A few weeks ago I did a keynote speech at a public meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission in Public Diplomacy.  Later in the meeting I heard a presentation by Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).  The topic of his talk tied together several topics recently discussed on COMOPS Journal, and accordingly I want to share it with readers.

Presumably in response to the myriad calls to better coordinate U.S. government strategic communication, the CSCC was charged in a recent executive order to

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Among other things, the CSCC oversees the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which has been the subject of  previous posts on this blog, both appreciative and critical. Amb. LeBaron’s talk focused on a recent DOT effort that allows me to add another post in the appreciative category, and I don’t believe it is very well known.

The DOT recently produced three videos juxtaposing AQ’s ideology with facts-on-the ground in the Arab Spring protests.  The first features clips from an Ayman al-Zawahiri video where he insists that “apostate regimes” can only be overthrown by violent jihad and that change through peaceful means is hopeless.  The second is based on a rant against democracy by Abu Yahia al-Libi.  The third (and most hilarious) uses clips of captured video from bin Laden’s compound showing him watching videos of himself.  In all three cases the AQ clips are intercut with news footage of the Arab Spring protests.

In my opinion this is a superb effort for a number of reasons:

• They reinforce messages that have long been priorities for U.S. strategic communication in the counterterrorism arena, namely that violent jihad is not necessary for social change, and that the best change is democratic.
• They present these messages while side-stepping problems with U.S. credibility, by mashing-up AQ’s own video with clips from independent news reports.
• They are “prosumer” efforts, done by DOT members with desktop video editing software, rather than slick professional productions.  As such they embrace cutting-edge trends in social media.
• They effectively employ the principle of ridicule as strategic communication, poking the Bad Guys in the eye by making them seem silly and out of touch with reality, and contributing to their developing image as a toxic brand.

We have argued that on the rugged-landscape of counterterrorism communication more out-of-the-box efforts like this are needed.  So hats off to the DOT for taking the leap.

You can watch the DOT videos, with English subtitles, here:

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On Sunday, September 25, a lone suicide bomber detonated a bomb at a Protestant Church in Surakarta (Solo), Central Java, as services were letting out. Along with the bomber, one congregant was killed and several wounded from the shrapnel composed of nails, bolts and buckshot. In the ensuing week there has been a struggle over how the event should be framed, with most Islamist groups denying responsibility.

The bomber has been identified as Pino Damayanto aka Yosepa Hayat Ahmad aka Abu Daud Raharjo, and was wanted by police in connection to the network that bombed a mosque in a police station in Cirebon, West Java, last April. Police have since announced that they are in pursuit of others suspected of being a part of the attack, who might have fled to East Java, as well as a number of bombs that are suspected to have been built. On Friday, Indonesia’s anti-terrorism squad Densus 88 captured Beni Ahmad Asri, wanted in conjunction with the Cirebon network, in West Sumatra.

Police announced that the bomber was a member of jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Basyir’s Jama’ah Ansarut Tauhid (JAT). This was quickly met with a denial by a JAT spokesman. It has been confirmed, however, that he studied at the Islamic boarding school run by Abu Bakar Basyir at Ngruki.

One immediate concern was whether this bombing was a reaction to the sectarian violence in Ambon three weeks ago. As my earlier post notes, extremist Islamist groups have stoked the flames of violence in Ambon, calling for jihad and continuing to portray Christians in the region as separatist members of the Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas, or RMS). The RMS was defeated in the early 1950s, was supported then by both Christians and Muslims alike, has little support in the Moluccas, and has never been a significant threat to the state of Indonesia since its defeat.

The day of the Solo church bombing, there were three bombs found in Ambon, in front of churches.  A fourth was found a day later. Despite the location of the bombs, extremist sites such as Prisoner of Joy place the blame on Christians. Indonesian police have reported similarities in the construction of the bombs found in Ambon to those found and used in Cirebon and Solo. One extremist site, Ghur4ba,  proudly proclaimed its support for the church bombing, and linked it to the violence in Ambon, the general crusade of Christians against Muslims, the apostacy of the Indonesian government, and referred to the bomber as a martyr. The declaration has appeared on several other sites, and is attributed to Forum Islam al-Busyro.

On Saturday, the head of Indonesia’s anti-terrorism agency proclaimed that after investigation, the violence in Ambon was not tied to the bombing.

As the toll rose to two dead including the bomber and 22 injured, Detik.com and others reported that the suicide bomber had apparently left a bag containing a Qur’an, gloves and other items at a nearby internet cafe, where he used a computer just prior to carrying out the bombing. The day after the bombing, news site Surya published this story stating that the bomber had looked at the extremist site ar Rahmah before the bombing.

Eastern Indonesia’s flagship paper Pos Kupang gave a list of the stories that the bomber had viewed. The stories the bomber viewed were mostly about American and allied casualties in Afghanistan, with one about Osama bin Laden. The stories referenced powerful Islamist master narratives, notably the crusader master narrative and the martyr master narrative (the latter in reference to Osama bin Laden).

In the days following the Solo bombing, police and investigative journalists began to release details about the bombing, and extremists began issuing their predictable condemnations of the event – while continuing to valorize suicide bombings elsewhere and jihad in general. Mainstream Muslim groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah immediately condemned the bombings, and an NU spokesman asked that the government take down extremist sites.

Responding to calls for shutting down extremist websites, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Information Titaful Sembiring stated that websites are likely not what push people to radicalism, but rather it is a fundamental misunderstanding of Islam, which bans attacks on places of worship. While I agree with the latter part of the statement, there is mounting evidence that self-radicalization can occur via the internet.

