Earlier this month (December 13-15) we were privileged to participate in a “The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media” sponsored by the Saudi sponsored Muslim World League (MWL, Rabita al-Alam al-Islami) and the Indonesian Ministry of Religion in Jakarta Indonesia.  Tension between the co-sponsors was evident in the selection of participants, the themes of formal presentations and in social interaction over the course of the conference. Differing perspectives on religious inclusivism, freedom of expression, social media and gender were especially apparent.

The conference theme was “The New Media and Information Technology.” Approximately 400 delegates and guests from 39 countries in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia were in attendance.  Jakarta was chosen as the conference venue because it was the site of the first conference that was held in 1980.  Many observers noted that the timing of the two conferences was not coincidental.  Both were held shortly after social and political upheavals that presented serious challenges to Saudi Arabia – the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Arab Spring of 2011.

Indonesian participants noted that the pairing of MWL and Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion was “peculiar” because of their very different orientations and agendas.  MWL is an international organization founded by the Saudi government in 1962 with the purpose of globalizing Saudi Wahhabism and countering other understandings of Islam and secularism. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion has a more inclusive understanding of Islam, and unlike MWL, actively promotes democracy and freedom of expression.

The Guest List

MWL selected conference delegates from the Middle East, Africa and Europe who share the leadership’s Wahhabi orientation. Efforts to secure a similarly sympathetic Indonesian contingent failed. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion delegated responsibility for inviting participants to academics in the Islamic University system, who invited Muslim scholars, journalists and activists with diverse religious views. The result was that while delegations from Middle Eastern, European and African countries supported the MWL agenda, the Indonesian contingent was less sympathetic. While participants included representatives of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, and other Indonesian organizations affiliated with MWL, none were invited to make formal presentations.

Most of the Indonesian participants were university lecturers with religious orientations very different from their Saudi hosts. This led to a marked contrast in the themes of formal presentations and a combination of humorous remarks and sometimes bitter comments about the implicit Saudi agenda.  Some found it ironic that Muslims who Wahhabis think of as kafir (unbelievers) because they engage in “deviant” forms of religious devotion including the veneration of saints, were invited at all. There were many sarcastic comments about the contrast between the pious pontificating of Saudi delegates and the burgeoning “temporary marriage”/sex tourism trade catering primarily to Saudis centered in Bogor, only a short distance from the conference venue. Others were angered by what they saw as Saudi arrogance and their exclusivist, self-referential use of the terms Islam and Muslim. One described Saudis as “colonialists,” echoing a theme discussed previously on this blog.

Formal Presentations

The conference included formal remarks by political figures, academic papers, mostly by Indonesian scholars, triumphalist, self congratulatory presentations by representatives of WML sponsored Islamic television networks in the United Kingdom and South Africa, speeches by WML officials calling for Muslim unity in efforts to counter western moral decadence and the destabilizing effects of the “New Media.” There was a consensus that there are positive and negative sides to New Media, and that the negatives include its use as a tool for the dissemination of radical ideologies and pornography. Indonesian speakers tended to embrace New Media because it promotes democratic change and freedom of expression. WML speakers expressed concern about it for exactly the same reason.

The disconnect between Saudi and Indonesian perspectives was apparent throughout the conference.  An editorial in the December issue of MWL Journal, distributed at the conference, summarized the Saudi position:

If the changing dynamics of media are not understood in its proper perspectives and an effort is not made to discipline the youth, it can create havoc in the society, as is being witnessed in many places.

Indonesian Vice-president Boediono opened the conference with a speech in which he stated:

The emergence of social networking media has created  new social institutions, in the forms of new social networks that bypass social borders and strata, creating virtual horizontal relationships. This New Media also helps to strengthen civil society and allows everyone access to it, greater freedom of expression and freedom of speech, including direct and open criticism of the Government.

Governments that have not been willing to allow greater democratic   participation and failed to respond adequately and in a timely manner to democratic voices have found themselves in difficulties or even been forced out of power by popular movements, the people’s power. Government’s control over media, is no longer effective. Gadgets, small yet very high-tech devices that can provide any information at any time, are easily available everywhere. Information has become a public domain. This is the new reality that we all have to adjust to and live with.

Social networking media can produce enormous benefits for the society. This is the experience in this country. The practice of democracy in Indonesia has been enriched by the development of social networking media.

He also called on Muslim religious authorities to issue “contextual fatwa (legal opinions)” to counter the influence of Internet based extremism. In Indonesian Muslim discourse “contextual” refers to a mode of legal reasoning that uses general principles abstracted from sacred texts to arrive at solutions to contemporary problems. This discursive style is an anathema to Saudi scholars who insist on literal readings. These are very different understandings of Shari’ah. The conflict between these positions was evident throughout the conference.

MWL General Secretary At-Turki

Presentations by General Secretary Abdallah Ben Abdel Mohsen At-Turki and other MWL speakers reiterated the themes of the MWL Journal editorial. They emphasized the dangers that global news and entertainment media pose to “Islam and the Muslims.” They stressed the need for government to government cooperation in efforts to establish “Muslim” alternatives to both existing Old Media and New Media. One speaker proposed creating a “Muslim” alternative to Facebook. Several speakers were critical of (unnamed) individuals who have declared the Internet to be haram (forbidden). They stressed the point that technology is morally neutral and should be used to promote Islamic values. Several presentations focused on the importance of satellite television as a communications medium. They indicated that television is the preferred medium because it can be used to deliver standardized content in multiple languages.

In their formal presentations WML delegates tended to speak of “Islam,” “The Muslim Community” and “The West” in monolithic ways. There were frequent references to “genuine” and Islamic teachings and the need to “correct” deviant tendencies. These statements reflect WML’s concerns with establishing Wahhabi orthodoxy and combatting other forms of Islam, especially Sufism and the Shiah.  “The West” was described as being anti-Islamic and as a source of moral corruption. “Western media” were often mentioned as engaging in conspiracies to corrupt Muslim youth and ultimately to destroy Islam. In general, portrayals of the West were far more negative than those in WML English language publications.

WML delegates we interviewed seemed not to understand the dynamics of New Media. One spoke of establishing an on line international Muslim media clearing house complete with electronic versions of “authentic texts,” and encouraging young people to study Information Technology as strategies to counter “anti-Islamic forces and influences.”  He did not appear to grasp the point that New Media is user driven. One of the editors of MWL Journal stated that he used e-mail and that some of his children had Facebook pages but that he did not really understand it. Another expressed confidence that if they were given proper Muslim educations, young people would watch “Muslim” programs on satellite TV instead of the frivolous entertainment programing offered by conventional media.

Presentations by Indonesian delegates echoed Boediono’s embrace of the democratizing power of New Media.  Parni Hadi, one of the founding editors of the Indonesian Islamic daily Republika, spoke with great passion and idealism about the constructive role of the New Media. In his remarks he mentioned links between technology and democratization, pointing to the role New Media in the Arab Spring movements that led to the overthrown of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He called for the development of a “Prophetic” journalistic ethos and practice  based on freedom of expression with “no oppression by whosoever, government and religious authorities as well as media owners.” He called on journalists to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad in efforts to promote “dignity, devotion, tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect and non-violence.” He was also critical of government attempts to control print, broadcast and on-line media.

