In two recent briefings, one for the MSM and one for bloggers, Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Jim Glassman spoke approvingly of an incident that took place in Colombia earlier this year.  It involved Facebook and a march against Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a Bolivarian revolutionary guerrilla organization.  FARC is classified as a terrorist group by the government of Colombia, the United States, and the European Union because of the large number of kidnappings the group has committed over more than a decade.

In early January of this year, a 33 year old Colombian engineer named Oscar Morales expressed his indignation (and that of many other Colombians) against the FARC by launching a Facebook group called Un Millón de Voces Contra las FARC (UMVCF, “One Million Voices Against the FARC”).  It contained the declaration

Firmly and unanimously we want to express to the whole world that the FARC does not represent any of us, nor our interests, nor our people. We also want to express that we strongly condemn all their terrorist actions that, for more than 40 years, have been producing death and pain, while stopping the progress of the country we want for our families and children. For the previously listed reasons we want the whole world to know: We DON’T want more kidnappings. We DON’T want more death. We DON’T want more terrorism. We DON’T want more FARC.

The Facebook group, and its companion web site colombiasoyyo.org (I am Colombia), underwent exponential growth.  Within four days the group had 20,000 members, and by late January it swelled to almost one-quarter million members.

UMVCF became the basis for an anti-FARC protest march on February 4th that was one of the biggest civil events in Colombian history.  On the day of the protest, February 4th, an estimated 4.8 million people turned out across Colombia.  Numerous other protests were held simultaneously in 44 other countries around the world.

Press accounts tend to credit the Facebook group itself with causing the march.  For example, the Christian Science Monitor’s story carried the headline “Facebook used to target Colombia’s FARC with global rally.”  Glassman also seems to regard Facebook as a primary cause of the marches.  In his press briefing, the Under Secretary said

I recently came back from Colombia, and in Colombia, a small group of young Colombians, without government assistance, used Facebook to build a movement that put 12 million people around the world into the streets on February 4th, including 1 million in Bogota alone, in demonstrations against the FARC, a violent extremist group that has terrorized that country for more than 40 years.

Accordingly, he is launching efforts to “speed the use of the same techniques — again employed by foreign citizens, not governments — to build movements against violence.”

While there can be no doubt that Facebook played an important role in the events, it is a mistake to assume that it was the root cause of the movement.  What most press accounts of the march leave out is that the UMVCF group formed in the wake of an event in late December of 2007 that sources in Colombia describe as being similar in impact to the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.  Here is the rest of the story.

In the third week of December 2007 the FARC announced plans to release three high-profile hostages to President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, who was acting as an intermediary with the Colombian government.  They included Consuelo González, a former senator, and Clara Rojas, a campaign manager for former Colombian presidential candidate and FARC hostage Ingrid Betancourt.  In 2006 it was learned that Rojas had given birth in captivity to a son named Emmanuel, and he was also to be released.

The hand-over was to take place on December 31st in an area of Colombia near the Venezuelan border.  Chávez and numerous international observers waited to receive the hostages.  But at the last minute, the FARC canceled the release, citing military operations and a lack of security in the neutral area.

An infuriated President Álvaro Uribe of Colombia flew to the area and gave a televised address to the Colombian people in which he accused the FARC of duplicity. Uribe revealed that his Attorney General’s office was investigating the case of a foster child in the care of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute who they believed to be Emmanuel.  Four days later the Attorney General announced that a first round of DNA tests showed a “very high probability” that the boy was Rojas’s son.

Ordinary Colombians were off work for the holidays, and watched the address and other televised developments by the millions.  It soon became apparent to everyone that the release was canceled not because of security concerns, but because  the FARC had promised to release a hostage they did not hold.  The result was that public sentiment turned overwhelmingly against the group.  It is notable that UMVCF was launched on the same day that the Attorney General announced the results of the DNA tests identifying Emmanuel.

While Facebook played an important role in the development of the protest march, it can be better described as a catalyst than a cause.  Public resentment was building against the FARC, especially over 2007.  “Emmanuel-gate,” as it came to be called — plus its fortuitous timing when Colombians were home to follow events in the media — pushed things to a tipping point.  It was in this environment that something as seemingly innocuous as an online group could lead to a protest involving millions.

Under Secretary Glassman and other commetators like Marc Lynch have correctly pointed out that Web 2.0 technologies may offer important asymmetries (in our favor, for a change) in the effort to resist terrorist groups.  But at the same time, the full story of the anti-FARC marches in Colombia shows the danger of technological determinism in these efforts.

Had the conditions not been exacrly right, UMVCF probably would have become one more drop in an ocean of online groups.  Likewise, merely giving Facebook (or other social networking technologies) to people in other terrorism hotspots will probably do little until the right social conditions develop for them to have an imact.  Facebook, by itself, is not enough to cause social movements that can defeat terrorism.