Extremist sites such as ar Rahmah and Voice of al-Islam cited the minister’s speech in defense of their right to publish, and argued that they are the only ones exposing the true war against Islam in Indonesia, citing (once again!) the conflict in Ambon. Ar Rahmah plays the persecuted card, as though it is a victim of Islamophobia (and as though it doesn’t publish stories inciting violence in the name of twisted interpretation of Islam). Ar Rahmah published a story asking why the death of Christians warranted so much attention, when the deaths of Muslims in Ambon — according to them — did not.

As extremist groups began distancing themselves from the bombing, ar Rahmah published a story asking people not to link the bombing with jailed terrorist leader Abu Bakar Bashir. Conspiratorial thinking emerged as well — according to another story on ar Rahmah, intelligence analyst A. C. Manullang stated that the bombing may have been a pretext to crack down on radical groups in  Solo. In a story on Voice of al-Islam (which was subsequently removed), head of the paramilitary group Islamic Defenders Front Habib Rizieq claimed that the bombing was part of a “divide and conquer” tactic by the government.

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Last year, my colleagues Steven Corman, Jeffrey Halverson and I wrote a series of blog posts exploring Islamist reactions to anti-Islam and anti-Muslim events in the US, including the debate over the Park51 Islamic Center and an American pastor’s proposal to burn a Qur’an on 9/11, among others. One of the points we made in our final post was that these events fuel the extremist narrative that the US and its allies are at war with Islam, rather than counter the extremists’ messages. We also argued that the State Department could play a more proactive role in refuting the acts and rhetoric that damages the American message abroad, especially since the acts and rhetoric were mainly coming from private citizens, and not the government. What to do, however, when it is the government itself that is making the gaffes?

Last week a story about an FBI trainer gained a lot of traction in both the American mainstream media as well as various online outlets including blogs and news sites. William Gawthrop, who is an instructor at the American Military University and has held several positions in national security and intelligence, also trains law enforcement officials in counterterrorism. On June 8 he was discovered to have been continuing to conduct law enforcement training lectures that repeat messages about Islam and Muslims, even though the FBI claimed that the presentation was a one time affair that ended in April after fierce criticism of its content. Gawthrop’s analysis, which essentially states that the problem isn’t radical Muslims but Islam itself, was spread to a room full of law enforcement officials who likely trusted that their source of information was not only better informed that they were, but well informed. Gawthrop violated this trust, however, and delivered a lecture that demonized Islam.

Counterterrorism experts have widely criticized Gawthrop, yet he continues to misinform law enforcement. From a Wired article (with a video clip of the presentation), here is Aki Peritz, a former analyst with the National Counterterrorism Center:

This is mind-numbingly stupid and dangerous. If we were to follow his idea to a logical extension, that means we have individuals in every single government agency, at top levels, from CIA to the Defense Department to members of Congress, that are part of this cabal to destroy Western civilization. If you truly believe that, then this is McCarthyism on steroids.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s plays right into the terrorists’ narrative. First, some of what Gawthrop said.

Gawthrop’s assertion that Islam was 17 percent religion and 83 percent ideology might have seemed charitable when compared to Dutch Islamophobe Geert Wilder’s assertion that the proportion are more like 5 percent and 95 percent, respectively. Both comments cry out for an explanation, however; how in the world did Gawthrop come up with that number? He doesn’t say. Most offensive, however, is his general demonization of Islam, comparing Muslims to iron filings and stating that Islam is like a magnet determining their movement, and whose “force is exerted against you” — a room full of New York City police officers. Most dangerous is his claim that instead of focusing our counterterrorism efforts on groups such as al Qaeda, we should instead focus them on the “ideology” of Islam. Gawthrop cites Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis, which has been widely criticized for its lack of depth and understanding and broad generalizations of the “civilizations” that Huntington purports are destined to fight each other.

This kind of disinformation about Islam is unfortunate because it spreads incorrect and dangerous ideas to American law enforcement, and increases tension between them and the American Muslim community. This tension causes distrust, and makes law enforcement more difficult. Yet it is not simply a domestic problem.

Not only did this story spread through US media, but it spread to extremists sites where it was touted as evidence that the US was actually at war with Islam; Gawthrop’s ideas are consistent with Islamist extremists’ narrative. It plays directly into the hands of Islamist extremists the world over, and bolsters their message that America’s desire to end Islamist terrorism is really a war on the religion of Islam itself. This message could be effective at drawing recruits to terrorism. But is the message really spreading? Is the Muslim world paying attention?

The answer is a definite yes. In Southeast Asia, Islamist extremists have picked up the story about Gawthrop and spread it, including on social media cites such as Facebook. Posted Wednesday, September 21, the ar Rahmah story on Gawthrop’s lecture had nearly 3000 hits by Thursday afternoon, and the link was recommended by 811 people on Facebook. On their Facebook posting of the same story, it was “liked” by 101 people, and 30 comments. Comments range from the hope that non-believers will find one day find Islam to agreeing that this is proof that the United States is at war with Islam. Some of these comments include violent rhetoric. Does this mean everyone who posted comments will take up arms against the United States? Of course not. But will they spread the message that Americans are admitting that they are at war with Islam? Almost certainly, and this can lead to radicalization. In the Arab-speaking world, the story spread as well; Islamist Ansar al Jihad, for example, has posted it. The story has also been reported in mainstream news outlets in the Muslim world.