In general Indonesian participants were far more open to changes wrought by the New Media than their Saudi counterparts. They tended to emphasize the opportunities rather than the dangers of the emergence of citizen journalism. They were less inclined to paint monochrome portraits of either “The West” or “Islam.” They also had a more expansive visions of “Muslim” media. In his address Professor  Azyumardi Azra, Dean of the Graduate School at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, called for a pluralistic understanding of Islam. He later observed that Muslim media can, and should be more than sermons and that there was nothing “un-Islamic” about media coverage of the Manchester United football team, a perennial favorite in Indonesia.

The Social Dimension – Exclusivism and Gender

International conferences are complex social events in which cultures sometimes collide. Gender was an especially divisive issue at this conference. Men and women mix freely at conferences sponsored by Indonesian Islamic Universities. There are always women on the program. Seating is gender mixed, women and men converse freely and join each other for meals and coffee breaks.

Saudi and other MWL organizers were clearly uneasy about these aspects of Indonesian Muslim intellectual and cultural practice. There were no women in MWL sponsored delegations. Of the approximately 200 Indonesians invited by the Ministry of Religion, at least half were female, but in deference to Saudi concerns, none were asked to make presentations. Gender issues were not addressed in any of the formal presentations. The Indonesian organizers did not compromise on gender integrated seating and meals. Saudi and other WML sponsored delegates did not, however, speak with Indonesian women when they could avoid it, much less join them for coffee or lunch.

Inayah Rohmaniyah Occupying the Podium

Many Indonesians, men as well as women, found the absence of women from the program to be unprofessional and insulting. When Labibah Zain of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University raised the issue in a question and answer session, the Saudi response was that the question could not be answered. After the session ended, but with at least a hundred people still in the room, she and Inayah Rohmaniyah, Senior Lecture in the Department Quranic Exegesis and Hadith Studies at the same Islamic University “occupied” the podium to which they and other female scholars had been denied access.  The Saudi English language Arab News mentioned her “protest” but described her only as a blogger and social activist.  It did not mention the act of symbolic resistance that followed the non response to her question.

Final Thoughts – New Media, Media Events and the World Muslim League

The Muslim World League describes itself as a non-governmental organization. While this is technically correct, it functions as a public diplomacy arm of the Saudi Arabian State. Its publications depict the Saudi State, the king and the Saudi religious scholars as patrons and defenders of Islam and denounce their opponents.  It supports the spread of the Saudi version of Islam by funding schools, mosques and media outlets in many countries. It sponsors international conferences that usually unanimously endorse directives from the Saudi religious establishment. These conferences are as much media events, promoting Saudi claims to leadership of the global Muslim community, as they are forums for intellectual discussion and debate.  The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media was intended to further this agenda and to formulate strategies to control opposing voices in the New Media. The conference approved a resolution establishing a “code of honor” for Muslim journalists and media organizations emphasizing their responsibility:

…… to affirm a belief in the moral principles and values of Islam, to safeguard the Islamic identity from the negative effects of globalization and westernization and to ensure freedom that is responsible and disciplined by Shari’ah guidelines; confront atheism and all other anti-Islam tendencies that spread hatred against Islam and Muslims.

It was, however, clear that the Indonesian Muslim establishment, including the Ministry of Religion and the Islamic University system and many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals do not share the Saudi desire to control either the Old or the New Media or to counter the role of New Media in democratic change. They clearly do not share Saudi perspectives on gender. WML publications often include photos of conferences in which no women appear. There were no such “photo ops” at this conference. One account of the conference, including quotations from Parni Hadi’s address, can already be found by searching 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media on Facebook. There will, no doubt, be others.

_____________________________

* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University.

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A few weeks ago I did a keynote speech at a public meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission in Public Diplomacy.  Later in the meeting I heard a presentation by Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).  The topic of his talk tied together several topics recently discussed on COMOPS Journal, and accordingly I want to share it with readers.

Presumably in response to the myriad calls to better coordinate U.S. government strategic communication, the CSCC was charged in a recent executive order to

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Among other things, the CSCC oversees the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which has been the subject of  previous posts on this blog, both appreciative and critical. Amb. LeBaron’s talk focused on a recent DOT effort that allows me to add another post in the appreciative category, and I don’t believe it is very well known.

The DOT recently produced three videos juxtaposing AQ’s ideology with facts-on-the ground in the Arab Spring protests.  The first features clips from an Ayman al-Zawahiri video where he insists that “apostate regimes” can only be overthrown by violent jihad and that change through peaceful means is hopeless.  The second is based on a rant against democracy by Abu Yahia al-Libi.  The third (and most hilarious) uses clips of captured video from bin Laden’s compound showing him watching videos of himself.  In all three cases the AQ clips are intercut with news footage of the Arab Spring protests.

In my opinion this is a superb effort for a number of reasons:

• They reinforce messages that have long been priorities for U.S. strategic communication in the counterterrorism arena, namely that violent jihad is not necessary for social change, and that the best change is democratic.
• They present these messages while side-stepping problems with U.S. credibility, by mashing-up AQ’s own video with clips from independent news reports.
• They are “prosumer” efforts, done by DOT members with desktop video editing software, rather than slick professional productions.  As such they embrace cutting-edge trends in social media.
• They effectively employ the principle of ridicule as strategic communication, poking the Bad Guys in the eye by making them seem silly and out of touch with reality, and contributing to their developing image as a toxic brand.

We have argued that on the rugged-landscape of counterterrorism communication more out-of-the-box efforts like this are needed.  So hats off to the DOT for taking the leap.

You can watch the DOT videos, with English subtitles, here:

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On Sunday, September 25, a lone suicide bomber detonated a bomb at a Protestant Church in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, as services were letting out. Along with the bomber, one congregant was killed and several wounded from the shrapnel composed of nails, bolts and buckshot. In the ensuing week there has been a struggle over how the event should be framed, with most Islamist groups denying responsibility.

The bomber has been identified as Pino Damayanto aka Yosepa Hayat Ahmad aka Abu Daud Raharjo, and was wanted by police in connection to the network that bombed a mosque in a police station in Cirebon, West Java, last April. Police have since announced that they are in pursuit of others suspected of being a part of the attack, who might have fled to East Java, as well as a number of bombs that are suspected to have been built. On Friday, Indonesia’s anti-terrorism squad Densus 88 captured Beni Ahmad Asri, wanted in conjunction with the Cirebon network, in West Sumatra.

Police announced that the bomber was a member of jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Basyir’s Jama’ah Ansarut Tauhid (JAT). This was quickly met with a denial by a JAT spokesman. It has been confirmed, however, that he studied at the Islamic boarding school run by Abu Bakar Basyir at Ngruki.

One immediate concern was whether this bombing was a reaction to the sectarian violence in Ambon three weeks ago. As my earlier post notes, extremist Islamist groups have stoked the flames of violence in Ambon, calling for jihad and continuing to portray Christians in the region as separatist members of the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas, or RMS). The RMS was defeated in the early 1950s, was supported then by both Christians and Muslims alike, has little support in the Moluccas, and has never been a significant threat to the state of Indonesia since its defeat.

The day of the Solo church bombing, there were three bombs found in Ambon, in front of churches.  A fourth was found a day later. Despite the location of the bombs, extremist sites such as Prisoner of Joy place the blame on Christians. Indonesian police have reported similarities in the construction of the bombs found in Ambon to those found and used in Cirebon and Solo. One extremist site, Ghur4ba,  proudly proclaimed its support for the church bombing, and linked it to the violence in Ambon, the general crusade of Christians against Muslims, the apostacy of the Indonesian government, and referred to the bomber as a martyr. The declaration has appeared on several other sites, and is attributed to Forum Islam al-Busyro.

On Saturday, the head of Indonesia’s anti-terrorism agency proclaimed that after investigation, the violence in Ambon was not tied to the bombing.

