It did not take long for the images of the US Marines urinating on corpses of Taliban fighters to go viral. A moment of lapsed judgment will circulate as long as anyone is interested in seeing it, certainly long after short attention spans move on to other things and the fallout – including, presumably, disciplinary actions for the soldiers – settles.

Predictably, extremist sites have been all over this. In Indonesia, the story has run on Voice of al Islam, Hidayatullah, ar Rahmah, and others. Voice of al Islam made a clever play on words in their headline; they cited the Council on American-Islamic Relations by using its acronym CAIR, which means “liquid” in Indonesia. The headline “CAIR Kutuk Penodaan Mayat Anggota Taliban oleh Marinir AS” means “CAIR condemns the desecration of Taliban Corpses by US Marines,” but it could be read “Accursed Liquid Desecrates the Taliban corpses by US Marines.” The story itself is a pretty straightforward account of CAIR’s reaction – writing to secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, issuing a condemnation, and hoping for justice.

VOI’s subsequent post ratchets up the rhetoric, however. “Animals! American Marines Piss on Taliban Mujahidin.” The story quotes Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, who stated that “actions such as this make the Taliban want to continue to attack America.” For emphasis, the quote was highlighted and used as a pull quote in the text. The behavior is condemned as abominable, wild, and animalistic.

Ar Rahmah’s coverage invokes the Crusader master narrative, linking the act to centuries of perceived conflict and occupation. The headline quotes Taliban Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed’s statement that there are hundreds of similar unreported cases.

The story is also being repeated in the Arabic-speaking world. The bladialyoum blog embedded the video, and refers to the soldiers as barbarians, condemning the occupation of Muslims lands, and linking the act to other perceived acts of aggression against the Muslim world. In this post on Arabic.rt, comments condemn the act, and link it to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed denounced the act as “barbaric.”

That extremist sites are reporting this story should come as no surprise, nor should it be surprising that mainstream media outlets are covering it as well. In Indonesia, for example, both English language dailies – the Jakarta Post and the Jakarta Globe – ran stories, as did most Indonesian language outlets such as Kompas, which embedded a link to the video on its website. Al Jazeera has been following the story, and updating it as details emerge (such as this report about the identification of US soldiers). These mainstream outlets reach exponentially more readers, and their coverage is nearly identical to the extremists, minus the hyperbole and the explicit anti-Americanism.

Not to say that those interested in combating extremism shouldn’t be paying attention to the extremist sites, but the readers of the mainstream sites are important too. Most of those few who follow the extremist sites have already chosen sides, but many in the mainstream media audience are “middle ground” observers, who may not have a strong opinion about the conflict. Stories such as this may push them toward sympathizing or even supporting extremists.

The story also shows the importance of non-verbal communication in the digital age. The despicable act itself was communication, but seeing and hearing it for oneself has much more of an impact than simply reading about it. Will the images inspire copycats and image manipulators in the same way the infamous images from the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib did? Will they become memes? Cartoon parodies have popped up, in both liberal and (neo)conservative media.

Domestic reaction to the images is mixed. Public officials and military spokespeople are nearly unanimous in their condemnation. So are many among the commentators on mainstream new sites. But many other sources  are not, arguing, essentially, that it is “no big deal.” Floundering presidential candidate Rick Perry’ argued, essentially, that it was no big deal, and criticized President Obama’s (and just about every other public figure’s) reaction. Islamist sites duly reported Perry’s words, and continue to follow the story, reporting on new details such as the identification of the soldiers.

It is, however a “big deal.” The internet age has drastically changed strategic communication, which is why it’s unfathomable that these soldiers thought it was a good idea to film this. As Robert Wright in the Atlantic writes in “The Banality of Urination,” that the act itself was committed is not particularly surprising:

You send hordes of young people into combat, people whose job is to kill the enemy and who watch as their friends are killed and maimed by the enemy, and the chances are that signs of disrespect for the enemy will surface–and that every once in a while those signs will assume grotesque form.

It is, rather, the “transparency of war” and the danger that the act will spread hatred and revulsion among those who view it.

The attention surrounding this act gives the extremists symbolic ammunition and may make the “middle ground” readers forget about the Taliban’s horrendous atrocities, such as their bombings of weddings, volleyball games, and other events that kill Muslims, or training children to behead their enemies. It may appear that they have gained the “moral high ground” for a brief period. Swift and public disciplining of those responsible may help reduce the fallout, but as the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, this is another reminder why the US needs to go to great lengths to try to minimize negative perceptions in the Muslim world.

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As Congress is once again behaving badly, I thought I would post a brief note about some interactions I have had while visiting Asia.  Comments here show that what many of us regard as “inside baseball” matters a lot to foreign publics, and it has them worried.

Last week I attended the Singapore Global Dialogue, organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. It was attended by influential people from all over the Asia Pacific region.  Roughly three out of four people I talked to inquired about ongoing political problems in the U.S.  They often asked specifically about the debt reduction circus of this summer, but in many cases conversations expressed deeper concerns.

For example, an international banker asked me if the political system in the U.S. was in danger of collapsing.  He explained how closely people in this part of the world follow our political developments. They look to the U.S. for leadership and depend on us to do the right thing. Accordingly they get very worried–at least as worried as people in the U.S., based on these conversations–when it appears that our system is becoming gridlocked and unable to function.

One academic colleague suggested that ongoing political problems in the U.S. play into skepticism in the streets of countries where our stated goal is promoting democracy: “The average guy hears about this and says: ‘So this is what we get with democracy? Who wants that?’”

All this goes to show that our political problems in the U.S. aren’t just a domestic matter. They have public diplomacy functions too.  At the moment they are sending a very bad message about the U.S. and its viability as a world leader–at just the time, incidentally, when China is seen as ascendent (another big theme at the conference).