This is similar to a flap that occured last week, when an FBI manual was found to contain similar anti-Islam sentiments. In one graph, the manual argued that the more devout a Muslim was, the more likely the Muslim was to be violent. This story was also reported in the Muslim world, for example here on al Jazeera (this is the English language version), an here on Islamist site Islamic Awakening.

The United States Government has repeatedly acknowledged that it needs to work on its message to the Muslim world. This latest flap shows that it also needs to work on its message to Americans, because the wider Muslim world continues to pay attention.

 UPDATE, January 26, 2012

In another example of a messaging gaffe on the part of the American law enforcement, the film “The Third Jihad,” an anti-Muslim film that purports to show the threat to the United States from American Muslims, continued to be shown to law enforcement oficers despite widespread condemnation and statements that it was no longer shown, according to the New York Times and other sources.

The film is another example of anti-Muslim scare tactics that do not reflect reality, but rather complement the Islamist extremists’ messages that the US is at war with Islam. “This is the true agenda of much of Muslim leadership here in America… A strategy to infliltrate and dominate America… This is the war you don’t know about,” warns a narrator. Using this kind of misinformation to train law enforcement is not only mind boggling, but it creates clear difficulties and mistrust between law enforcement and the Muslim community.

The New York city Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly is featured in the film, but a police spokesman initially denied that he participated, stating that his presence in the film was based on old interviews. The film’s website, however, contradicts that claim and states that the Commissioner sat for an exclusive 90-minute interview. Yesterday the New York Times printed a story describing Kelly’s acknowledgement and regret at having participated in the film.

The film shows inflammatory images such as an Islamic flag flying over the White House. Images such as these are easily obtained from Islamist extremist sites, but to portray them as common ideas among American Muslims is grossly misleading. Furthermore, in a statement defending the film, its producer Raphael Shore argues that it is based on information provided by terrorism experts, including Kelly and Rudolph Giuliani. These two may have tactical knowledge regarding how to deal with terrorism, but I question the depth of their knowledge of Islam as a religion, or even Islamist movements in general, based on their statements. And despite what the Islamist extremists and the anti-Islam propagandists want us to believe, the two are very different subjects.

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The past couple of weeks have been interesting in Indonesia, especially for those concerned with religion and conflict in the world’s most populous Muslim country.

Ahmadiyya sentences.

On February 6 in Banten, West Java, some 1000 villagers attacked a house with several members of Ahmadiyya inside. Ahmadis consider themselves Muslims, but many Muslims consider Ahmadis heretics because of their belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet who came after Mohammad. The tension had been mounting, and the Ahmadis had been asked to leave and faced threats and intimidation. They were also accused of stockpiling weapons — if true, an understandable reaction given the palpable threats they were facing. During the attack, Ahmadis were viciously beaten, and three were killed, their corpses stomped into the mud as police stood by and watched. Video footage of the attacks, including idle police, remains on YouTube. Members of the extremist Islamic Defenders Front, who consider themselves vigilantes, were among the attackers.

Yesterday, a court in Jakarta announced a verdict of six months in jail for Deden Sudjana, an Ahmadi leader whose hand was nearly severed in the attack, for incitement and “maltreatment.” Last month, 12 of those who attacked the Ahmadis were handed down sentences of three to six months. None were tried for murder.

Ahmadiyya is persecuted under Indonesian law; its adherents are not allowed to demonstrate their faith publicly. There have been several attempts to ban the sect outright, and a branch of the sect was attacked in Makassar, Sulawesi last weekend.

Ramadan violence.

The Muslim fasting month of Ramadan is well under way, and in Indonesia, like clockwork extremist groups such as the FPI increased their attacks on what they perceive as immorality. Although they target criminal activities such as prostitution and drugs, they also target activities that are not illegal under Indonesian law, such as selling or eating food during the fast. Indonesia has practitioners of religious traditions other than Islam, as well as a wide continuum among Muslims regarding the strictness with which they carry out their faith. These attacks, including against a food stall in Makassar (Ujung Padang), Sulawesi, the other day, are frequently ignored by local police, who may sympathize with the FPI or may even be afraid to move against them, despite their claims to the contrary.

Another unfortunate Ramadan tradition in Indonesia is the targeting of Christian churches. On August 1 in Riau, two Protestant churches were burned down.

Terrorist Umar Patek brought back from Pakistan.

Umar Patek, a Jemaah Islamiyah member with ties to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, who was arrested in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January, was repatriated to Indonesia. Conspiracy theorists speculated about his return, which took much longer than expected, accusing the Indonesian secret service of brainwashing him into admitting guilt.Following his return, he admitted his role in the first Bali bombing in 2002 as well as bombings of churches on Christmas Eve in 2000.

It cannot be a coincidence that he was picked up in the same town where Osama bin Laden met his demise, despite American claims to the contrary, although it is still unclear whether the two met. Umar Patek certainly has knowledge about the connections between Southeast Asian extremists and the rest of the world, and likely about the current state of these organizations. There is also speculation that Umar Patek divulged information that led to the raid on Osama bin Laden’s residence.

Whether or not he will talk is unclear, but the United States is among those hoping to be able to interrogate him. According to the head of the Indonesian National Counter Terrorism Agency Ansyaad Mbai, he cannot be tried under the 2003 anti-terrorism law, written in response to the Bali bombing; he will, however, be tried for other offenses including murder and possible explosives charges.

Violence in Papua.