As the toll rose to two dead including the bomber and 22 injured, Detik.com and others reported that the suicide bomber had apparently left a bag containing a Qur’an, gloves and other items at a nearby internet cafe, where he used a computer just prior to carrying out the bombing. The day after the bombing, news site Surya published this story stating that the bomber had looked at the extremist site ar Rahmah before the bombing.

Eastern Indonesia’s flagship paper Pos Kupang gave a list of the stories that the bomber had viewed. The stories the bomber viewed were mostly about American and allied casualties in Afghanistan, with one about Osama bin Laden. The stories referenced powerful Islamist master narratives, notably the crusader master narrative and the martyr master narrative (the latter in reference to Osama bin Laden).

In the days following the Solo bombing, police and investigative journalists began to release details about the bombing, and extremists began issuing their predictable condemnations of the event – while continuing to valorize suicide bombings elsewhere and jihad in general. Mainstream Muslim groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah immediately condemned the bombings, and an NU spokesman asked that the government take down extremist sites.

Responding to calls for shutting down extremist websites, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Information Titaful Sembiring stated that websites are likely not what push people to radicalism, but rather it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islam, which bans attacks on places of worship. While I agree with the latter part of the statement, there is mounting evidence that self-radicalization can occur via the internet.

Extremist sites such as ar Rahmah and Voice of al-Islam cited the minister’s speech in defense of their right to publish, and argued that they are the only ones exposing the true war against Islam in Indonesia, citing (once again!) the conflict in Ambon. Ar Rahmah plays the persecuted card, as though it is a victim of Islamophobia (and as though it doesn’t publish stories inciting violence in the name of twisted interpretation of Islam). Ar Rahmah published a story asking why the death of Christians warranted so much attention, when the deaths of Muslims in Ambon — according to them — did not.

As extremist groups began distancing themselves from the bombing, ar Rahmah published a story asking people not to link the bombing with jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Bashir. Conspiratorial thinking emerged as well — according to another story on ar Rahmah, intelligence analyst A. C. Manullang stated that the bombing may have been a pretext to crack down on radical groups in  Solo. In a story on Voice of al-Islam (which was subsequently removed), head of the paramilitary group Islamic Defenders Front Habib Rizieq claimed that the bombing was part of a “divide and conquer” tactic by the government.

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Violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in the city of Ambon, Maluku Province, Indonesia on Sunday, September 11. Official sources state that an ojek (motorcycle taxi) driver named Darmis Saiman was killed in an accident on September 10. But rumors sent via text message spread the following day when he was buried claimed that the Muslim driver had been tortured to death by Christians.At last count, seven people have been confirmed dead and at least 60 wounded, and the government has sent between 200 and 400 Mobile Brigade (Brimob) forces to the region as back up. Although rational voices are pleading for calm, Indonesian Islamist extremists are using the conflict to stoke more violence, recalling the sectarian conflict that roiled the region between 1999 and 2002 and claimed some 9000 lives.

Islamists were quick to use the master narratives of the Crusades and martyrdom in their reports on the conflict.  That the incident occurred on the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the United States was not just a coincidence for the extremists. The extremist web site Voice of Islam reported that the attack was provoked by the United States as a way to portray Ambon as a hotbed for terrorists.  The site stated that if Islamist groups come to Ambon to help the Muslims fighting there, America will simply portray it as terrorism and thus use it as an excuse to kill Muslims.

Voice of Islam also covered Abu Bakar Basyir’s statement on the violence.  Basyir is the former spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah and leader of Jama’ah Anshorut Tauhid, recently jailed for 15 years. He issued a fatwa for jihad in Ambon, and repeated the claims that the violence is a conspiracy to to bring attention to the region so that the “crusaders” can eliminate Islam there. Ar Rahmah, perhaps the most popular extremist web site in Indonesia, also invoked the crusader master narrative in its early reporting of the conflict, linking the violence to a coordinated attempt by Christians to wipe out Islam.

In another posting, ar Rahmah urged Ambonese Muslims to be at the ready. The site reported that the violent paramilitary group the Islamic Defenders Front is preparing to send jihad forces to Ambon, using the term “laskar jihad.” This is a loaded term, because Laskar Jihad was a group that formed Islamist militias to go to Ambon in 1999 during sectarian violence there. The group was subsequently disbanded under pressure from the government in the aftermath of the 2002 Bali Bombing.In the story, the FPI claimed that separatist members of the Republic of South Moluccas (RMS) are part of the Christian group, and that Jewish conspirators are behind the violence.

Although there are a few remaining supporters of the RMS in Ambon, and a fringe group called the Moluccan Sovereignty Front emerged during the 1999-2002 violence, separatism is not a serious threat. The RMS exists mostly as a government-in-exile in Holland, and has made recent statements that it is willing to accept Indonesian sovereignty in the region. Nonetheless, the “threat” of separatism — imagined or real — is frequently used to incite violence. A post on Suara Islam Online linked the violence to a supposed Christian military training camp in Bogor, West Java named Christ of Ambon.

Others chimed in to incite. The Council of Indonesian Ulama released a statement as well, claiming as factual that the death of Darmis Saiman was caused not by the accident but by stab wounds inflicted by Christians. They called for a reduction in influence of Christians in Ambon, as well as a call to arm Muslims to prepare for jihad.

Blogger Ghur4Ba invoked the Crusader narrative, and appealed to readers to pray for the warriors of jihad. Voice of Islam, in a subsequent post entitled “The Lessons from Ambon: Preparing Strength for Jihad is Important,” condemned the Crusaders and urged Musims to prepare to fight:

In conclusion, Muslims must begin to prepare for jihad, to begin physical training, preparing the means of war, and make efforts for the perfection of jihad fi sabilillah. That’s because the jihad, according to the basic beliefs Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama, will remain until the end of time.

Despite the rhetoric of the extremists, cooler heads are noting marked differences in the violence between 1999 and Sunday, such as the unwillingness of larger groups to join in, and the fact that the violence did not spread to other regions. In an article in the Jakarta Globe, Najib Azca, an expert on violence in Ambon and a researcher at Gadjah Mada University’s Center for Peace and Security Studies, noted that some of the factors that stoked conflict a decade ago remained, such as poverty and religious segregation. Coordinator of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence Haris Azhar, however, argued that this wasn’t sectarian conflict, and noted the differences between Ambon then and now. The article noted how the violence remained contained, and that others in the religiously segregated communities worked to protect minorities in their midst.

Although it ran an alarmist headline, this Jakarta Post story noted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s desire to not repeat the mistakes of a decade ago, and included plans to reach out to local leaders. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Marshall (ret) Djoko Suyanto acknowledged the role of provocation-by-SMS, and the importance of providing factual information to counter instigation:

In the future, we need to reinforce the people’s resilience so that they are not so easily incited, including through SMS or twitters instigating anarchy. People should be able to filter information.

This brief interview by Radio Australia with International Crisis Group Southeast Asia Senior Advisor Sidney Jones describes the phenomenon of SMS instigation in Indonesia and elsewhere. Consistent with analysis by well regarded Indonesianist political scientists such as Gerry van Klinken, Jones notes that the political context is much different now. In the earlier conflict, in the context of a democratizing Indonesia, local actors in Ambon were jockeying for new political opportunities, which fueled the violence. Politically, things are much more stable now, and it appears that calm — albeit a nervous calm — was restored quickly and has thus far maintained.

Because of the potential for violence, police have been searching passengers for weapons on passenger ships bound for Ambon in Java’s major ports, and continue their efforts to find those who spread incitement via text messages.

