The release last week of documents captured from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad has generated a flurry of interest in the press and blogosphere.  Yet a question has arisen as to whether the release was wise, since the documents are intelligence assets that could give the enemy valuable information regarding what we know about them.  We argue that the release makes sense from a strategic communication perspective, given what al-Qaeda has become.­

The controversy was raised by James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation in an op ed in Friday’s New York Post. Asking “why would the government publish these documents in the first place,” Carafano concluded that it was an act of election-year “preening” by the White House, and said:

The first rule of intelligence is this: Don’t tell the enemy anything if you don’t have to. It would be like FDR releasing the messages captured by ULTRA, the US-British signals-intelligence program that broke the Nazis’ most secret codes.

The analogy to ULTRA is excessive (al-Qaeda leadership already knew we captured their documents whereas the Nazis did not know we had broken their codes), but Carafano’s basic objection is worth taking seriously.  Our position is that whatever intelligence disadvantages accrued from the release are more than offset by strategic communication advantages.

First, everyone agrees that the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism long ago degraded al-Qaeda’s ability to organize large scale attacks.  As outlined in President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism, American-led efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have destroyed much of al-Qaida’s leadership and “weak­ened the organization substantially.”

For some time now, the concern has been less about al-Qaeda’s operational abilities and more about their force as a social movement. Its brand name has been flexible enough in recent years, much to bin Laden’s discontentment, to accommodate everyone from regional affiliate organizations to organically appearing terrorist cells to anomalous lone wolves.  In many ways, the social movement that al-Qaeda hoped to inspire on 9/11 has transcended the group that created it.

Robert Benford and David Snow have shown that social movements face three key framing tasks. Diagnostic framing means identifying what a movement should consider as the problem it is facing.  Prognostic framing deals with establishing a course of action, and motivational framing establishes reasons members should participate in the recommended actions.

Al-Qaeda has been masterful at diagnostic framing.  The problem, as presented to their audience, is that the West is engaged in a cosmic battle against Islam—a continuation of the Crusades.  Stories of recent wars, al-Nakba (the loss of Palestine to Israel), and treacherous alliances with governments of the Middle East all support this narrative.  Their diagnosis is that a force of champions must step forward to defeat this menace and restore the Ummah to safety and prosperity, and that violent offensive Jihad is the only plausible path to success.  For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri asserted in a 2008 video that “there is no hope of removing the foul regimes in the Muslim countries by anything but force. There is no opportunity for change through peaceful activity.” The motivational frame is to portray al-Qaeda as this champion, an organization that all good Muslims should support, if not join.

Attacking a movement’s framing ideally means undermining its diagnosis, because without it the prognosis and motivation are irrelevant. However, this is impractical in the case of al-Qaeda because public opinion in Muslim continues to support their diagnostic framing.  The alternative, then, is to attack the prognosis and motivation. The same public opinion data show better prospects here, with half to three-quarters of Muslims expressing concern about Islamist extremism.

Release of the Abbotabad documents is good strategic communication precisely because it further undermines the idea that al-Qaeda is a champion of Muslims and that they deserve support. The documents are already challenging, if not entirely rewriting, the bin Laden story. Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership can no longer be viewed as master architects running the show from behind a curtain. Rather, the documents reveal impotent leadership in an al-Qaeda that is internally divided, marginalized and exasperated.

The image is equally bad for their regional affiliates in places like Iraq and Yemen.  Far from the dutiful soldiers they portray themselves to be, the documents show just how far off the reservation they have wandered, pursuing parochial agendas against bin Laden’s wishes and the interests of al-Qaeda’s brand.  They are revealed as loose cannons that can accomplish little except killing the Muslims they are supposed to be saving.

Release of the documents is also justified because turnabout is smart play.  Al-Qaida has long supported the philosophy of rhetorical ninjitsu. Any time they can turn our own words against us, they do.  In the foreword to a book he penned about America’s internal bureaucratic dysfunction al-Qaeda senior leader Abu Jihad al-Masri even used the phrase, “From the words of your own mouth I condemn you” to describe this strategy.

Now the tables are turned.  Thousands of al-Qaeda’s followers in the extremist support forums have already read about these documents, which highlight bin Laden’s strategic irrelevance and managerial impotence. Their reactions are of defensiveness and confusion.  It is hard to dismiss the evidence when it is penned by bin Laden’s own hand.

In short, the Abbotabad documents should have been released because they provide a golden opportunity to injure al-Qaeda the social movement.  The anachronistic argument that they should not have been released ignores the reality that today our adversaries thrive more on perceptions of strength and leadership than real world applications of it.

Update May 11, 2012

Tony Lemieux has posted a blog on this topic.

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Indonesian extremists continue to portray Ambonese Christians as engaged in separatist rebellion against Indonesia, and a crusade against Muslims. This isn’t true, but raises the question: where on earth did they get this idea?

The adage that if a lie gets repeated enough times it becomes true is, apparently, applicable in Indonesia’s Ambon region. It was home to a brief separatist insurgency following the Indonesian revolution (1945-49).  Following their defeat in 1950, the separatists (who were Dutch loyalists and both Christian and Muslim) fled the region for asylum in Holland.  There they have carried the torch for an independent Republic of the Southern Moluccas (RMS) ever since.

A strange thing happened with the case of the RMS over time, however: It came to be perceived as a Christian movement that is anti-Islam in nature. Islamist sources in Indonesia repeated this claim Tuesday as the 25 April anniversary of the declaration of the RMS approaches:

History shows that the formation of the RMS is a kind of rebellion among a number of Christian Moluccans opposed to the Jakarta Charter (that would impose Shariah law as state law) as the foundation for the state… This proves that the Moluccan Christian Community has the spirit of separatism, where the church protects these separatist movements.

Nevermind that Islamist extremists aren’t particularly fond of the Indonesian state and its newfound democracy, and that some of them want the state dissolved into a pan-Southeast Asian caliphate that include Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, and southern Philippines.

Scholars – notably Richard Chauvel – have noted that the RMS movement was supported by both Christians and Muslims, especially those who gained by their associations with the Dutch. This included village-level and higher Muslim authorities. They were supported by the Dutch and felt that they would lose the prestige and financial rewards – and be punished by the Indonesians – for this association with the former colonizer.

Because much of the fighting that occurred was between the Ambonese Dutch colonial soldiers (who were predominantly Christian and trusted by the Dutch) and the predominantly Muslim nascent Indonesian military, the perception that it was a war of Christians versus Muslims emerged and spread. This is despite the fact that Indonesia’s first president had Christian Moluccans among some of his most trusted (and rewarded) advisers.