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Last year, my colleagues Steven Corman, Jeffrey Halverson and I wrote a series of blog posts exploring Islamist reactions to anti-Islam and anti-Muslim events in the US, including the debate over the Park51 Islamic Center and an American pastor’s proposal to burn a Qur’an on 9/11, among others. One of the points we made in our final post was that these events fuel the extremist narrative that the US and its allies are at war with Islam, rather than counter the extremists’ messages. We also argued that the State Department could play a more proactive role in refuting the acts and rhetoric that damages the American message abroad, especially since the acts and rhetoric were mainly coming from private citizens, and not the government. What to do, however, when it is the government itself that is making the gaffes?

Last week a story about an FBI trainer gained a lot of traction in both the American mainstream media as well as various online outlets including blogs and news sites. William Gawthrop, who is an instructor at the American Military University and has held several positions in national security and intelligence, also trains law enforcement officials in counterterrorism. On June 8 he was discovered to have been continuing to conduct law enforcement training lectures that repeat messages about Islam and Muslims, even though the FBI claimed that the presentation was a one time affair that ended in April after fierce criticism of its content. Gawthrop’s analysis, which essentially states that the problem isn’t radical Muslims but Islam itself, was spread to a room full of law enforcement officials who likely trusted that their source of information was not only better informed that they were, but well informed. Gawthrop violated this trust, however, and delivered a lecture that demonized Islam.

Counterterrorism experts have widely criticized Gawthrop, yet he continues to misinform law enforcement. From a Wired article (with a video clip of the presentation), here is Aki Peritz, a former analyst with the National Counterterrorism Center:

This is mind-numbingly stupid and dangerous. If we were to follow his idea to a logical extension, that means we have individuals in every single government agency, at top levels, from CIA to the Defense Department to members of Congress, that are part of this cabal to destroy Western civilization. If you truly believe that, then this is McCarthyism on steroids.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s plays right into the terrorists’ narrative. First, some of what Gawthrop said.

Gawthrop’s assertion that Islam was 17 percent religion and 83 percent ideology might have seemed charitable when compared to Dutch Islamophobe Geert Wilder’s assertion that the proportion are more like 5 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Both comments cry out for an explanation, however; how in the world did Gawthrop come up with that number? He doesn’t say. Most offensive, however, is his general demonization of Islam, comparing Muslims to iron filings and stating that Islam is like a magnet determining their movement, and whose “force is exerted against you” — a room full of New York City police officers. Most dangerous is his claim that instead of focusing our counterterrorism efforts on groups such as al Qaeda, we should instead focus them on the “ideology” of Islam. Gawthrop cites Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which has been widely criticized for its lack of depth and understanding and broad generalizations of the “civilizations” that Huntington purports are destined to fight each other.

This kind of disinformation about Islam is unfortunate because it spreads incorrect and dangerous ideas to American law enforcement, and increases tension between them and the American Muslim community. This tension causes distrust, and makes law enforcement more difficult. Yet it is not simply a domestic problem.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s ideas are consistent with Islamist extremists’ narrative. It plays directly into the hands of Islamist extremists the world over, and bolsters their message that America’s desire to end Islamist terrorism is really a war on the religion of Islam itself. This message could be effective at drawing recruits to terrorism. But is the message really spreading? Is the Muslim world paying attention?

The answer is a definite yes. In Southeast Asia, Islamist extremists have picked up the story about Gawthrop and spread it, including on social media cites such as Facebook. Posted Wednesday, September 21, the ar Rahmah story on Gawthrop’s lecture had nearly 3000 hits by Thursday afternoon, and the link was recommended by 811 people on Facebook. On their Facebook posting of the same story, it was “liked” by 101 people, and 30 comments. Comments range from the hope that non-believers will find one day find Islam to agreeing that this is proof that the United States is at war with Islam. Some of these comments include violent rhetoric. Does this mean everyone who posted comments will take up arms against the United States? Of course not. But will they spread the message that Americans are admitting that they are at war with Islam? Almost certainly, and this can lead to radicalization. In the Arab-speaking world, the story spread as well; Islamist Ansar al Jihad, for example, has posted it. The story has also been reported in mainstream news outlets in the Muslim world.

This is similar to a flap that occured last week, when an FBI manual was found to contain similar anti-Islam sentiments. In one graph, the manual argued that the more devout a Muslim was, the more likely the Muslim was to be violent. This story was also reported in the Muslim world, for example here on al Jazeera (this is the English language version), an here on Islamist site Islamic Awakening.

The United States Government has repeatedly acknowledged that it needs to work on its message to the Muslim world. This latest flap shows that it also needs to work on its message to Americans, because the wider Muslim world continues to pay attention.

 UPDATE, January 26, 2012

In another example of a messaging gaffe on the part of the American law enforcement, the film “The Third Jihad,” an anti-Muslim film that purports to show the threat to the United States from American Muslims, continued to be shown to law enforcement oficers despite widespread condemnation and statements that it was no longer shown, according to the New York Times and other sources.

The film is another example of anti-Muslim scare tactics that do not reflect reality, but rather complement the Islamist extremists’ messages that the US is at war with Islam. “This is the true agenda of much of Muslim leadership here in America… A strategy to infliltrate and dominate America… This is the war you don’t know about,” warns a narrator. Using this kind of misinformation to train law enforcement is not only mind boggling, but it creates clear difficulties and mistrust between law enforcement and the Muslim community.

The New York city Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly is featured in the film, but a police spokesman initially denied that he participated, stating that his presence in the film was based on old interviews. The film’s website, however, contradicts that claim and states that the Commissioner sat for an exclusive 90-minute interview. Yesterday the New York Times printed a story describing Kelly’s acknowledgement and regret at having participated in the film.

The film shows inflammatory images such as an Islamic flag flying over the White House. Images such as these are easily obtained from Islamist extremist sites, but to portray them as common ideas among American Muslims is grossly misleading. Furthermore, in a statement defending the film, its producer Raphael Shore argues that it is based on information provided by terrorism experts, including Kelly and Rudolph Giuliani. These two may have tactical knowledge regarding how to deal with terrorism, but I question the depth of their knowledge of Islam as a religion, or even Islamist movements in general, based on their statements. And despite what the Islamist extremists and the anti-Islam propagandists want us to believe, the two are very different subjects.