Update, 9-21-11:

Reports of police sweeps of ships heading to Ambon noted that some “sharp weapons” were confiscated, but no firearms. The Jakarta Post reports that the police still don’t have a suspect in the sending of the text messages that stoked the violence. Although it is clear Ambon remains peaceful, there are understandably some underlying tensions that remain, as well as some internally displaced persons who have not returned to their homes. Islamist extremists, however, continue to spread disinformation in an attempt to stoke violence.

Islmaist site Ghur4Ba provided some updats on the situation in Ambon, included alerting its readers to where groups of armed Muslims are gathering in preparation for fighting. No fighting broke out, however.

English language site Prisoner of Joy (among others) questioned the police response to the riot, arguing that Muslims were the victim sof the rio, and so it is unjust that they are being targeted by security forces. Accounts of the violence, however, clearly point to Muslim provocateurs sending the original text messages, and starting the upheavals. Although a official account of the death of Darmis Saiman, the ojek driver, showed that he died of injuries sustained in the traffic accident, and that Christian onlookers attempted to help him after the accident, Islamist sites continue to insist that he was murdered and tortured by a group of Christians. Umar Abduh, an Indonesian convicted on terrorism charges but now free after serving a 10-year sentence, argued that the police in Indonesia support “the Crusaders” and, perhaps most astonishingly, that Christians, including those who opposed the Jakarta Charter (which would have made sharia the land of the law in Indonesia), are anti-Indonesia, separatist, and anti-pluralism. This belies a stunning ignorance of Indonesian history, a history in which Christian Indonesians played significant roles in the anti-colonial struggle and in the founding of the Indonesian state. Ar Rahmah posted a story quoting Umar Abduh that paints the violence as a governmnet conspiracy, and argues that the UN should try those responsible in the Indonesian government for the violence. The Islamic Defenders Front, a thuggish paramilitary group organized under the guise of protecting Islam, has given the Indonesian government an ultimatum of one month before they start sending jihadis to the region.

These responses show that the Islamists are merely eager to stoke more violence in the region. It is particularly ironic to hear Islamists such as Umar Abduh accuse the small minority of Indonesian Christians of being against pluralism and diversity — clearly against their self-interest — as well as hear the cry for the UN to get involved, given Islamists history of antipathy toward the organization.

Update, October 4

The International Crisis Group has released its report on the violence in Ambon, available here. As usual, it is a well researched and documented report, and perhaps most notably it describes the presence of “peace provocateurs,” an interfaith group in Ambon who used social media to dispell and counter rumors that were circulating in order to stoke violence:

Their core group was about ten, each of whom had some ten or fifteen contacts around the city’s major flashpoints. They were on the phone with each other constantly, checking out stories and sending informationover Twitter and Facebook and by text messages. When a member of the network in one part of town heard the rumours about the Silo Church being destroyed, he called a member of the network stationed at the church totake a photograph with his phone and circulate it, to prove it was standing undamaged.

 The report also criticizes the government, police and military responses to the violence, and discusses some of the theories circulating about the causes of the violence.

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Unlike the protests of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, the campaigns underway against the Assad regime in Syria have a distinctly sectarian character. The Assad regime is dominated by the Alawites, a little-known esoteric Shi‘ite sect. However, the majority of Syria’s population is Sunni Muslim (approx. 75%). And caught in the middle of the conflict are Syria’s Christians (10% of the pop.), Druze, Twelver Shi‘ites, and others, including a small number of Jews. In July of 2011 alone, at least 30 people were killed in violent clashes between pro-regime Alawites and anti-regime Sunnis in the city of Homs.

Conflict between the two religious communities is nothing new. During the reign of Hafez Assad (d. 2000), the Alawite regime perpetrated an infamous massacre of Sunni Muslims in the city of Hama, just north of Homs, that claimed between ten thousand to forty thousand lives. And back during the reign of the Sunni Ottoman Empire in Syria, Alawites were not recognized as Muslims or People of the Book, but rather as heretics with no legal status. The history of conflict and tense relations between the Alawites and Sunnis in Syria is obviously long and complex. Yet, these complexities aside, the sectarian dimension of the Syrian conflict reveals much about the significance and power of narrative.

For those interested in politics, democratization, and international relations, looking at the role of narrative in the Syrian uprising is particularly informative. Indeed, by framing the conflict in Syria in sectarian terms (as I did above), we see the belligerents through their religious affiliations and the differences that exist between them and little else. The Alawites have different doctrines, rituals, practices, institutions, and so on, than do the Sunni Muslims. The variety of differences in the area of religion can be distracting and misleading though.

These differences, and the broader implications they have had, are actually all symptoms of a conflict of narratives, albeit profoundly shaped by the accidents and currents of world history. Without narrative, all of the doctrines, rituals, or institutions would be nothing beyond what is observed by a person that does not know the narratives involved, and they would carry no substantive meaning or significance. For example, without narrative, the act of wudhu or ritual ablutions by a Sunni Muslim becomes simply a hygienic act of washing.

To illustrate the conflicting narratives that exist between the Sunnis and the Alawites, I have radically paraphrased and structurally simplified the core underlying narratives at play in both sects.

Sunni Muslims: The One Deity revealed His Will to His Final Prophet and humanity must follow that revealed knowledge to select wise leaders, create a just and righteous society, and earn salvation after death in Heaven through steadfast effort and intention.

Alawites: The Triune Deity (think “Holy Trinity”), incarnated during the time of the Prophet, revealed esoteric knowledge of the true religion through the Family of the Prophet and select initiates, and, through this secret esoteric knowledge, initiates can attain salvation and their souls will transmigrate into more perfect forms.

[Note: Alawites historically practice taqiyya and avoid exposing their beliefs and practices to outsiders, thus scholars debate the actual tenants of the Alawites]

These serve as starting points for notions of identity, institutions, worldviews, and customs. Due to the particularly insular nature of the Alawite narrative,  and the Sunni rejection of them as fellow Muslims, the Alawites have existed as a minority in Syria (indeed, a more precarious minority than Christians, who are at least “People of the Book” as an Abrahamic pre-Islamic religion) and the Alawites have acted in ways  that support their interests, such as serving the French colonialists or supporting Baathism and crushing Sunni Islamism.

Religion, at its most skeletal level, is narrative. More specifically, I mean to say (tipping my hat to Bruce Lincoln) that “religion,” at its core, is a particular, communally-shared narrative (or narratives) attributed to a transcendent source (e.g. deity, ancestor, totem etc). This makes these particular narratives qualitatively different than those attributed to a mundane human author or folk culture (where anonymity may rule the day). Practices, community and institutions all start and take shape from there. Due to this exceptional attribution (“Allah revealed these stories to our leader on the mountain”), the narrative(s), and the beliefs or rituals or institutions that the narrative(s) supports, carries transcendent authority.

These two qualities distinguish religion, or (for the sake of convenience) a “religious narrative,” from all other narratives. This is one of the principal reasons why older religions, such as Judaism or Christianity, are privileged in our society over younger religions, such as Mormonism (LDS). The narratives of the older religions are protected by the ambiguities and gaps of the past, lost in history (as well as longstanding communities and institutions), and the rhetorical tricks that these obscurities of the past have allowed contemporary adherents and institutions to enjoy. But how does this business of religion and narrative relate to Syria?