Violence continues in West Papua, where recent demonstrations in favor of an independence referendum have been met with bloody crackdowns, and elections in some regions have turned violent. Indonesian sovereignty in West Papua has been contested since its de facto integration in 1962, formalized in the 1969 “Act of Free Choice.” The 1969 plebiscite was a fundamentally flawed process, and is considered a Cold War appeasement to Indonesian President Suharto, who had come to power four years earlier in a bloodbath of communists.

Papua is not immune to light sentencing for horrendous crimes. Last week a court handed down sentences of six to 15 months to three soldiers for “insubordination.” Their crime? The murder and decapitation of Reverend Kindeman Gire, reported by the Sydney Morning Herald.

Another article, also by Tom Allard, describes a tightly woven web of monitoring and surveillance in Papua that creates a climate of fear and intimidation. A group of professors from some of Indonesia’s best universities, calling themselves the Academic Forum for a Peaceful Papua, called for the government to eschew violence in favor of dialogue to solve Papua’s problems.

These recent events point to the continued increasing influence of extremist Islam the continuing impunity of the military and are a blow to multiculturalism and democracy in Indonesia. Lame duck President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will likely not make any bold steps to reign in groups such as the FPI nor is he likely to make any bold moves to reign in the military.

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The next chapter in the saga of Abu Bakar Basyir, called the spiritual leader of terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, came to an end on June 16. The court in South Jakarta pronounced its verdict of guilty to the charges of inciting terrorism related to the Jemaah Islamiyah training camp in Aceh — which was broken up amidst arrests and killings of militants in February 2010 — and sentenced the cleric to 15 years. The more serious charge of funding the camp was thrown out for lack of evidence. For Basyir, aged 72 and in frail health, this is almost certainly a life sentence, unless he is granted a pardon or a significant remission (a tradition in Indonesia on August 17, Independence Day, and one that Basyir has benefited from in the past).

Indonesian police arrested Basyir last August and held him for several months before formally leveling charges related to the camp. More than once police had to file for an extension of his imprisonment before they charged him, fueling speculation about the strength of the case against him.

Some of the trial highlights — or lowlights I suppose, depending on your perspective — include the accusation of hypocrisy leveled at Basyir (also spelled Bashir) for wearing American-made Crocs shoes, Basyir’s attempted justification of the camp despite claiming he had no ties to it, and the build up of security forces as the announcement of the verdict approached. The Indonesian police bolstered their presence in the area, and the Indonesian military offered its assistance. The police closed roads near the court, and many businesses were shuttered. Retributive violence, however, has thus far been avoided.

Basyir rejected the sentence as thaghut, or invalid because it is based on human law handed down by infidels and not divine law (never mind that divine law must be interpreted through humans); this, however, won’t stop his imprisonment. What happens in prison, however, is ripe for further speculation.

Norimitsu Onishi, writing today in the New York Times, is guardedly optimistic:

The ruling puts an end for now to the activities of Mr Bashir, whom the Indonesian authorities had often appeared reluctant to prosecute for fear of antagonizing Islamic extremists.

Yet Indonesian prisons do not have a good history of deradicalizing Islamist extremists — as this International Crisis Group report notes, raising the question as to how Basyir will shift his strategy from behind bars. At this stage in the game it is fair to argue that Basyir is beyond deradicalization; he is, after all, considered the emir or spiritual leader of Jemaah Islamiyah. Cause for concern, however, is the potential for Basyir to recruit more extremists while in jail, as well as his ability to continue to influence or direct Jemaah Islamiyah operations from inside prison.

Islamist extremists are predictably condemning the verdict as tyrannical, demanding Basyir’s release and issuing a vague warning to the lawyers, judges, police and government they view as responsible. They are also beginning to refer to Basyir as a martyr. There is no doubt that some kind of retaliatory attacks will be planned, although what form they may take is unknown. Jemaah Islamiyah appears to have begun adopting new tactics, shying away from expensive bombing campaigns that kill indiscriminately and toward more focused attacks, especially on police, and including drive-by shootings.

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The first 48 hours after the death of Osama bin Laden were grounds for relief in the United States, its allies, and those who condemn violent extremism, but they have also been fraught with speculation and rumors concerning the operation. Is bin Laden really dead? Did he really use his wife as a shield? Was he really armed and did he fire at the Navy Seals? Why have there been no pictures of his body released? Why was he buried at sea?

Extremists have attempted to pounce on these seeming inconsistencies in the tale of bin Laden’s demise. The Indonesian branch of Hizbut Tahrir emphasized the inconsistencies to cast doubt on the American version of events. Going even further, extremist blog Prisoner of Joy posted a story attributed to Ruslan Sinbarigov of the Kavkaz Center (an Eastern European Islamist website) that claimed – based on the purported tweets of a nearby Pakistani – that the helicopter did not malfunction but rather was shot down, that the operation took two hours and not forty minutes, that the DNA test took too little time to be believable, and others. The implied conclusions?

1. Bin Laden was not in the house that was attacked by the Americans.
2. Bin Laden was indeed killed, but the body was so badly damaged, or the Americans so desecrated his body by doing some of their kufar rituals, that it was not possible to identify him visually.

The Voice of al-Islam parrots these claims: according to the Taliban, Osama bin laden is not dead. Adding fuel to the fire is the presence of fake Osama bin Laden “death photos,” which began circulating just after his death. A simple Google image search brought up these images, but after they were exposed as fake, this became proof of a conspiracy for extremist sites such as Hizbut Tahrir and Prisoner of Joy. The fact that the White House has decided (at this point) not to release images of a dead Osama bin Laden means that these rumors will most likely live on since they haven’t been effectively countered.

