The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has released a short monograph, De-Legitimizing al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach, by sociologist Paul Kamolnick, a professor at Eastern Tennessee State University. Kamolnick criticizes current US efforts to counter al-Qaeda’s messaging and recruitment strategies as ineffective, and proposes an alternative two-fold solution to marginalize and defeat al-Qaeda. However, Kamolnick’s proposed strategy is problematic for several reasons.

In the first component of his proposed strategy, Kamolnick suggests that since Islam (specifically Sunni Islam) is a religion of orthopraxy and law, American policy makers and strategists should determine how Islamic jurispru­dence, specifically discourses on jihad, “may be leveraged for, and not against, vital U.S. national security interests.” It is unclear what exactly this “leveraging” entails. But he does warn that the US government must do so in secret (deferring “open association” until a later time) so as not to taint the legitimacy of potentially helpful sharia scholars and their formulations.

These formulations should ideally come from “credentialed actors of immense statue and learning.” And these jurists would reaffirm how Islam and the sacred texts prohibit things such as killing non-combatants indiscriminately. He is particularly interested in what he calls “jihadi-realist” scholars, meaning militant Islamists (such as Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl) who have rejected terrorism as a strategy to bring about change. By “leveraging” this sort of work (how remains unclear) for “vital U.S. national security interests” the US can create a narrative (my wording, not his) that portrays the US as a country “on the side of the lawful and just” against those who violate sharia (i.e., al-Qaeda).

The truth is that there is no shortage of Muslim scholars, jurists, preachers, activists, and so on, who have condemned terrorism and al-Qaeda’s violent strategies – despite the bizarre yet common refrain in America that no one in the Muslim community has done so. The traditional rules of warfare in Islam, such as prohibitions against killing civilians or women and children, are also already commonly known among Muslims. Therefore, I’m not sure how having the US secretly “leverage” these condemnations will harm al-Qaeda. When it comes to fatwas (Islamic juridical rulings) it only takes one to justify a practice or behavior. And there have been plenty of bizarre and isolated fatwas out there justifying abhorrent behavior.

It must also be said that while sharia is important to Sunni Muslims, especially Salafi and other über devout people, Kalmonick’s emphasis on the resounding mass influence of sharia on the decisions people make, especially the youth, seems exaggerated. At the end of the day, someone bent on committing an act of violence won’t stop because someone gave a ruling that it was a sinful or bad idea. Aspiring perpetrators will either find a ruling to support them, make their own ruling, or dispense with a juridical ruling altogether and act anyway. They could even invoke a dream where the Prophet Muhammad told them to act – which is not as far fetched as it sounds.

Another issue on the topic of sharia and fatwas is that even seemingly clear-cut issues can be stretched, twisted, and overturned by using a range of well-established juridical principles. That’s why most everyone knows that killing civilians is forbidden, but al-Qaeda still manages to win some people over. For example, it is a well-established belief in Islam that suicide is forbidden. Suicide is a grave sin.

There are numerous hadiths that describe the truly horrific punishments that someone will receive in Hell if they commit suicide. We can also find countless rulings by Muslim jurists that prohibit suicide. These positions are well-known. So why do we have some Muslims committing suicide by strapping bombs to their bodies or crashing airliners into buildings for al-Qaeda? It could suggest that religio-legal justifications aren’t that important when it comes to people seeking vengeance or justice for outstanding sociopolitical grievances.

But more to the point, extremists also utilize concepts like niyya (intention), darura (necessity), and reciprocity, among others, to neutralize these prohibitions against suicide or whatever else goes against their preferred strategy or plan of action. For example, al-Qaeda might claim that a terrorist who blew himself up at a military outpost in Iraq did not commit suicide because his intention was to attack and inflict harm on the enemy. After all, the Prophet once said: “All actions are judged by intentions.”

For al-Qaeda, it only counts as suicide if the person was lost in despair and their intention was to end their life. That was not the intention though, it is argued, and thus the prohibition is nullified. Instead, the terrorist is a celebrated battlefield martyr. The core of the matter is that sharia is always the product of interpretive agents; meaning people devise the divine rules according to their own subjective human interests and goals. So I wouldn’t invest too much in the restrictive powers of Islamic law as a counter-terrorism strategy.