While it is true that most Christians, including Moluccans (such as Johannes Leimena, co-founder of the Christian political party Parkindo and member of both Sukarno’s and Suharto’s cabinets) opposed the Jakarta Charter and lobbied against it, so did many Muslims. Opposing the Jakarta Charter did not make one a separatist, but rather merely one who disagreed with Sharia as the foundation of the state. But among some of today’s Islamist thinkers in in Indonesia, opposing sharia as state law makes one a separatist.

After the debate over the Jakarta Charter, many of the Muslims who supported it, such as Muslim cleric, scholar and prolific writer Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, essentially conceded their loss and accepted the desire of the majority. The country had more pressing problems to overcome. In the early years of Indonesian independence, Sukarno made repeated overtures to reassure the Moluccan Christians (and Christians elsewhere) that they would be welcome in the Indonesian fold, even while the smoldering remnants of the RMS waged a low-intensity guerrilla war on nearby Ceram Island (the main RMS rebellion was put down within a year or so).

When Suharto came to power, however, things changed. Following a bloody purge of communist and left-leaning Indonesians, Suharto imposed a security state based on fear to create stability. Despite the lack of danger from the extinguished RMS, Suharto treated the Ambon region as a threat, built up a strong military presence there, and continued to cite it (along with West Papua, Aceh, and after its 1975 invasion, East Timor) as a threat to the unity of the Indonesian state. He planned to ease population density on Java and elsewhere and to “water down” Christian communities perceived as supporting separatism. So Suharto ordered forced and voluntary transmigration to Ambon and other regions. This sparked resentment.

In 1998, the East Asian Economic Crisis caused chaos that crippled Indonesia’s economy and led to the abdication of Suharto. Violence between Christians and Muslims broke out in Ambon and nearby regions. Scholarship has shown that political competition and jockeying for power in a newly democratizing Indonesia was a major factor in the violence in Ambon. The violence started between Christian Ambonese and non-Ambonese Muslim immigrants.

But the government – and Islamists – blamed the RMS. Muslim senior military officials were implicated in programs to send arms and armed groups to the region, which swung the advantage clearly to the Muslims fighting the Christians. A nervous peace emerged in the region following the conflict’s cessation.

It was shattered last September and December as Muslims once again battled Christians (see COMOPS blog post here). Again, Islamists blamed the RMS.

In my experience interviewing Christian Ambonese in Java and the Ambon region, they, and the vast majority of Christian Ambonese, remain frustrated but loyal Indonesians. No matter what they do or how vehemently they refute the accusation that they are separatists, they continue to be framed as such by Islamists and by some in the Indonesian government.

This legacy, dating back to the Suharto era, is based on lies and fear. It goes to show, however, that state-sponsored strategic communication – albeit with dubious goals – can come back to haunt. The nominal enemies of the state – in this case, Indonesia’s Islamist extremist community –  use these arguments to support their calls for violent jihad among a predominantly peaceful and loyal Ambonese Christian community.

Despite the tremendous positive changes Indonesia has made since beginning its transition to democracy, it continues to struggle in some regions that have or are currently experiencing conflict. Ambon is one such region. If the Indonesian government actively worked to dispel the myth that separatism was somehow tied to Christianity in the region and more actively promoted the role of patriotic Christian Ambonese (such as Leimena, who was declared a national hero), it would help to deflate the argument that the Indonesian state’s enemies – the Islamist extremists – are making. It could also deescalate some of the tensions that lead to spasms of violence, and eliminate some of the resentment among Christian Ambonese, many of whom are frustrated with being portrayed as a threat to the state. A more peaceful Ambon is in everyone’s interest – except the Islamist extremists.

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The CSC has an article in the current issue of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism on casualty inflation by the Taliban in the Afghanistan conflict.  The abstract follows, and the full text is available here (subscription).

Cooking the Books: Strategic Inflation of Casualty Reports by Extremists in the Afghanistan Conflict

Chris Lundry, Steven R. Corman, R. Bennett Furlow, & Kirk W. Errickson

Islamist extremists in Afghanistan and elsewhere are exaggerating their successes in inflicting casualties on American and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. This article quantifies the exaggeration for the month of November 2010, putting the claimed casualty rate at approximately one-half battalion per month. It provides an analysis of how and why this is occurring, and links this extremist strategic communication effort to dominant historical master narratives in the region that may produce sympathy among intended recipients of the messages. The authors argue that these measures undertaken by the extremists can be countered successfully through the use of similar story forms, more timely reporting, use of side-by-side comparisons, and use of similar reporting venues. These steps could challenge the credibility of the Taliban reports, reduce sympathy, and diminish potential recruitment.

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Last month, James Appathurai, NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy,  agreed to participate in an electronic Q&A sponsored by the Atlantic Community.  He answered 20 questions in four installments, on global partnerships and the Arab spring, partnerships in Asia, questions on Central Asia/Caucasus, and the NATO mission.  The latter includes an item on the NATO narrative that illustrates the large challenge the alliance faces in filling a narrative vacuum that currently exists.

Yours truly was invited to submit a question to Mr. Appathurai. As it happened, my colleagues and I had recently been discussing the issue of NATO’s narrative. So I asked:

It is widely acknowledged that public and political support for the NATO alliance is flagging in many member countries. I and many of my colleagues believe this is because NATO’s narrative has been slowly disintegrating. With the Cold War some twenty years in the past, its original motivating conflict is fading from memory.

What do you see as a sustainable narrative for NATO in the 21st Century? What basic conflict does it exist to deal with, and what desire does that create? What is the projected resolution of that desire? What actors, actions, and events lead from the desire to the resolution?

He answered:

This is the classic and very important question. I don’t mean classic in an old-fashioned sense. We debate this here all the time. I personally don’t have too many questions about it.

What we don’t have is a good slogan. In the early days of the Cold War, one NATO Secretary General defined NATO’s purpose as “keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” That was the post-Second World War conception. Since the end of the Cold War, those things aren’t really necessary. The Americans are in. We don’t need the Russians out. Actually, we have them as partners. And the Germans are, of course, strong and vibrant members of this Alliance and of Europe and of the world, without there being anything negative, only positive things about that.

So we never found a good new slogan. And I can assure the new Secretary General has encouraged us to look for one. But to my mind, NATO is about what it is and then about what it does. What it is, is a collection of democracies that is uniquely capable militarily. No other organization can do what NATO can do militarily. You saw it in Libya. You see it in Afghanistan. And that’s a priceless thing because there are times when you need that capability as an international community. We can’t get rid of it.