UPDATE 11/18

Here is a post by Matt about a conference the State Department is sponsoring to catalyze similar uses of Facebook.

UPDATE 11/25

I have it on good authority that Under Secretary Glassman does not think of Facebook as a primary cause of the Colombia protests.  I suppose this illustrates the hazards of divining someone’s beliefs from press statements.  In any case, I’m glad to hear this is the case.

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State-funded terrorism, international intrigue, drug production, saber rattling, cold-war leftovers, and false promises: These are headlines and/or accusations that have characterized the situation in Afghanistan and more surprisingly, a crisis in South America. The recent showdown in South America has highlighted the Venezuela/Ecuador/Columbia region as an area of increasing importance.

Many of the details of what happened in South America remain shrouded in secrecy or misinformation. But a quick recap of widely agreed upon events was recently provided by the BBC,

The crisis began after Colombian air and ground forces attacked a camp inside Ecuador, killing the Farc rebels’ second-in-command Raul Reyes and more than 20 others. Ecuador and Venezuela broke off diplomatic ties with Colombia in the worst diplomatic row in the region for years and sent extra troops to their respective borders.

For about a week tensions ran high and diplomatic ties were cut off. Thankfully, tensions eased, embassies reopened, and the threat of violence subsided—for now.

The aftermath of the crisis has amped up the international intrigue and pulled in a variety of different parties. Recovered documents from the FARC camp raided by Columbia point toward a tight relationship between the rebel group and Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. This has set the stage for at least three possible outcomes.

First, Ecuador is supporting the idea of a United Nations (UN) regional presence. Second, the Organization of American States (OAS) has launched an inquiry into the matter. Third, the United States is exploring the idea of placing Venezuela, due to their alleged links with FARC, on a list of nations that support terrorism alongside Iran, Syria, and North Korea. It is this third option that I want to consider in greater detail.

Last year Aaron Hess and I criticized the language the United States uses in the “global war on terrorism” because it is both vague in terms of “terrorism” and misleading in terms of “war.” This crisis in South America certainly adds to the problems of the “global war on terrorism.” The problem with this terminology is that it obligates the United States to take an aggressive stance, sometimes backed by military force, anytime the label “terrorism” is attached to a group or action.

FARC does not represent the kind of threat to the United States that Al-qaeda does/did, yet we use the same terms to describe both organizations. I am not defending FARC. Most commentators agree they are engaged in drug running, kidnapping and a number of other nefarious operations. But, they are not trying to blow up US naval ships or fly planes into US buildings either. In addition, Chavez’s alleged financial support of FARC is not analogous to the Taliban’s relationship with Al-qaeda. So, why would we use the same lists and classifications to discuss both situations?

Labeling Venezuela a state-supporter of terrorism creates a scenario that severely limits our diplomatic options and/or support of international groups like the UN or the OAS. With the United States military stretched thin and our list of international allies shrinking this should be a moment to encourage international problem solving rather than put ourselves in a situation where military intervention or unilateral sanctions are the only tools to send a consistent policy message. This is a situation that needs to be dealt with, but not necessarily by the United States.

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In early March, President Bush embarked on a five-nation tour of Latin American with the goal of advancing America’s image in the region. According to the White House website, the message of this tour was clear:

The President Is Committed To Helping Democracies In The Western Hemisphere:

• Build government institutions that are fair, effective, and free of corruption;
• Meet basic needs like education, healthcare, and housing; and
• Maintain economies that make it possible for workers to provide for their families and rise in society.

Bush’s visit focused on introducing initiatives in strategically important countries in the region that emphasize America’s positive role in supporting democracy and working to reduce poverty. In Brazil, Bush and Brazilian president Lula convened a press conference to announce an agreement to increase cooperation in the development of biofuels such as ethanol. Bush appeared with the presidents of Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico to introduce similar cooperative measures. The visit was part of a larger effort to engage a region that critics say the administration has neglected during the Global War on Terror.

Bush’s tour was complicated by the competing tour of one of the administration’s harshest critics, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. Chavez toured the region at the same time as Bush, visiting countries not on Bush’s itinerary and introducing his own agreements with those countries’ leaders, while also taking the opportunity to lead rallies against Bush. However, despite Chavez’s persistent taunting of the president, Bush refused to acknowledge Chavez during his trip.

Principles

Bush used a common debating tactic in his refusal to mention the name of his primary adversary in the region. Rather than humanize an opponent by using their proper name, debaters will often refer to them with the formula “my opponent” or refuse to acknowledge them at all. In these cases, recognizing an adversary, or “sanctioning the devil” as it is commonly called, is believed to lend credibility to the other side, while denial of the opponent indicates an attitude that their arguments are not even worthy of consideration. Because the Bush tour was focused on promoting the US image in South America, to acknowledge Chavez would presumably distract the public from the message of American solidarity with the region.

