In December, COMOPS was invited to participate in a question and answer forum with General Stéphane Abrial, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, hosted by Atlantic-Community.org. Atlantic-Community is a leading European online think tank focused on transatlantic relations. The Q&A reveals that General Abrial has an integrative, forward-looking conceptualization of the role of strategic communication in NATO.  A close read also suggests that NATO faces both internal, as well as external, strategic communication challenges.

As the head of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), General Abrial is one of two strategic commanders in the NATO organizational structure (Allied Command Operations or ACO is the other, led by Admiral James Stavridis), and is charged with leading and facilitating the continuous improvement of NATO capabilities to meet NATO missions, operations and goals now and into the future.  The online forum consisted of a video by General Abrial introducing the concept of “Smart Defense”, an initiative recently put in place by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and General Abrial’s thoughts on what Smart Defense means for ACT.

Members of Atlantic-Community were invited to submit questions to General Abrial, facilitated by the editors at Atlantic-Community, and over the course of two subsequent sessions General Abrial answered a selection of these questions.  The first set of questions addressed specific implementations of Smart Defense, including definitions and ACT implications as well as transparency and development concerns.  The second inquired about broader NATO issues such as maritime security, cultural obstacles to cooperation and strategic communication.  The complete question and answer session can be found here.

One of the underlying factors driving Smart Defense, emphasized both in General Abrial’s introductory video and his answers to multiple questions, is the increased pressure on defense budgets in the face of the current European debt crisis and severe recession in the United States.  Yet, the security challenges faced by NATO and member countries have not abated.  These fiscal conditions motivate a need to do more with less, or as the general puts it: “We need to spend better.”  General Abrial provides some interesting thoughts about cooperative procurement as a method to leverage economies of scale.  In addition, he suggests the coordination of each member-country’s unique strengths and capabilities would be more efficient than developing parallel capabilities across the Alliance.

Acknowledging the fiscal challenges underpinning Smart Defense, my question to General Abrial centered on what sort of security dividend could be realized by emphasizing strategic communication as an additional tool for achieving NATO security objectives.  In other words, with the significant rise in insurgency and other irregular warfare situations, might non-kinetic solutions offer a cost-effective supplement to traditional kinetic military capabilities (and by implication, could successful non-kinetic solutions reduce the need for expensive weapons systems procurement and maintenance, if only slightly)?

General Abrial’s answer emphasized the role of strategic communication as part of a broad public diplomacy effort and cited a 2009 NATO Summit conclusion that strategic communication must be an integral part of both political and military objectives.  This dual role of strategic communication points to a significant challenge for conducting it effectively.  Which arm of NATO (or any government for that matter), the political or military, should lead strategic communication?

Thinking of strategic communication in terms of public affairs and information operations is too restrictive. It is a discipline that bridges both political and military domains and is intricately enmeshed with both political and military operations.  It requires careful planning and forethought, otherwise devaluing its strategic benefit.  General Abrial calls for “building a professional framework strategic communications related military disciplines” and I would argue that this framework should be overtly collaborative with the political dimension of the alliance’s functions.

General Abrial’s answer also got me thinking about two sides of strategic communication and the special challenges faced by NATO.  All countries when seeking to communicate their objectives and goals, and seeking to persuade an audience to cooperate in the achievement of those goals have two audiences, external and internal.  In its traditional definition—communication crafted and coordinated to support the achievement of a goal—strategic communication is often conceived as an externally focused process, and this is especially true when subcomponents of the discipline such as public diplomacy, information operations and psychological operations (psyops) are considered.  However, countries have domestic audiences that require information and need to understand what their government is trying to accomplish.

In NATO’s case, this internal audience presents a particular challenge:  28 member countries, each with its own unique security and diplomatic concerns, its own internal political turmoil, not too mention significant historical and cultural concerns.  Each country itself has both internal and external audiences.  General Abrial’s comments introducing Smart Defense indicates this need to address this internally-focused facet of strategic communication.

He observes that a question facing NATO is: “how do we best encourage groups of like-minded countries to reap economies of scale by working together more often?”  This sounds like a strategic communication issue, but not one suited to information operations or pysop campaigns.  Rather, it is about getting all the member countries to share the same vision of NATO’s future and the same vision about how they can contribute to that future.  In short, they need to participate in the same narrative.

This challenge illustrates how approaching narrative from a systemic perspective can be helpful, not only in terms of narrative analysis and understanding, but also in terms of strategic communication planning.  Smart Defense already articulates some fundamental themes: cooperation, fiscal prudence, balancing sovereignty and solidarity, etc.  As we’ve noted here at COMOPS Journal before (notably here and here), a narrative is (1) an explanatory organization of information; (2) is structured with a trajectory towards the resolution a conflict or satisfaction of a desire (and the events of this trajectory illustrate themes, values and ideals); and (3) is a system of stories.

Constructing a Smart Defense narrative, then, would consist of identifying a variety of stories that constitute the events in the overall narrative trajectory.  For an effective and coherent narrative that unites the alliance, these stories would ideally be sourced from the member countries and thus consistent with those narrative landscapes.  Next, they would contain within them actions and characters and events that, when collected together, place Smart Defense at the resolution of the conflicts or the satisfaction of  desires germane to each member country.  Of course, that’s easier said than done.

The most encouraging of all the general’s comments, though, was his assertion that strategic communication “must be incorporated into all operational planning, instead of being relegated to an after-the-fact attempt to explain, or build support for a decision that has already been taken.”  As my co-authors and I argue in our upcoming book Narrative Landmines, understanding the narrative landscape and incorporating that knowledge into the decision-making process at operational and strategic levels can make the difference between success or failure of civil affairs, public outreach, crisis management and other soft power enterprises.

We at COMOPS thank General Abrial and Atlantic-Community for the opportunity to engage in this dialogue, and look forward to following NATO’s efforts in implementing Smart Defense and ensuring both European and Transatlantic security in the years to come.

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*Dr. Scott W. Ruston is an Assistant Research Professor at the Center for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University. A specialist in narrative theory and media studies, he is the co-author of Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (Rutgers UP, available March 2012).  He is also an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve newly assigned to a NATO ACT reserve support unit.

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In an apparent budget cutting move, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy was cut from the recently passed budget, and has ceased to exist. The move eliminates an organization over 60 years old.

The Commission was established under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 as the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.  It was merged with an educational exchange commission in 1977 to produce the current name and configuration.

According to its website, the Commission had only one permanent staffer (its Executive Director) and a budget of just $135,000.  I can attest that the activities of the Commission were valuable.  In a recent post I recounted some events from one of their meetings.  That meeting also led to a connection between our group and a group in Afghanistan working on narrative issues there.  It doesn’t take too many such connections to justify a budget that basically amounts to a rounding error in the Federal balance sheet.

The now-former Executive Director of the Commission is Matt Armstrong, whose mountainrunner blog went into hibernation while he had the gig.  Matt is restarting the blog and I welcome him back to the PD/SC blogoshopere, though I wish it were under different circumstances.

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Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People, November 15, 2011.  While nearly half (46%) of Afghans say their country is moving in the right direction, more respondents (35%) than at any time since the Foundation began polling there in 2004 say Afghanistan is headed in the wrong direction.  Attacks, violence, and terrorism are cited.  The survey also found, however, that Afghans see progress in access to education, drinking water, health services, and in household financial well-being.  Sympathy for armed opposition groups declined dramatically in 2011, reaching its lowest level since the Foundation’s surveys began.

Tom Bartlett and Karin Fisher, “The China Conundrum,” The New York Times, November 6, 2011.  In this NYT Education Life feature, Bartlett and Fisher argue that American colleges have been slow to adjust to challenges caused by the rapid rise in Chinese undergraduates — now the largest group of foreign students in the United States.  In their eager competition for students from China’s expanding middle class who can afford to pay full tuition, American colleges contend with application, language, and acclimation problems as they “struggle to distinguish between good applicants and those who are too good to be true.”  The article is a collaboration between The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education.

British Council, Corporate Plan 2011-2015, posted September 2011.  The British Council’s vision for 2015 anticipates significant reductions in government funding, more collaboration with corporate and civil society partners, increased income from paid services, and greater priority to countries with strategic importance to the UK.   Includes a foreword by Council CEO Martin Davidson and sections on English teaching, education and society, the arts, sports, science, climate change, digital platforms, regional programs, and a financial plan.  See blog comments by Alex Case on implications of a 26 percent cut in government funding and keeping an eye on the Council’s “increasing commercialism.”

British Council, “Trust and Why it Matters,” Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, pp. 190-193.  Calling for an evidence-based approach to trust building, the Council reports on its survey of young urban, educated, and online “influencers” (age 16-34) in India, China, Poland, and Saudi Arabia.  The survey tested for levels of trust in the people and governments in the UK, the US, Germany, and France.  The Council found “a clear positive association” between self-assessed levels of trust and some form of cultural relations activity involving the base line countries as well as a willingness to engage further with those countries.  Levels of trust were significantly higher for the UK, Germany, and France than for the United States.

Broadcasting Board of Governors, Impact Through Innovation and Integration, BBG Strategic Plan, 2012-2016, posted November 2011. In this brief (seven pages) and imaginative five year plan, the BBG outlines a strategy for US international broadcasting intended to address fundamental changes in the global information environment.  Its strategy includes a revised statement of mission, a vision for “altogether new ways of doing business” in programing and use of new technologies, making internet censorship circumvention and anti-jamming a top priority, and transformational changes in the identity and organizational structure of the BBG and its broadcasting services.  See also the BBG’s press release and “Frequently Asked Questions.”

Massimo Calabresi, “Hillary Clinton and the Rise of Smart Power,” Time, November 7, 2011, 26-33.  Time magazine’s cover story chronicles US Secretary of State Clinton’s efforts to face different situations, threats, and opportunities with smart combinations of diplomacy, development, and military hard power.  Her tools include the “convening power” of connections with civil society organizations, greater control over US foreign aid strategy, expansion of political advisors in the Department of Defense, and immersing “everyone from entry-level foreign service officers to newly appointed ambassadors in social media.”  Many of her initiatives, Time observes, are low on budget, “long on jargon and short on deliverables,” and run out of her office making their duration problematic.  Includes a Q&A with the Secretary by Time’s Managing Editor Richard Stengel.

