many people who had been negatively affected by US foreign policy. Ridiculing the new American President before any concrete action has been taken runs the risk of eroding existing support for al-qaeda among local communities, many of whom seem moderatley hopeful about a new direction in US foreign policy. And opponents of terrorism we should be encouraged by this new message from Zawahiri because in his desire to keep al-Qaeda relevant he has rushed into a strategic communication blunder that could have serious negative implications for the support of organization itself.

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On September 24 Columbia University hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as part of its annual World Leaders Forum series. Past guests for the series have included leaders from both US allies and competitors on virtually every continent. Following an introduction by Columbia’s President Lee C. Bollinger Ahmadinejad’s prepared were remarks followed by a question and answer session with the audience. The event, particularly Bollingers introduction, received considerable critical attention from inside and outside the university.

In a strongly worded editorial, the New York Daily News wrote that Columbia and President Bollinger were “so damnably wrong” to host the Iranian leader. The speech itself evoked considerable controversy. From the audience attending the presentation, catcalls, hissing and laughter were audible in the background and picked up by reports of the event. A recent editorial in The New York Times, Blogging Ahmadinejad in Tehran, noted the criticism of the Iranian President’s remarks even from within his own country.

While the event itself was provocative for student and community groups alike, reaction to the introduction and remarks by Columbia President Bollinger has become a story of its own. Bollinger’s blistering fifteen and a half minute introduction preceded the Iranian leader’s remarks. Focusing on what he called “a few critically important points to emphasize” Bollinger denounced human rights abuses within Iran, Ahmadinejad’s statements denying the holocaust, and his call for the destruction of Israel. When Ahmadinejad spoke next, opening with a recitation from the Qur’an and then chastising Bollinger’s introduction, his remarks were met with cheers and jeers.

Georgetown University Professor of Law and columnist Rosa Brooks argued that Bollinger’s harsh introduction was ineffectual and crude, while the Iranian leader likely gained some domestic and international popularly as he stood up to “crass American bullies.” Given the criticism heaped upon himself and his university for hosting President Ahmadinejad, Bollinger’s introductory remarks warrant closer scrutiny. The withering charges he leveled against Ahmadinejad illustrate what the late literary critic Kenneth Burke described as “scapegoating.”

Principles

“Scapegoating” comes from Burke’s Iron Law of History, where he wrote that “Order leads to Guilt, Guilt Needs Redemption [and] Redemption needs a Redeemer” (Rhetoric of Religion, p. 4-5). The redeemer, as in the biblical story of Abraham and his son Issac, is the vessel which takes on the sins of an individual or group. Purification, or restoration of order, is achieved through sacrifice of the redeemer, or what Burke termed “the kill.” This kill can be symbolic (a “fall guy”) or material (a real, bleating sacrificial lamb).

In his 1974 book, The Philosophy of Literary Form, Burke describes the “projection device” which allows for “purification by dissociation,” whereby the failures or inadequacies of a group can be piled on an individual who is then collectively shunned Order, the Secret, and the Kill.” He argues that humans are socialized toward a devotion to the kill through language and symbol systems, that we are focused on the maintenance or restoration of Order; and that the true motives of sacrifice may be concealed or manipulated (p. 264-266). It is in the context of Burke’s notions of scapegoating and the maintenance of Order that Bollinger’s comments take on significance.

Analysis

Prior to his term as the nineteenth President of Columbia University, Lee C. Bollinger’s career as teacher, researcher, and administrator focused on the first amendment and free speech. Author of The Tolerant Society and Images of a Free Press, Bollinger’s bona fides as a free speech advocate and internationalist are without question. In 2003, he helped oversee the launch of the World Leaders Forum, among many efforts to increase Columbia’s global outreach.

The Columbia President’s credentials allow him to sacrifice Ahmadinejad – his “projection device” – to purge his collective and individual guilt over Columbia’s invitation to the Forum and his own image as a staunch free speech advocate. Noting that he is “only a professor [feeling] all the weight of the modern civilized world yearning to express the revulsion at what you stand for,” Bollinger positions himself as the collective voice for those whose disdain would sacrifice the foreign leader and his ideology. He referred to the Iranian president as likely lacking “the intellectual courage” to address the issues he raised, predicted that Ahmadinejad’s “fanatical mindset” would “embarrass sensible Iranian citizens,” and forecast continued electoral defeats for the President’s party. Bollinger portrayed the Iranian President as a leader pushed out by the world community and his own nation.