And it’s also a place where we consult politically. All these 28 countries are here every single day and discussing and debating all sorts of issues. And by the way, with a very wide group of partners now as well. So it is a unique political forum and a very important one.

What do we do? We do three things. We do collective defense. That’s the ultimate mission of NATO, to defend the Allies. Second, crisis management. I mentioned Libya, I mentioned Afghanistan. I can mention Kosovo. I can mention counter piracy missions. And third we do collective security. Building trust and confidence and inter-operability in the broadest political sense as well as technical sense with partners around the globe. So all of that I think is a very important role. But I can’t think of the slogan to define it, and I tried for a long time. I came up with a lot of bad ones, but I never came up with a good one.

I would first like to thank Mr. Appathurai for answering my question, and indeed for participating in entire exercise.  High ranking officials are not required to do things like this, and taking the time that was involved here indicates his commitment to strengthening the alliance’s partnerships and frameworks, and doing so openly and participatively. This is commendable.

That said, I do not find his response especially satisfying.  True, it might be useful if NATO had a slogan. But slogans encapsulate narratives; they do not substitute for them.  I suspect Mr. Appathurai’s difficulty finding one stems from the incoherence of the narrative elements as they exist.  Yes, NATO “defends the Allies” and does collective security, but defends and secures against what?

The second paragraph of my question invokes a narrative arc described by Kenneth Burke.  He said that all narrative is based on a conflict (or other deficiency) that creates desire.  The desire implies a satisfaction (actual or potential). Narrative is a trajectory of participants, actions, and events that leads from the desire to the satisfaction.  This is rhetorically powerful because the narrative is grounded in the desire, and suggests a path to the resolution of the desire.  The need for satisfaction creates an incentive for people to buy into the trajectory–i.e. accept and participate in the narrative.

During the Cold War, NATO had a very strong narrative arc.  The conflict was with the Soviets, as Mr. Appathurai notes, and its behavior in the wake of World War II created a strong desire for protection from the “bear in the woods” (to use the 1984 Reagan campaign’s brilliant storyline).  The bear threatened to eat the North Atlantic countries, so a strong military alliance was the resolution of that desire.  NATO–its participating countries, treaty, mutual defense agreements, joint exercises, funding, etc.–was the trajectory leading from the desire to the resolution.  The story form organizing this narrative was deliverance, in which a threatener menaces a community until a champion comes along to defeat the threatener and restore the community to safety (David and Goliath is a deliverance story).

This was a compelling narrative that served NATO well for many decades.  Then the bear wandered away, leaving a gap where there was once a clear conflict creating a strong desire for the trajectory leading to the alliance.  As a result, to some observers, NATO looks today like a solution in search of a problem.  Lawrence Kaplan, for example, wonders if NATO is anything more than the military arm of the UN.

The 9/11 attacks against the United States are the basis for NATO’s participation in the Afghanistan conflict, and terrorism seems to be the leading candidate for a new conflict/threat to organize NATO’s narrative.  A page on NATO’s website explaining Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty even bears the header (graphic) “NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism.”  Terrorism also figures prominently in  NATO’s most recent (2010) strategic concept.

However, there are many ways terrorism does not fit into NATO’s existing story.  It would be a stretch to link NATO’s action in Libya to terrorism (while the Libyan government is suspected of involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103, that happened over 20 years ago).  The intervention in Kosovo was not related to terrorism. Also numerous terrorist incidents in Europe in the 70s and 80s were never met with a NATO response.  There is even disagreement, especially in Europe, about whether terrorism should treated as a matter of war (as opposed to crime).

Stephen Walt notes the incoherence of the current narrative when he says “in recent years NATO has tried to transform itself into some sort  of global expeditionary force.” This incoherence leaves some NATO partners questioning their investment, and disagreeing about what the organization should be, as Klaus Wittman notes in a Danish Institute of International Studies report:

[T]here is no really solid unity on a number of issues: namely whether NATO is a regional or a global organisation, predominantly political or military, how it must balance collective defence and expeditionary orientation, how it must assess certain security challenges and their emphasis in the view of individual allies, the NATO–EU relationship and its political ‘blockage’, the UN mandate issue, the approach to Russia, nuclear weapons policy etc. (p. 37)

Most commentators seem to agree that NATO should be sustained.  But this requires filling the current narrative vacuum.  To do so, NATO must define a clear conflict and corresponding desire that that alliance resolves. Once this is done, it should be scrupulous about maintaining narrative coherence by lending its name only to those actions that are squarely consistent with resolving the desire.

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Earlier this month (December 13-15) we were privileged to participate in a “The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media” sponsored by the Saudi sponsored Muslim World League (MWL, Rabita al-Alam al-Islami) and the Indonesian Ministry of Religion in Jakarta Indonesia.  Tension between the co-sponsors was evident in the selection of participants, the themes of formal presentations and in social interaction over the course of the conference. Differing perspectives on religious inclusivism, freedom of expression, social media and gender were especially apparent.

The conference theme was “The New Media and Information Technology.” Approximately 400 delegates and guests from 39 countries in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia were in attendance.  Jakarta was chosen as the conference venue because it was the site of the first conference that was held in 1980.  Many observers noted that the timing of the two conferences was not coincidental.  Both were held shortly after social and political upheavals that presented serious challenges to Saudi Arabia – the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Arab Spring of 2011.

Indonesian participants noted that the pairing of MWL and Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion was “peculiar” because of their very different orientations and agendas.  MWL is an international organization founded by the Saudi government in 1962 with the purpose of globalizing Saudi Wahhabism and countering other understandings of Islam and secularism. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion has a more inclusive understanding of Islam, and unlike MWL, actively promotes democracy and freedom of expression.

The Guest List

MWL selected conference delegates from the Middle East, Africa and Europe who share the leadership’s Wahhabi orientation. Efforts to secure a similarly sympathetic Indonesian contingent failed. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion delegated responsibility for inviting participants to academics in the Islamic University system, who invited Muslim scholars, journalists and activists with diverse religious views. The result was that while delegations from Middle Eastern, European and African countries supported the MWL agenda, the Indonesian contingent was less sympathetic. While participants included representatives of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, and other Indonesian organizations affiliated with MWL, none were invited to make formal presentations.