The second part of Kalmonick’s strategy is a radical shift in US foreign policy and military policy in order to fundamentally alter perceptions of US intentions in the Muslim world. No specifics are given. “No amount of spin or messaging matters,” he writes, “when daily life and its common-sense interpretation contradict official pretensions and pronouncements.” I can agree with this statement, but then again he doesn’t provide any specifics. And let’s get real. Given the various special-interest groups and ideological trends currently entrenched in the US political system, this part of Kamolnick’s strategy is probably even less plausible than his problematic covert sharia ideas.

Major changes in US foreign and military policies might help alleviate some of the serious grievances among Muslims that al-Qaeda invokes in its messaging against the US. And I think most scholars would agree with that. But Kamolnick does not specifically discuss what changes should be made – maybe a compelling US push to establish a two-state solution along the 1967 borders to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Nor does Kamolnick address how the memories of past events still influence the present. For example, ending the Crusades centuries ago hasn’t stopped it from being invoked (as a narrative system) at every opportunity.

Regardless, it is extremely unlikely that the US government will ever make major changes to address Muslim grievances, such as the annexation of East Jerusalem or Russian control of Chechnya. More importantly though, the intention or meaning behind any changes to US foreign policy are still entirely subject to interpretation, despite US intentions or what Kamolnick calls “common-sense interpretation.” Those interpretations, typically conveyed as narratives, can vary widely among different audiences.

For example, if the US withdraws from a country (e.g. Iraq) under the pretense that the mission was accomplished and it has no interest in occupying the country, al-Qaeda disseminates a narrative that the US withdrawal was a “retreat” and a victory for the mujahideen over the “Crusaders.” This is the business of narrative, and human beings, regardless of religion, love and live by their stories. And do not think for a second that “leveraging” condemnations of al-Qaeda by some credentialed Muslim jurists or “jihadi-realists” won’t fall victim to al-Qaeda’s narratives either. Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl, was dismissed by Zawahiri and other extremists as a sell-out and someone who gave into torture in prison. Extremists discredit and condemn Muslim scholars and jurists who oppose them as hypocrites, apostates, heretics, Zionist agents, even as the “magicians of the Pharaoh,” every day. And this sort of rhetoric existed long before al-Qaeda ever took shape in Afghanistan.

In the final evaluation, I did not find anything that is particularly new or plausible in Professor Kamolnick’s approach to dealing with al-Qaeda’s messaging and recruitment strategies. In fact, I fear that his dismissal of the importance of narrative and counter-narrative strategies would set the US back in this ongoing struggle and make his own strategy suggestions all the more untenable.

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The release last week of documents captured from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad has generated a flurry of interest in the press and blogosphere.  Yet a question has arisen as to whether the release was wise, since the documents are intelligence assets that could give the enemy valuable information regarding what we know about them.  We argue that the release makes sense from a strategic communication perspective, given what al-Qaeda has become.­

The controversy was raised by James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation in an op ed in Friday’s New York Post. Asking “why would the government publish these documents in the first place,” Carafano concluded that it was an act of election-year “preening” by the White House, and said:

The first rule of intelligence is this: Don’t tell the enemy anything if you don’t have to. It would be like FDR releasing the messages captured by ULTRA, the US-British signals-intelligence program that broke the Nazis’ most secret codes.

The analogy to ULTRA is excessive (al-Qaeda leadership already knew we captured their documents whereas the Nazis did not know we had broken their codes), but Carafano’s basic objection is worth taking seriously.  Our position is that whatever intelligence disadvantages accrued from the release are more than offset by strategic communication advantages.

First, everyone agrees that the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism long ago degraded al-Qaeda’s ability to organize large scale attacks.  As outlined in President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism, American-led efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have destroyed much of al-Qaida’s leadership and “weak­ened the organization substantially.”