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In business marketing, branding means creating demand for a product by creating an image that is appealing to potential consumers.  This probably brings to mind successful brands like Coca-Cola, Disney, and Nike.  But brands can also become “toxic.” Recent evidence suggests al-Qaeda may now be one such failed brand.

Brands become toxic when they are initially strong and well known, then negative events transform their image in a way that turns off potential customers.  A strategic communication asset is suddenly transformed into a liability.  The stronger the initial brand image, the greater the liability when it goes bad.

In recent years several well-known brands have turned toxic.  Rupert Murdock’s News Corporation is now being called a toxic brand because of fallout from scandals in the UK over voice mail hacking.  The label was applied to BP in the wake of the Gulf oil spill disaster, and to AIG because of its role of the U.S. economic meltdown.

In some cases, a brand becomes so toxic that the only solution is to throw out the old identity and start over.  This was the strategy used by Blackwater Worldwide.  After its brand was hopelessly contaminated by scandals in Iraq, it changed its name to Xe.

Reports suggest that Osama bin Laden considered the same move for al-Qaeda.  According to The Telegraph, documents seized in the raid on bin Laden’s compound “portray bin Laden as a terrorist chief executive, struggling to sell holy war for a company in crisis following in the footsteps of arch-enemies like Blackwater, which became Xe after a run of bad headlines.”

Now there is a possibility that bin Laden wasn’t the only one concerned about AQ brand weakness.  Last week, Saeed al-Jamhi of the Al-Jahmi Centre for Studies and Research claimed that in May, groups associated with al-Qaeda in Yemen began operating under a new name, Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Sharia).  The purpose of the change is to avoid to toxic associations with AQ and provide an image of greater religious legitimacy:

The al-Qaeda name conjures up terror and signifies violence and destruction. The organisation was compelled to hatch groups that operate under local religious-oriented names to persuade others to support them and move from under the spotlight that is cast on them as terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda.

It is unclear whether this is a wholesale change or just the launch of a new subsidiary.  But in either case, these developments–along with the widely-acknowledged irrelevance of al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring–are signs that the brand is fading, if not toxic.

Whether due to Western efforts to undermine AQ’s image or their own contradictions coming home to roost, it would be a welcome development.  Some U.S. leaders claim AQ is on the verge of organizational defeat, but for years they have not been very threatening as a discrete actor.  Brand toxicity may be the thing that finally kills AQ as a social movement.

Update December 16, 2011

This story from Fox News quotes a “senior Arab diplomat” who corroborates this report of a name change for AQAP.

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The CSC has released a new white paper entitled A New Cultural Path for Indonesia’s Islamist PKS? by Mark Woodward, Ali Amin, Inaya Rohmaniyah, and Chris Lundry.  The executive summary is as follows:

With the commencement of Indonesia?s transition to democracy, following 32 years of rule by the military dictator Suharto, political space has opened for dozens of political parties to form and regularly contest elections. The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Prosperity and Justice Party, PKS) is an Islamist party that emerged following the first post-1999 democratic elections, with roots that extend to the pre-Suharto era. Although Indonesia has a history of Islamist political parties that goes back to the founding of the nation, since democratization they have never garnered much support, despite Indonesia?s nearly 90 percent Muslim population.

Political parties are interested in mobilizing the highest number of supporters in order to create legislation that reflects the parties? ideological underpinnings. Often these same ideological underpinnings are tempered in order to broaden the support base of a given party. We show that PKS has faced a dilemma. Sticking with a rigid interpretation of its Islamist foundation alienates some voters who may be sympathetic to a less rigid platform, therefore broadening the party?s base and increasing its electoral success may include tempering its ideological strictness. On the other hand, as a strict Islamist political party, its core supporters are those who agree with its rigid ideological stance. Tempering this stance may alienate the hard core of supporters.

We show that there is increasing tension in the PKS leadership between the two camps over the issue of base broadening. The “justice” faction favors stricter Islamist ideology, and the “prosperity” faction favors tempering the Islamist message in order to draw more electoral support. This tension became manifest during the PKS national convention in February 2011. The convention was held in Yogyakarta, an autonomous region in Central Java that is considered the home of traditional Javanese culture (including mysticism – anathema to the PKS position on religious practice, and a sultan who is traditionally viewed as a caliph). The notion of “culture” in the context of the PKS meeting, therefore, was a fulcrum for party leadership, with the “justice” cadres on one side, and the “prosperity” cadres on the other.

It may be that the apparent embrace of culture is simply a result of the party?s gradualist approach to change. This makes it possible for party cadre to advocate and practice “deculturalized” Islam while their leaders state publically that PKS is “open to culture” and not opposed to traditional practices.

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It was bound to happen: London’s Daily Mail reported yesterday that the face of Osama bin Laden appeared on a Londoner’s piece of toast. I have been fascinated with how the image of Osama bin Laden became a pop cultural phenomenon after 9-11 in some parts of the Muslim world (including Indonesia, where I do much of my work). The image was usually intended to shock rather than express true solidarity with the terrorist leader, and I liken it to college kids with Che Guevara posters or t-shirts, or even early punk rockers adopting nazi symbolism.

The punk rockers were not Nazi sympathizers, and the college kids aren’t communists. The imagery of Che Guevara has become cliché, however, and turned into an internet meme: witness Colonel Sanders or Homer Simpson as Che. It’s lost its ability to shock. Nazi symbolism, however, continues to shock – just think back to some recent events, such as Jesse James’ ex-girlfriend/stripper Michelle McGee wearing Nazi gear in photos, or Prince Harry appearing at a party in a Nazi uniform.

Which will be the eventual fate of Osama bin Laden imagery? In the west, with bin Laden dead, it’s clear that his image has lost much of its ability to shock, and is now, rather, simply viewed with derision. The Daily Mail story misses no opportunity for a pun: “From terror to toast!” “One sandwich short of a picnic!” “Worst thing since sliced bread!” Puns such as these were unthinkable in the weeks following 9-11.