Daryl Copeland, “Science Diplomacy: What’s It All About?” Center for International Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 13, November 2011.  Copeland (Canadian diplomat and author of Guerrilla Diplomacy) calls for greater attention to science diplomacy in addressing global issues that challenge development and security.  He distinguishes between science diplomacy (a subset of public diplomacy with governance connections) and international scientific collaboration among corporate and civil society partners.  His paper frames conceptual issues and outlines difficulties flowing from dominance of defense-related funding and lack of awareness and capacity in foreign ministries, multilateral organizations, and science-based institutions.

Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “All Talk and No Action,” Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, pp. 20-25.  Cross (University of Southern California) looks at rising Euro-pessimism in the United States and finds widespread lack of awareness of Europe’s political, economic, and military achievements.  She suggests three images that Europe should strive to promote:  a Europe “united in diversity,” a Europe that acts and doesn’t just talk, and a Europe that effectively combines hard and soft power in facing 21st century challenges.  Cross examines the role the European External Action Service can play in addressing US misperceptions with particular emphasis on the value of networked cultural diplomacy.

Recent articles by Professor Cross also include:  “Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the EEAS,” European Foreign Affairs Review, (2011), 16: 447-464.  On building professionalism, expertise, flexibility, and collective identity in the European External Action Service.  “Europe, A Smart Power?” International Politics (2011), 48, 691-706.  On the meaning of smart power and Europe’s use of soft and smart power.

European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC), Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011.  This fourth edition of the Culture Report — published for the first time within the framework of EUNIC (a network of 19 European cultural diplomacy organizations) — examines the current state of Europe’s external cultural relations.  Includes chapters by 30 scholars and practitioners from 20 countries that examine external perspectives on Europe, the role of culture in Europe’s external affairs, and the evolution of the EUNIC network.

“2011: Facets of Diplomacy,” Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars, Syracuse University, November 2011. Graduate students at Syracuse University have published their second edition of online journal Exchange.  Includes:

Simon Anholt (Editor, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy), “Beyond the Nation Brand — The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations”

Rachel Wilson (Syracuse University), “Cocina Peruana Para El Mundo: Gastrodiplomacy, the Culinary Nation Brand, and the Context of National Cuisine in Peru”

Sofia Kisou (Ionia University), “The Power of Culture in Diplomacy: The Case of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in France and Germany”

Ivaylo Ladjiev (University of Bath), “Searching for Influence and Persuasion in Network-Oriented Public Diplomacy: What Role for ‘Small States?’”

Shahihul Alam (Independent University) “Stretching the Parameters of Diplomatic Protocol: Incursion into Public Diplomacy”

Ellen Huijgh (Netherlands Institute of International Affairs), “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension”

Candace Ren Burnham (University of Southern California), “Public Diplomacy Following 9/11: The Saudi Peace Initiative and ‘Allies’ Media Campaign”

Michael Schneider (Syracuse University), “Book Review: The Practice of Public Diplomacy — Confronting Challenges Abroad”

Bruce Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6 (2011) 351-372.  This article looks ways in which characteristics of an American approach to public diplomacy are rooted in the nation’s history and political culture.  These include episodic resolve correlated with war and surges of zeal, systemic tradeoffs in American politics, competitive practitioner communities and powerful civil society actors, and late adoption of communication technologies.  The aarticle examines these characteristics in the context of the Obama administration’s strategy of global public engagement and three illustrative issues:  a culture of understanding, social media, and multiple diplomatic actors.  It concludes that characteristics shaping US public diplomacy significantly constrain its capacity for transformational change.

Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts, (Lexington Books, 2012).  Hayden (American University) asks why do international political actors increasingly believe communicating with foreign audiences is crucial to their interests?  His answers are provided in a significant new inquiry into the theoretical nature of soft power and the variety of ways soft power is interpreted and implemented in the public diplomacy initiatives of different actors.  Hayden draws on concepts and methods in international relations and communications to develop a theoretical treatment of soft power and public diplomacy.  He then examines discourses and practices of soft power in case studies of the public diplomacy and strategic communication policies of China, Japan, Venezuela, and the United States.  Hayden is particularly concerned with the rhetoric of soft power — the reasoning, policy discussions, and public arguments that shape how public diplomacy programs of these actors are imagined and what they view to be necessary political action through communication.

Institute for International Education (IIE), Open Doors 2011, November 2011.  IIE’s annual report on cross border student flows finds international student enrollment in the US increased 5% in 2011. Students from China led the increase followed by students from India, South Korea, Canada, and Taiwan.  The top three countries comprise almost half of the international enrollment in US higher education.  Although only 270,604 American college students studied abroad in 2010-2011, there has been a steady annual rise with an increase of about 10,000 from the previous year.  Most US students still choose traditional destinations in Western Europe.  However, enrollment in less traditional destinations such as India, Israel, and Brazil is on the rise.

Robert Kelley, “Repairing the American Image, One Tweet at a Time,” The United States After Unipolarity, LSE Ideas, London School of Economics, 2011, 35-39.  Kelley (American University) looks at the Obama administration’s public diplomacy.  He commends efforts to put “social media and technology exchanges into the toolkit of the public diplomat.”  In contrast with these innovations in method, however, he finds an “absence of a strategic framework for public diplomacy” and a “strategic incoherence” in which means matter more than content.

Michelle Lee, “Public Diplomacy: At the Crossroads Between Practitioner and Theorist,” Council of American Ambassadors, The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2011.  Lee (a US Foreign Service Officer currently assigned at the Department of State) looks at reasons for the divide between practitioners and academics in public diplomacy and what might be done in the two communities to benefit from greater collaboration.  Her article discusses recent efforts to bridge the divide, the value of advanced educational as well as increased training for mid-career diplomats, and recommendations to strengthen the practice and study of public diplomacy.

Jan Melissen, Beyond The New Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Discussion Paper No. 3, October 2011.  The Director of Clingendael’s Diplomatic Studies Program and co-editor of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy looks at changes in diplomatic practice in a world of multiple actors and diverse networks.  His paper assesses criticisms of public diplomacy; varieties of public diplomacy practices by states; the increasing public diplomacy roles of sub-state, regional, and civil society actors; and points of learning from the public diplomacy of East Asian countries.  Given these changes, Melissen argues the juxtaposition of “traditional” and “new” public diplomacy is no longer satisfactory.  Rather, public diplomacy and diplomacy are merging into a more inclusive and “societized” form of diplomacy.  In a polylateral world of multiple actors, states remain highly relevant, but their diplomacy can best be understood in a context where non-state and non-official actors have a much greater role in international relationships.  Practitioners, he suggests, can learn much “outside their comfort zone from how public diplomacy is practiced in distinct organizational and cultural settings.”

Pew Research Center, Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking Popular Worldwide, December 20, 2011.  Pew’s survey of digital communication in 21 countries finds overwhelmingly large majorities in most major countries use cell phones for text messages (75%), taking pictures/video (50%), and Internet use (23%) based on median percentages across the nations surveyed.  Social networking remains popular but with only marginal change in use since 2010.  Exceptions are Egypt and Russia where usage has increased from 18% to 28% in Egypt and 33% to 43% in Russia.  Multiple uses of cell phones and social networking correlates with youth demographics and education. Media release.

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, guest editors, “American Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 6, Nos. 3-4 2011.  In this special issue of the Journal, Sharp (University of Minnesota, Duluth) and Wiseman (University of Southern California) convene a team of scholars and practitioners to look at the conduct of American diplomacy, the character of its diplomatic culture, efforts to reform, and suggestions for what lies ahead.  Includes:

Introduction

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, “American Diplomacy,” 231-234

Research Papers

Geoffrey Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” 235-259

David Clinton (Baylor University), “The Distinction Between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice,” 261-276

CHEN Zhimin (Fudan University), “US Diplomacy and Diplomats: A Chinese View,” 277-297

Michael Smith (Loughborough University), “European Responses to US Diplomacy: ‘Special Relationships,’ Transatlantic Governance and World Order,” 299-317

Karin A. Esposito and S. Alaeddin Valid Gharavi (School of International Relations, Tehran), “Transformational Diplomacy: US Tactics for Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2004-2006,” 319-334

David Bosco (American University), “Course Correction: The Obama Administration at the United Nations,” 335-349

Bruce Gregory (George Washington University/Georgetown University), “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” 351-372

James Der Derian (Brown University), Quantum Diplomacy: German-US Relations and the Psychogeography of Berlin,” 373-392

Paul Sharp, “Obama, Clinton and the Diplomacy of Change,” 393-411

Practitioners’ Perspectives

Chas W. Freeman Jr. (US diplomat, retired), “The Incapacitation of US Statecraft and Diplomacy,” 413-432

Thomas Hanson (University of Minnesota, Duluth), “The Traditions and Travails of Career Diplomacy in the United States,” 433-450

Alec Ross (US Department of State), “Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign Policy,” 451-455.

Clay Shirky, Salant Lecture — Press Freedom in a Global Era, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, October 2011.  Shirky (New York University and author of Here Comes Everybody) looks at press freedom as a relationship between technological capability and the regulatory power of legal and policy constraints.  Using Wikileaks and other examples, Shirky examines challenges to freedom of expression in “a post national environment.”  He argues the US and other democracies, which have been good at lecturing autocracies on freedom of speech, need to become much better at holding themselves to the standards they espouse.  (Courtesy of Bob Coonrod)

Russell Shorto, Descartes’ Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict Between Faith and Reason, (Vintage Books, 2008).  Intellectual historian and journalist Russell Shorto tells the story of Descartes’ legacy and its relevance to today’s competing fundamentalist impulses (secular, Christian, and Muslim).  His lively and witty narrative uses the strange story of a centuries long struggle between scientific and religious authorities over the disposition of Descartes’ physical remains as a metaphor for understanding the continuing conflict between faith and reason.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A New Theory for the Foreign Policy Frontier: Collaborative Power,” The Atlantic, November 30, 2011.  Slaughter (Princeton University) updates her inaugural Joseph S. Nye lecture at Princeton to frame a concept of “collaborative power,” — defined as “the power of many to do together what no one can do alone” — which she contrasts with Nye’s concept of “top down” relational power.  Elements of collaborative power include mobilization, connection, and adaptation of one’s preferences to enable meaningful dialogue.  For Slaughter, collaborative power is not held by A in relation to B.  Rather it is an “emergent phenomenon,” which leaders can learn to unlock and guide but not possess.