For some time now, the concern has been less about al-Qaeda’s operational abilities and more about their force as a social movement. Its brand name has been flexible enough in recent years, much to bin Laden’s discontentment, to accommodate everyone from regional affiliate organizations to organically appearing terrorist cells to anomalous lone wolves.  In many ways, the social movement that al-Qaeda hoped to inspire on 9/11 has transcended the group that created it.

Robert Benford and David Snow have shown that social movements face three key framing tasks. Diagnostic framing means identifying what a movement should consider as the problem it is facing.  Prognostic framing deals with establishing a course of action, and motivational framing establishes reasons members should participate in the recommended actions.

Al-Qaeda has been masterful at diagnostic framing.  The problem, as presented to their audience, is that the West is engaged in a cosmic battle against Islam—a continuation of the Crusades.  Stories of recent wars, al-Nakba (the loss of Palestine to Israel), and treacherous alliances with governments of the Middle East all support this narrative.  Their diagnosis is that a force of champions must step forward to defeat this menace and restore the Ummah to safety and prosperity, and that violent offensive Jihad is the only plausible path to success.  For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri asserted in a 2008 video that “there is no hope of removing the foul regimes in the Muslim countries by anything but force. There is no opportunity for change through peaceful activity.” The motivational frame is to portray al-Qaeda as this champion, an organization that all good Muslims should support, if not join.

Attacking a movement’s framing ideally means undermining its diagnosis, because without it the prognosis and motivation are irrelevant. However, this is impractical in the case of al-Qaeda because public opinion in Muslim continues to support their diagnostic framing.  The alternative, then, is to attack the prognosis and motivation. The same public opinion data show better prospects here, with half to three-quarters of Muslims expressing concern about Islamist extremism.

Release of the Abbotabad documents is good strategic communication precisely because it further undermines the idea that al-Qaeda is a champion of Muslims and that they deserve support. The documents are already challenging, if not entirely rewriting, the bin Laden story. Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership can no longer be viewed as master architects running the show from behind a curtain. Rather, the documents reveal impotent leadership in an al-Qaeda that is internally divided, marginalized and exasperated.

The image is equally bad for their regional affiliates in places like Iraq and Yemen.  Far from the dutiful soldiers they portray themselves to be, the documents show just how far off the reservation they have wandered, pursuing parochial agendas against bin Laden’s wishes and the interests of al-Qaeda’s brand.  They are revealed as loose cannons that can accomplish little except killing the Muslims they are supposed to be saving.

Release of the documents is also justified because turnabout is smart play.  Al-Qaida has long supported the philosophy of rhetorical ninjitsu. Any time they can turn our own words against us, they do.  In the foreword to a book he penned about America’s internal bureaucratic dysfunction al-Qaeda senior leader Abu Jihad al-Masri even used the phrase, “From the words of your own mouth I condemn you” to describe this strategy.

Now the tables are turned.  Thousands of al-Qaeda’s followers in the extremist support forums have already read about these documents, which highlight bin Laden’s strategic irrelevance and managerial impotence. Their reactions are of defensiveness and confusion.  It is hard to dismiss the evidence when it is penned by bin Laden’s own hand.

In short, the Abbotabad documents should have been released because they provide a golden opportunity to injure al-Qaeda the social movement.  The anachronistic argument that they should not have been released ignores the reality that today our adversaries thrive more on perceptions of strength and leadership than real world applications of it.

Update May 11, 2012

Tony Lemieux has posted a blog on this topic.

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In previous posts I have advocated amplifying al-Qaeda’s record of killing Muslims, and argued this practice was doing serious damage toAQ’s brand.  Captured documents from bin Laden’s compound indicate that he was worried about the same thing.

Last week David Ignatius of the Washington Post wrote a story based on his “exclusive look” at those documents.  The headline was about bin Laden’s supposed plot to kill President Obama.  But later in the story he describes bin Laden’s hand-wringing over his organization’s image:

Bin Laden’s biggest concern was al-Qaeda’s media image among Muslims. He worried that it was so tarnished that, in a draft letter probably intended for Atiyah, he argued that the organization should find a new name.