As one would imagine, the story found its way onto Islamist websites (I found it first through looking at arrahmah.com, an Indonesian extremist site). The puns from the Mail story are lost in translation – likely right over the head of whoever translated the story. But the end of the Mail story, where the death of bin Laden is discussed, has been replaced with the following in the arrahmah.com posting:

Whether or not this matter is true, whether or not there is an element of purpose in the appearance of the “face” of Sheik Osama, as a Muslim there is only one thing we can acknowledge as truth, that is that during his lifetime Sheik Osama was known as a warrior in the fight against the enemies of Islam to enforce the profession of faith in Allah on earth.

One group’s joke becomes another’s call to arms and faith.

After showing my colleagues the story, we noted that in the image the beard does not quite join at the chin, giving the appearance of mutton chops, and bringing comparisons to a salty sea captain or a 1970s British pub dweller. In the west, I think it’s safe to say the image of bin Laden following his death is no longer shocking. People claim that images of Jesus Christ have appeared on a piece of toast, and later on all sorts of other things (an iron, a potato chip, a pancake). These images have become internet memes, copied and rearranged for a variety of figures. Where will the next image of bin Laden appear? And will it too spawn spoofs?

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On Friday, October 22, Wikileaks released almost 400,000 documents on the Iraq War.  At first Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell seemed to downplay the release, claiming the documents were “essentially snapshots of events” and do not “tell the whole story.” But chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen condemned the release, tweeting: “Another irresponsible posting of stolen classified documents by Wikileaks puts lives at risk and gives adversaries valuable information.”  Appearing on the Diane Rheem Show, Morrell also took a more serious tone toward the release in line with Mullen:

Well, what I’m speaking of is our fear is that our enemies can look at these documents and see patterns of behavior, can connect the dots in terms of how we respond in — when we’re engaged with small arms fire, when — what are our — what is our standard operating procedure in the aftermath of an IED attack, how we cultivate sources on working with Iraqis or Afghans, the capabilities of our equipment, response times, things of this nature. These and — listen, we are dealing with — and have been for years — a knowing, thinking, adaptive enemy. of this nature. These and — listen, we are dealing with — and have been for years — a knowing, thinking, adaptive enemy. They are — they know that this is a treasure trove of information that they can mine and make them smarter and better fighters.

Others emphasize different outcomes or downplay the danger these releases pose to troops. Human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, have called for a full investigation of the claims of abuse and torture found in the documents.  Daniel Ellsberg has been particularly outspoken in support of the release.  Appearing on the Larry King show, he responded to the issue of endangering troops by changing the subject:

KING: How do you respond to the White House assertion that this leak puts U.S. forces in danger?

ELLSBERG: You know, the people who put U.S. forces in harm’s way—100,000 men and women in Afghanistan—are the last two administrations, but particularly this one, with a decision to escalate the war. I think it takes a lot of –I don’t know what to say—chutzpah, effrontery, for people who made the reckless, foolish, and I would say irresponsible decisions to escalate a war that I’m sure they know internally is as hopeless as these new revelations reveal it to be.

So a crucial question seems to be: Are extremist groups really mining these leaked documents for information that could put our troops in danger, or is this threat being overemphasized, drawing attention away from issues of official misconduct?

To our knowledge nobody has taken a public look at this question, so we decided to address it by looking at web sites and message boards frequented by extremists, to see how the Wikileaks release is being discussed.  We discovered three “camps” that viewed the release in radically different ways.

Camp 1: That’s nice but…

Members of the first camp exist in virtually all of the forums we surveyed.  They believe the WikiLeaks documents are beneficial.  The documents provide evidence that support their claims against Nouri al-Maliki. These include claims that Maliki has had a role in Shi’a attacks on Sunnis, Americans turn a blind eye to his abuses, Iranian militias are fighting in Iraq, and the civilian death toll in Iraq is far higher than the U.S. will admit.  In their eyes, the documents do not contain new information, but provide only further confirmation of their existing views.

This group considers the documents “half truths.” The contents are “not surprising,” and they “do not want to touch” the documents because they “do not point to the main killers nor their aides and lackeys inside and outside Iraq.” They emphasize that these reports can help expose the “true nature” of Maliki and the American occupation, but relate only a fraction of the atrocities that have occurred.  For some, including the spokesman of Jaish al-Fatiheen, that is enough to have “no desire to touch the documents” any further.

Camp 2: It’s a trap

Those in the second camp advocate staying away from the documents entirely. They are suspicious of them and argue that the documents are part of a conspiracy. In their view, there must be a reason for the leak or some sinister motive behind it. These voices are loudest on the Shumookh al-Islam Forum, which the Quilliam Foundation recently rated as “the second most popular al-Qaeda affiliated Jihadist forum.” It is also endorsed by al-Qaeda’s online logistical network al-Fajr.

One interesting conspiracy theory, promoted on the Shumookh Forum, argues that the Wikileaks documents are part of an American-Iranian plot to fool Sunni Arabs into thinking America is an ally, while Iran and America are actually in a secret alliance. The documents are designed to delude al-Qaeda into thinking Maliki is not a strong ally of the U.S. and decrease their interest in attacking Iraqi ministries and forces. Other conspiracy theories also exist, including the idea that there are new mysterious documents in the list that were not originally there.

Camp 3: Translations wanted

Those in the third camp do not share the suspicions of Camp 2. In fact, they are very interested in acquiring information from the leaked documents. To do so, they call for translations of the documents into Arabic and encourage others to analyze them to find information that can benefit the “mujahideen.”

This indicates a couple of things.  First, they recognize that the documents could support the extremist narrative by helping prove that the U.S. has acted criminally and inhumanly.  But second, this camp realizes that a complete translation might backfire against them, so selective work is advised.  If the documents are treated as credible (and they must be credible or why bother translating them?) and they indicate that the “mujahideen” have committed crimes or atrocities, it has the potential to weaken support for the extremists.

The third camp is found on multiple forums, but seem strongest on al-Hanin Forum, where a separate section of the forum titled “WikiLeaks” was created for users to post translations and discuss the documents. There is a significant amount of activity in the “WikiLeaks” section with one user in particular, named “Sword of the Samurai.” This user has contributed over thirty translations since the section appeared on the form around October 26. Another ongoing forum thread contains translations posted by a user named “Abu Yousef al-Bashir,” now at a length of seven pages with over 2,500 views since October 24.