Tara Sonenshine, Under Secretary-designate for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, US Department of State, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 8, 2011.  In prepared remarks for her confirmation hearing, Sonenshine (Executive Vice President, US Institute for International Peace) described public diplomacy as “a shared means to a shared goal of extending America’s reach and security by influencing how individuals around the world come to know and understand us.  It is about the advancement of foreign policy goals through people-to-people connections in a complex, global networked society.”  Successful public diplomacy, she stated, “is inextricably linked to national security.”  Public diplomacy “increases economic security through global engagement,” and it “must be agile and adaptive in using state of the art information technologies.”

In a Huffington Post blog, “America’s Next Move on Public Diplomacy,” co-authored with her USIP colleague Sheldon Himelfarb on May 5, 2009, Sonenshine offered her ideas to then incoming Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale.

Janet Steele, “Justice and Journalism: Islam and Journalistic Values in Indonesia and Malaysia,” Journalism, 12(5) 533-549.  Drawing on interviews with journalists in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Kuala Lumpur, Steele (George Washington University) looks at ways in which Southeast Asian journalists think about their work and implications for US public diplomacy.  She argues “journalists in Indonesia and Malaysia express universal values of journalism, but do so in an Islamic idiom” that privileges goals of economic justice and the legitimacy of those in authority more than freedom.  If the US wishes to engage journalists in these countries, Steele contends, “rather than focusing on ‘the role of a free press in a democracy,’ it would make far more sense to focus on ‘the role of independent media in a just society.’”

Kishan S. Rana, 21st Century Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Guide, (The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).  In this recent contribution to the Key Studies in Diplomacy series, former Indian Ambassador and DiploFoundation scholar Kishan Rana provides a guide to modern diplomacy for diplomacy practitioners and scholars.  His book is written with particular attention to its use in foreign ministry training courses and by teachers and students in academic institutions.  The book divides into three categories.  (1) A section on the international environment includes chapters on globalized, regional, and small states diplomacy; public diplomacy and country branding; and disapora diplomacy. (2) Chapters on institutions and processes look at foreign ministry reform, the reinvented embassy, decision-making and risk management, performance evaluation, information and communications technologies, the new consular diplomacy, and protocol.  (3) A section on diplomacy skills offers guidance on professional responsibilities, advocacy and public speaking, media skills, writing skills, and training exercises.

Websites and blogs of Interest

Robert Albro (American University), Public Policy Anthropology, a blog site that looks at cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, intercultural dialogue, and other topics.

Intermedia’s AudienceScapes, an interactive tool and knowledge resource “on how citizens and policymakers gather, share, and use information for all sources.”  In a news release on December 15, 2011, Intermedia announced the appointment of Ali Fisher (Director of Mappa Mundi Consulting) as Associate Director of Digital Media Research.

R. S. Zaharna (American University), Culture Posts, an interactive blog site on USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy platform.

“U.S. Department of State Announces Launch of New Website,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, October 12, 2011.  The Department’s interactive Discover Diplomacy website seeks to introduce the world of diplomacy and the work of the State Department to high school and college students.

Gem from the past

Walter R. Roberts, “The Evolution of Diplomacy,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 17.3 (Summer 2006), 55-64.  In this article, retired US diplomat and scholar Walter Roberts examines the origins of diplomatic practice as it focused increasingly on publics and differed from traditional diplomacy between governments during the second half of the 20th century.  It is a succinct overview of a transformation in diplomatic practice that led eventually to a global conversation on the meaning and methods of public diplomacy.  His article is a useful foundational reading as scholars and practitioners in the 21st century ask whether another transformation is occurring.  Has public diplomacy become so central to diplomacy that it is no longer helpful to treat it as unique theoretical concept and subset of diplomatic practice.  Mediterranean Quarterly lists “The Evolution of Diplomacy” as its seventh most cited article of the past eleven years.  His article is available online courtesy of the Public Diplomacy Alumni Association.

Walter Roberts career, which began in the Voice of America in 1942, included diplomatic assignments in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, service as an associate director of the US Information Agency, and a presidential appointment to membership on the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.  He pioneered the teaching of public diplomacy at George Washington University in the 1980s and 1990s.
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*Bruce Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

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Manan Ahmed, Where the Wild Frontiers Are: Pakistan and the American Imagination, (Just World Publishing, 2011).  The author of “Chapati Mystery” blog and a historian of Islam in South Asia (Freie Universitate Berlin) gathers his commentaries on US imaginings about Pakistan and historical and political trends within Pakistan.  Sharply critical, humorous, and well written, Ahmed’s short essays portray a failure on the part of American officials and writers in mainstream media to “imagine” the realities of Pakistan’s people and society.  Ahmed’s blogs make a case for deeper comprehension of relations between the two societies:  “Unless we decide to get local, to pay attention to local narratives, facts, histories, realities, languages, religions, ethnicities, cultures, and so forth, we will remain in this deeply flawed discourse.”  Includes a foreword by Amitava Kumar (Vassar College).

Robert M. Beecroft, “Taking Diplomatic Professional Education Seriously,” Foreign Service Journal, July/August 2011, 66-69.  Retired US Foreign Service Officer Beecroft argues the “new diplomacy” requires “a systematic regimen of professional diplomatic education at the Department of State.”  His article summarizes key findings and recommendations in the 2011 report sponsored by the Stimson Center and the American Academy of Diplomacy on Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service Through Professional Education and Training.

Lee C. Bollinger, “News for the World — A Proposal for a Globalized Era: an American World Service,” Columbia Journalism Review, July/August 2011, 29-33.  Bollinger (Columbia University) finds (1) a contradiction between the need for global news and the diminished supply of foreign reporting; (2) a rise in national media intended to have a global presence (BBC World Service, Al Jazeera, Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, and France 24), (3) a continuing need for journalistic institutions to offset laissez-faire “citizen journalism;” and (4) a trend from local to regional to global in civil society institutions such as universities and the media.  He discusses America’s dual system of public broadcasting — the journalism of National Public Radio and PBS and international broadcasters such as Voice of America and RFE/RL, which are rooted in the Cold War and barred from broadcasting to US audiences by “constitutionally suspect” provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948.  Bollinger calls for an “American World Service” to provide a “stronger publicly funded system of international news.”

Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “In Afghanistan’s Garmser District, Praise for a U.S. Official’s Tireless Work,” The Washington Post, August 13, 2011. The Post’s correspondent and author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City (2006) profiles the work of State Department representative Carter Malkasian during his two year stay in Garmser on the Helmand River.  Chandrasekaran attributes Malkasian’s success to his Pashto fluency, sensitivity to local cultural norms, willingness to take risks, countless meetings and roadside conversations, residence in a local trailer, two-year  stay in one district, a “soft spoken manner” combined with “fierce negotiating skills,” his credibility with US troops, and his willingness as a temporary civilian hire to “to forge his own job description, even if it meant bucking the State Department’s rules.”  In a letter to the Post on August 23, 2011, US Ambassador Ryan Crocker comments that “hundreds of foreign service officers and other federal agency workers are doing similar work in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.”

Jacob Comenetz, “Innovating Public Diplomacy for a New Digital World,” The Washington Diplomat, July 27, 2011. Contributing writer Comenetz discusses conceptual issues and operational challenges facing US diplomats in using social media tools.  His essay looks at (1) implications of ideas on network power and “Internet Freedom” in the writings of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former State Department official Anne-Marie Slaughter; (2) projects and institutional changes in the Department’s public diplomacy bureaus; and (3) uses of digital technologies to create stealth networks and enable activists challenging regimes in Iran, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere.  Comenetz also summarizes contrasting views, drawing particularly on Evgeny Morozov’s critique in The Net Delusion (2010).

Paul Cornish, Julian Lindley-French, and Claire Yorke, Strategic Communications and National Strategy, A Chatham House Report, Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 2011.  Cornish (University of Bath), Lindley-French (Netherlands Defense Academy), and Yorke (Chatham House) call for a whole of government approach to strategic communication and increased awareness of its central role in the development and implementation of national strategy.  They argue the UK government has a good understanding of strategic communication’s importance, but this understanding is “relatively limited in its sophistication and imagination.”  Their recommendations fall into three categories:  (1) establish a clearer definition of strategic communication and its place in national strategy, (2) reform how strategic communication is managed within government, and (3) adapt and strengthen strategic communication in response to the challenges of new information technologies and cyber security.  (Courtesy of Robin Brown)

Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks Are Transforming the European Union, (The University of Michigan Press, 2011).  Cross (University of Southern California) argues the European Union has made significant advances in achieving internal and external security through collaboration in and among epistemic communities — i.e., knowledge-based transnational networks of diplomats, soldiers, scientists, civilian crisis professionals, and other areas of shared expertise. Her generally optimistic view of EU integration is grounded in her reading of the capacity of networks to supersede national governments in the diplomacy of “security decision making.”  Through their common culture, shared professional norms, frequent meetings, speed, and flexibility, epistemic communities are changing how we think about governance, diplomacy, and approaches to dealing with terrorism, immigration, cross-border crime, drug and human trafficking, and other transnational security threats.

“Diplomacy Post 9/11: Life in the US Foreign Service,” The Kojo Nnamdi Show, National Public Radio, September 22, 2011. Host Kojo Nnamdi interviews American Foreign Service Association President Susan Johnson, US Foreign Service Officer Matthew Asada, and US Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter.  Issues discussed include tensions between security and fulfilling mission goals, changes in recruitment and promotion, training requirements, and debates between proponents of “a traditional service and an expeditionary service.”  Available in audio and transcript versions.  (Courtesy of Michelle Lee)

Ali Fisher and David Montez, Evaluating Online Public Diplomacy Using Digital Media Research Methods, A Case Study of #ObamainBrazil, InterMedia Global Research Network, July 2011 (available online through USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy.  In this study, Fisher (Mappa Mundi Consulting) and Montez (InterMedia) (1) discuss research methods needed to develop, implement, and evaluate social media campaigns in public diplomacy; (2) assess the State Department’s use of digital media to support President Obama’s March 2011 visit to Brazil; and (3) offer recommendations for using social media in future public diplomacy campaigns.  They conclude that, to be effective, public diplomacy practitioners must adopt new research methods and strategies that take into account opportunities and constraints in using social media.