The al-Qaeda brand had become a problem, bin Laden explained, because Obama administration officials “have largely stopped using the phrase ‘the war on terror’ in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims,” and instead promoted a war against al-Qaeda. The organization’s full name was “Qaeda al-Jihad,” bin Laden noted, but in its shorthand version, “this name reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them.” He proposed 10 alternatives “that would not easily be shortened to a word that does not represent us.” His first recommendation was “Taifat al-tawhid wal-jihad,” or Monotheism and Jihad Group.

Bin Laden ruminated about “mistakes” and “miscalculations” by affiliates in Iraq and elsewhere that had killed Muslims, even in mosques. He told Atiyah to warn every emir, or regional leader, to avoid these “unnecessary civilian casualties,” which were hurting the organization.

“Making these mistakes is a great issue,” he stressed, arguing that spilling “Muslim blood” had resulted in “the alienation of most of the nation [of Islam] from the [Mujaheddin].” Local al-Qaeda leaders should “apologize and be held responsible for what happened.”

The moral is that words really do matter when it comes to government strategic communication.  As William Saletan writes in Slate, the Obama administration took a lot of political heat for ratcheting-down the “war on terror” rhetoric, but has been vindicated.  Maintaining the idea that the United States is fighting a religion only reinforces the clash of civilizations narrative, which in turns plays directly into the communication strategy of the Bad Guys.

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The past couple of weeks have been interesting in Indonesia, especially for those concerned with religion and conflict in the world’s most populous Muslim country.

Ahmadiyya sentences.

On February 6 in Banten, West Java, some 1000 villagers attacked a house with several members of Ahmadiyya inside. Ahmadis consider themselves Muslims, but many Muslims consider Ahmadis heretics because of their belief that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet who came after Mohammad. The tension had been mounting, and the Ahmadis had been asked to leave and faced threats and intimidation. They were also accused of stockpiling weapons — if true, an understandable reaction given the palpable threats they were facing. During the attack, Ahmadis were viciously beaten, and three were killed, their corpses stomped into the mud as police stood by and watched. Video footage of the attacks, including idle police, remains on YouTube. Members of the extremist Islamic Defenders Front, who consider themselves vigilantes, were among the attackers.

Yesterday, a court in Jakarta announced a verdict of six months in jail for Deden Sudjana, an Ahmadi leader whose hand was nearly severed in the attack, for incitement and “maltreatment.” Last month, 12 of those who attacked the Ahmadis were handed down sentences of three to six months. None were tried for murder.

Ahmadiyya is persecuted under Indonesian law; its adherents are not allowed to demonstrate their faith publicly. There have been several attempts to ban the sect outright, and a branch of the sect was attacked in Makassar, Sulawesi last weekend.

Ramadan violence.

The Muslim fasting month of Ramadan is well under way, and in Indonesia, like clockwork extremist groups such as the FPI increased their attacks on what they perceive as immorality. Although they target criminal activities such as prostitution and drugs, they also target activities that are not illegal under Indonesian law, such as selling or eating food during the fast. Indonesia has practitioners of religious traditions other than Islam, as well as a wide continuum among Muslims regarding the strictness with which they carry out their faith. These attacks, including against a food stall in Makassar (Ujung Padang), Sulawesi, the other day, are frequently ignored by local police, who may sympathize with the FPI or may even be afraid to move against them, despite their claims to the contrary.

Another unfortunate Ramadan tradition in Indonesia is the targeting of Christian churches. On August 1 in Riau, two Protestant churches were burned down.

Terrorist Umar Patek brought back from Pakistan.

Umar Patek, a Jemaah Islamiyah member with ties to Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, who was arrested in Abbottabad, Pakistan in January, was repatriated to Indonesia. Conspiracy theorists speculated about his return, which took much longer than expected, accusing the Indonesian secret service of brainwashing him into admitting guilt.Following his return, he admitted his role in the first Bali bombing in 2002 as well as bombings of churches on Christmas Eve in 2000.