Curiously, one above-ground Islamist group in Indonesia, the Islamic Defender’s Front, chose to hold a “service of gratitude” for bin Laden, apparently taking reports of his death at face value. This is curious because the group shares no theological affinity with the salafist al Qaeda, and despite its publicized attacks on specific targets it deems antithetical to Islam, it does not promote the kind of violence – bombings, for example – that al Qaeda does.

The struggle over the image of someone – living or dead – is of course nothing new. I was reminded of this Washington Post article of last year, which described CIA plots to portray both Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein as gay. The plan to film a Hussein impersonator in compromising actions was shelved after analysts reached the conclusion that a film showing him bragging of sex with young boys would do little to damage his credibility. The plan against bin Laden actually made it to the filming stage. One CIA employee remarked that “some of us dark skinned employees” were used to portray bin Laden and his cohorts around a campfire, drinking liquor and reminiscing about their homosexual conquests. This plan was scrapped as being “ridiculous.”

There is a history of such plans. In the 1950s, the CIA hatched a plan to make a pornographic film starring a look-alike of Indonesian President Soekarno, using an actor wearing a Soekarno mask. The film, entitled “Happy Days” was apparently shot but not circulated, although still photographs were. The plan was purportedly canceled after some thought that it might actually enhance Soekarno’s reputation among Indonesians (Soekarno was a well-known philogynist). A similar plan was hatched – and later shelved – to film Soviet Premiere Nikita Kruschev in flagrante delicto with a comely spy.

Sometimes, however, rumors and sexual innuendo win the day. As my colleagues Daniel Bernardi, Pauline Hope Cheong, Scott Ruston and I describe in our  book Narrative Landmines: Rumor, Islamist Extremism, and the Struggle for Islamic Influence (Rutgers University Press, forthcoming), the Indonesian government successfully floated a rumor to taint the legacy of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist Noordin Top (comops blog post here). Following a forensic exam, a police spokesman and a University of Indonesia forensics expert claimed that a physical deformity in Top proved that he was gay or bisexual, antithetical to his puritanical brand of Islam and rendering him a munafiq or hypocrite. The mainstream news reported it, and it soon spread to the Indonesian blogosphere, YouTube, and elsewhere. Despite the fact that the rumor was based on demonstrably false forensic science from the 19th century, Top’s legacy appears to have been successfully tainted: jihadist websites that normally laud killed extremists as martyrs were strangely silent following the announcement.

In the uncertainty and secrecy inherent in operations such as those that killed bin Laden, rumors and doubt will surface and swirl, and sides will jostle for control of the narrative. Although the changes in the American portrayal of the fight are understandable due to its chaotic nature, it nevertheless left some room for extremists to attempt to influence the narrative. At this point, however, it seems a lost cause, especially as these attempts begin to float toward the ridiculous.

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Since March 15 Indonesia has experienced another wave of bombings, including a suicide attack on the Az Zikro mosque located in a police compound in Cirebon, Central Java. The bomber struck during Friday prayers. Other targets have included a book bomb mailed to Ulil Abshar Abdallah, the leader of Jaringan Islam Liberal (The Liberal Islamic Network), the offices of Densus 88, an elite anti-terrorism unit, a natural gas pipeline and Christian churches on Good Friday services. Indonesian authorities have again demonstrated their ability to locate and arrest suspects, more than twenty at last count. It is clear to most Indonesian Muslim leaders that effective police power alone will not bring the threat of terrorism to an end. Escalating reactions to these events by civilian groups are taking a possibly worrying turn, however.

In this report I focus on responses to the bombings, especially to that of the Cirebon mosque, and in regard to counter-radicalism measures taken by the progressive Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) prior to and in response to these attacks. NU is Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, with membership of at least fifty million and many more supporters. The Cirebon attack was particularly significant for NU because Az Zikro is an NU mosque.

In Indonesia radical groups have rarely attacked mosques. They seem to have assumed, correctly as it turns out, that attacking one of the most important symbols of Islam would yield little sympathy. Churches and structures symbolic of western dominance or cultural decadence, including Western “branded” hotels such as the Jakarta J.W. Marriott and bars catering to foreign tourists in Bali have been the most common targets. No group claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the identity of the Cirebon bomber soon became clear.

Muhammad Syarif was a bright young man, 31 years old, who had been fascinated with electronics since he was in elementary school. He became involved with a radical Muslim movement in 2000 and vanished from sight for nine years. When he resurfaced in 2009, his character and behavior had changed dramatically. He was formerly respectful and polite but had become violent and angry. He called both his parents kafir (unbelievers) and married without their permission. He often wore a jubbah (Arabian-style robe). His father also described him as being a follower of the radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who is who is generally believed to the spiritual mentor of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah.

Many Indonesians believe that Syarif must have been the victim of cuci otak (brain washing), as the indoctrination techniques used by radical groups are commonly known. The Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) movement calls this tactic “Basic Training” (English in the original). It involves blindfolding potential recruits, taking them to remote locations and subjecting them to several days of intense religious instruction. Many reject the message, but those who accept it undergo a process of cognitive restructuring in which core values, personal and collective identity are redefined in terms of the group’s radical teachings.

As is almost always the case, mainstream Muslim organizations denounced the attacks and even radicals have condemned the Cirebon mosque bombing. Ba’asyir stated that there was no Islamic justification for bombing a mosque and that the attacker was with a kafir who had a childish understanding of religion or who was mentally ill.