Analysis

What do these sites tell us about the threat of the Wikileaks documents to national security?  The first camp sees the documents as irrelevant. If the leaked documents do not contain anything new, then nothing has changed.  Most of the posts coming from the second camp, regarding conspiracies, are found on one site, Shumoukh Forum, and those posts ceased after three days of activity.  This suggests that the second camp is probably the smallest and least significant of the three.

It is the third camp, which seeks translation of the documents, which should command our attention. In the hands of this group the Wikileaks documents could, at minimum, provide a strategic communication ammunition for the extremists.  The documents could support their “justification for hostilities” against Maliki and the U.S. and affirm what the extremists have said about U.S. motivations and activities all along.

This brings us to another concern: The documents could serve as a recruiting tool. Non-participants, who may have been skeptical or uninterested in extremist claims against the U.S., could become roused or active in response to new information, largely due to the source. That said, it is important not to overemphasize the scale of the threat here.  There is no shortage of grievances, being deployed by extremists against the United States, whether based in reality or on bizarre conspiracy theories. Further confirmation or expansion of those grievances, especially based on documentation of the past, does not present a unique or novel threat.

Overall, in the immediate sense and judging by the sites analyzed, the Wikileaks documents do not appear to pose a threat to national security in the way conceptualized by Mullen and Morrell. We found only minimal effort to mine the documents to learn more about American battle tactics and strategy on these web sites.  However, the documents may well pose a more significant threat from a strategic communication point of view, providing evidence of bad behavior by the U.S. and its allies.  The release of any such internal material that supports a negative narrative about U.S. involvement in the Middle East is most certainly counter to U.S. interests.

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A couple of weeks ago as I skimmed the news, I saw the freshly-released images of the Park51 Community Center (colloquially known as the “Ground Zero Mosque”). In the same sitting, I also performed my semi-regular check of a former professor’s co-authored blog, No Caption Needed. Perusing the two in such short succession inspired reflection on the nature of the image in strategic communication – and more specifically, the nature of the image in the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terror, as well as that conflict’s implications in contemporary American public culture. Strategically, images make claims concrete. Curiously, in the case of the Park51 project, even the mere promise of images was worthy enough to create front-page news.

Park51 Street View Concept

According to the Park51 Blog, on September 28, 2010, three “renderings” of the proposed community center were released. As of October 3, 2010, no architectural brainstorms had been added to this slim posting. The computerized images look light, airy, and labyrinthine. The colorless interior and exterior of the building form what appears to be the frame of an empty mosaic. Though interesting, the renderings are far from blueprints and there are very few of them. Why, then, did they command enough attention to be featured as one of CNN’s top stories on October 3, five full days after the images were posted? And is it mere coincidence that after the images were released, we began to hear stories break about the community center’s supporters being under threat?

There are several plausible explanations for the images’ catalyzing force. First, the “renderings” of Park51 move the center’s existence from the realm of the hypothetical to the realm of the eminently plausible. Although images can inspire dialogue, they do not require it – an image exists because someone thought to bring it into being, not necessarily because a group engineered its appearance. This has implications for the efficacy of strategic communication more broadly. Images can often signal quick forays into the public dialogue, and like all other forms of communication, they can take on a life all their own. In other words, by presenting a public with an image, that public is encouraged to discuss what they are seeing – and yet the creative processes behind the image’s genesis need not be the result of discussion itself.

Second, when used and regarded strategically, images evoke things they do not visibly picture. These preliminary sketches of the community center are not simply musings about a building. They represent an implied victory in a very prominent public conflict. With these images, plans for Park51 publicly move forward – in contrast with plans to rebuild the World Trade Center, which have repeatedly stalled. Apart from and intertwined with the controversy itself, the images evoke a residue of terror and anguish. Therefore, despite the largely unimpressive nature of the architectural plans themselves, Park51’s blog posting was quickly catapulted to national and international news levels.

Strategically, the use and analysis of imagery has tremendous potential to alter the ways we think about contested spaces. Fundamentally, many of the ideological conflicts we try to mitigate are spatial as well. In the case of the “Ground Zero Mosque,” for example, the issue of location plays an incredibly prominent role.  This conflict is not about the existence of an Islamic community center per se, but rather the center’s proximity to the World Trade Center site. Visual depictions of what the community center might look like are actually inserted into the Manhattan landscape. In terms of public debate, it hardly matters that the landscape is fictitious.

Acts of terror are also territorialized, and can be thought of as contests over space. Competing ideas of what should be done with different locations permeate much contemporary conflict, so we can think of space and imagery as (potentially) persuasive. Spaces can be engineered, manipulated, and captured graphically. That instance of manipulation can, with the split-second click of a mouse, be globally transmitted.

With reference to Park51 and the project’s ability to communicate strategically, the entry of images into the public conversation has certainly sped up the rate of dialogue. Though groups in conflict can quite notably use imagery to draw attention to their specific causes, images can also have messy and unintended consequences. Such images can call up intimations of the very phenomena they are trying to usurp, in this case, terrorism.

To clarify, I do not believe the community center bears any resemblance to an act of terror, but rather that even peaceful architectural sketches can implicate such far-removed phenomena as the former “Global War on Terror.” Images direct our minds rapidly and in many directions. They should be both used and analyzed with care.  In the case discussed here, it is necessary to question not only the images, but why they became so popular.  The questioning should take place in specifically public contexts, not just individually in the privacy of our own spaces.

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This series has examined the reaction, mostly in mainstream news sources of foreign Muslim societies, to the recent surge in anti-Islam events in the United States. Part I focused on the Park51 (or Cordoba House) project, the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque.” In part II we looked at the controversy surrounding the “International Burn a Qur’an Day,” previously scheduled for tomorrow. Part III examined various other  incidents involving Muslims (actual or imagined) and mosques. In this final installment, we analyze common themes from the incidents discussed in the first three parts, and suggest implications for how these kinds of events could be better handled by the media and government.

Before turning to our analysis, here are updates on some of the events we’ve covered.