Most of the Indonesian participants were university lecturers with religious orientations very different from their Saudi hosts. This led to a marked contrast in the themes of formal presentations and a combination of humorous remarks and sometimes bitter comments about the implicit Saudi agenda.  Some found it ironic that Muslims who Wahhabis think of as kafir (unbelievers) because they engage in “deviant” forms of religious devotion including the veneration of saints, were invited at all. There were many sarcastic comments about the contrast between the pious pontificating of Saudi delegates and the burgeoning “temporary marriage”/sex tourism trade catering primarily to Saudis centered in Bogor, only a short distance from the conference venue. Others were angered by what they saw as Saudi arrogance and their exclusivist, self-referential use of the terms Islam and Muslim. One described Saudis as “colonialists,” echoing a theme discussed previously on this blog.

Formal Presentations

The conference included formal remarks by political figures, academic papers, mostly by Indonesian scholars, triumphalist, self congratulatory presentations by representatives of WML sponsored Islamic television networks in the United Kingdom and South Africa, speeches by WML officials calling for Muslim unity in efforts to counter western moral decadence and the destabilizing effects of the “New Media.” There was a consensus that there are positive and negative sides to New Media, and that the negatives include its use as a tool for the dissemination of radical ideologies and pornography. Indonesian speakers tended to embrace New Media because it promotes democratic change and freedom of expression. WML speakers expressed concern about it for exactly the same reason.

The disconnect between Saudi and Indonesian perspectives was apparent throughout the conference.  An editorial in the December issue of MWL Journal, distributed at the conference, summarized the Saudi position:

If the changing dynamics of media are not understood in its proper perspectives and an effort is not made to discipline the youth, it can create havoc in the society, as is being witnessed in many places.

Indonesian Vice-president Boediono opened the conference with a speech in which he stated:

The emergence of social networking media has created  new social institutions, in the forms of new social networks that bypass social borders and strata, creating virtual horizontal relationships. This New Media also helps to strengthen civil society and allows everyone access to it, greater freedom of expression and freedom of speech, including direct and open criticism of the Government.

Governments that have not been willing to allow greater democratic   participation and failed to respond adequately and in a timely manner to democratic voices have found themselves in difficulties or even been forced out of power by popular movements, the people’s power. Government’s control over media, is no longer effective. Gadgets, small yet very high-tech devices that can provide any information at any time, are easily available everywhere. Information has become a public domain. This is the new reality that we all have to adjust to and live with.

Social networking media can produce enormous benefits for the society. This is the experience in this country. The practice of democracy in Indonesia has been enriched by the development of social networking media.

He also called on Muslim religious authorities to issue “contextual fatwa (legal opinions)” to counter the influence of Internet based extremism. In Indonesian Muslim discourse “contextual” refers to a mode of legal reasoning that uses general principles abstracted from sacred texts to arrive at solutions to contemporary problems. This discursive style is an anathema to Saudi scholars who insist on literal readings. These are very different understandings of Shari’ah. The conflict between these positions was evident throughout the conference.

MWL General Secretary At-Turki

Presentations by General Secretary Abdallah Ben Abdel Mohsen At-Turki and other MWL speakers reiterated the themes of the MWL Journal editorial. They emphasized the dangers that global news and entertainment media pose to “Islam and the Muslims.” They stressed the need for government to government cooperation in efforts to establish “Muslim” alternatives to both existing Old Media and New Media. One speaker proposed creating a “Muslim” alternative to Facebook. Several speakers were critical of (unnamed) individuals who have declared the Internet to be haram (forbidden). They stressed the point that technology is morally neutral and should be used to promote Islamic values. Several presentations focused on the importance of satellite television as a communications medium. They indicated that television is the preferred medium because it can be used to deliver standardized content in multiple languages.

In their formal presentations WML delegates tended to speak of “Islam,” “The Muslim Community” and “The West” in monolithic ways. There were frequent references to “genuine” and Islamic teachings and the need to “correct” deviant tendencies. These statements reflect WML’s concerns with establishing Wahhabi orthodoxy and combatting other forms of Islam, especially Sufism and the Shiah.  “The West” was described as being anti-Islamic and as a source of moral corruption. “Western media” were often mentioned as engaging in conspiracies to corrupt Muslim youth and ultimately to destroy Islam. In general, portrayals of the West were far more negative than those in WML English language publications.

WML delegates we interviewed seemed not to understand the dynamics of New Media. One spoke of establishing an on line international Muslim media clearing house complete with electronic versions of “authentic texts,” and encouraging young people to study Information Technology as strategies to counter “anti-Islamic forces and influences.”  He did not appear to grasp the point that New Media is user driven. One of the editors of MWL Journal stated that he used e-mail and that some of his children had Facebook pages but that he did not really understand it. Another expressed confidence that if they were given proper Muslim educations, young people would watch “Muslim” programs on satellite TV instead of the frivolous entertainment programing offered by conventional media.

Presentations by Indonesian delegates echoed Boediono’s embrace of the democratizing power of New Media.  Parni Hadi, one of the founding editors of the Indonesian Islamic daily Republika, spoke with great passion and idealism about the constructive role of the New Media. In his remarks he mentioned links between technology and democratization, pointing to the role New Media in the Arab Spring movements that led to the overthrown of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He called for the development of a “Prophetic” journalistic ethos and practice  based on freedom of expression with “no oppression by whosoever, government and religious authorities as well as media owners.” He called on journalists to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad in efforts to promote “dignity, devotion, tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect and non-violence.” He was also critical of government attempts to control print, broadcast and on-line media.

In general Indonesian participants were far more open to changes wrought by the New Media than their Saudi counterparts. They tended to emphasize the opportunities rather than the dangers of the emergence of citizen journalism. They were less inclined to paint monochrome portraits of either “The West” or “Islam.” They also had a more expansive visions of “Muslim” media. In his address Professor  Azyumardi Azra, Dean of the Graduate School at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, called for a pluralistic understanding of Islam. He later observed that Muslim media can, and should be more than sermons and that there was nothing “un-Islamic” about media coverage of the Manchester United football team, a perennial favorite in Indonesia.

The Social Dimension – Exclusivism and Gender

International conferences are complex social events in which cultures sometimes collide. Gender was an especially divisive issue at this conference. Men and women mix freely at conferences sponsored by Indonesian Islamic Universities. There are always women on the program. Seating is gender mixed, women and men converse freely and join each other for meals and coffee breaks.

Saudi and other MWL organizers were clearly uneasy about these aspects of Indonesian Muslim intellectual and cultural practice. There were no women in MWL sponsored delegations. Of the approximately 200 Indonesians invited by the Ministry of Religion, at least half were female, but in deference to Saudi concerns, none were asked to make presentations. Gender issues were not addressed in any of the formal presentations. The Indonesian organizers did not compromise on gender integrated seating and meals. Saudi and other WML sponsored delegates did not, however, speak with Indonesian women when they could avoid it, much less join them for coffee or lunch.