When we look at the conflict between the Alawites and the Sunnis in Syria through the lens of narrative , we can see people following different or conflicting narratives. There is no empirical verifiable evidence to support the religious claims of either group (or any other religious sect for that matter); there are only the narratives (and that is what matters) that they tell to relate a certain depiction of the past, explain the origin and meaning of their communal identity, or rituals, or extol the authority of their texts and traditions and the ongoing authority of those texts and traditions in the 21^st century, et cetera. The rival conceptions of authority and identity that the Alawites and Sunnis profess put them at odds with each other and delineate them as two factions, consisting of individual human beings, engaged in hostilities throughout the years.

When we see the conflict through the lens of narrative, we can also see certain solutions. Namely, a narrative lens suggests that the key to a vibrant democratic-nationalist society in Syria, where citizenship displaces sect, is the formation and adoption of a resonant narrative that offers an alternative reference point for the formation of Syrian identity. As an example of one such successful narrative, one that has largely displaced religious (or sectarian) or ethnic narratives and fostered a democratic society, we can look to the United States of America. That said, the success of that narrative (as we know) in the United States has not been a simple or bloodless process at all, nor will that process be so in Syria (nor should we expect it to be). It is, however, an effort worth supporting.

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In the immediate aftermath of Usama bin Laden’s death there was no shortage of news and commentary trying to explain the significance of his demise. What does his death mean for the U.S. and al-Qaeda, or for the War in Afghanistan? The unilateral action by the U.S. also presented many questions about the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

But beyond Usama bin Laden’s death and its immediate implications, there was also the issue of his legacy. The White House clearly wanted to avoid any further elevation of his status among the extremists. They released still-caps and video of bin Laden that were intended to strip the man of the mythology. He was not the terrorist mastermind hiding out survivalist-style in the mountains and caves of the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead, he was a vain old man sitting alone under a dirty blanket in a small room watching himself on a cheap, little TV set. He dyed his beard before making videos, which were directed by someone else off camera, and exhibited a strong concern for his image. This is not exactly the terrorist mastermind imagined among the extremists.

It made perfect sense for the White House to attempt to draft his legacy. They don’t want him to be a grand martyr for the cause that can inspire others to emulate his conduct. The U.S. acted to show a weak and pathetic, cowardly man, hiding behind a woman (an erroneous statement later taken back by White House officials). They wanted the most feared man in the world looking painfully ordinary and unremarkable. .

The White House and media pundits were not alone in trying to craft the image of bin Laden after death. In the weeks after his killing, numerous extremist groups and leaders have released eulogies for “Sheikh Usama” that attempt to reclaim his legacy and portray a very different view of the man.

In extremist eulogies, bin Laden is the “lion of Islam.” He is a “knight among the knights of jihad.” He has achieved martyrdom, which he has sought for the past thirty years. It was a death that he was destined for. He “was killed with his finger on the trigger as he fought the enemies of God” (a statement not backed up by the facts as bin Laden was apparently unarmed). He is even compared to the Prophet Muhammad, and, we are told, certainly wishes that he could “return to this world to be killed again and again just as [he] used to tell us about [our] beloved one [the Prophet], God’s peace and prayer be upon him.” Citing a hadith, the eulogy relates that: “The Prophet swore that he wished he would be killed in the cause of God, brought back to life to be killed again, and be brought back to life once more to be killed also.” According to Islamic history, however, the Prophet Muhammad died while lying sick in his bed, and in the arms of his wife, at the age of 62.

Beyond these attempts to secure bin Laden’s place as the grand martyr of the his global movement, the extremists also want to convey what his death means practically in the temporal world. That message is simple: The struggle will continue. As one might expect, there are cries for revenge and vengeance (which is the norm when a extremist leader is killed). And President Obama himself is “wanted dead or alive,” appropriating President Bush’s well-known language regarding bin Laden.

Eulogizing a “martyr” is certainly not new or unique to bin Laden. There are ample examples of biographies of extremist martyrs with vivid retellings of their deaths. But the stakes are higher with bin Laden. He is not simply a foot soldier with a suicide vest. He was, at least symbolically, the ideological leader of the global movement. His eulogy is therefore hardly a three-line press release, but rather, taken together, these eulogies constitute the formative phase of a hagiography of sorts. His life, if it has not already, will take on mythological qualities. Usama Bin Laden is the champion in a classic tale of the small defeating the powerful. He is Muhammad and the Muslims at the Battle of Badr. He is David facing Goliath.

While the White House may want to portray bin Laden as a weak old man, these eulogies depict him as a spiritual warrior fighting for the downtrodden and oppressed. They are not histories (which require facts), but are the beginnings of a legend. And this is the rub. The mythical bin Laden cannot die. He can emerge as an eternal inspiration to all extremists going forward, with none of the faults that the historical bin Laden had. Certainly, those engaged in writing these eulogies have a high degree of respect and reverence for the man, but strategically they know his real value. Alive, he was the man able to evade capture for many years. Dead, he is a heroic lion of God and a symbolic tour-de-force. Now that the man is gone, the challenge ahead is how the U.S. can defeat the legend of Usama bin Laden.

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As details pour in regarding this past weekend’s daring raid in which U.S. Navy SEALs  killed elusive al-Qaeda leader and world’s most wanted terrorist Osama Bin Laden, the exact details of the events keep changing slightly. The New York Times titled an article covering a recent revision to the sequence of events and details about the operation as “White House Corrects Bin Laden Narrative”.

I would argue, however, the “Bin Laden Narrative” that matters most is not the play-by-play account of what happened, and in what sequence, in that Abbottabad compound. (In fact, I wouldn’t even call that sequence of events a “narrative” in order to avoid confusion about that term.)  While the details of who was shot first and where are important, the bigger narrative concern is what happens now that Osama bin Laden has been killed. And, my interest here in this piece is not an operational question, i.e. will Ayman al-Zawahiri take over as the leader of al-Qaeda or will another figure assert leadership of the terrorist network. No, my concern here is: How will the U.S. (collectively both the government and the populace) frame, conceive and think about the contemporary world order now that the number-one-most-wanted-terrorist story has come to an end.

In an earlier post I noted that narrative is more than simply the recounting of events. Stories and events are crucial parts of narrative: They are parts of the system that is narrative. And, systems are more than just assemblages of their parts. Systems have emergent properties, and in the case of narrative, one of those properties is sense-making.

Narrative, fundamentally, is a method of making sense of a body of information that includes actors (entities that act, not Denzel Washington or Natalie Portman), actions/events,  settings and even stories. Sometimes a narrative is a system comprised of actual events, real actors, and a collection of stories told about them. Other times, a narrative is a fictional construction. The factual and fictional domains can also overlap and influence on another. America is famously a world leader in generating moving image narratives (films and television), so I use examples from that art form in what follows.

As Americans, we tend to organize the world in the most simplistic of narrative structures, the binary. In a binary narrative there is one protagonist who is understood as the good guy.*  This is usually “us” or “America” or our hero-du-jour, be it John Wayne, Tom Cruise, General MacArthur, President Abraham Lincoln, or James Bond (never mind that he’s English). The hero represents all that is good and right about us. The good guy is opposed by the antagonist “bad guy.”

The original Star Wars film offers a readily accessible example of how the binary offers a simple and air-tight understanding of a world. In a galaxy far away, a young man (Luke Skywalker on behalf of “The Republic”) enters into battle with an archetypal enemy (Darth Vader, dressed ominously in black and leading the forces of the evil “Empire”). Understanding this world is simple. There are those allied with Luke and the Republic and there are those allied with Vader and the Empire. It is a black and white world.