Kathy R. Fitzpatrick, U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 6, 2011.  Fitzpatrick (Quinnipiac University) finds a lack of consensus among scholars, practitioners, and informed observers on the methods and goals of public diplomacy in the decade since 9/11.  Her paper draws on dialogue theory to assess US public diplomacy during the Bush and Obama administrations and to create a prescriptive relational model that seeks to ground its practice in two-way “symmetric engagement.”

Thomas L. Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used To Be Us, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).  Using stories, interviews, and analysis, New York Times columnist Friedman and Johns Hopkins (SAIS) professor Mandelbaum assess the causes and implications of four challenges: globalization, the revolution in information technology, America’s chronic deficits, and its excessive energy consumption.  Their critique — intended as “both a wake up call and a call to collective action” — offers a change manifesto grounded in more and better education and different habits of saving and consumption.  Students and teachers will find useful their chapters on bottom up innovation and “creative creativity” as today’s necessary adjuncts to learning critical skills and mastering knowledge domains.

Amanda Foreman, A World on Fire: Britain’s Crucial Role in the American Civil War, (Random House, 2010).  Forman (University of London) puts the war in an international context with a focus on Britain’s policy of neutrality, deep opposition to slavery, and dependence on the South for cotton; the South’s need for British-made weapons and ships; and the North’s frequent consideration of war with Britain and efforts to block diplomatic and economic connections with the Confederacy.  Her massive (958 pages) and critically acclaimed study reinforces the correlation between US public diplomacy and armed conflict throughout American history.  She offers many fresh insights into the practice of traditional and public diplomacy midway between the American Revolution and World War I. Written from the perspective of political leaders, diplomats, soldiers, journalists, writers, and citizen activists, Foreman’s narrative includes a thorough assessment of the diplomatic and public opinion implications of the North’s capture of Confederate agents Mason and Slidell in the Trent affair, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, military successes and failures, and the political and economic interests all concerned.

Public diplomacy practitioners and scholars will find particularly interesting Foreman’s discussion of US Minister Charles Francis Adams’ skills in traditional diplomacy, which contrasted with his pronounced unwillingness to engage journalists and British publics; the methods and tools used by Thurlow Weed, sent by Secretary of State William Seward to influence European public opinion; the methods and tools used by the skilled, multi-lingual journalist Henry Hotze, who was recruited by the Confederacy to engage the press on behalf of the South’s Commission in London; Hotze’s pro-South journal the Index; the uneasy relationship between diplomats and spies; the influence of citizen activists and journalists with pro-South or pro-North sympathies; dissemination of unattributed speeches and editorials; and the roles of the telegraph, photographs, political cartoons, debates in Parliament, and non-governmental organizations in shaping public opinion.

Seward’s controversial release of all US diplomatic correspondence in the first half of 1862, motivated by domestic political considerations, proved deeply embarrassing to Adams who never imagined his letters would become public.  Britain’s political leaders and diplomats took this 19th century precursor to WikiLeaks in stride.

Peter W. Galbraith, “How to Write a Cable,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2011, 102-103.  The former US Ambassador to Croatia and Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Afghanistan argues that, contrary to what Julian Assange might say, most diplomats “do not worry that the wrong people will read their cables, but that the right people won’t.”  With a twinkle in his eye, Galbraith in this short piece, offers this advice:  (1) “be strategically nasty,”  (2) “a spoonful of Ukrainian nurse helps the cable go down,” (3) accuracy is at a premium (except about the home team); (4) “pretend you’re a foreign correspondent — back in the glory days;” and (5) “be literate.”

Susan Gigli and Ali Fisher, “Networked Audiences: 10 Rules for Engagement,” The Channel (Association of International Broadcasters), Issue 2, 2011.  Gigli (InterMedia) and Fisher (Mappa Mundi Consulting) provide a brief guide for media organizations seeking to embrace new networked media platforms.  Their 10 rules show how “users behave and cluster with these networks, and how users are shaping their own news and information environments.”

William Hague, “The Best Diplomatic Service in the World: Strengthening the Foreign and Commonwealth Office as an Institution,” London, September 8, 2011.  In a speech at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the British Foreign Secretary outlines his vision for the future of the Foreign Office and steps needed to improve the skills and capabilities of Britain’s diplomats.

Steven Livingston, Africa’s Evolving Infosystems: A Pathway to Stability and Security, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Research Paper No. 2, December 2010, March 2011.  Livingston (George Washington University) looks at cellular telephony and other emerging information and communication technologies in the context of emerging democratic institutions in Africa.  He concludes that although these “technologies can, at times, be used for less positive purposes, including crime and politically motivated violence, on the whole they are enhancing human security and sustainable economic development across the continent.”

Ali Molenaar, Reading Lists, Clingendael Library and Documentation Centre, Netherlands Institute of International Relations.  Clingendael’s librarian continues to provide useful literature lists on public diplomacy and a wide range of related topics.  Recent updates include:
– Literature on Public Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Celebrity Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Cultural Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Citizen and Track 11 Diplomacy, July 1, 2011
– Literature on Branding, July 1, 2011
– Literature on External Relations of the European Union, July 1, 2011
– Literature on European Level Diplomacy and the EU Diplomatic Service, July 1, 2011
– United States of America: Diplomatic Relations, July 1, 2011

Alex Oliver and Andrew Shearer, Diplomatic Disrepair: Rebuilding Australia’s International Policy Infrastructure, Lowy Institute for International Policy, August 2011.  In this in-depth followup to a 2009 blue ribbon panel report on Australia’s Diplomatic Deficit, the Lowy Institute’s Oliver and Shearer conclude that Australia’s international policy infrastructure and overseas diplomatic network “remain seriously under-resourced and lagging behind comparable nations.” Their study looks at overstretched diplomatic posts, critical shortfalls in foreign language training and other critical skills, “lackluster” public diplomacy, “almost nonexistent use of new digital platforms,” and a significant gap between diplomatic capacity and the nation’s interests.  An appendix compares Australia’s diplomatic service with those of the US, the UK, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the European Union.  The 33-page report and a 2-page Fact Sheet can be downloaded from the Institute’s website.

Alasdair Roberts, “The WikiLeaks Illusion,” The Wilson Quarterly, Summer 2011, 16-21.  Roberts (Suffolk University Law School) argues that although new information technologies make it easier to leak and broadcast sensitive government information, barriers remain to what WikiLeaks seeks to achieve.  His article discusses implications of the large amount of information released, minimal public outrage, business decisions by commercial companies that hurt WikiLeaks’ functionality, and the lack of surprise at the “open secrets” released.  Roberts, quoting former New York Times Executive Editor Bill Keller, agrees the disclosures did not “expose some deep unsuspected perfidy in high places.”  Rather they provided only “texture, nuance, and drama.”

Paul S. Rockower, “Projecting Taiwan: Taiwan’s Public Diplomacy Outreach,” Issues & Studies, 47, No. 1 (March 2011), 107-152, (Available on the USC Center on Public Diplomacy’s Resources website).  Rockower (a journalist and former Israeli Foreign Ministry press officer) analyzes Taiwan’s soft power and use of public diplomacy “not only as a means of promotion, but also as a means of ensuring its diplomatic survival and access to the international arena.” His essay discusses Taiwan’s public diplomacy strategies and tactics, narratives, institutions, and methods.  Rockower looks particularly at Taiwan as a middle power with unusual limitations and capacities and its emphasis on polylateral connections with non-state actors and multilateral institutions.  His paper combines an academic assessment of Taiwan’s public diplomacy with recommendations for practitioners.

Max Schulman, “The State Department’s Shameful Record on Internet Freedom,” The New Republic, August 8, 2011.  TNR intern Schulman finds “significant failures, both in overall funding efforts and in the omission of vital tools” in implementation of the State Department’s Internet freedom agenda.  He summarizes the arguments of Congressional and public policy critics, views of the US Broadcasting Board of Governors, and views of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Notes From the Foreign Policy Frontier,” The Atlantic, July 2011.  Slaughter (Princeton University and former director of policy planning at the US Department State) has joined The Atlantic as a correspondent and “curator/host’ of an online feature that examines ways of thinking about foreign affairs in a “framework that moves beyond states and addresses both governments and societies.”  In her first post, “The New Foreign Policy Frontier” (July 27, 2011) she summarizes her goals and intentions.  See also her YouTube video presentation, DIY Foreign Policy, Personal Democracy Forum 2011, June 27, 2011 (19 minutes).

US International Strategy for Cyberspace:  Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World, Washington, DC, May 2011.  In his covering letter, President Obama describes his cyberspace strategy as “an approach that unifies our engagement with international partners on the full range of cyber issues.”  The document contains elements of a US cyberspace policy, a vision for cyberspace’s future, and a statement of policy priorities.  The section on diplomacy focuses on the need to “strengthen international partnerships” and “engage the international community in frank and urgent dialogue” on “principles of responsible behavior in cyberspace” and actions needed to build a system of cyberspace stability.  Like White House national security strategies, the cyberspace “strategy” is more a policy and public diplomacy statement than an analysis of tradeoffs among priorities, resources, costs and risks, and specific steps needed to achieve its goals.

US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Kerry Introduces Legislation to Authorize and Strengthen the State Department and U.S. Diplomacy,” July 27, 2011.  Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry’s authorization bill for Fiscal Years 2012-13 contains a number of proposals to modernize the State Department, build the capacity of US diplomacy, strengthen public diplomacy, increase program accountability, exempt US international broadcasting from restrictions on domestic dissemination of “public diplomacy information,” and support global development, cyberspace, and Internet freedom.  The full text of the bill, S. 1426, is available on the Library of Congress Thomas website.