Before providing Ahmadinejad the Forum to speak to the assembled audience and the world, Bollinger raked him over the coals. The significant issues he raised in his speech were contradicted by the fact that Bollinger was providing a venue for the leader’s remarks, but that very contradiction allowed him to make his “kill.” Bollinger’s disgust with Ahmadinejad was meant to isolate him and constrain his remarks. Aiming for redemption for himself and those he claimed to represent, Bollinger dissociated Ahmadinejad and made him the vessel of our collective frustrations by naming him the scapegoat: “Mr. President you exhibit all the signs of a petty and cruel dictator.” Through his attacks on President Ahmadinejad and his apologies to those who might be hurt by the leader’s presence and remarks on campus, Bollinger was able to restore Order for himself and his university with many communities – both foreign and domestic – who were unsettled by the guest’s appearance.

Tragically, though, his introduction may have served the Iranian President’s goals better than Bollinger’s own by amplifying the rhetorical skill President Ahmadinejad demonstrated in the Columbia forum. While Bollinger’s points were damning, President Ahmadinejad cleverly averted addressing their substance. He also contained and deflected much of Bollinger’s criticism by linking his personal treatment to that of his nation in world forums. From Ahmadinejad’s point of view, the two speeches were only further evidence of brutal American attack and heroic Muslim defense.

Bollinger underestimated the skill of the scapegoat. As I, and others, have argued elsewhere, we must very carefully listen to Ahmadinejad and then respond with closely engaged, culturally appropriate and timely strategic messages. Bollinger’s openly challenging, oppositional and isolating framework, despite being cloaked in an offer of a podium, meant only that another moment for effective strategic communication was lost.

Further reading:

• Goodall, B., Cady, L., Corman, S., McDonald, K., Woodward, M., Forbes, C. (2006, May 18, 2006). Strategic Ambiguity, Communication, and Public Diplomacy in an Uncertain World: Principles and Practices. Report #0602, Consortium for Strategic Communication.
• Burke, K (1970). The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

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The film 300 has broken box office records and helped pave the way for a new type of cinema that bridges the gaps between video games, animation, and live action. The highly stylized telling of the Battle of Thermopylae has also forged an unlikely link—between popular culture and international relations.

The film tells the story of a brave collection of Spartan warriors who fight against an advancing Persian force. The Spartans number in the 300s while the Persian Empire advances in the millions. The Spartans choose a narrow ravine to make their stand as a way to increase their odds against the overwhelming numbers of better equipped Persian warriors. After several days of fighting, the Spartans are betrayed by one of their own and they all die. However, their story inspires the rest of the Greek world to unite under one flag and defeat the Persians. The retelling of the story is no doubt five parts fiction for every one part fact, but that certainly has not stopped the film from making an international impact beyond the box office.

Government officials from Iran have lodged very public complaints against 300’s depiction of ancient Persia. The Daily Herald compiled the most vibrant attacks by Iranian officials,

The movie is aimed at “humiliating” Iranians, who are descendants of the ancient Persians, said Javad Shamghardi, cultural adviser to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The movie is “part of a comprehensive U.S. psychological warfare aimed at Iranian culture,” Shamghardi said. “Hollywood declares war on Iranians” was the headline in the Ayan Ho newspaper, while state-run television ran several commentaries calling the film insulting.

Reactions have been so severe that Iran has asked China to prevent the film from being screened within Chinese borders. The emphatic attacks on the film from abroad have been matched by endorsement from some United States Marines. The Chicago Tribune reports,

To the U.S. Marines serving at Camp Pendleton, there is much to learn from the Spartans, those heroic warriors of ancient Greece whom one might have called “the few, the proud” centuries before the Marine Corps adopted the motto. In the hit new film “300,” Marines see parallels between the current war in Iraq and the film’s story, which tells of hopelessly outnumbered Spartans fighting heroically to the death against mighty Persian invaders at the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 B.C.