Park51 Update

The Siasat Daily, a newspaper in Hyderbad, India, carried a story reporting the condemnation of anti-Muslim sentiment from the Hindu American Foundation (HAF). The story also discusses the other incidents mentioned in this blog series. A representative of the HAF is quoted as saying: “‘If Americans adamantly reject any particular community, what makes them different than Saudi Arabians who don’t allow any other place of worship or the import of any other religious item other than what their Wahhabi leaders allow?”

Qur’an Burning Update

Earlier in the week more high ranking government officials added their voices condemning the event. President Obama said it could “increase the recruitment of individuals who’d be willing to blow themselves up in American cities or European cities,” and that it is contrary to American values. Secretary of State Clinton called the planned event “disgraceful” and said it doesn’t represent who we are. Sarah Palin and David Axelrod have also made statements condemning the plan. State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley said Clinton had instructed diplomats to reassure foreign leaders that the event does not represent American values.

The proposed Qur’an burning got increasing coverage in Indonesia, in both mainstream and extremist media. An element of the coverage focused on reactions in other predominantly Muslim countries, such as this story in the English-language Jakarta Post. It focused on Bahrain and Pakistan, and included a conspiratorial anti-Zionist rant.  This story from Islamist Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia covered a demonstration in Kabul where an effigy of Terry Jones and the American flag were burned. Much of the coverage also noted the Vatican’s recent condemnation of the event.

Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono wrote a letter to President Obama asking him to prevent the burning, and several stories question why the U.S. is not stopping Jones: “United States, don’t pretend to be a stupid nation by not banning or taking strong action against Terry (Jones). What will be done by Terry (an insult to Islam) out in the open, he has to be sentenced to death under Islamic law,” said Secretary General Muhammad Al Khaththath of the Muslim Community Forum.

Christian groups, wary of retaliatory violence given Indonesia’s past and recent sectarian violence, continued to release public condemnations of the event. Indonesia’s Minister of Religious Affairs, Suryadharma Ali, issued a statement for Indonesians not to be provoked, but notes that “Whereas only a small group of Muslims committed acts of terror, how could it be that they have given rise to hatred towards millions of Muslims throughout the world?”

Perhaps as a result of this pressure, Terry Jones announced yesterday that he would cancel the event based on assurances that the Park51 project would be moved, and said he would travel to New York to meet with Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, leader of the project. This is a bizarre development because to our knowledge Jones never previously linked the Qur’an burning event to the Park51 project, and because Imam Rauf said he didn’t know what Jones was talking about.

Now there is a new report that Jones believes he was lied to by Imam Muhammad Musri of Florida who brokered the erstwhile deal, and that the burning event is only “suspended,” not canceled.

Meanwhile, a report surfaced that another minister, Rev. Bob Old of Springfield, Tennessee, planed to burn a Qur’an at his home on Saturday and post a video of the performance on the Internet. Other Tennessee religious leaders immediately condemned his plans: ”The guy is a nut,” said Rev. Larry Herbert of Faith Covenant Church in Springfield.

Assorted Incidents Update

The Ahlul Bayt News Agency out of Iran carried a story on the vandalism of a mosque under construction in Phoenix, Arizona. The article is a standard news report taken from the local CBS affiliate.

Building a Narrative

Beyond opposition in the Muslim world to the events we’ve reviewed, there is reason to be concerned about the larger narrative they create. A narrative is a system of stories that relate to one another and provide a coherent view of the world. Since narratives are collections of stories, the bigger the collection, the more weight the narrative will have.

We find clear evidence that the anti-Islam events that we have described are being linked by foreign sources to form such a system, especially the Qur’an burning and the Park51 project. This Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia story, for example, references the Qur’an burning, the Park51 project, and Qur’an defiling actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This story on Sybab links the Qur’an burning with recent vandalism in mosques in New York and California in the context of “Islamophobia.” Another Hizbut Tahrir story condemns a “wave of Islamophobia” in the U.S., “peaking” with the 9th anniversary of 9/11 and cites the Park51 project, the Qur’an burning, and the stabbing of taxi driver Ahmed Sharif as evidence. Despite the condemnation of some religious groups, it continues:

Anti-Islamic sentiment in the U.S. continues to grow in recent weeks… the alliance of Zionists, Christian fundamentalists, neo-conservatives and American racist groups continue to revoke the political and social rights of millions of Muslims in the land that “protects” religious freedom.

With yesterday’s developments, we see that some of the players in the U.S. events are now providing linkages too. Terry Jones has implied that his Qur’an burning event was linked to the Park51 project by announcing that his cancellation was due to a decision to move the project. Rev. Old, who has announced a personal Qur’an burning, is located only 60 miles from the site of the construction site vandalism in Murfeesboro, Tennessee.

Linkage to a Master Narrative

A master narrative is an enduring system of stories that is deeply embedded in a culture. In a forthcoming book we describe master narratives that support the causes of Islamist extremists. One of these is the Crusader, which depicts Muslims as under attack by hostile foreign forces bent on subjugating them and destroying their religion. This is not only about the actual Crusades, but later events which many Muslims view as analogous.

There is evidence that recent events are being tied to this larger master narrative. Numerous stories emphasized the idea that Christian political forces in the U.S. were inciting anti-Muslim sentiment for larger ends, perhaps reminiscent of Pope Urban II’s incitement in the 11th century. Many of them used the word “crusade” explicitly.  There is further evidence in reader comments that the analogy to the Crusades was being made.

In Indonesia, several stories have explicitly referred to the Crusades in their coverage of the events that we have chronicled in this series. The English-language extremist blog Prisoner of Joy notes that terrorism is the “counter reaction from (sic) the global colonization carried out by America and Co,” and argues that the Qur’an burning is a sign that the West is at war with Islam and has already been defeated intellectually.