Richard Wike, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power: Changing Global Perceptions of the U.S. in the Post-September 11 Era,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, September 7, 2011.  Findings in the Pew Research Center’s 2010 and 2011 surveys include:  (1) America’s global image improved significantly in Western Europe and many parts of the world after Barack Obama’s election in 2008; (2) the Obama bounce has staying power overall, but with lower marks for his handling of Iran, Afghanistan, and Israeli-Palestinian issues; (3) there has been no Obama bounce in Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, and Palestine; and (4) the economic downturn since 2008 did not significantly affect positive opinions, but did lead to a reassessment of American economic power overall and relative to China.

R.S. Zaharna, Battles2Bridges blog. American University communication scholar Zaharna blogs on relational approaches in public diplomacy, assertive public diplomacy, Palestinian public diplomacy, digital strategies, and other issues.

Gem from the Past

Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy, (The University of Chicago Press, 2004).  In Projections of Power, communications scholar Robert Entman (George Washington University) developed his cascade model of media framing and examined its implications for public opinion, foreign policymaking, and the “framing” of events by political leaders.  When it was published to critical acclaim in 2004, Harvard University’s Thomas E. Patterson called it a “stunning achievement” and observed that “scholars and practitioners alike will be relying on this book for years to come.”  The reviewers were right.  Projections of Power recently earned Professor Entman the American Political Science Association’s Doris Graber Book Award for the best book published in the last ten years in political communication.
*Bruce Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

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As Congress is once again behaving badly, I thought I would post a brief note about some interactions I have had while visiting Asia.  Comments here show that what many of us regard as “inside baseball” matters a lot to foreign publics, and it has them worried.

Last week I attended the Singapore Global Dialogue, organized by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University. It was attended by influential people from all over the Asia Pacific region.  Roughly three out of four people I talked to inquired about ongoing political problems in the U.S.  They often asked specifically about the debt reduction circus of this summer, but in many cases conversations expressed deeper concerns.

For example, an international banker asked me if the political system in the U.S. was in danger of collapsing.  He explained how closely people in this part of the world follow our political developments. They look to the U.S. for leadership and depend on us to do the right thing. Accordingly they get very worried–at least as worried as people in the U.S., based on these conversations–when it appears that our system is becoming gridlocked and unable to function.

One academic colleague suggested that ongoing political problems in the U.S. play into skepticism in the streets of countries where our stated goal is promoting democracy: “The average guy hears about this and says: ‘So this is what we get with democracy? Who wants that?’”

All this goes to show that our political problems in the U.S. aren’t just a domestic matter. They have public diplomacy functions too.  At the moment they are sending a very bad message about the U.S. and its viability as a world leader–at just the time, incidentally, when China is seen as ascendent (another big theme at the conference).

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Intended for teachers of public diplomacy and related courses, here is an update on resources that may be of general interest.  Suggestions for future updates are welcome.

Jozef Batora and Monika Mokre, eds., Culture and External Relations: Europe and Beyond, (Ashgate, 2011). The essays compiled by Batora (Comenius University, Brataslava) and Mokre (Austrian Academy of Sciences) examine conceptual issues, historical case studies, and trends in the uses of culture in external relations.  The authors assess ways in which political entities use culture to generate goodwill and frame international agendas, culture’s role in creating boundaries, and its role in building connections across boundaries.  Includes:
– Jozef Batora and Monika Mokre, “Introduction: What Role for Culture in External Relations?”
Part I, Universalism Versus Particularism
– Erik Ringmar, “Free Trade by Force: Civilization Against Culture in the Great China Debate of 1857″
– Iver B. Neumann, “Our Culture and All the Others: Intercultural and International Relations”
– Srdjan Vucetic, “The Logics of Culture in the Anglosphere”
Part II, Boundary Building Versus Boundary Transcendence
– Monika Mokre, “Culture and Collective identifications”
– Jozef Batora, “Exclusion and Transversalism: Culture in the EU’s External Relations”
– Bahar Rumelili and Didem Cakmakli, “‘Culture’ in EU-Turkey Relations”
Part III, Policy Aspects
– Manfred J. Holler and Barbara Klose-Ullmann, “Abstract Expressionism as a Weapon of the Cold War”
– Milena Dragicevic Sesic, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Cultural Policies of and Towards Serbia”
– Emil Brix, “European Coordination of External Cultural Policies”
– Monika Mokre and Jozef Batora, “Conclusions”

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), Board Meeting, Transcript, Washington, DC, June 3, 2011. In its “first ever public meeting,” BBG Chair Walter Isaacson and US international broadcasting’s bipartisan board “outlined initiatives to reform U.S. international broadcasting, provided an update on the BBG’s strategic review, announced the Burke Award winners to recognize courage, integrity and originality of BBG journalists, and took questions from the public on U.S. international broadcasting.”  Additional information and related documents are available at the BBG’s website.  A subsequent BBG board meeting was held on July 14, 2011.

Rosa Brooks, “Ten Years On: The Evolution of Strategic Communication and Information Operations since 9/11,” Statement Before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, US House of Representatives, July 12, 2011. Brooks (Georgetown University) draws on her past two years as senior advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in these reflections on drawbacks in the term strategic communication, lessons from the past decade, and thoughts about the future.  Among many useful observations, Brooks calls for:  (1) clear distinctions between strategic communication and related terms; (2) appropriate assumptions about accountability, metrics, methods, and timeframes; (3) the compelling need to understand human terrain (the languages, narratives, memories, and hopes of others); (4) learning from the “major mistake” of validating Osama bin Laden’s “special” status and fixation on terrorism; (5) a willingness to take risks and recognition that mistakes will happen; and (6) recognition that “obsession with who does what” in government-wide communication is a waste of time.

Caitlin Bryne and Rebecca Hall, Australia’s International Education as Public Diplomacy: Soft Power Potential, Clingendael Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, No. 121, July 2011. Bryne (Bond University) and Hall (International Education Resources Group) discuss trends and opportunities in international education as an instrument of public diplomacy.  They argue that Australia has not realized its full potential and call for more active public diplomacy leadership, enhanced evaluation, and increased dialogue within Australia’s public diplomacy community and civil society.

Damian Carrington, “Artists Condemn British Council’s Decision to Axe Climate Programme,” The Guardian, July 14, 2011. In an open letter on July 14, a group of well-known British authors and artists “with affectionate connections to the British Council” have written to express “mystification and deep concern” that funding and staffing have been radically cut for work on climate change, one of the Council’s three top priorities. The move was criticized by the UK’s Foreign Minister Jeremy Brown in a letter to British Council Chief Executive Martin Davidson.  In his letter, leaked to The Guardian, Brown reportedly admonished Davidson “for his apparent ‘termination’ of one of the council’s ‘success stories.’”  In a letter to The Guardian on July 16, Davidson stated the Council’s work on climate change would continue.  He noted, however, that “we are not a climate change organization” and that the Council would focus on its “core programmes in the arts, English, education and society around the world.”  (Courtesy of Robin Brown’s (Leeds University) Public Diplomacy: Networks and Influence blog.)   

Daniel Costa, Guestworker Diplomacy, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper No. 317, July 11, 2011. In this report critical of the State Department’s exchange visitor program, EPI’s Immigration Policy Analyst Costa finds that the J visa program “gives U.S. employers significant financial incentives to hire foreign workers over U.S. workers, while providing them no labor protections.”  He faults the State Department, which oversees the J visa program, for collecting “very little data” on visa holders and for relying on employers and sponsoring organizations to regulate themselves.  His report looks at the history of the J visa program, including its large Summer Work Travel program, and at the “severe exploitation of J visa holders” consequent to the outsourcing of State’s oversight responsibilities.

For the State Department’s views on “New Regulations for J-1 Visa, Summer Work Travel,” see “Question Taken at the June 20, 2011 Daily Press Briefing,” Office of the Spokesperson, Department of State, June 21, 2011 and Holbrook Mohr and Mitch Weiss, “Student Visa Program: New Rules, Same Problems,” ABC News, Associated Press, June 20, 2011.

Nicholas Cull and Ali Fisher, eds., The Playbook: Case Studies of Engagement. InThe Playbook, a project commissioned by the British Council, Cull (University of Southern California) and Fisher (Mappa Mundi Consulting) host a coordination point for international practitioners to share experiences on methods of engagement and the practice of public diplomacy.  Examples from among dozens of cases in its growing collection include:  China’s Panda Diplomacy, Framing Climate Change at the G-8 Summit, Forgotten Voices Listening Project UK, Creative Cities Project East Asia, Japan’s International MANGA Award, The Franklin Book Program, and the New York Philharmonic’s Trip to North Korea.  Users are invited to register, comment, and contribute cases.

Shawn Dorman, ed., Inside a U.S. Embassy: Diplomacy at Work, 3rd edition, Foreign Service Books, 2011. Dorman (Associate Editor, Foreign Service Journal) has compiled an entirely new edition of essays on the lives and work of US foreign service officers and other foreign affairs professionals.  Its broad spectrum of nearly 100 short chapters by practitioners include profiles of the work of ambassadors (Marie Yovanovitch, Armenia), political officers (Dereck Hogan, Russia), public affairs officers (Christopher Teal, Mexico), and entry level officers (Carolyn Dubrovsky, Nepal); “day in the life of” accounts of a cultural affairs officer (Anne Benjaminson, Tajikistan), a public affairs officer (Michael McClellan, Iraq), and an environment, science, technology, and health officer (Jason McInerney, Honduras); chapters on embassies, employees, and families; chapters on a variety of field activities; and chapters with guidance for those interested in joining the foreign service and foreign affairs agencies.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?” Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011, 57-68. Drezner (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) asserts that grand strategies matter far less than national economic and military power and the actions taken by states.  He contends that grand strategies are important, however, as “cognitive beacons” or signals to others in times of “radical uncertainty” — i.e., during wars, revolutions, depression, or power transition.  Grand strategies for Drezner are communication strategies far more than planning and decision-making guides.  Drezner argues that although the Obama administration was wrong early on to assume that improved standing in the world would give the US greater policy leverage, it was right to pivot to a more assertive grand strategy of “counterpunching.”   Yet the administration has failed to clearly explain its grand strategy to Americans and to the rest of the world, which for Drezner defeats the whole purpose of having one.