Inayah Rohmaniyah Occupying the Podium

Many Indonesians, men as well as women, found the absence of women from the program to be unprofessional and insulting. When Labibah Zain of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University raised the issue in a question and answer session, the Saudi response was that the question could not be answered. After the session ended, but with at least a hundred people still in the room, she and Inayah Rohmaniyah, Senior Lecture in the Department Quranic Exegesis and Hadith Studies at the same Islamic University “occupied” the podium to which they and other female scholars had been denied access.  The Saudi English language Arab News mentioned her “protest” but described her only as a blogger and social activist.  It did not mention the act of symbolic resistance that followed the non response to her question.

Final Thoughts – New Media, Media Events and the World Muslim League

The Muslim World League describes itself as a non-governmental organization. While this is technically correct, it functions as a public diplomacy arm of the Saudi Arabian State. Its publications depict the Saudi State, the king and the Saudi religious scholars as patrons and defenders of Islam and denounce their opponents.  It supports the spread of the Saudi version of Islam by funding schools, mosques and media outlets in many countries. It sponsors international conferences that usually unanimously endorse directives from the Saudi religious establishment. These conferences are as much media events, promoting Saudi claims to leadership of the global Muslim community, as they are forums for intellectual discussion and debate.  The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media was intended to further this agenda and to formulate strategies to control opposing voices in the New Media. The conference approved a resolution establishing a “code of honor” for Muslim journalists and media organizations emphasizing their responsibility:

…… to affirm a belief in the moral principles and values of Islam, to safeguard the Islamic identity from the negative effects of globalization and westernization and to ensure freedom that is responsible and disciplined by Shari’ah guidelines; confront atheism and all other anti-Islam tendencies that spread hatred against Islam and Muslims.

It was, however, clear that the Indonesian Muslim establishment, including the Ministry of Religion and the Islamic University system and many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals do not share the Saudi desire to control either the Old or the New Media or to counter the role of New Media in democratic change. They clearly do not share Saudi perspectives on gender. WML publications often include photos of conferences in which no women appear. There were no such “photo ops” at this conference. One account of the conference, including quotations from Parni Hadi’s address, can already be found by searching 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media on Facebook. There will, no doubt, be others.

_____________________________

* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University.

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A few weeks ago I did a keynote speech at a public meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission in Public Diplomacy.  Later in the meeting I heard a presentation by Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).  The topic of his talk tied together several topics recently discussed on COMOPS Journal, and accordingly I want to share it with readers.

Presumably in response to the myriad calls to better coordinate U.S. government strategic communication, the CSCC was charged in a recent executive order to

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Among other things, the CSCC oversees the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which has been the subject of  previous posts on this blog, both appreciative and critical. Amb. LeBaron’s talk focused on a recent DOT effort that allows me to add another post in the appreciative category, and I don’t believe it is very well known.

The DOT recently produced three videos juxtaposing AQ’s ideology with facts-on-the ground in the Arab Spring protests.  The first features clips from an Ayman al-Zawahiri video where he insists that “apostate regimes” can only be overthrown by violent jihad and that change through peaceful means is hopeless.  The second is based on a rant against democracy by Abu Yahia al-Libi.  The third (and most hilarious) uses clips of captured video from bin Laden’s compound showing him watching videos of himself.  In all three cases the AQ clips are intercut with news footage of the Arab Spring protests.

In my opinion this is a superb effort for a number of reasons:

• They reinforce messages that have long been priorities for U.S. strategic communication in the counterterrorism arena, namely that violent jihad is not necessary for social change, and that the best change is democratic.
• They present these messages while side-stepping problems with U.S. credibility, by mashing-up AQ’s own video with clips from independent news reports.
• They are “prosumer” efforts, done by DOT members with desktop video editing software, rather than slick professional productions.  As such they embrace cutting-edge trends in social media.
• They effectively employ the principle of ridicule as strategic communication, poking the Bad Guys in the eye by making them seem silly and out of touch with reality, and contributing to their developing image as a toxic brand.

We have argued that on the rugged-landscape of counterterrorism communication more out-of-the-box efforts like this are needed.  So hats off to the DOT for taking the leap.

You can watch the DOT videos, with English subtitles, here:

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On Sunday, September 25, a lone suicide bomber detonated a bomb at a Protestant Church in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, as services were letting out. Along with the bomber, one congregant was killed and several wounded from the shrapnel composed of nails, bolts and buckshot. In the ensuing week there has been a struggle over how the event should be framed, with most Islamist groups denying responsibility.

The bomber has been identified as Pino Damayanto aka Yosepa Hayat Ahmad aka Abu Daud Raharjo, and was wanted by police in connection to the network that bombed a mosque in a police station in Cirebon, West Java, last April. Police have since announced that they are in pursuit of others suspected of being a part of the attack, who might have fled to East Java, as well as a number of bombs that are suspected to have been built. On Friday, Indonesia’s anti-terrorism squad Densus 88 captured Beni Ahmad Asri, wanted in conjunction with the Cirebon network, in West Sumatra.

Police announced that the bomber was a member of jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Basyir’s Jama’ah Ansarut Tauhid (JAT). This was quickly met with a denial by a JAT spokesman. It has been confirmed, however, that he studied at the Islamic boarding school run by Abu Bakar Basyir at Ngruki.

One immediate concern was whether this bombing was a reaction to the sectarian violence in Ambon three weeks ago. As my earlier post notes, extremist Islamist groups have stoked the flames of violence in Ambon, calling for jihad and continuing to portray Christians in the region as separatist members of the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas, or RMS). The RMS was defeated in the early 1950s, was supported then by both Christians and Muslims alike, has little support in the Moluccas, and has never been a significant threat to the state of Indonesia since its defeat.

The day of the Solo church bombing, there were three bombs found in Ambon, in front of churches.  A fourth was found a day later. Despite the location of the bombs, extremist sites such as Prisoner of Joy place the blame on Christians. Indonesian police have reported similarities in the construction of the bombs found in Ambon to those found and used in Cirebon and Solo. One extremist site, Ghur4ba,  proudly proclaimed its support for the church bombing, and linked it to the violence in Ambon, the general crusade of Christians against Muslims, the apostacy of the Indonesian government, and referred to the bomber as a martyr. The declaration has appeared on several other sites, and is attributed to Forum Islam al-Busyro.

On Saturday, the head of Indonesia’s anti-terrorism agency proclaimed that after investigation, the violence in Ambon was not tied to the bombing.