Our predilection for formulaic, familiar and always-resolved narratives is evident in the overwhelming popularity of police and medical “procedurals” on American television. While these shows might appear on the surface to be more complicated than the binary just described, at base they are just that.

In most police procedurals (think the CSI franchise, the Law and Order franchise, and the host of newer shows like Castle or the newly remade Hawaii Five-0.), the “good guys” and the “bad guys” are clearly delineated. The police (and prosecutors) represent the forces of good, normative American society opposing a criminal element—classical bad guys whether they are on-screen shooting at police or the off-screen subject of a mystery investigation.

In the medical procedurals (think House or Crossing Jordan as well as the reality-based medical/crime crossover shows like, Dr. G: Medical Examiner and Forensic Files), the intelligent and committed medical practitioners battle their enemy, disease or mystery, and the disease’s ever-present ally of the ticking clock.  All of these shows, whether fictional or reality-based, share the common traits of a clear protagonist (individual or group), a clear antagonist (criminal or disease) and, most importantly for what I see as the dominant form of narrative in the American psyche, a clear resolution.

So, what does all this have to do with Osama Bin Laden? For more than 10 years, Osama bin Laden has been the Darth Vader leading an evil empire of al-Qaeda, Taliban and miscellaneous Islamist extremists. The antagonist umbrella even covered Iraq and Saddam Hussein for a period of time (before the lack of narrative coherence finally separated Iraq from the bin Laden/al-Qaeda menace). The binary narrative structure in which the U.S. fights bin Laden and his allies actually simplifies a complex geo-political landscape into a format already familiar to the American public—the Cold War.

A classic binary narrative structure, the Cold War narrative neatly divided the world into good and evil, protagonist and antagonist, and made understanding simple. With the demise of the Soviet Union, that binary narrative structure was disrupted until the advent of bin Laden. While both President Obama and President Bush have repeatedly asserted that the U.S. is not at war with Islam or the Arab people, neither would have had to say this if the binary narrative that offers only two options (you’re with us or you’re against us) had not been dominating the American psyche.

Iraq was a sub-plot, one that we tried to force-fit into the fairly simple binary narrative pattern of protagonist vs. antagonist. The lack of unity in accepting the Iraq campaign illustrates that it did not cohere with the overall narrative system. This is a good illustration of the narrative comprehension process. Data is received (actions, events, actors) and a template (such as the binary structure here described) is applied. If the data fit the template, a concise comprehension is achieved. If they don’t fit, back to the drawing board. The situation in Iraq has never conveniently fit the binary template, which gave rise to the considerable contention, confusion and lack of understanding surrounding that ongoing episode.

With clear resolution being one of the hallmarks of the binary structure (House cures the disease, Benson and Stabler catch their criminal, Luke Skywalker defeats Darth Vader), what happens to our narrative understanding of the world now that resolution of this narrative is at hand?  With bin Laden dead, does the narrative end and the credits roll?  Hardly.

The geo-political landscape is just as complicated and unsuited to a binary narrative today as it was a week ago (not to mention 10 years ago). It seems to me that we have two options. We can take the “24 approach” and simply discover a new antagonist. This path elevates Ayman al-Zawahiri (or perhaps, as our friend Jarret Brachman suggests, Abu Yahya al-Libi) into the antagonist role. Then we could continue comprehending the contemporary moment as one of conflict between the U.S. and al-Zawahiri (or whatever new figurehead represents the evil empire of Al Qaeda, Taliban, AQAP, AQLIM, etc.).

Alternatively, we could jettison the binary narrative structure, its simplicity of conflict and its obvious path to resolution. Perhaps it is time that our mainstream culture and mainstream media recognize what our troops on the ground in Afghanistan already know and deal with everyday. There is no simple us vs. them arrangement in Afghanistan, or across the Middle East. Pakistan seems to be playing both sides of the fence. The Taliban is only one of at least five different insurgent groups in Afghanistan contesting the American presence. The Arab Spring has displaced leaders like Egypt’s Mubarak (who by virtue of the binary structure became an ally but who is now revealed as a less-than-savory bedfellow), and has left only questions in the wake of the uprisings. I’m not saying there isn’t evil in the world that needs to be opposed by American will and American military might. But I am saying that in the complicated geo-political and socio-cultural landscapes we face, an overly simplistic and binary organization of people, events and actions into some sort of uber-narrative structure is problematic and unhelpful.

The considerable gnashing of teeth occurring right now over Pakistani complicity or incompetence in bin Laden’s concealment illustrates the flaws of the binary that has dominated American culture. Why?  Because we had assigned to Pakistan the ally role in our binary narrative. Discovering the archetype of evil residing in relative comfort 60 miles from the capital of an ally does not comport with a simplistic understanding of “us vs. them”. Politicians across the political spectrum are grand-standing and calling for investigation in the $4 billion of foreign aid provided to Pakistan annually, claiming, essentially, some sort of breach of contract.

The reality is twofold. As a single nation-state entity, Pakistan has multiple interests (deter India, collect U.S. aid, limit anarchy in the northwest, deter further extremist attacks inside Pakistan, assert Pakistani sovereignty, develop relations with Russia and China, etc). As a fractured, barely functional government, different factions exercise different agendas and thus the government may not act in a consistent manner. This reality means that elements in Pakistan might have known of bin Laden’s presence and some may have aided him, but it does not mean that Pakistan is secretly a member of bin Laden’s evil empire. It also means that Pakistan is not always a stalwart ally. Complicated.

What to do then? We live in a complex world and it is time for our mode of understanding to embrace that complexity rather than try to over-simplify. Rather than imposing one, dominant and over-arching narrative to explain all things, we should embrace the systemic (recognize that sub-components of narrative such as stories, actors, events, settings may play different roles in multiple smaller narrative systems), multi-layered (rather than one dominant explanation that all components fit under, recognize that narratives exist in parallel and at multiple levels) and intersecting qualities of narrative.

These qualities are increasingly apparent in popular culture in the field of transmedia storytelling. Stories that share some common elements are told across a variety of media platforms. The recent glut of comic book hero movies exemplifies the trend. Spiderman begins as a comic book (one with multiple titles, no less), then movies and video games (and an animated television series with an oh-so-catchy theme song, lest we forget) proliferate.

The stories told on these different platforms sometimes integrate, and sometimes contradict. Add in fan-generated fiction from fan sites, and the system of stories, actions, events, actors and settings proliferates in a complex and tangled web. Yet, despite contradictions, the Spiderman universe remains eminently understandable. Complementary (and complimentary) stories add to Spidey’s heroism, while contradictory stories can be held at the same time by the reader/viewer. These add nuance and multiple facets to characters and situations without compromising understanding. This is precisely because these seemingly contradictory elements are part of smaller narrative systems that are flexibly interlinked into a broader system, rather than components being force-fit into a single, simplistic, binary narrative structure.

From cowboys vs. Indians to Axis vs. Allies to the Cold War, American culture has been fond of its simple, binary narratives. This same, familiar pattern has been applied to America’s conflict with terrorism and Islamist extremism, but now with bin Laden’s death perhaps we can put an end to this detrimental over-simplification. Again taking a cue from pop culture, our political communication can embrace the complexity of narrative structure that the culture is clearly capable of managing, and drive towards a more nuanced understanding of the complicated world around us.

____________________

* it is almost always a guy or a team that collectively constitutes the good team. Female-lead fictional narratives tend towards structures other than the binary.