It cannot be a coincidence that he was picked up in the same town where Osama bin Laden met his demise, despite American claims to the contrary, although it is still unclear whether the two met. Umar Patek certainly has knowledge about the connections between Southeast Asian extremists and the rest of the world, and likely about the current state of these organizations. There is also speculation that Umar Patek divulged information that led to the raid on Osama bin Laden’s residence.

Whether or not he will talk is unclear, but the United States is among those hoping to be able to interrogate him. According to the head of the Indonesian National Counter Terrorism Agency Ansyaad Mbai, he cannot be tried under the 2003 anti-terrorism law, written in response to the Bali bombing; he will, however, be tried for other offenses including murder and possible explosives charges.

Violence in Papua.

Violence continues in West Papua, where recent demonstrations in favor of an independence referendum have been met with bloody crackdowns, and elections in some regions have turned violent. Indonesian sovereignty in West Papua has been contested since its de facto integration in 1962, formalized in the 1969 “Act of Free Choice.” The 1969 plebiscite was a fundamentally flawed process, and is considered a Cold War appeasement to Indonesian President Suharto, who had come to power four years earlier in a bloodbath of communists.

Papua is not immune to light sentencing for horrendous crimes. Last week a court handed down sentences of six to 15 months to three soldiers for “insubordination.” Their crime? The murder and decapitation of Reverend Kindeman Gire, reported by the Sydney Morning Herald.

Another article, also by Tom Allard, describes a tightly woven web of monitoring and surveillance in Papua that creates a climate of fear and intimidation. A group of professors from some of Indonesia’s best universities, calling themselves the Academic Forum for a Peaceful Papua, called for the government to eschew violence in favor of dialogue to solve Papua’s problems.

These recent events point to the continued increasing influence of extremist Islam the continuing impunity of the military and are a blow to multiculturalism and democracy in Indonesia. Lame duck President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will likely not make any bold steps to reign in groups such as the FPI nor is he likely to make any bold moves to reign in the military.

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In business marketing, branding means creating demand for a product by creating an image that is appealing to potential consumers.  This probably brings to mind successful brands like Coca-Cola, Disney, and Nike.  But brands can also become “toxic.” Recent evidence suggests al-Qaeda may now be one such failed brand.

Brands become toxic when they are initially strong and well known, then negative events transform their image in a way that turns off potential customers.  A strategic communication asset is suddenly transformed into a liability.  The stronger the initial brand image, the greater the liability when it goes bad.

In recent years several well-known brands have turned toxic.  Rupert Murdock’s News Corporation is now being called a toxic brand because of fallout from scandals in the UK over voice mail hacking.  The label was applied to BP in the wake of the Gulf oil spill disaster, and to AIG because of its role of the U.S. economic meltdown.

In some cases, a brand becomes so toxic that the only solution is to throw out the old identity and start over.  This was the strategy used by Blackwater Worldwide.  After its brand was hopelessly contaminated by scandals in Iraq, it changed its name to Xe.

Reports suggest that Osama bin Laden considered the same move for al-Qaeda.  According to The Telegraph, documents seized in the raid on bin Laden’s compound “portray bin Laden as a terrorist chief executive, struggling to sell holy war for a company in crisis following in the footsteps of arch-enemies like Blackwater, which became Xe after a run of bad headlines.”

Now there is a possibility that bin Laden wasn’t the only one concerned about AQ brand weakness.  Last week, Saeed al-Jamhi of the Al-Jahmi Centre for Studies and Research claimed that in May, groups associated with al-Qaeda in Yemen began operating under a new name, Ansar al-Sharia (Supporters of Sharia).  The purpose of the change is to avoid to toxic associations with AQ and provide an image of greater religious legitimacy:

The al-Qaeda name conjures up terror and signifies violence and destruction. The organisation was compelled to hatch groups that operate under local religious-oriented names to persuade others to support them and move from under the spotlight that is cast on them as terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda.

It is unclear whether this is a wholesale change or just the launch of a new subsidiary.  But in either case, these developments–along with the widely-acknowledged irrelevance of al-Qaeda in the Arab Spring–are signs that the brand is fading, if not toxic.