For a critique of Drezner’s argument, a defense of the Obama administration’s worldview, and an argument that the search for grand strategies is misguided in “today’s multipolar, multilayered world,” see Fareed Zakaria, “Stop Searchng for an Obama Doctrine,” The Washington Post, July 6, 2011.  For Drezner’s reply, see “The Virtues of Grand Strategies” on his Foreign Policy blog, July 7, 2011.  See also, David Ignatius, “Obama’s Communications Gap,” The Washington Post, July 15, 2011.

Alexandra Dunn, “Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s January 25 Uprising,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol.35:2, Summer 2011,15-24. Dunn (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies) assesses the Egyptian government’s shifts from a strategy of content suppression to a “shutdown strategy” that sought to close entire media platforms and tools — and then to a strategy of “commandeering the country’s mobile phone networks to conduct a countrywide SMS message campaign directed at quelling protests.”  She concludes that Egypt’s strategies “alienated the business community, disproportionately impacted apolitical citizens, and inadvertently increased international focus on the crisis.”

“International Broadcasting,” PD Magazine, Issue 6, Summer 2011. Now in its third year, the online publication edited by graduate students at the University of Southern California’s Center for Public Diplomacy continues to provide useful articles by scholars and practitioners on issues in public diplomacy.  Articles in the sixth issue focus on international broadcasting in a transformational media environment and include:
– Simon Mainwaring, “Social Media and Business: Creating New Pathways in Diplomacy”
– Alan Heil, “VOA and BBC at a Crossroads”
– Shawn Powers, “R.I.P., Broadcasting”
– Philip Seib, “Al Jazeera English in Focus”
– Oliver Zollner, “International Broadcasting in the Social Network Era”
– Interviews with former members of the Broadcasting Board of Governors James Glassman and Ted Kaufman and current members Michael Meehan and S. Enders Wimbush
– Philip Wang, “Transformation of Radio Taiwan International”
– Alex Oliver and Annmaree O’Keefe, “Struggling to be Heard: Australia’s International Broadcasters Fight for a Voice in the Region”
– Kim Andrew Elliott, “In International Broadcasting, Even the Static Must be Credible”

Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp, eds., America’s Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age, Volumes 1 and 2, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), June 2011. In this detailed examination of cyber security issues, CNAS editors Lord and Sharp have organized the work of some 200 analysts in a project co-chaired by Robert E. Kahn (Corporation for National Research Initiatives), Mike McConnell (Booz Allen Hamilton), Joseph Nye (Harvard University), and Peter Schwartz (Global Business Network).  Volume 1 discusses findings and recommendations relating to interests, trends, risk assessments, policies, strategies, and government-private sector partnerships.  Volume 2 contains thirteen chapters by subject matter experts.  Includes chapters by Joseph Nye on “Power and National Security in Cyberspace,” Martha Finnemore (George Washington University) on “Cultivating International Cyber Norms,” and Richard Fontaine (CNAS) and Will Rogers (CNAS) on “Internet Freedom and Its Discontents.”

Marc Lynch, Upheaval: U.S. Policy Toward Iran in a Changing Middle East, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), June 2011. In this CNAS report, Lynch (George Washington University) argues that the US policy of “strategic patience” toward Iran, which until recently has had some success, can no longer be sustained.  In today’s environment, a viable Iran policy means “aligning the United States with the emerging empowered Arab publics and preserving key regional alliances, while denying Iran the ability to exploit the changing environment.”  Lynch’s recommendations include engaging with publics in the Arab world and Iran, a significantly increased focus on human rights in Iran, accommodating legitimate demands of Bahrain’s Shi’a population, continuation of lower level diplomacy and confidence building measures rather than a new public negotiating initiative, and a strategic communication campaign that highlights Iran’s failures.  He notes this does not mean calling for regime change or supporting subversion in Iran and that it is essential to disaggregate the challenge posed by Iran from local political problems.

Johannes Matyassy and Seraina Flury, Challenges for Switzerland’s Public Diplomacy: Referendum on Banning Minarets, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 4, June 2011. Matyassy (Switzerland’s Ambassador to Argentina) and Flury (Switzerland’s Department of Foreign Affairs) examine Switzerland’s communication strategy in dealing with the anti-minaret initiative.  Their paper examines the strategy’s strengths and limitations and provides practical “Do’s” and “Don’ts” for other countries.  They argue the strategy was successful in shifting a concentrated international focus on Switzerland to a focus on Europe as a whole in which the Swiss case was seen as part of a larger set of issues involving migration and integration.

James Pamment, The Limits of the New Public Diplomacy, PhD thesis, 2011. In his thesis, available by pdf download, Pamment (Stockholm University) compares ways in which British, Swedish, and American diplomats plan and evaluate media campaigns. He argues that “old” and “new” public diplomacy models are not distinct categories in which the latter has replaced the former.  Using comparative empirical data, Pamment explores the extent to which the new public diplomacy is truly new, practical constraints that foreign ministries face in adapting to the new diplomacy, and the value of the “new public diplomacy” as an explanatory concept.

Christopher Paul, “Getting Better at Strategic Communication,” Statement Before the Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, US House of Representatives, July 12, 2011. In his statement, Paul (RAND Corporation) builds on his recent book, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates (2011), and his earlier publications in the field.  His testimony examines tensions and conceptual issues in what scholars and practitioners mean by strategic communication as well as his own views on its “unassailable core.” He summarizes common themes in a decade of reports on strategic communication and public diplomacy discussed in his study Whither Strategic Communication? A Survey of Current Proposals and Recommendations (2009).  Paul concludes with comments on finding the right balance between civilian and military capacity, the Woodrow Wilson Center’s SAGE effort to create a business plan for a civil society entity that will strengthen public-private partnership, and his seven recommendations for improving strategic communication.

Pew Research Center, China Seen Overtaking U.S. as Global Superpower, Global Attitudes Project, July 13, 2011. Pew’s survey finds that in most regions of the world attitudes toward the United States continue to be more favorable than during the George W. Bush administration, but in 15 of 22 nations majority opinion holds that China has or will replace the US as the world’s leading economic power.  This view is particularly prevalent in Western Europe.  The survey also finds that global opinion is consistently negative regarding China’s capacity to match the US in military power.  Key findings are summarized in the report’s overview.

Lawrence Pintak, “Breathing Room: Toward a New Arab Media,” Columbia Journalism Review, May/June, 2011, 23-28. In CJR’s cover story, Pintak (Washington State University) looks at how journalists in the Arab world are “warily testing boundaries, adjusting to new realities, and daring to dream of the possibilities.”  He sees potential for independent, nationally focused television channels to challenge regionally focused channels, the possible the rise of an “Egypt effect” from more open Egyptian media, a redefinition of the role of Arab journalists, and more citizen journalism on the part of young Arabs skeptical of traditional media organizations.

Giles Scott-Smith, “The Heineken Factor? Using Exchanges to Extend the Reach of U.S. Soft Power,” AmericanDiplomacy.org, June 23, 2011. Scott-Smith (Leiden University and author of Networks of Empire, 2008) looks at the “continuing use-value of exchanges for favorably altering the opinions of international visitors coming to the United States.”  His article focuses on the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program and the use of exchanges in three case studies:  (1) overcoming diplomatic tensions with Iran, 2006-2009; (2) overcoming prejudices through the 1983 “Pluralism in U.S. Society” regional project; and (3) efforts to connect with second and third generation immigrants through the Muslim Incentive Program in Western Europe, 2003-2010.  Scott-Smith’s article and previous scholarship on exchanges is useful for its examination of the strengths, limitations, risks, lessons, and situational relevance of exchanges in public diplomacy.   Among his conclusions:  “Be wary of running exchange programs with an obvious connection to foreign policy goals.”

Mary Beth Sheridan, “Low-key U.S. Diplomat Transforms Syria Policy,” The Washington Post, July 12, 2011. Post reporter Sheridan profiles US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford’s trip to Hama, his greeting from cheering protestors, his Facebook page comments on Syria’s anti-demonstration policies. and his career-long interest in public outreach.

Geoffrey Wiseman, “Theorizing Diplomacy and Diplomats on Their Own Terms,” Review of Paul Sharp’s Diplomatic Theory of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2009) in International Studies Review (2011), 13, 348-350. Wiseman (University of Southern California) provides a brief summary, probing questions, and generous praise for Sharp’s (University of Minnesota, Duluth) wide ranging study of diplomatic theory.  Wiseman commends the book to “international relations theorists and their graduate students” and to “reflective diplomats interested in theorizing themselves.”

Sharp’s Diplomatic Theory of International Relations was annotated in “Public Diplomacy: Books, Articles, Websites #50,” March 2, 2010.

Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2010). Wu (Columbia University and the New America Foundation) uses his sweeping history of modern telecommunications to raise central questions about the future of the Internet.  His well-written narrative focuses on the progression of the telegraph, the telephone, film, radio, and television from “somebody’s hobby to somebody’s industry” — from a freely accessible medium to control by large corporations and cartels in a process he calls “the Cycle.”  Wu’s book raises critical questions.  “Is the Internet really different?”  Is the “net neutrality” of the Internet, with its indifference to content, destined to replace single medium industries?   “Which is mightier:  the radicalism of the Internet or the inevitability of the Cycle?”

Gem from the Past

Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture, (Anchor Books paperback edition, 1981, originally published in 1976). The scholarship of American anthropologist Edward T. Hall (1914-2009) and his insights into intercultural relations and nonverbal communication have long been useful for diplomats, foreign aid professionals, Peace Corps volunteers, and other practitioners.   Beyond Culture — which sits on the shelf with The Silent Language The Hidden Dimension, and other works — examines culturally influenced “unconscious” attitudes that shape thoughts, emotions, communication, and actions.  In Beyond Culture, Hall developed his views on high context cultures (where many things are left unsaid and are explained by the cultural context) and low context cultures (where words and verbalization are more important to communication).   Hall taught at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute from 1950-1955.