Narratives–either master narratives or the less grand kind–start with a desire rooted in conflict, and create a trajectory of events that promise satisfaction of the desire. The danger is that for Muslims, these recent events will signal a trend of hostility toward Islam in the United States. Extremists will work to relate such perceptions to the larger Crusader historical pattern. If Muslims view this as the conflict they will desire safety, and a logical narrative trajectory will be to defend themselves against the attackers. This is, of course, exactly what the extremists want. We concur with Marc Lynch, who said in a recent post:

By fueling the narrative of a clash of civilizations and an inevitable war between Islam and the West, this unfortunate trend is empowering extremists on all sides and weakening moderates.

Other Notable Patterns

There are some other regularities in the coverage we reviewed. One is attempts to connect the events with Zionist interests. An Iranian government spokesman sought to link the Qur’an burning event to Zionist interests. In the Park51 case, there was an attempt to create a double bind by saying Jewish supporters of the project were part of a conspiracy to inflame U.S. passions against Muslims. In this case the U.S. is in a no-win situation: If the project goes forward it serves Zionist interest, and if it does not, it is evidence of discrimination against Muslims. The Zionism linkage, incidentally, invokes another master narrative, al-Nakba (the catastrophe), which is about the loss of Palestine to the Israelis.

We also found a pattern of selective attention in the reports. There was an effort to identify opponents of the project as Jewish while overlooking the fact that Michael Bloomberg, an outspoken supporter, is also Jewish. Foreign sources failed to mention available evidence that Jewish groups were supporting Muslim interests–for example that the Simon Wiesenthal Center condemned the Qur’an burning event. Foreign media neither depicted the opposition of Veterans’ and mainstream Christian groups to this event, nor emphasized that the Dove World Outreach Center is a fringe group consisting of only about 50 followers.

Another clear pattern is that most of the foreign Muslim media sources reported on these events by relaying U.S. mainstream media stories. These were often re-published verbatim, but were sometimes enhanced to sensationalize the incidents. For example, two sources included pictures of a bloodied Ahmed Sharif in their reports on the attack against the taxi driver.

Implications

Official U.S. policy in both the Bush and Obama administrations has been that the United States is not in a conflict with Islam or all Muslims. Yet the events we reviewed form a coherent narrative suggesting the opposite. This is undermining U.S. policy toward the Muslim world, widening its say-do gap, and diminishing its already low credibility with mainstream Muslims.

It is tempting to conclude that some of the players in these incidents want to undermine U.S. policy in this area, and stoke conflict with Muslims. For those of us in the majority who are interested in supporting U.S. policy, there are some implications about how events like this could be better handled in the future.

First, the mainstream media in the U.S. plays a key role in diffusion of these stories abroad. As we noted, most of the foreign reports were straightforward relays of stories in U.S. news outlets. Accordingly, the way U.S. outlets report these stories from the beginning is very important.

Critics (for example, Jackson) believe that the media have an interest in sensationalizing stories, amplifying the controversy they contain and/or emphasizing actions designed to gain attention. This is indeed what seemed to happen in much of the reporting we saw. For example, until recently stories about the Qur’an burning event did not emphasize the obscure nature and small congregation of the Dove World Outreach Center. Nor did they position it within the spectrum of Christianity in the U.S., or feature the negative reaction of other secular and Christian groups to their plans. Early reports on the Park51 project focused on opposition to, rather than support for, the project.

We suspect that most members of the domestic media view their audience as primarily made up of domestic readers and viewers. But in controversies involving Islam or Muslims (if not in other cases) this is a mistake. The domestic media outlets are the primary conduit through which impressions of the U.S. are created abroad. Reporters and editors should bear this in mind. When reporting stories that they know (or should know) will inflame foreign audiences they should take care to put them in context, and seek out commentary from less extreme and/or opposing viewpoints.

A second and related implication has to do with timing. A clear pattern we see is that these controversies arise, are reported, and diffuse in foreign sources, while it takes time for opposing points of view to develop and be reported. Yet it is well known that attitudes are resistant to change once they are established. Accordingly the opposing points of view may have relatively little impact once they are reported (if indeed they are), given the context created by the original reporting. This was the case with the story of the militia group that planned to provide armed protection for the Qur’an burning event (which was reported) but later decided this would be un-Christian (not reported). Those interested in supporting U.S. policy should therefore be more proactive in getting in front of these issues when they emerge, ideally within the same news cycle.

Much the same can be said for U.S. public diplomacy efforts, our third implication. We applaud Secretary Clinton’s recent instructions to diplomatic personnel to fan out and denounce the Qur’an burning event. But had Jones not canceled, it may have been too little, too late. It would have been much better to start this effort when the event was announced earlier this year and was beginning to diffuse in foreign media.

We saw a pattern of willingness to cover U.S. diversity of opinion on these controversies in many cases. The State Department should take advantage of this by playing a more proactive role in detecting the early up-trend of these controversies, encouraging early pro-policy statements by U.S. groups, and drawing the attention of foreign media to these statements.

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So far in this series we have looked at two high-profile anti-Muslim incidents in the U.S.  Part I focused on the Park51 project, the so-called Ground Zero Mosque.  In part II we looked at the controversy surrounding the “International Burn a Qur’an Day,” scheduled for Saturday.  In addition to these high-profile cases, a number of similar but lesser known anti-Muslim events have occurred in the U.S. Some, but not all, have received attention from foreign Muslim media outlets.

The Attempted Murder of Ahmed H. Sharif

On Tuesday, August 24, 2010, a film student, Michael Enright, slashed Ahmed H. Sharif’s throat, face, and arms with a knife, after asking about Sharif’s religion during a taxi ride. Enright faces up to 25 years in prison if convicted of attempted murder.

The majority of reports in the Arabic press and blogs appear to be standard Reuters or AP accounts of the incident. One Arabic article accessed through a general news portal (“Good News 4 Me”), akin to Yahoo!, begins by saying that racism and the ugly bigotry of Western civilization showed itself when Michael Enright (a full body picture of Mr. Enright is displayed) stabbed his Muslim driver who was fasting during Ramadan. After that provocative opening statement, the story is a standard account. That said, the story does include a picture (see below) of the Muslim taxi driver’s bloody face from the moments immediately after the attack.