As the toll rose to two dead including the bomber and 22 injured, Detik.com and others reported that the suicide bomber had apparently left a bag containing a Qur’an, gloves and other items at a nearby internet cafe, where he used a computer just prior to carrying out the bombing. The day after the bombing, news site Surya published this story stating that the bomber had looked at the extremist site ar Rahmah before the bombing.

Eastern Indonesia’s flagship paper Pos Kupang gave a list of the stories that the bomber had viewed. The stories the bomber viewed were mostly about American and allied casualties in Afghanistan, with one about Osama bin Laden. The stories referenced powerful Islamist master narratives, notably the crusader master narrative and the martyr master narrative (the latter in reference to Osama bin Laden).

In the days following the Solo bombing, police and investigative journalists began to release details about the bombing, and extremists began issuing their predictable condemnations of the event – while continuing to valorize suicide bombings elsewhere and jihad in general. Mainstream Muslim groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah immediately condemned the bombings, and an NU spokesman asked that the government take down extremist sites.

Responding to calls for shutting down extremist websites, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Information Titaful Sembiring stated that websites are likely not what push people to radicalism, but rather it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islam, which bans attacks on places of worship. While I agree with the latter part of the statement, there is mounting evidence that self-radicalization can occur via the internet.

Extremist sites such as ar Rahmah and Voice of al-Islam cited the minister’s speech in defense of their right to publish, and argued that they are the only ones exposing the true war against Islam in Indonesia, citing (once again!) the conflict in Ambon. Ar Rahmah plays the persecuted card, as though it is a victim of Islamophobia (and as though it doesn’t publish stories inciting violence in the name of twisted interpretation of Islam). Ar Rahmah published a story asking why the death of Christians warranted so much attention, when the deaths of Muslims in Ambon — according to them — did not.

As extremist groups began distancing themselves from the bombing, ar Rahmah published a story asking people not to link the bombing with jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Bashir. Conspiratorial thinking emerged as well — according to another story on ar Rahmah, intelligence analyst A. C. Manullang stated that the bombing may have been a pretext to crack down on radical groups in  Solo. In a story on Voice of al-Islam (which was subsequently removed), head of the paramilitary group Islamic Defenders Front Habib Rizieq claimed that the bombing was part of a “divide and conquer” tactic by the government.

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Violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in the city of Ambon, Maluku Province, Indonesia on Sunday, September 11. Official sources state that an ojek (motorcycle taxi) driver named Darmis Saiman was killed in an accident on September 10. But rumors sent via text message spread the following day when he was buried claimed that the Muslim driver had been tortured to death by Christians.At last count, seven people have been confirmed dead and at least 60 wounded, and the government has sent between 200 and 400 Mobile Brigade (Brimob) forces to the region as back up. Although rational voices are pleading for calm, Indonesian Islamist extremists are using the conflict to stoke more violence, recalling the sectarian conflict that roiled the region between 1999 and 2002 and claimed some 9000 lives.

Islamists were quick to use the master narratives of the Crusades and martyrdom in their reports on the conflict.  That the incident occurred on the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the United States was not just a coincidence for the extremists. The extremist web site Voice of Islam reported that the attack was provoked by the United States as a way to portray Ambon as a hotbed for terrorists.  The site stated that if Islamist groups come to Ambon to help the Muslims fighting there, America will simply portray it as terrorism and thus use it as an excuse to kill Muslims.

Voice of Islam also covered Abu Bakar Basyir’s statement on the violence.  Basyir is the former spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and leader of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid, recently jailed for 15 years. He issued a fatwa for jihad in Ambon, and repeated the claims that the violence is a conspiracy to to bring attention to the region so that the “crusaders” can eliminate Islam there. Ar Rahmah, perhaps the most popular extremist web site in Indonesia, also invoked the crusader master narrative in its early reporting of the conflict, linking the violence to a coordinated attempt by Christians to wipe out Islam.

In another posting, ar Rahmah urged Ambonese Muslims to be at the ready. The site reported that the violent paramilitary group the Islamic Defenders Front is preparing to send jihad forces to Ambon, using the term “laskar jihad.” This is a loaded term, because Laskar Jihad was a group that formed Islamist militias to go to Ambon in 1999 during sectarian violence there. The group was subsequently disbanded under pressure from the government in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali Bombing.In the story, the FPI claimed that separatist members of the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS) are part of the Christian group, and that Jewish conspirators are behind the violence.

Although there are a few remaining supporters of the RMS in Ambon, and a fringe group called the Moluccan Sovereignty Front emerged during the 1999-2002 violence, separatism is not a serious threat. The RMS exists mostly as a government-in-exile in Holland, and has made recent statements that it is willing to accept Indonesian sovereignty in the region. Nonetheless, the “threat” of separatism — imagined or real — is frequently used to incite violence. A post on Suara Islam Online linked the violence to a supposed Christian military training camp in Bogor, West Java named Christ of Ambon.

Others chimed in to incite. The Council of Indonesian Ulama released a statement as well, claiming as factual that the death of Darmis Saiman was caused not by the accident but by stab wounds inflicted by Christians. They called for a reduction in influence of Christians in Ambon, as well as a call to arm Muslims to prepare for jihad.

Blogger Ghur4Ba invoked the Crusader narrative, and appealed to readers to pray for the warriors of jihad. Voice of Islam, in a subsequent post entitled “The Lessons from Ambon: Preparing Strength for Jihad is Important,” condemned the Crusaders and urged Musims to prepare to fight:

In conclusion, Muslims must begin to prepare for jihad, to begin physical training, preparing the means of war, and make efforts for the perfection of jihad fi sabilillah. That’s because the jihad, according to the basic beliefs Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama, will remain until the end of time.

Despite the rhetoric of the extremists, cooler heads are noting marked differences in the violence between 1999 and Sunday, such as the unwillingness of larger groups to join in, and the fact that the violence did not spread to other regions. In an article in the Jakarta Globe, Najib Azca, an expert on violence in Ambon and a researcher at Gadjah Mada University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, noted that some of the factors that stoked conflict a decade ago remained, such as poverty and religious segregation. Coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence Haris Azhar, however, argued that this wasn’t sectarian conflict, and noted the differences between Ambon then and now. The article noted how the violence remained contained, and that others in the religiously segregated communities worked to protect minorities in their midst.

Although it ran an alarmist headline, this Jakarta Post story noted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s desire to not repeat the mistakes of a decade ago, and included plans to reach out to local leaders. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Marshall (ret) Djoko Suyanto acknowledged the role of provocation-by-SMS, and the importance of providing factual information to counter instigation:

In the future, we need to reinforce the people’s resilience so that they are not so easily incited, including through SMS or twitters instigating anarchy. People should be able to filter information.