*Brice Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

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There is a new narrative responsible for the success of the uprisings that spread from Tunisia through Egypt and now are heard in the streets of Syria, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere.  It is a secular narrative generated by young Muslims who recognize that older jihadist forms of “telling their resistance story” by linking them to Islamic Master Narratives were largely responsible for the binary oppositions that divide them, and Islam, from the West and modernity.

As Jacqueline O’Rourke, a communication consultant working in Qutar and writing in Z Magazine sees it:

This new communications plan is a direct attempt to create a counter-narrative to the predominant one which has dominated Western discourse for the past decade. That narrative runs roughly like this: Muslims are jealous of the freedom and technological advantages of the West. Their society has been in decline after their scientific advances of medieval Europe. Instead, they try to use the West’s technology against itself. Whether airplanes, viruses, or chemicals, Muslims have appropriated science for the purposes of terrorism.

As Thomas Friedman and others have pointed out, the existing “anti-technology/science” narrative is often coupled with Zionist-American conspiracy tales, and together they have fueled the extremist “New Jahiliyya” master narrative developed by Sayyid Qutb.  It depicts a Muslim world in chaos and disorder that can only be made righteous again by a vanguard of True Believers who rise up and seize power by any means necessary, and who essentially return their culture and people to a 7^th Century CE way of life.

Clearly that old religious narrative has been either silent or silenced in the face of these new uprisings by young Muslims throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  Not even the Muslim Brotherhood is calling for an Islamic state.  Instead, the young Muslims and their new leaders are pressing for reforms that offer more freedom, more opportunity, and more control over their own choices, not a return to Sharia law or the reestablishment of a Caliphate.  More importantly, their call for reform is accomplished without challenging the sanctity of the Five Pillars of Islam, which places obedience to God before any other duty or goal.  In this way, young Muslims have opened up a “Third Way” narrative that balances respect for religious traditions with progressive political reforms designed to improve their ability to live well and to compete in a global economy.

But as good as this new secular narrative may sound to Western ears, O’Rourke explains the outcome is unlikely to be one that accepts Western “hypocrisy and condescension”:

One critical reality is that this revolution is not only a revolution against Arab dictators, but a revolution against the humiliation Muslims have been facing in the post-9/11 global landscape. The Arab/Muslim people are not just enraged with political, social, and economic oppression, they are also angry with their rulers’ complicity with imperialism, particularly American and Israeli. In short, the revolution has erupted from Muslim societies as a result of internal oppression and as a response to political, economic, and cultural imperialism, with which the post-9/11 youth are intricately familiar. In this regard, the international community must get the message that this revolution is as much against its hypocritical and condescending manner of dealing with Muslim societies as it is against Mubarak, Ben Ali, or Qadaffi.

One way to think about how all of these narrative tensions may play out is to consider that across this region people are not so much interested in trading one way of life for another, but instead creating a new way of life—a new language for governance—that avoids the pitfalls of either the old jihadi ideological worldview or one that values free market capitalism via oil revenues in exchange for continued support for dictators, particularly if the latter alternative carries with it unquestioning support of Israel.

What might that new narrative be?  One possible story is a hybrid combination of socialism designed to better distribute the wealth and opportunities afforded by revenues (however they are derived) with a progressive Islam dedicated to improving human rights and building communities that are based more on Islamic scholarship and nonviolence than on free market capitalism or extremism.

In this brave new narrative the system of stories would be all about more openness and tolerance, as well as more democratic reform, but there would be no good reason to expect that U.S. corporate or political interests would enjoy any special status in it.  There are other emerging markets—from China to India to the EU—and the political landscape that was once dominated by American foreign policy backed by an unlimited military budget is not what it once was nor do we have the will to wield power in the old fashioned way.

The speech given in Cairo by President Obama last year set in motion a storyline that may well have influenced young Muslims to go ahead with their uprisings.  The president’s late intervention in Libya—and that only with international backing and cooperation—further provided evidence that our intentions are no longer driven by revenge, as they have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead by a steely pragmatism that weighs in on the side of those fighting against oppression but leaves outcomes to those who must then forge a new society.

In general, this new secular narrative is all about accepting this post-uprising/revolution responsibility.  It is thankfully free of the old Islamist rant.  It is so far mostly free from violence, except in Libya.  We should begin to expand our conception of how secular narratives are producing political and social change and rethink our approach to strategic communication as a result.  We don’t want to make the old Pentagon mistake of preparing for the last war, in this case the jihad drawn from master narratives of Islamist extremism, while a whole set of new strategic communication challenges that has nothing to do with those old stories takes shape.

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In our work identifying and tracking the use of Islamist narratives here at the CSC, the second most frequently invoked among Islamist extremists in our research (after Nakba or Palestine) has been the Crusader master narrative. The use of this term among Islamists connotes religious war, subjugation by Western Christians, injustice, and eventual colonization. Its use in the West, however, connotes a much different meaning: a righteous cause, good triumphing over evil, a reclamation of holy lands. Hence perspective is key in the use of narratives, which is why they are so powerful and able to convey deep meanings with the invocation of a few key terms. The use of narrative to convey meaning is important, and it is equally important to understand how audiences perceive the use of these narratives.

Islamists the world over continue to use the term “crusade” to describe the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But when George W. Bush referred to the war in Iraq as a crusade, he was roundly (and rightly) criticized for playing into the Islamists’ narrative. While he may have wanted to convey the justness of the struggle to eliminate violent extremism, to Muslims worldwide he conveyed the meaning of religious war in order to dominate Muslim lands. The narrative slip is widely considered the gaffe that it was.

When NATO forces began to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya in an effort to prevent Muammar Qaddafi from bombing and strafing his own people, the opinions of observers – including allies and enemies of the United States – ran the gamut from full support to condemnation. Because it was an attack on a predominantly Muslim nation by predominantly Christian nations (Qatar an exception), Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized the effort and called it a crusade (Qaddafi also used the term). Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev, in a rare public difference on policy, condemned the use of the word in this context.

The Putin-Medvedev rhetorical dispute was covered in the mainstream press, including the New York Times, which carried a story with the connotation that Putin’s words were not well chosen (Christian Science Monitor story here). My colleague Jeffry Halverson wrote a Comops blog post about Putin’s comments here.

This is why it was particularly surprising and disturbing to read a front-page story on March 29 about the conflict in Libya that invoked the crusade narrative in referring to Samantha Power, President Obama’s advisor on human rights.

The Times fell into a narrative trap that it set for itself. The issue of human rights in the Muslim world – and elsewhere in Asia and Africa – is contentious. Dictators – in Africa, Latin America, and Asia – have often portrayed western ideals of human rights as an imposition of foreign values on these countries, and claim that democracy, for example, is inconsistent with their cultures (here is a recent essay on the topic from the Chinese embassy in the US).  This is belied, of course, by these countries’ grassroots human rights and pro-democracy movements – including those in Libya (although it remains to be seen exactly what would hold the rebels together if they should achieve their goal of ousting Qaddafi). Sharp observers of those condemning “western” human rights point out that this criticism is made frequently by those for whom human rights and democracy are a threat – such as Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, Indonesia’s Suharto, and more recently Syria’s Bashar al Assad.

When the Times refers to a human rights promoter as a “crusader,” however, it plays into the historical notion of human rights as a foreign, western concept, and provides rhetorical ammunition for Qaddafi and his supporters, as well as opponents of democracy and human rights elsewhere. It is as if the United States is suggesting that human rights are an imposition of western or foreign or even Christian values, similar to the crusades, and it is a particularly curious and troublesome choice of words on the part of the Times. It sends an unfortunate message that undermines its intent when viewed from a Muslim perspective. Many Muslims have beliefs about human rights that are mostly consistent with international norms. We need to engage and empower these people, not alienate them.

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Events rapidly accelerated in Egypt on Friday, January 28, as expected. On Thursday night, the regime shut down internet access. This startling graphic by Craig Labovitz shows the precipitous drop in online traffic. Over the course of the day, the U.S. government repeatedly modified its official stance after making questionable remarks during the two days prior. Meanwhile, a Time Magazine article quoted a member of Netanyahu’s government in Israel expressing support for Mubarak and stating: “I’m not sure the time is right for the Arab region to go through the democratic process.”

By late Friday night – after the Egyptian military asserted its presence in the streets of Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities – Hosni Mubarak finally appeared on state television. Mubarak warned about the threat of chaos and nominally acknowledged the concerns of the protesters. But he claimed that a plot was underway to destabilize the country and that time was needed to “fix” the economy and to help the poor and he would appoint a new government to do so. Of course, he (Mubarak) would appoint and lead this new government. As one might guess, the protesters on the streets were not satisfied and they continued with renewed energy into the weekend.

On Saturday, January 29, Mubarak appointed Omar Suleiman as his Vice-President. This marked the first time in Mubarak’s rule that he has appointed a Vice-President, which is the office that Mubarak previously held under Anwar Sadat. It is rumored that Egypt’s First Lady, Suzanne Mubarak, played a role in preventing the appointment of a Vice-President prior to this, in order to position her son, Gamal, as the one to succeed his father. Obviously, that is no longer a possibility, and it is appears (so far) that Suleiman will likely be the one who leads a transitional military government until national elections can occur (scheduled for September). This appointment has not satisfied the protesters though. As Mohamed ElBaradei astutely put it: “This is a mere change of people, and we are talking about a change of regime. The Egyptian people are saying one word: ‘The Egyptian president has to leave’.”

Throughout the “chaos” (as so many news outlets have called it) the UK daily, The Guardian, has had among the most outstanding coverage of developments in Egypt all week. And on Friday afternoon, The Guardian noted the sudden increased U.S. media interest in the protests, as it became the story of the moment, and commented that:

The exception has been Fox News, where coverage has been more muted. ‘You probably don’t give a lot of time thinking about Egypt,’ a Fox News presenter suggested about an hour ago, before explaining that ‘groups linked to al-Qaida’ were in danger of taking over the government in Cairo.