Ahmed H. Sharif following the attack

A similar example, this time from a Jordanian website, cites standard information from CNN, but it too has a huge image of the Muslim driver’s bloody face. Perhaps the most interesting part of the story is the anonymous readers comments section. There we find some readers invoking God to help the Muslims against the enemies of Islam, crush the infidels, and remarks about American terrorism and racism.

An Egyptian story, again pretty standard, contained remarks in the readers’ comments section which suggested that the Sharif attack was an act of terrorism and a continuation of the Crusades, a remark about the injustice of blaming peaceful Muslims for terrorism, and suggestions that the USA has used terrorism against poor countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. That said, other posts by readers rebuked these views and stressed looking at the context of the attack, and not contributing to further hatred or backward thinking.

Meanwhile in Bangladesh, the native country of Mr. Sharif, an editorial in the August 30th edition of the newspaper New Age commented that: “The ‘clashes of civilization’ theory, sponsored and propagated by the western establishments, may have taught Enright that Muslims in general are enemy and may have led him to attack the politically innocent Muslim cabbie.” Overall, the editorial frames the incident as a by-product of the longstanding “anti-Muslim political rhetoric” in the U.S. political establishment, particularly among Republicans, heightened since the Park51 dispute.  The author notes that “some Republican leaders have not hesitated to draw analogy between Nazis and Muslims.” The editorial concludes on a positive note, however, by stating that: “Thankfully, there are saner minds in US society like the more than 40 religious and civic groups who announced a coalition in support of the [Park51] project on the ground of religious freedom and tolerance.”

There were also standard reports of the story in the Moroccan site hespress.com on Afghan Arzu TV News, and al-Quds, and similar reporting from Indonesia’s mainstream Surya and Tribun Timur as well as Hizbut Tahrir, whose story features a graphic image of a bloodied knife.

Tennessee Mosque Arson

In the early morning hours of August 28th, 2010, someone poured flammable liquid on four pieces of construction equipment and set fire to one at the site of a planned new Islamic center and mosque just outside of Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The site was previously the scene of anti-Muslim protests, and hundreds of opponents had packed a Rutherford County Commission meeting in mid-June to protest the construction of the mosque.

The Arab-American news site, al-Watan, carried a story that mentioned the Tennessee arson incident only in passing. It’s included in an article on the heated debate over the Park51 project entitled “American Muslims ask for more Protection due to Growing Hostility.” The same article is posted on the website, almoslim.net, which is based in Saudi Arabia. Another standard article is posted on DoniaNews.net, a news website based in Amman, Jordan. Coverage of the Tennessee mosque incident in the Arabic media appears to be minimal and limited to standard reporting. The same can be said for the reporting coming from Indonesia.

In Karachi, Pakistan, however, a television news program, Aaj News, devoted significant time to the story and discussed it in the context of the other incidents reviewed in this blog series. Aaj News correspondent Maooz Asad Siddiqi reported that “hatred against the construction of mosques has grown throughout the United States,” and “mainstream right wing leaders, including former presidential candidate Sara Palin and [Newt Gingrich], former speaker of a democratic country like the United States, [have] started issuing statements against Muslims.” While painting a bleak picture of the situation in the U.S., even suggesting it is worse than after 9/11, the Aaj News report does detail the efforts of government (e.g. FBI) and religious organizations to speak out against the rise in anti-Muslim sentiment.

Man Urinates in Prayer Room of NYC Mosque

On the evening of August 25th, 2010, an intoxicated man entered a New York City mosque, shouted insults at Muslims inside, and urinated on prayer rugs in the masala (prayer space).

This incident has received little coverage that we could find in the foreign Muslim media. In an article entitled “‘The Burning of the Qur’an: the Vicious Plan of the Crusaders,” the Indonesian site Syabab writes that this (along with the vandalism of a mosque in Fresno the same night) is proof that the “physical and mental violence and terror towards Muslims is though to be increasing as teh anniversary of September 11 approaches.” The article also warns of the spread of the “disease” of Islamophobia in the U.S.

Man in Turban Attacked in Seattle

On the morning of August 21, 2010, a 35-year-old Seattle man attacked a convenience store clerk, punching him in the head and yelling: “You’re not even American, you’re Al-Qaeda. Go back to your country.’” The clerk was a Sikh and wore a turban.

This story seems to have gone largely unnoticed in the Arabic media, but has been picked up in India and Sikh community media outlets, such as this website.

Teens fire Shotgun, Shout Epithets outside Upstate NY Mosque

On Monday, August 30, 2010, a group of teenagers in western New York harassed members of a mosque by yelling obscenities and insults during evening prayers for Ramadan, sideswiping a worshiper with a vehicle, and firing a shotgun outside. Five teenagers were arrested.

This incident has received no coverage that we could find in the Muslim foreign media.

Phoenix Mosque Vandalized

Yesterday the Islamic Community Center of Phoenix, under construction, was vandalized.  According to the article in the Arizona Republic:

Paint was spilled on the floor and several tall, arched glass windows were broken by what appeared to be gunshots, Shami said. There was also anti-Muslim graffiti.

This incident is too recent to have received foreign press coverage, but comments posted on the local story indicates concern about the incident.  One reader said:

Muslims as a whole would love to see American [sic] destroyed and turned into a Muslim state they might get a clue. We work on a time frame of years while Muslims work on decades and centuries. They know they cannot destroy the USA in years or decades but they can and will in centuries.

Conclusion

Many of the smaller incidents we studied did not receive any coverage in foreign Muslim sources. Of these, the Sharif stabbing got the most. This incident got the most coverage in the media among the “assorted” stories, but not as much as the Park51 or Qur’an burning stories. This suggests that these incidents are only taken up when they generate a large amount of controversy and press attention in the United States, perhaps particularly when they get a lot of play in the political blogosphere.

As with the cases discussed in Parts I and II of this series, the incidents (when they are covered) are taken as growing evidence of anti-Muslim discrimination, and used as an opportunity to once again invoke the Crusader narrative. In the case of the Sharif stabbing, a gruesome photo was used to sensationalize what was otherwise a routine report.

Tomorrow, in the final part IV of the series, we examine common threads across these cases and draw implications for the handling of these events and those like them in the future.

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