Whether due to Western efforts to undermine AQ’s image or their own contradictions coming home to roost, it would be a welcome development.  Some U.S. leaders claim AQ is on the verge of organizational defeat, but for years they have not been very threatening as a discrete actor.  Brand toxicity may be the thing that finally kills AQ as a social movement.

Update December 16, 2011

This story from Fox News quotes a “senior Arab diplomat” who corroborates this report of a name change for AQAP.

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The Karbala master narrative is one of the most rich and influential in the Islamic world, specifically among Shi‘a societies. We devoted an entire chapter to it in the book Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism, and Kamran Scott Aghaie has penned a wonderful study of it in relation to the history of Iranian identity and nationalism. There is a terrific documentary too, examining the narrative in contemporary Iran and Iraq, which aired on PBS several years ago, called Pilgrimage to Karbala. Nevertheless, despite its prominence and the scholarly attention the narrative has received, I was very much surprised to see Ayman al-Zawahiri invoking this master narrative in his eulogy for Usama bin Laden.

In fact, al-Zawahiri made an explicit analogy comparing Bin Laden to Imam Husayn. He stated:

[Usama bin Laden] departed to his God, stained with the blood of his martyrdom. He was the man, who did not surrender, until the last moment of his life. He was killed among his family and sons. Abu Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin was killed the same way Abu Abdallah al-Husayn [the grandson of Prophet Muhammad], may God be pleased with him, was killed among his family and children. Abu Abdallah al-Husayn cried in pride on the day he was slain in Karbala: “I will never show humiliation.” Abu Abdallah Usama Bin Ladin did the same in Abbottabad, when he cried: “I will never show humiliation to the United States, I will never show humiliation to the arrogance of the Crusaders, I will never show humiliation to the collaborative Pakistanis, and I will never give concessions on the ummah’s sanctities and dignity. (Ayman al-Zawahiri, June 8, 2011)

Ayman al-Zawahiri’s use of the Karbala master narrative is unusual for a number of reasons. The Shi‘a master narrative carries deep cosmic and redemptive significance. These sectarian notions run contrary to several core Sunni Muslim beliefs. Indeed, a common Sunni polemical argument against Shi’ism is that it deifies Husayn and the other Imams and thereby commits the unforgivable sign of shirk (idolatry). As such, Sunnis would reject much of the content found in Shi‘a accounts of the Battle of Karbala, such as those traditionally recounted or performed during Ashura.

These theological disagreements notwithstanding, the tragic death of Husayn at Karbala in 680 (CE) is certainly an acknowledged event in Islamic history that is lamented by Sunni Muslims. Reverence for Husayn as a wali or saint among Sunni Muslims is also particularly strong in Egypt, where an ornate shrine believed to contain his severed head serves as one of the two holiest Muslim sites in the country. The other is the shrine-tomb of Sayyida Zaynab, who was Husayn’s sister. I personally visited the shrine of Husayn, as well as Zaynab, in Cairo back in 2001 and saw the Sunni reverence for Husayn first hand. And as most everyone knows, Ayman al-Zawahiri is Egyptian.

The shrine of Sayyidna Husayn in Cairo, Egypt

Nevertheless, there is great irony in eulogizing Usama bin Laden, who was a Saudi Wahhabi, by comparing him to Imam Husayn. In 1802 (CE), Saudi Wahhabi zealots from Arabia (later “Saudi Arabia”) launched an attack under Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad bin Saud on the mosque-shrine of Husayn at Karbala in Iraq. The Wahhabis committed a massacre of the Shi‘a Muslim inhabitants in the holy city and proceeded to plunder and destroy Husayn’s sacred tomb-shrine. In their view, Shi‘ism was an infidel heresy and its idolatrous shrines, the foremost being those at Karbala and Najaf, needed to be destroyed under the banner of “true Islam.” They also carried out a similar attack against the mosque-shrine of Husayn’s father, Ali, at the holy city of Najaf in Iraq, and later in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

It must be profoundly disturbing for Shi‘a Muslims to hear a contemporary Wahhabi zealot being explicitly compared to Imam Husayn. If al-Zawahiri was trying to craft an ecumenical message that might unite Sunnis and Shi‘as against the “Crusader” United States, then he most certainly failed.