Leaders of many mainstream Muslim organizations, including Din Syamsudinn of Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim organization,  spoke of the need to address the underlying social, political and economic causes of terrorism but offered little in the way of specifics. Vice-President Boediono called on the ministries of education and religion to upgrade religious and citizenship instruction in schools, colleges and universities. Numerous commentators called attention to the “brainwashing” techniques used by radical organizations to recruit young people and the need to respond to them.

By far the strongest response has been from the religiously and socially conservative NU leaders who reiterated their commitment to comprehensive counter radicalism efforts and announced new efforts to make sure that radicals do not use any of the tens of thousands of NU mosques to recruit new followers.

NU’s counter-radicalism program includes four basic components:

• Active cooperation with security forces in efforts to apprehend suspected terrorists.
• Refutation of extremist ideologies, especially those concerning jihad. This is a common theme in Friday sermons, religious talks (pengajian) and in many pesantren (traditional boarding schools) affiliated with NU. NU’s position is that radicals have fundamentally misunderstood the concept of jihad, that suicide bombings are not jihad and that those who carry them out are not martyrs. It also repudiates the anti-Semitic views held by many Islamist organizations.
• Outreach programs for young people in print, online and at Indonesia’s government sponsored Islamic colleges and universities. They have recently published a book entitled Peaceful Jihad for Teens (only the title is in English), available at bookstores through out the country.
• Assisting victims of terrorist attacks. The NU youth organization Ansor and the paramilitary security force Banser NU routinely assist with the repair and renovation of churches damaged by bombings.

In response to the most recent bombings NU announced a self-policing program. On April 25, leader Nusron Wahid  announced that Ansor and the Baser cadre would begin nationwide  “sweeping” operations to cleanse NU mosques of radical teachers and preachers. At a speech in Magelan in Central Java he stated that men with “long beards and short pants” had occupied many of the largest mosques in the country, spreading radical messages and teaching that all who oppose them are unbelievers or polytheists. He linked them to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and accused them of planning and encouraging terrorist attacks. He also pointed to the need for similar actions at mosques on university campuses that have become centers for the dissemination of radical ideas.

Nurson’s observations about the exclusivist character of radicals and the fact they often use mosques for recruitment purposes are accurate. New recruits are often taught that they do not have to seek their parents’ permission to join in jihad. They are encouraged to recruit family and friends, but told that those who do not join them are kafir.  In a society such as Indonesia, where respect for parents is a core value, these views are on the outer limits of extremism. Mosques are public spaces and are often unoccupied. Private teachers unaffiliated with organizations that officially control them often use unoccupied mosques for religious lessons.

Nurson is, however, known for off the cuff statements, exaggeration and hyperbolic rhetoric. The term “sweeping” (English in the original) is used by the radical Front for the Defense of Islam for the violent attacks it conducts against those it views as “sinners” or religious “deviants.” Nuron’s use of the term suggests that NU is prepared to use similar tactics. The expression “long beard, short pants” has become short hand for a wide variety of salafi groups, who sport beards and distinctive Pakistani style clothing to distinguish themselves from traditional Indonesian Muslims.

Calf-length pants and robes are considered to be equivalents in this symbolic discourse. Most who wear such clothing are religious fundamentalists but very few are terrorists. Some are explicitly and vocally opposed to the use of violence for political purposes. Nurson’s comments  are examples of a growing tendency to associate salafism and terrorism. I and my colleagues Inayah Rohmaniyah and Ali Amin have argued that this component of Indonesian counter-radical discourse is disturbing and potentially dangerous because it tends to demonize innocent people who share the religious orientation, but not the violent inclinations, of terrorist organizations. From an organization that is generally viewed as being tolerant toward not only other faiths but also other streams of Islam, this is a development that is cause for concern.

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* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta Indonesia. Unless otherwise indicated this report is based on ethnographic research conducted in Yogyakarta and elsewhere in Indonesia.

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There is a new narrative responsible for the success of the uprisings that spread from Tunisia through Egypt and now are heard in the streets of Syria, Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere.  It is a secular narrative generated by young Muslims who recognize that older jihadist forms of “telling their resistance story” by linking them to Islamic Master Narratives were largely responsible for the binary oppositions that divide them, and Islam, from the West and modernity.

As Jacqueline O’Rourke, a communication consultant working in Qutar and writing in Z Magazine sees it:

This new communications plan is a direct attempt to create a counter-narrative to the predominant one which has dominated Western discourse for the past decade. That narrative runs roughly like this: Muslims are jealous of the freedom and technological advantages of the West. Their society has been in decline after their scientific advances of medieval Europe. Instead, they try to use the West’s technology against itself. Whether airplanes, viruses, or chemicals, Muslims have appropriated science for the purposes of terrorism.

As Thomas Friedman and others have pointed out, the existing “anti-technology/science” narrative is often coupled with Zionist-American conspiracy tales, and together they have fueled the extremist “New Jahiliyya” master narrative developed by Sayyid Qutb.  It depicts a Muslim world in chaos and disorder that can only be made righteous again by a vanguard of True Believers who rise up and seize power by any means necessary, and who essentially return their culture and people to a 7^th Century CE way of life.

Clearly that old religious narrative has been either silent or silenced in the face of these new uprisings by young Muslims throughout the Middle East and North Africa.  Not even the Muslim Brotherhood is calling for an Islamic state.  Instead, the young Muslims and their new leaders are pressing for reforms that offer more freedom, more opportunity, and more control over their own choices, not a return to Sharia law or the reestablishment of a Caliphate.  More importantly, their call for reform is accomplished without challenging the sanctity of the Five Pillars of Islam, which places obedience to God before any other duty or goal.  In this way, young Muslims have opened up a “Third Way” narrative that balances respect for religious traditions with progressive political reforms designed to improve their ability to live well and to compete in a global economy.