These disparate reactions seem to call for a deeper analysis of how a piece of popular culture has become a topic of controversy for the nation of Iran and a rallying cry for U.S. Marines.

Principles

Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification is a useful framework for understanding how people come to connect with others. Burke wrote that human beings are naturally separated. We exist within different bodies and have different interests. These natural divisions are compounded by additional separations, for instance people are part of different nations and religious groups. The purpose of studying identification is to try and understand how human beings forge connections with each other despite these differences.

One specific type of identification Burke discussed was what he termed consubstantiality. This term refers to the establishment of identification based on mutual interests. Burke (1968) writes in reference to consubstantiality that “in acting-together, men [sic] have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial” (p. 21). The byproduct of establishing consubstantial identification is frequently the creation of separation from another group of people. This of course refers to a second concept from Burke, his description of humans as the “inventor of the negative” (1968, p. 9). In short, this framework from Burke—that humans overcome natural separation through consubstantial identification, which bonds individuals with similar interests into a group but simultaneously divides them from those who are different—aids in understanding international political reactions to the film 300.

Analysis

Working from Burke’s principles of identification and negation one can now ask the question, how did the Iranian government and members of the U.S. Marines identify within the film? The answer to this question is more complicated than it appears.

Iranian government officials identified with the Persians of 300. This reading of the film is primarily ethnic. Contemporary Iranians are descended from ancient Persians. In fact, up until 1935 or so Iran was still called Persia. Iranian leaders identified a common ethnic heritage with the Persians of 300.

The U.S. Marines took a different road to identify with the Spartans. Ethnically, very few Americans would be able to trace their family lineages to ancient Greece, and even fewer to Sparta. Instead, the Marines identified based on training and ideology. The Los Angeles Times reported on Marine reactions to viewing the film: “Some Marines nodded in recognition at lines in the movie that were familiar from their training — such as when King Leonidas instructs his son that the more troops sweat in training, the less they will bleed in combat.” In a marked departure from the Iranian government, the Marines established consubstantiality through ideology rather than ethnicity. Identifying with the film ideologically means that the nationalities involved become irrelevant.

The irony of the Marine reading of the film is that ideological identification would seem to run the other way. The Spartans represented a vastly outnumbered force, eager to die for their cause, fighting a purely symbolic battle against a collection of nations with overwhelming strength. Ideologically, the Spartans approximate to Al-Qaeda in Iraq much more than the Marines. After all, it is the terrorists who are outnumbered and waiting in line for martyrdom, and the very nature of terrorism is symbolic. Of course this reading also unfavorably positions the coalition forces as the advancing Persian army via Burke’s negation. The coalition has advanced to a foreign land with unprecedented technological advantages and personnel superiority. Yet, despite the fact that these identifications seem obvious and plausible, they are not the ones adopted either by the U.S. Marines or by the Iranian government, both of whom cast Middle-Easterners as Persians and the U.S. as Spartans.

The different examples of identification in relation to 300 could be indicators of any number of issues. First, it is possible that Iran is simply looking for a fight about anything, anytime, anywhere and that popular culture is interesting territory. If this is true then the United States should be increasingly mindful of the cultural productions from Iran and other nations of interest as they circulate internationally in response to Western cultural productions. The second issue deals with the different types of identification. Iran provides an example of identification based on ethnicity, while the Marine reading focuses on ideology. This event may point towards a tendency for the Iranian government to identify ethnically rather than ideologically. If this is true, the United States needs to capitalize on this tendency by foregoing attempts to engage Iran directly, working instead through sympathetic intermediaries that share an ethnic bond with Iran. Third, at the very least, it is certain that Iran and probably other nations of interest are watching Western cultural productions. Perhaps it is time to approach consubstantial identification strategically, by producing cultural artifacts (movies, video games, books) that emphasize the positive contributions of the Middle East and position the nations therein as allies.

Other nations are watching, trying to identify with the themes and characters of cultural production. The question that needs answering is: For the U.S. and the Middle East, will popular culture be a vehicle of alliance building or another zone of conflict?

Further Reading

• Burke, K. (1969). A grammar of motives. New York, NY: Prentice Hall.

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