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It was bound to happen: London’s Daily Mail reported yesterday that the face of Osama bin Laden appeared on a Londoner’s piece of toast. I have been fascinated with how the image of Osama bin Laden became a pop cultural phenomenon after 9-11 in some parts of the Muslim world (including Indonesia, where I do much of my work). The image was usually intended to shock rather than express true solidarity with the terrorist leader, and I liken it to college kids with Che Guevara posters or t-shirts, or even early punk rockers adopting nazi symbolism.

The punk rockers were not Nazi sympathizers, and the college kids aren’t communists. The imagery of Che Guevara has become cliché, however, and turned into an internet meme: witness Colonel Sanders or Homer Simpson as Che. It’s lost its ability to shock. Nazi symbolism, however, continues to shock – just think back to some recent events, such as Jesse James’ ex-girlfriend/stripper Michelle McGee wearing Nazi gear in photos, or Prince Harry appearing at a party in a Nazi uniform.

Which will be the eventual fate of Osama bin Laden imagery? In the west, with bin Laden dead, it’s clear that his image has lost much of its ability to shock, and is now, rather, simply viewed with derision. The Daily Mail story misses no opportunity for a pun: “From terror to toast!” “One sandwich short of a picnic!” “Worst thing since sliced bread!” Puns such as these were unthinkable in the weeks following 9-11.

As one would imagine, the story found its way onto Islamist websites (I found it first through looking at arrahmah.com, an Indonesian extremist site). The puns from the Mail story are lost in translation – likely right over the head of whoever translated the story. But the end of the Mail story, where the death of bin Laden is discussed, has been replaced with the following in the arrahmah.com posting:

Whether or not this matter is true, whether or not there is an element of purpose in the appearance of the “face” of Sheik Osama, as a Muslim there is only one thing we can acknowledge as truth, that is that during his lifetime Sheik Osama was known as a warrior in the fight against the enemies of Islam to enforce the profession of faith in Allah on earth.

One group’s joke becomes another’s call to arms and faith.

After showing my colleagues the story, we noted that in the image the beard does not quite join at the chin, giving the appearance of mutton chops, and bringing comparisons to a salty sea captain or a 1970s British pub dweller. In the west, I think it’s safe to say the image of bin Laden following his death is no longer shocking. People claim that images of Jesus Christ have appeared on a piece of toast, and later on all sorts of other things (an iron, a potato chip, a pancake). These images have become internet memes, copied and rearranged for a variety of figures. Where will the next image of bin Laden appear? And will it too spawn spoofs?

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In the immediate aftermath of Usama bin Laden’s death there was no shortage of news and commentary trying to explain the significance of his demise. What does his death mean for the U.S. and al-Qaeda, or for the War in Afghanistan? The unilateral action by the U.S. also presented many questions about the future of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

But beyond Usama bin Laden’s death and its immediate implications, there was also the issue of his legacy. The White House clearly wanted to avoid any further elevation of his status among the extremists. They released still-caps and video of bin Laden that were intended to strip the man of the mythology. He was not the terrorist mastermind hiding out survivalist-style in the mountains and caves of the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Instead, he was a vain old man sitting alone under a dirty blanket in a small room watching himself on a cheap, little TV set. He dyed his beard before making videos, which were directed by someone else off camera, and exhibited a strong concern for his image. This is not exactly the terrorist mastermind imagined among the extremists.

It made perfect sense for the White House to attempt to draft his legacy. They don’t want him to be a grand martyr for the cause that can inspire others to emulate his conduct. The U.S. acted to show a weak and pathetic, cowardly man, hiding behind a woman (an erroneous statement later taken back by White House officials). They wanted the most feared man in the world looking painfully ordinary and unremarkable. .

The White House and media pundits were not alone in trying to craft the image of bin Laden after death. In the weeks after his killing, numerous extremist groups and leaders have released eulogies for “Sheikh Usama” that attempt to reclaim his legacy and portray a very different view of the man.