But as good as this new secular narrative may sound to Western ears, O’Rourke explains the outcome is unlikely to be one that accepts Western “hypocrisy and condescension”:

One critical reality is that this revolution is not only a revolution against Arab dictators, but a revolution against the humiliation Muslims have been facing in the post-9/11 global landscape. The Arab/Muslim people are not just enraged with political, social, and economic oppression, they are also angry with their rulers’ complicity with imperialism, particularly American and Israeli. In short, the revolution has erupted from Muslim societies as a result of internal oppression and as a response to political, economic, and cultural imperialism, with which the post-9/11 youth are intricately familiar. In this regard, the international community must get the message that this revolution is as much against its hypocritical and condescending manner of dealing with Muslim societies as it is against Mubarak, Ben Ali, or Qadaffi.

One way to think about how all of these narrative tensions may play out is to consider that across this region people are not so much interested in trading one way of life for another, but instead creating a new way of life—a new language for governance—that avoids the pitfalls of either the old jihadi ideological worldview or one that values free market capitalism via oil revenues in exchange for continued support for dictators, particularly if the latter alternative carries with it unquestioning support of Israel.

What might that new narrative be?  One possible story is a hybrid combination of socialism designed to better distribute the wealth and opportunities afforded by revenues (however they are derived) with a progressive Islam dedicated to improving human rights and building communities that are based more on Islamic scholarship and nonviolence than on free market capitalism or extremism.

In this brave new narrative the system of stories would be all about more openness and tolerance, as well as more democratic reform, but there would be no good reason to expect that U.S. corporate or political interests would enjoy any special status in it.  There are other emerging markets—from China to India to the EU—and the political landscape that was once dominated by American foreign policy backed by an unlimited military budget is not what it once was nor do we have the will to wield power in the old fashioned way.

The speech given in Cairo by President Obama last year set in motion a storyline that may well have influenced young Muslims to go ahead with their uprisings.  The president’s late intervention in Libya—and that only with international backing and cooperation—further provided evidence that our intentions are no longer driven by revenge, as they have been in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead by a steely pragmatism that weighs in on the side of those fighting against oppression but leaves outcomes to those who must then forge a new society.

In general, this new secular narrative is all about accepting this post-uprising/revolution responsibility.  It is thankfully free of the old Islamist rant.  It is so far mostly free from violence, except in Libya.  We should begin to expand our conception of how secular narratives are producing political and social change and rethink our approach to strategic communication as a result.  We don’t want to make the old Pentagon mistake of preparing for the last war, in this case the jihad drawn from master narratives of Islamist extremism, while a whole set of new strategic communication challenges that has nothing to do with those old stories takes shape.

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Indonesian police have charged Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Basyir with supporting terrorism for his role in the the Jemaah Islamiyah training camp in Aceh. He has been accused of participating in planning and funding the project and ordering others to commit terrorist acts, and police reported finding progress reports and videos from the camp.

The training camp, led by Javanese who came to Aceh thinking they would find support, was broken up in February 2010. Its members were either arrested or killed by police (CSC blog post on the camp here).

Police arrested Basyir on August 9, but after seven days — the time allowed by Indonesian law for detention without charges — they requested and were granted a 40-day extension. Now that charges have been filed, the police are weighing whether to release him or continue to detain him until the trial begins. Baysir is old and frail, and police may assume that he would pose a minimal risk for flight.

Basyir served two brief jail terms for his involvement in the bombings of Christian churches in 2000 and for his role in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2003 attack on the Marriott hotel. In these trials, police were unable to make the most serious charges stick, and Basyir served relatively brief jail sentences. Indonesian media reports over the new charges, however, give detailed information regarding, for example, money transfers from Basyir to the Aceh group (such as this English language story in the Jakarta Post), which may indicate that the police have enough evidence to convict Basyir on more serious charges this time.

As is to be expected, extremist blogs and web sites jumped to his defense. Some argued that his arrest was engineered by the US government. A hacker calling himself Ashaburayatisud posted a defense of Abu Bakar Basyir and Mohammad Jibriel,  disrupting several web sites (including the official government site for the province of East Kalimantan; a list is included here). As of this writing, about half of the sites have returned to normal. Mohammad Jibriel was sentenced to five years in prison for supporting the July 2009 Marriott and Ritz-Carlton bombings.

The hacked web pages demand: “Free them, hey you enemies of Allah!” Followers of “human law” such as democracy, the Indonesian Constitution, and Pancasila – Indonesia’s state ideology — are condemned to hell as non-believers, polytheists, and godless. In an oddly polite twist, the hacker also promised that he did not damage any of the sites’ important information.

A “Free ABB” website has also emerged (http://freeabb.com/), as well as a facebook page (http://facebook.com/free.abb), which is ironic considering Islamists’ condemnations of Facebook for promoting “free sex.” Leaders of other Islamist groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Jamaat Ansharut Tawhid (a group Basyir co-founded), have also made statements condemning the arrest. Basyir’s pesantren (Islamic boarding school) al Mukmin posted a statement lamenting the arrest, and promised that it will not disrupt the pesantren’s activities.

Islamists claimed a minor victory, however, by declaring that their prayers had been answered and that Police Chief Bambang Hendarso Danuri fell ill because of the arrest of Basyir.

Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization, issued a statement supporting the arrest.

The announcement of charges and the early indications of evidence bode well for the police and Indonesian governmnet’s case. Indonesia was embarassed by the inability to make charges against Basyir stick in his earlier trials, and was criticized by other governments, notably Australia and the United States. It would be another embarassment should Basyir be able to elude these latest charges. If convicted, however, it would be a significant victory for Indonesia’s anti-terrorism efforts.

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For some time people who think about the problem of terrorism have faced a puzzling question: Why is it that some Muslims who hold fundamentalist or radical beliefs about Islam become violent, while others don’t? New research shows that the answer is probably not what you might think.

A popular view is that Islam is simply a violent belief system. For example, in National Review’s blog The Corner Andy McCarthy writes:

[A]s an admirer of the courage of moderate Muslims, it is my most fervent wish that they are successful in reforming Islam. We need to be honest, however, that they are trying to achieve reform precisely because there are problems with Islam as is. The most frustrating thing about “moderate Islam” is that no one seems to be able to say what it entails. The so called “radicals” tell us exactly what they believe and (accurately) cite chapter and verse in the scriptures. The moderates never persuasively refute the radicals — they just say the radicals are too “extreme.” This doesn’t come close to making the case that the radicals have Islam wrong. If your goal is to persuade other Muslims — and everyone seems to agree that only Islam can settle its internal divisions — that’s the case that has to be made.

Underlying this statement is a view that Islam, at least as currently constituted, is inherently violent. If so, then the more people know about it the more likely they are to want to kill non-Muslims, and institutions like madrasas, pesantren, and Islamic universities are little more than jihadist indoctrination camps.

However, Mark Woodward (a frequent contributor to this blog) and colleagues find that, at least in Indonesia, the exact opposite seems to be the case. In the abstract of a paper now under review they write:

The paper refutes the linkage of Muslim education in Indonesia with radicalization, and addresses the commonly held, if incorrect, perception that theological conservatism has a causal relationship with violent extremism. Rather than a causal agent for extremism, Muslim education in Indonesia tends to operate as a protective mechanism against radicalization, as does participation in vibrant religious and cultural celebrations. Students attending the secular universities are most susceptible to extremist discourse, through the process of re-Islamization, and the development of a stark and detached rational understanding of Islam.

So the more people know about the theology and traditions of Islam, the less likely they are to be radical.

Also reflected in McCarthy’s viewpoint is the idea that the Muslim world is divided into two camps, the fundamentalists/radicals and the “moderates.” The former group is large, dangerous and violent, while the latter is small, tolerant and peaceful. But Muslims are thought to make up about a quarter of the world’s population. If any large percentage of 1.2 billion people (let alone most of them) were really dangerous and violent the world would have been a smoking ruin long ago. So why isn’t it?

A recent report by Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell and Michael King of the UK think tank Demos sheds some light on this question. They spent two years examining the differences and similarities between violent and non-violent Muslims in Europe and Canada who hold radical Islamist political views. The biggest difference difference they found was in the approach to religion. The non-violent radicals are more “humble and reflective” with respect to their faith. They also  tend to study subjects in the humanities and have a better understanding of history and other aspects of social context.

The violent radicals are more likely to be dogmatic and to have an uneducated ”do-it-yourself” approach to religion. They study technical subjects like engineering and computer science and tend to use pejorative terms to reduce people’s worth. They also have a “bizarre obsession” with texts about how to recognize unbelievers, people against whom any action is justified. They believe the ummah (worldwide Muslim community) is under attack, a view the non-violent radicals tend not to support.

So simply holding strong religious views is not enought to make someone violent. What, then, is the difference that makes the difference? It may be youthful boredom.

Many people who became violent said they did so because it was cool, exciting, and dangerous. Training camps were like adventure camps–a counter-culture experience where they got to hang out in in exotic locations and play with weapons. The camps also provided meaningful structure: A sense of camaraderie and a system for building prestige that they found lacking in their normal lives.

Finally, in a new book my colleague Jeff Halverson (another frequent contributor to this blog) argues that theology (kalam)–the rational debate over Muslim beliefs and readings of the sacred texts–became virtually extinct in Sunni Islam in the late Middle Ages. In the absence of theology extremists can espouse heretical and radical viewpoints under the guise of orthodoxy, and promote highly questionable readings of the Qu’ran and Hadith to support their violent enterprises. One anti-theological or Athari group that emerged in the absence of kalam was Wahhabism – a sect that considers theology “satanic.” Today, few institutions and resources remain in place to challenge these Athari formulations (or innovations) of Sunni Islam. In this kind of intellectual environment, it is hardly surprising that unsophisticated views of religion and a “do-it-yourself” approach can prevail.

So a new view of the role of Islam in violence seems to be developing and it is challenging taken for granted views like those of McCarthy. More education in Islam seems to prevent, not cause, violent radicalism. Many or even most politically “radical” Muslims are just as non-violent as the elusive “moderates,” providing they have a sound education that encourages critical thinking and reflection. Those who become violent often do so not because they believe in Islam per se. Instead they are adolescents or young adults who think it would be cool to be a mujahid, and are influenced by self-appointed religious “authorities.” These people are able to self-appoint because there is a dearth of theological institutions to challenge their views.

On the whole this new research suggests that, ironically, the way to combat violent extremism may be to strengthen Islamic education, theology and religious authority, and to provide more constructive, non-violent outlets for youthful desires and radical beliefs.

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