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Recently, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been abuzz over the release of a video entitled “The Coming is Very Near,” a 28-minute production created by a group of Twelver Shi‘a devotees of the Hidden Imam al-Mahdi, known as the Harbingers of the Coming (perhaps associated with the Hojjatieh Society). It is believed that President Ahmadinejad’s chief-of-staff Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei is a member of the group. A report released by the Open Source Center estimates that there are 2 million copies of the video in circulation and there are rumors that a sequel is currently in production.

The video claims to show evidence of the imminent return of the Hidden Imam from his Occultation (ghaybat), which began in the ninth century (CE). In doing so, it casts several prominent Shi‘a leaders in the roles of characters in the Mahdi master narrative. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is known as a zealous devotee of the Hidden Imam, is depicted as the Mahdi’s deputy, Shuayb ibn Saleh, who will come from Khurasan (eastern Iran). The Supreme Leader of Iran, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is cast as Seyyed-i Khorasani, who is tasked with appointing Shuayb to prepare the way for al-Mahdi. And Lebanese Hezbollah leader, Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, is cast as Yamani, who will lead the Mahdi’s army and march on the holy cities. Viewers are asked to see the recent events in the Middle East, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the Arab uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, as events foretold for the End Times.

Thankfully, many prominent Shi‘a voices have denounced the video, including the Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and scholars from the Hawza in Qom. Criticism of the video has been intriguing. Some critics allege that the video is dangerous propaganda in support of Ahmadinejad, while others allege that the video is propaganda against Ahmadinejad. But regardless of the political intentions of the video (which appears to be strongly pro-Ahmadinejad), the emergence of the video and the controversy it has created is further confirmation of the active narrative landscape in Iranian politics.

Last year, I wrote a white paper discussing the use of the Karbala master narrative as a framework for anti-government sentiment in Iran. The paper, titled “A Counter-Narrative to Iranian Tyranny,” received some attention and a few detractors. For example, a professor from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the Army War College related her opinion of the paper by stating simply: “I don’t know which is a more horrifying sort of propaganda, this, or the effort to label dead terrorists homosexuals.” I certainly never envisioned the white paper as “horrifying propaganda.” Instead, my intention was to show how a powerful master narrative of Iranian Shi‘a culture, previously harnessed by the revolutionary regime itself, can actually be inverted against the regime. The white paper also called on readers to see the active narrative landscape that exists in contemporary Iranian politics, an assertion supported by the controversy over the recent “Coming is Very Near” video.

Messianic narratives, such as the Mahdi in Twelver Shi‘ism, are a common affair, but seldom are heads of state so intertwined with them as they are in Iran. Comparing or identifying certain similarities between contemporary events and the vague symbolic imagery of ancient “prophecies” is hardly unusual among followers of Abrahamic religions. Christians have a long history of seeing prophetic events underway and the imminent Second Coming of Jesus Christ. Sects such as the Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and a range of Pentecostal and Evangelical movements, have built their entire belief systems around the Second Coming. Televangelist programs, such as the bizarre Jack Van Impe Presents show, seem to see foretelling events in everything. And they always will, despite the fact that they are always wrong.

Messianic narratives remain popular because they provide solace to the suffering, offer explanations amidst perceived chaos, and present promises of triumphant rewards (“pie in the sky”)  in the end. The danger of such narratives lies in the intention or ability of certain devotees to mobilize military or violent action in order to bring the “prophetic” events into being, and this seems to be the case among some in the Iranian leadership. A greater awareness of the narrative frameworks at play in these matters can help to prevent foreign leaders from stepping into them and ideally disrupt or neutralize them. In doing so, the international community can better avoid any recourse to military intervention, a step which will inevitably fall into the narrative framework itself as an “apocalyptic battle” – an element that  figures so prominently in many messianic narratives.

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Muammar Gaddafi, “Leader and Guide” of Libya, and Vladimir Putin, current Prime Minister of Russia and former head of the FSB (formerly KGB), have separately denounced (Putin here ) UN Security Council Resolution 1973, approving military action in Libya, as something resembling “the medieval Crusades.” We understand why Gaddafi might use the comparison for strategic communication purposes. But why would a non-Muslim Russian statesman make such a provocative comparison to one of the most powerful master narratives in Islamic culture?

It’s not as strange or unlikely as one might think. Russia is a predominately Orthodox Christian nation. And Rome’s Crusades, beginning with Pope Urban II’s call at Claremont in 1095, ostensibly aimed to defend their “eastern brethren” (i.e. Orthodox) from the Turkish advance into Anatolia, in addition to conquering the Holy Land of Palestine. But as Putin knows, that goal would change, as we discuss below.

Pope Urban II’s decree at the Council of Claremont, which Putin compared to the UN resolution on Libya, bares no resemblance to any statement issued by the United Nations. Obviously, the Security Council consists of numerous non-Christian nations, including communist China (who abstained from voting). Meanwhile, Pope Urban II’s “Letter of Instruction” to those who would take up the cross (i.e. Crusade), states:

Urban, bishop, servant of the servants of God, to all the faithful, both princes and subjects, waiting in Flanders; greeting, apostolic grace, and blessing,

Your brotherhood, we believe, has long since learned from many accounts that a barbaric fury has deplorably afflicted and laid waste the churches of God in the regions of the Orient. More than this, blasphemous to say, it has even grasped in intolerable servitude its churches and the Holy City of Christ, glorified by His passion and resurrection. Grieving with pious concern at this calamity, we visited the regions of Gaul and devoted ourselves largely to urging the princes of the land and their subjects to free the churches of the East. We solemnly enjoined upon them at the council of Auvergne (the accomplishment of) such an undertaking, as a preparation for the remission of all their sins. And we have constituted our most beloved son, Adhemar, Bishop of Puy, leader of this expedition and undertaking in our stead, so that those who, perchance, may wish to undertake this journey should comply with his commands, as if they were our own, and submit fully to his loosings or bindings, as far as shall seem to belong to such an office. If, moreover, there are any of your people whom God has inspired to this vow, let them know that he (Adhemar) will set out with the aid of God on the day of the Assumption of the Blessed Mary, and that they can then attach themselves to his following. (emphasis added)

When we examine the Pope’s letter against the wording of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, there is obviously no comparison. The letter urged “the princes of the land and their subjects to free the churches of the East.” The UN Resolution is  “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council.”

And while the Pope’s decree condones a “holy war” and guarantees the forgiveness of sins to those who take up the cross, there is no religious content in the UN Resolution. It is a pragmatic statement of objectives justified by the need for “humanitarian relief” under “international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law” for citizens of a state attacked by their own leader. “Forgiveness of sins” is clearly not an issue.

Of course, wars are always unpredictable and plans tend to change. After all, the First Crusade may have begun as a defense of the Church, its lands, and its cities against “infidel invaders,” but it turned into a legendary bloodbath. Many accounts of Crusaders killing, raping, pillaging, and otherwise destroying whatever got in their way, are documented by Christian and Muslim chronicles alike. So it is not so much the literal image of the Crusader Putin summons, but perhaps what Sayyid Qutb called “the Crusading Spirit,” a spirit recognized by many Muslims in the age of European colonialism.

Putin is also certainly aware that the Crusaders turned against the Orthodox, treating them as “heretics” and rebels against Rome. The Western and Eastern Church had split in the “Great Schism” of 1054. And the Western Crusaders laid siege to the Orthodox capital of Constantinople, a city they once vowed to defend, multiple times amidst their campaigns. The most notorious siege resulted in a bloody sacking of the sacred city in 1204. Thus, an analogy between Western military action in Muslim North Africa and the Crusades drawn by a Russian, nominally Orthodox, statesman, is not entirely shocking, even if it is politically unwise.