This brief interview by Radio Australia with International Crisis Group Southeast Asia Senior Advisor Sidney Jones describes the phenomenon of SMS instigation in Indonesia and elsewhere. Consistent with analysis by well regarded Indonesianist political scientists such as Gerry van Klinken, Jones notes that the political context is much different now. In the earlier conflict, in the context of a democratizing Indonesia, local actors in Ambon were jockeying for new political opportunities, which fueled the violence. Politically, things are much more stable now, and it appears that calm — albeit a nervous calm — was restored quickly and has thus far maintained.

Because of the potential for violence, police have been searching passengers for weapons on passenger ships bound for Ambon in Java’s major ports, and continue their efforts to find those who spread incitement via text messages.

Update, 9-21-11:

Reports of police sweeps of ships heading to Ambon noted that some “sharp weapons” were confiscated, but no firearms. The Jakarta Post reports that the police still don’t have a suspect in the sending of the text messages that stoked the violence. Although it is clear Ambon remains peaceful, there are understandably some underlying tensions that remain, as well as some internally displaced persons who have not returned to their homes. Islamist extremists, however, continue to spread disinformation in an attempt to stoke violence.

Islmaist site Ghur4Ba provided some updats on the situation in Ambon, included alerting its readers to where groups of armed Muslims are gathering in preparation for fighting. No fighting broke out, however.

English language site Prisoner of Joy (among others) questioned the police response to the riot, arguing that Muslims were the victim sof the rio, and so it is unjust that they are being targeted by security forces. Accounts of the violence, however, clearly point to Muslim provocateurs sending the original text messages, and starting the upheavals. Although a official account of the death of Darmis Saiman, the ojek driver, showed that he died of injuries sustained in the traffic accident, and that Christian onlookers attempted to help him after the accident, Islamist sites continue to insist that he was murdered and tortured by a group of Christians. Umar Abduh, an Indonesian convicted on terrorism charges but now free after serving a 10-year sentence, argued that the police in Indonesia support “the Crusaders” and, perhaps most astonishingly, that Christians, including those who opposed the Jakarta Charter (which would have made sharia the land of the law in Indonesia), are anti-Indonesia, separatist, and anti-pluralism. This belies a stunning ignorance of Indonesian history, a history in which Christian Indonesians played significant roles in the anti-colonial struggle and in the founding of the Indonesian state. Ar Rahmah posted a story quoting Umar Abduh that paints the violence as a governmnet conspiracy, and argues that the UN should try those responsible in the Indonesian government for the violence. The Islamic Defenders Front, a thuggish paramilitary group organized under the guise of protecting Islam, has given the Indonesian government an ultimatum of one month before they start sending jihadis to the region.

These responses show that the Islamists are merely eager to stoke more violence in the region. It is particularly ironic to hear Islamists such as Umar Abduh accuse the small minority of Indonesian Christians of being against pluralism and diversity — clearly against their self-interest — as well as hear the cry for the UN to get involved, given Islamists history of antipathy toward the organization.

Update, October 4

The International Crisis Group has released its report on the violence in Ambon, available here. As usual, it is a well researched and documented report, and perhaps most notably it describes the presence of “peace provocateurs,” an interfaith group in Ambon who used social media to dispell and counter rumors that were circulating in order to stoke violence:

Their core group was about ten, each of whom had some ten or fifteen contacts around the city’s major flashpoints. They were on the phone with each other constantly, checking out stories and sending informationover Twitter and Facebook and by text messages. When a member of the network in one part of town heard the rumours about the Silo Church being destroyed, he called a member of the network stationed at the church totake a photograph with his phone and circulate it, to prove it was standing undamaged.

 The report also criticizes the government, police and military responses to the violence, and discusses some of the theories circulating about the causes of the violence.

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Unlike the protests of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, the campaigns underway against the Assad regime in Syria have a distinctly sectarian character. The Assad regime is dominated by the Alawites, a little-known esoteric Shi‘ite sect. However, the majority of Syria’s population is Sunni Muslim (approx. 75%). And caught in the middle of the conflict are Syria’s Christians (10% of the pop.), Druze, Twelver Shi‘ites, and others, including a small number of Jews. In July of 2011 alone, at least 30 people were killed in violent clashes between pro-regime Alawites and anti-regime Sunnis in the city of Homs.

Conflict between the two religious communities is nothing new. During the reign of Hafez Assad (d. 2000), the Alawite regime perpetrated an infamous massacre of Sunni Muslims in the city of Hama, just north of Homs, that claimed between ten thousand to forty thousand lives. And back during the reign of the Sunni Ottoman Empire in Syria, Alawites were not recognized as Muslims or People of the Book, but rather as heretics with no legal status. The history of conflict and tense relations between the Alawites and Sunnis in Syria is obviously long and complex. Yet, these complexities aside, the sectarian dimension of the Syrian conflict reveals much about the significance and power of narrative.

For those interested in politics, democratization, and international relations, looking at the role of narrative in the Syrian uprising is particularly informative. Indeed, by framing the conflict in Syria in sectarian terms (as I did above), we see the belligerents through their religious affiliations and the differences that exist between them and little else. The Alawites have different doctrines, rituals, practices, institutions, and so on, than do the Sunni Muslims. The variety of differences in the area of religion can be distracting and misleading though.

These differences, and the broader implications they have had, are actually all symptoms of a conflict of narratives, albeit profoundly shaped by the accidents and currents of world history. Without narrative, all of the doctrines, rituals, or institutions would be nothing beyond what is observed by a person that does not know the narratives involved, and they would carry no substantive meaning or significance. For example, without narrative, the act of wudhu or ritual ablutions by a Sunni Muslim becomes simply a hygienic act of washing.

To illustrate the conflicting narratives that exist between the Sunnis and the Alawites, I have radically paraphrased and structurally simplified the core underlying narratives at play in both sects.

Sunni Muslims: The One Deity revealed His Will to His Final Prophet and humanity must follow that revealed knowledge to select wise leaders, create a just and righteous society, and earn salvation after death in Heaven through steadfast effort and intention.

Alawites: The Triune Deity (think “Holy Trinity”), incarnated during the time of the Prophet, revealed esoteric knowledge of the true religion through the Family of the Prophet and select initiates, and, through this secret esoteric knowledge, initiates can attain salvation and their souls will transmigrate into more perfect forms.