This is the narrative that I warned about in my previous entry. Portraying the protests as an “Islamist uprising” or “revolution,” especially one associated with al-Qaeda, is exactly the sort of narrative Mubarak’s regime and other anti-democracy forces want to promote.

In a statement made on Sunday night, Mubarak claimed that: “Their demonstrations have been infiltrated by a group of people who use the name of religion who don’t take into consideration the constitution rights and citizenship values.” This message seems designed to unsettle the West and to divide the protesters into factions that will weaken opposition to the ruling regime. The threat of Islamist extremists on a global scale is certainly real, but the threat is constantly exploited by regimes in the Arab world in order to curb U.S. pressure for democratic reform and win substantial aid, especially military aid, that helps compensate for corrupt and incompetent economic policies.

Thus far, the Egyptian protests have maintained a distinctly nationalist and patriotic character. Nobel Laureate Mohamed ElBaradei joined the protests in Cairo after participating in Friday prayers and faced a confrontation with security forces. He was arrested and placed under house arrest, giving Egypt the dubious distinction of joining China in the group of countries imprisoning their Nobel Peace Prize winners. ElBaradei later issued the statement that:

The Egyptian people will be the ones who will make the change – we are not waiting for help or assistance from the outside world. But what I expect from the outside world, is to practice what you preach – is to defend the rights of the Egyptians for the universal values.

But by Sunday, the regime had pulled police forces from the city and ElBaradei was free to rejoin the protesters. He arrived in Tahrir Square and addressed the crowd – some cheered him, others jeered him as a political opportunist. Either way, it was a significant moment. He has since been appointed as the chief negotiator or representative of the various opposition parties and factions, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

Meanwhile, Al-Jazeera satellite TV was taken off the air in Egypt, but Egyptian state television continued. The state coverage appeared to focus on images of chaos and disorder, promoting a climate of fear that gangs of armed thugs were roaming the city. This is likely a tactic to keep citizens off the streets, or more ominously a strategic attempt to promote the idea of the necessity of the despot to control the chaos. Indeed, the regime ordered the police off the streets prior to this outbreak.

The U.S. government, as the primary Western patron of Mubarak’s regime, is in a difficult position.  Will we practice what we preach and support democratic transformation in Egypt? Or will our (and/or Israel’s) strategic interests override those ideals, widening that say-do gap in the Middle East?

One final note: As many news outlets have reported, the tear gas being used on the protesters in Egypt is American-made, and the words “Made in the U.S.A.” appear on the canisters. Not a good message in an environment where many people already blame the U.S. for propping up a dictatorial regime.

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The Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia last week beget further democracy uprisings in Egypt and Yemen this week, as well as protests in Jordan and Mauritania.  If the protesters are finally successful in Egypt and President Hosni Mubarak is forced out, this eruption of game-changing scenarios inspired by deep conflicts between the people and their leaders, and enabled by the velocity and spread of social media, poses a whole new set of communication and policy challenges for the United States.

For most Americans these developments are news items that we watch until we tire of the images on the screen and turn the channel or click onto another website or decide to check our email or post a change to our Facebook status.  I doubt many of us could locate Tunisia on a world map.  I know most of my students can’t.  But beneath that surface of relatively uninformed curiosity about the unfolding rebellion lies a deeper empty well of cultural ignorance.  Put simply, most of us couldn’t say why, or how, the words “Pharaoh” and “tyrant” used to describe Mubarak are such powerful narrative IEDs dropped into an already turbulent environment.

Here’s a brief version of the backstory, which you can read more about in a new book, Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, to be released next week.  (Full disclosure: I am one of the authors.)  The Pharaoh, a tyrant believed by many Muslims to be Ramses II, rejected the Word of God despite being repeatedly being shown signs through Moses who was acting as God’s agent, was drowned in the sea with his army while pursuing the Israelites.  Just before death, the Pharaoh accepted the God of Moses but it was too late.  God did not save him.  Instead, God promised to preserve the tyrant’s body for all time, so all could see what fate awaited those who reject God’s signs.  The body of Ramses II is, in fact, remarkably well preserved and on display in Cairo today.

That is where the Old Testament/Qur’anic story ends, but it is not the end of the story.  Master narratives derive their enduring cultural power over time and across geographies.  So it was that the story of the Pharaoh was used to discredit Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and to cast him as a tyrant.  As we recount it in the book:

On October 6, 1981, President Anwar Sadat was reviewing a military parade commemorating Egypt’s ‘victorious’ campaign in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  While television cameras captured the event, four men emerged from a truck and approached the viewing stand. When Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, the leader of the assassination plot finished firing his weapon at Sadat, he cried out: “I have killed the Pharaoh!” Sadat was shot thirty-seven times. Thereafter, videotapes of the bloody televised spectacle fetched huge prices on the black market and it remains readily accessible online today.

Similar tyrant/Pharaoh accounts and images exist on the Internet and are distributed in pamphlet form for other perceived tyrants, including Ariel Sharon, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama.  In each case, the master narrative is appropriated as a sign of history repeating itself and used to influence perceptions of the targeted leader/ruler.  It doesn’t matter that there may be no direct correlation between the Pharaoh, who was not an elected official, and today’s leaders.  Nor does it matter that thus far no Moses has appeared before the cameras to claim he or she is acting as God’s agent.  What does matter is that once a leader is branded a “tyrant” and called “the Pharaoh,” the details of the old story matters less than the idea that an injustice of historic proportions exists and must be remedied by true believers.

For those of you who may be thinking, “but this democracy uprising has nothing to do with radical Islam or even with religion in general,” that fact doesn’t make the interplay of a powerful set of rhetorical figures well known within and across cultures any less viable.  If anything, it only broadens the appeal.  For it is not just Muslims who are in the streets of Cairo or Tunis, but a diverse array of Arabs, Muslims, Christians, and Jews, who all know the old story of the tyrant known as “the Pharaoh” who dared to challenge the God of Moses.

In the case of Egyptian dictator Mubarak the comparison is made more relevant by his refusal to yield to the will of his people.  And it is underscored by his friendship with U.S. leaders and our continuing support of his regime.  Regardless of religion, the overt support of the U.S. is often associated with the use of our military and economic power to influence events and protect our interests in the region.  The irony, of course, is that while we officially endorse democracy everywhere in the world, this democratic uprising places our official position in conflict with the support of a major ally in the region.  Do we side with the people who are organizing for democracy, or with a stubborn dictator well past his sell-by date who has been tarnished with the tyrant label?

As Reuters reporter Amr Abdallah Dalsh on the scene in Cairo put it yesterday:

The Administration is caught in a bind, but it’s more strategic than just moral: Supporting tyrants loathed by their own people but willing to do Washington’s bidding in international matters is a decades-old U.S. tradition in the Middle East, as well as in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The problem with Mubarak is not simply that his methods are at odds with professed U.S. values; it’s that his brittle autocracy appears to have entered a period of terminal decline, with the U.S. potentially on the wrong side of history.

Being “on the wrong side of history” is a narrative we can little afford.  Yet no matter what we may or may not do in response to this and other popular uprisings, the perceived lack of U. S. support for the protesters and continuing support for Mubarak does evoke another historical parallel.  Aladdin Elaasar is the author of The Last Pharaoh: Mubarak and the Uncertain Future of Egypt in the Obama Age, and in a op-ed piece published today, he writes ominously of Egypt’s uncertain future:

It is possible to find parallels in Egypt to pre-revolutionary Iran. Given the social ills engendered by extended unemployment, especially among the qualified young; aggravated social polarization in which ill-gained wealth, insolently displayed, stood out against the growing misery of the rural and urban population; and generalized corruption spreading right up to the highest levels of society and state. Indeed, many U.S. analysts acknowledge Egypt’s instability. “It will rock the world,” wrote Michele Dunne, a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace scholar. “Octogenarian Mubarak, will leave office, either by his own decision or that of providence.” Instability in Egypt may become an international security concern. There is no clear chain of command or civil society base to facilitate the transfer of power to the next president.

Does the reference to “providence” call up the association of divine will bringing an end to the rule of a tyrant? Perhaps.  But dictators rarely die peacefully in their sleep.

The irony of the U.S. response is not lost on the rest of the world.  As Richard Grenell, Spokesperson for the United Nations, put it in an article earlier today:

[Vice President] Biden’s support for Mubarak in the face of his falling regime sends a powerful and unfortunate message to the Arab world that their freedoms are negotiable. While American interests in the Middle East must obviously be protected, America’s credibility to support democracy for everyone everywhere is crucial. WikiLeaks have already shown American ambassadors and foreign service officers criticizing governments privately but publicly saying very little. How can VP Biden ever talk about the importance of fighting for freedom and democracy again if he chooses to support a corrupt dictatorship at the very time its being so strongly challenged from within? The vice president’s absolute show of support for Mubarak is unfortunately being heard throughout the Arab world. The people of Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Cuba and North Korea are listening. It’s too bad that Vice President Biden can’t find a way to support everyday Egyptians’ pleadings for more freedoms.

Finally, with the master narrative in the backstory and the label of tyrant firmly in the foreground of published reports used to describe Mubarak, there can be no doubt about the message of the looters who broke into the Egyptian Museum last night and “destroyed” two Pharaonic mummies.

Democracy has proven to be a many-splintered thing in the Middle East and elsewhere, whether it arrives with an invasion that forces a regime change or by the will of angry mobs who threaten to topple a dictator. Regardless of method, the U.S. should pay greater attention to the language used to define the conflict and what the meaning of terms such as “Crusader,” “tyrant,” and “Pharaoh” conjure up for populations who are schooled to respect their histories.  The use of the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter, is not the reason the people have taken to the streets.  These devices are only distributors—and effective ones—of messages that are deeply rooted in culture and time.  What moves people to action is not the technology of rebellion, but the narrative that shapes it and the words used to define it.  Master narratives are powerful because they provide answers to essential questions of identity as well as what it takes to live a just and meaningful life.  As such, they serve as calls to action.  Because, to paraphrase the philosopher Alistair MacIntyre, in order to answer the question “what am I to do?” requires first being able to explain what narratives we are part of.

The Pharaoh is a master narrative throughout the region and most of the world.  We would do well to remember that when we begin formulating what our next move will be.

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