By drawing such an analogy, Putin is disassociating himself with Western powers that Muslim dissidents may group him and his government alongside. He is also issuing a rebuke of Western “democratization” efforts, which have often placed Putin and the Russian government in the crosshairs (figuratively speaking). Lastly, Libya has long been one of Russia’s strongest allies in the volatile (and oil-rich) region and Muammar Gaddafi’s overthrow is not in its interests.

For these reasons, the Crusades invocation makes some sense coming from Putin. But it is still an unwise strategic communication choice for Russia.

First and foremost, the term has a divisive effect that feeds violent extremist rhetoric. As Russian President Medvedev, speaking against the use of the term “Crusades” in Putin’s remarks, put it:

“Under no circumstances is it acceptable to use expressions which essentially lead to a clash of civilisations, such as ‘crusade’ and so on. . . It is unacceptable. Otherwise, everything may end up much worse compared to what’s going on now.”

Medevdev seems to recognize that ideas, and the words used to express them, have consequences. By referring to Samuel Huntington’s controversial thesis to denounce Putin’s use of the Crusades analogy, he—inadvertently or not—demonstrated an awareness of the importance of language and context, and more importantly, how those words may be interpreted—or misinterpreted—in a globalized world with social media. As we have argued in a series of white papers (this one in particular) and blogs, the senders of messages do not control how those messages—or in this case, how an analogy—will be interpreted locally in the world’s diverse cultures.

Within this strategic communication context, Russia is clearly unsettled by the Arab uprisings and revolutions. Russia does not need the West to perceive Putin’s remark as support for Gaddafi, and it does not need Muslims to hear anything that might inspire further unrest in the Caucasus, namely Chechnya and Dagestan, where authoritarian Russia has fought for years to maintain its control over a Muslim population. In other words, there is no good that can come from Putin’s poor choice of language. However Putin himself may have intended it, a lot of bad possibilities could, indeed, result from it.

Furthermore, contemporary usage of the Crusader master narrative in Muslim societies suggests that no clear distinction is made between the Catholic Crusaders and the Orthodox Christians. The Terry Jones controversy last year over the evangelical minister’s “Burn a Qu’ran Day” revealed that some in Muslim societies do not even have any understanding of the difference between Protestants and Catholics (calls were made for the Pope to prevent Jones from carrying through on his promise).  Hence, Muslim audiences will likely not detect the historical context of Putin’s remarks. They may well hear not a critic of the UN sponsored action but an “insider” of Crusading Europe getting caught in a moment of candor.

The Crusades are generally perceived in Muslim societies as a monolithic Christian civilizational campaign of aggression and exploitation against the Muslim world. In that scheme, Russia and Mr. Putin are understood as allies of Britain and the USA (e.g. due to Russia’s history in Chechnya and Afghanistan). Unless his rhetorical ploy works to distance himself and Russia from the UN Resolution, he may well find himself, and his country, “tarred” by the same master narrative brush. That consequence seems to be what Medevdev fears most.

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Events rapidly accelerated in Egypt on Friday, January 28, as expected. On Thursday night, the regime shut down internet access. This startling graphic by Craig Labovitz shows the precipitous drop in online traffic. Over the course of the day, the U.S. government repeatedly modified its official stance after making questionable remarks during the two days prior. Meanwhile, a Time Magazine article quoted a member of Netanyahu’s government in Israel expressing support for Mubarak and stating: “I’m not sure the time is right for the Arab region to go through the democratic process.”

By late Friday night – after the Egyptian military asserted its presence in the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities – Hosni Mubarak finally appeared on state television. Mubarak warned about the threat of chaos and nominally acknowledged the concerns of the protesters. But he claimed that a plot was underway to destabilize the country and that time was needed to “fix” the economy and to help the poor and he would appoint a new government to do so. Of course, he (Mubarak) would appoint and lead this new government. As one might guess, the protesters on the streets were not satisfied and they continued with renewed energy into the weekend.

On Saturday, January 29, Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman as his Vice-President. This marked the first time in Mubarak’s rule that he has appointed a Vice-President, which is the office that Mubarak previously held under Anwar Sadat. It is rumored that Egypt’s First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, played a role in preventing the appointment of a Vice-President prior to this, in order to position her son, Gamal, as the one to succeed his father. Obviously, that is no longer a possibility, and it is appears (so far) that Suleiman will likely be the one who leads a transitional military government until national elections can occur (scheduled for September). This appointment has not satisfied the protesters though. As Mohamed ElBaradei astutely put it: “This is a mere change of people, and we are talking about a change of regime. The Egyptian people are saying one word: ‘The Egyptian president has to leave’.”

Throughout the “chaos” (as so many news outlets have called it) the UK daily, The Guardian, has had among the most outstanding coverage of developments in Egypt all week. And on Friday afternoon, The Guardian noted the sudden increased U.S. media interest in the protests, as it became the story of the moment, and commented that:

The exception has been Fox News, where coverage has been more muted. ‘You probably don’t give a lot of time thinking about Egypt,’ a Fox News presenter suggested about an hour ago, before explaining that ‘groups linked to al-Qaida’ were in danger of taking over the government in Cairo.

This is the narrative that I warned about in my previous entry. Portraying the protests as an “Islamist uprising” or “revolution,” especially one associated with al-Qaeda, is exactly the sort of narrative Mubarak’s regime and other anti-democracy forces want to promote.

In a statement made on Sunday night, Mubarak claimed that: “Their demonstrations have been infiltrated by a group of people who use the name of religion who don’t take into consideration the constitution rights and citizenship values.” This message seems designed to unsettle the West and to divide the protesters into factions that will weaken opposition to the ruling regime. The threat of Islamist extremists on a global scale is certainly real, but the threat is constantly exploited by regimes in the Arab world in order to curb U.S. pressure for democratic reform and win substantial aid, especially military aid, that helps compensate for corrupt and incompetent economic policies.

Thus far, the Egyptian protests have maintained a distinctly nationalist and patriotic character. Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei joined the protests in Cairo after participating in Friday prayers and faced a confrontation with security forces. He was arrested and placed under house arrest, giving Egypt the dubious distinction of joining China in the group of countries imprisoning their Nobel Peace Prize winners. ElBaradei later issued the statement that:

The Egyptian people will be the ones who will make the change – we are not waiting for help or assistance from the outside world. But what I expect from the outside world, is to practice what you preach – is to defend the rights of the Egyptians for the universal values.

But by Sunday, the regime had pulled police forces from the city and ElBaradei was free to rejoin the protesters. He arrived in Tahrir Square and addressed the crowd – some cheered him, others jeered him as a political opportunist. Either way, it was a significant moment. He has since been appointed as the chief negotiator or representative of the various opposition parties and factions, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera satellite TV was taken off the air in Egypt, but Egyptian state television continued. The state coverage appeared to focus on images of chaos and disorder, promoting a climate of fear that gangs of armed thugs were roaming the city. This is likely a tactic to keep citizens off the streets, or more ominously a strategic attempt to promote the idea of the necessity of the despot to control the chaos. Indeed, the regime ordered the police off the streets prior to this outbreak.

The U.S. government, as the primary Western patron of Mubarak’s regime, is in a difficult position.  Will we practice what we preach and support democratic transformation in Egypt? Or will our (and/or Israel’s) strategic interests override those ideals, widening that say-do gap in the Middle East?

One final note: As many news outlets have reported, the tear gas being used on the protesters in Egypt is American-made, and the words “Made in the U.S.A.” appear on the canisters. Not a good message in an environment where many people already blame the U.S. for propping up a dictatorial regime.

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