Communication scientists have done studies that reveal a potential flaw in this type of strategy. Allen et al (1990) conducted a meta-analysis of how message sidedness affected persuasive outcomes by distinguishing between one-sided, two-sided and two-sided refutational message strategies. One-sided messages, such as that illustrated by the Bush strategy during the Latin American trip, convey the type of unified message that Allen and his colleagues found to be more effective than message strategies that simply acknowledge an opponent’s position. However, Allen el al found that the most persuasive messages are those that include both acknowledgement and refutation of oppositional views. Presumably two-sided refutational messages are most effective because, unlike one-sided message strategies that do not take into account other possible interpretations and non-refutational two-sided messages that allow oppositional interpretations to remain unchallenged, these more complex arguments give reasons why the position advocated is superior to alternatives.

Multiple interpretations to a single message can be understood through the pragmatic complexity model of communication. As an alternative to the older transmission model of communication (Source -> Message -> Audience), the model of pragmatic complexity draws on systems theory to explain how communicative success is dependent on a number of factors, not simply the skill of the communicators. Whereas the traditional model encourages repetition of the same simple message, this model requires diverse methods, messages modified for context and audience, experimentation, and an expectation of communicative failure. Put simply: Repeating an unsuccessful message does nothing more than breed repetitive failure to communicate.

Analysis

Bush’s denial of Chavez during his Latin American tour is consistent with the administration’s attitude that giving credence to many of their opponents would constitute “rewarding bad behavior.” However, one has only to look as far as Cuba to see not only a model of Chavez’s form of government but also a model of a failed policy of “sanctioning the devil,” where the decades-long embargo has failed to topple the Castro government. Fortunately, relations with Venezuela have not yet deteriorated to that extent, and opportunities exist for engagement with the Chavez government which may offer additional benefits.

The success of American engagement with South America rests on following up this visit with further initiatives that reinforce our commitment to the region, with an emphasis on refutation of oppositional positions. U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s planned trip to Latin America is one such opportunity to continue this focus on cooperation with Latin America. Additionally, collaboration with Brazil provides support to counterbalance Chavez’s influence in the region. History shows that a strategy of triangulation can be effective in defusing tensions with a similar socialist adversary. Henry Kissinger’s strategy of détente with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev during the height of the Cold War was especially effective because of Nixon’s simultaneous engagement with China. Despite adversarial rhetoric on both sides during the Cold War, America’s ability to negotiate with communist countries helped to bring about the peaceful fall of the Soviet Union and the modernization of China. Combined with closer relations with Brazil, there is a potential that engagement with Venezuela may open doors to solutions of other major conflicts around the world.

Chavez has relationships with some of America’s primary adversaries on the world stage, including North Korea and Iran. The CSC has already released a white paper about the Iranian letter to President Bush advising that we modify our communicative strategies in dealing with Iranian president Ahmadinejad and adapt our public diplomacy to engage with these opportunities for discussion despite the clear differences in the approach to diplomacy. A better relationship with Venezuela may open up new channels for communication with these other countries.

Reshaping America’s image abroad requires more than simply repeating positive messages about America, because these messages allow for undesired interpretations. One-sided message strategies can be spun as avoidance by adversaries of American policy. Perhaps Chavez drew inspiration for his challenge to Bush from Ahmadinejad’s unanswered call for a debate between the Iranian leader and Bush. Chavez knew that Bush would not allow himself to be dragged into a name-calling session, so Chavez was able to use this expectation to reinforce his counter-message to American openness and freedom of speech. If someone like Condoleezza Rice, who inspires less personal hate from Chavez, would answer the call to debate, it would not only disrupt expectations but also create new channels for communication between the two countries. This type of debate would give U.S. leaders an opportunity to directly refute the arguments against America and create a more persuasive positive image.

The primary obstacle we face in dealing with Venezuela is Chavez’s animosity towards President Bush. In a recent interview with ABC’s Barbara Walters, Chavez said that his problem isn’t with America, but with Bush himself. However, he also indicated a willingness to apologize for past name-calling. Another insight gained by ABC’s David Puente, who interviewed Chavez’s psychiatrist, may shed light on Chavez’s often irrational behavior: he suffers from bipolar disorder. Debating with an irrational person may have its risks, but a public debate would expose his irrationality on an international stage.

The influence Chavez has in the region cannot be ignored. A strategy of simple pro-U.S. messages does not address the diverse experiences of the people in the region. Opening communication channels and experimenting with different messages is a better approach. Our continued relations with Venezuela, combined with Chavez’s willingness to admit his own mistakes, mean that we may still have an opportunity to mend relations with the Venezuelan leader, so long as he stays on his medication.

Further Reading

• Allen, M. A., Hale, J. L., Mongeau, P. A., Berkowitz-Stafford, S., Stafford, S., Shanahan, W., et al. (1990). Testing a model of message sidedness: Three replications. Communication Monographs, 57, 275-291.

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