[Note: Alawites historically practice taqiyya and avoid exposing their beliefs and practices to outsiders, thus scholars debate the actual tenants of the Alawites]

These serve as starting points for notions of identity, institutions, worldviews, and customs. Due to the particularly insular nature of the Alawite narrative,  and the Sunni rejection of them as fellow Muslims, the Alawites have existed as a minority in Syria (indeed, a more precarious minority than Christians, who are at least “People of the Book” as an Abrahamic pre-Islamic religion) and the Alawites have acted in ways  that support their interests, such as serving the French colonialists or supporting Baathism and crushing Sunni Islamism.

Religion, at its most skeletal level, is narrative. More specifically, I mean to say (tipping my hat to Bruce Lincoln) that “religion,” at its core, is a particular, communally-shared narrative (or narratives) attributed to a transcendent source (e.g. deity, ancestor, totem etc). This makes these particular narratives qualitatively different than those attributed to a mundane human author or folk culture (where anonymity may rule the day). Practices, community and institutions all start and take shape from there. Due to this exceptional attribution (“Allah revealed these stories to our leader on the mountain”), the narrative(s), and the beliefs or rituals or institutions that the narrative(s) supports, carries transcendent authority.

These two qualities distinguish religion, or (for the sake of convenience) a “religious narrative,” from all other narratives. This is one of the principal reasons why older religions, such as Judaism or Christianity, are privileged in our society over younger religions, such as Mormonism (LDS). The narratives of the older religions are protected by the ambiguities and gaps of the past, lost in history (as well as longstanding communities and institutions), and the rhetorical tricks that these obscurities of the past have allowed contemporary adherents and institutions to enjoy. But how does this business of religion and narrative relate to Syria?

When we look at the conflict between the Alawites and the Sunnis in Syria through the lens of narrative , we can see people following different or conflicting narratives. There is no empirical verifiable evidence to support the religious claims of either group (or any other religious sect for that matter); there are only the narratives (and that is what matters) that they tell to relate a certain depiction of the past, explain the origin and meaning of their communal identity, or rituals, or extol the authority of their texts and traditions and the ongoing authority of those texts and traditions in the 21^st century, et cetera. The rival conceptions of authority and identity that the Alawites and Sunnis profess put them at odds with each other and delineate them as two factions, consisting of individual human beings, engaged in hostilities throughout the years.

When we see the conflict through the lens of narrative, we can also see certain solutions. Namely, a narrative lens suggests that the key to a vibrant democratic-nationalist society in Syria, where citizenship displaces sect, is the formation and adoption of a resonant narrative that offers an alternative reference point for the formation of Syrian identity. As an example of one such successful narrative, one that has largely displaced religious (or sectarian) or ethnic narratives and fostered a democratic society, we can look to the United States of America. That said, the success of that narrative (as we know) in the United States has not been a simple or bloodless process at all, nor will that process be so in Syria (nor should we expect it to be). It is, however, an effort worth supporting.

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In the immediate aftermath of Usama bin Laden’s death there was no shortage of news and commentary trying to explain the significance of his demise. What does his death mean for the U.S. and al-Qaeda, or for the War in Afghanistan? The unilateral action by the U.S. also presented many questions about the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

But beyond Usama bin Laden’s death and its immediate implications, there was also the issue of his legacy. The White House clearly wanted to avoid any further elevation of his status among the extremists. They released still-caps and video of bin Laden that were intended to strip the man of the mythology. He was not the terrorist mastermind hiding out survivalist-style in the mountains and caves of the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead, he was a vain old man sitting alone under a dirty blanket in a small room watching himself on a cheap, little TV set. He dyed his beard before making videos, which were directed by someone else off camera, and exhibited a strong concern for his image. This is not exactly the terrorist mastermind imagined among the extremists.

It made perfect sense for the White House to attempt to draft his legacy. They don’t want him to be a grand martyr for the cause that can inspire others to emulate his conduct. The U.S. acted to show a weak and pathetic, cowardly man, hiding behind a woman (an erroneous statement later taken back by White House officials). They wanted the most feared man in the world looking painfully ordinary and unremarkable. .

The White House and media pundits were not alone in trying to craft the image of bin Laden after death. In the weeks after his killing, numerous extremist groups and leaders have released eulogies for “Sheikh Usama” that attempt to reclaim his legacy and portray a very different view of the man.

In extremist eulogies, bin Laden is the “lion of Islam.” He is a “knight among the knights of jihad.” He has achieved martyrdom, which he has sought for the past thirty years. It was a death that he was destined for. He “was killed with his finger on the trigger as he fought the enemies of God” (a statement not backed up by the facts as bin Laden was apparently unarmed). He is even compared to the Prophet Muhammad, and, we are told, certainly wishes that he could “return to this world to be killed again and again just as [he] used to tell us about [our] beloved one [the Prophet], God’s peace and prayer be upon him.” Citing a hadith, the eulogy relates that: “The Prophet swore that he wished he would be killed in the cause of God, brought back to life to be killed again, and be brought back to life once more to be killed also.” According to Islamic history, however, the Prophet Muhammad died while lying sick in his bed, and in the arms of his wife, at the age of 62.

Beyond these attempts to secure bin Laden’s place as the grand martyr of the his global movement, the extremists also want to convey what his death means practically in the temporal world. That message is simple: The struggle will continue. As one might expect, there are cries for revenge and vengeance (which is the norm when a extremist leader is killed). And President Obama himself is “wanted dead or alive,” appropriating President Bush’s well-known language regarding bin Laden.

Eulogizing a “martyr” is certainly not new or unique to bin Laden. There are ample examples of biographies of extremist martyrs with vivid retellings of their deaths. But the stakes are higher with bin Laden. He is not simply a foot soldier with a suicide vest. He was, at least symbolically, the ideological leader of the global movement. His eulogy is therefore hardly a three-line press release, but rather, taken together, these eulogies constitute the formative phase of a hagiography of sorts. His life, if it has not already, will take on mythological qualities. Usama Bin Laden is the champion in a classic tale of the small defeating the powerful. He is Muhammad and the Muslims at the Battle of Badr. He is David facing Goliath.

While the White House may want to portray bin Laden as a weak old man, these eulogies depict him as a spiritual warrior fighting for the downtrodden and oppressed. They are not histories (which require facts), but are the beginnings of a legend. And this is the rub. The mythical bin Laden cannot die. He can emerge as an eternal inspiration to all extremists going forward, with none of the faults that the historical bin Laden had. Certainly, those engaged in writing these eulogies have a high degree of respect and reverence for the man, but strategically they know his real value. Alive, he was the man able to evade capture for many years. Dead, he is a heroic lion of God and a symbolic tour-de-force. Now that the man is gone, the challenge ahead is how the U.S. can defeat the legend of Usama bin Laden.

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