In extremist eulogies, bin Laden is the “lion of Islam.” He is a “knight among the knights of jihad.” He has achieved martyrdom, which he has sought for the past thirty years. It was a death that he was destined for. He “was killed with his finger on the trigger as he fought the enemies of God” (a statement not backed up by the facts as bin Laden was apparently unarmed). He is even compared to the Prophet Muhammad, and, we are told, certainly wishes that he could “return to this world to be killed again and again just as [he] used to tell us about [our] beloved one [the Prophet], God’s peace and prayer be upon him.” Citing a hadith, the eulogy relates that: “The Prophet swore that he wished he would be killed in the cause of God, brought back to life to be killed again, and be brought back to life once more to be killed also.” According to Islamic history, however, the Prophet Muhammad died while lying sick in his bed, and in the arms of his wife, at the age of 62.

Beyond these attempts to secure bin Laden’s place as the grand martyr of the his global movement, the extremists also want to convey what his death means practically in the temporal world. That message is simple: The struggle will continue. As one might expect, there are cries for revenge and vengeance (which is the norm when a extremist leader is killed). And President Obama himself is “wanted dead or alive,” appropriating President Bush’s well-known language regarding bin Laden.

Eulogizing a “martyr” is certainly not new or unique to bin Laden. There are ample examples of biographies of extremist martyrs with vivid retellings of their deaths. But the stakes are higher with bin Laden. He is not simply a foot soldier with a suicide vest. He was, at least symbolically, the ideological leader of the global movement. His eulogy is therefore hardly a three-line press release, but rather, taken together, these eulogies constitute the formative phase of a hagiography of sorts. His life, if it has not already, will take on mythological qualities. Usama Bin Laden is the champion in a classic tale of the small defeating the powerful. He is Muhammad and the Muslims at the Battle of Badr. He is David facing Goliath.

While the White House may want to portray bin Laden as a weak old man, these eulogies depict him as a spiritual warrior fighting for the downtrodden and oppressed. They are not histories (which require facts), but are the beginnings of a legend. And this is the rub. The mythical bin Laden cannot die. He can emerge as an eternal inspiration to all extremists going forward, with none of the faults that the historical bin Laden had. Certainly, those engaged in writing these eulogies have a high degree of respect and reverence for the man, but strategically they know his real value. Alive, he was the man able to evade capture for many years. Dead, he is a heroic lion of God and a symbolic tour-de-force. Now that the man is gone, the challenge ahead is how the U.S. can defeat the legend of Usama bin Laden.

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A few days ago, Noam Chomsky released a statement critical of the recent U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden.  Chomsky is a well known and accomplished scholar who has written extensively on issues of linguistics, communication, and philosophy.  His work on metaphor is standard reading in my academic field.  However, this statement borders on absurdity and makes me wonder what the man could be thinking.

Chomsky begins by calling the operation a “planned assassination.” Reports have recently come out contradicting initial statements that bin Laden was killed in a firefight and saying the there was minimal resistance.  Perhaps these more recent statements are part of a “psychological operation” to portray bin Laden as an ineffective fighter.  The fact is that nobody except the people involved and their superiors really know what took place in the Abbottabad compound.  Given conflicting accounts of the raid it is unreasonable to say with certainty (as Chomsky does) what really happened.

But does it really matter?  Whether it was a fight or an assassination, Chomsky’s basic argument is that the operation “multiply violat[ed] norms of international law.”  Without saying what these norms are, Chomsky argues that we really don’t have concrete evidence that bin Laden organized the 9/11 attacks, and that “Obama was simply lying when he said, in his White House statement, that ‘we quickly learned that the 9/11 attacks were carried out by al Qaeda.’”

It is true that we have no videotapes of bin Laden and his associates sitting around maps planning the attacks. In the absence of that, we have to rely on circumstantial evidence of capability, involvement in other high-profile attacks (U.S.S. Cole, African embassy bombings, earlier WTC attempt), and stated intent. On that evidence we can only conclude that al-Qaeda and its leaders were the perpetrators, unless we want to subscribe to crazy conspiracy theories that the U.S. government colluded with the Mossad to do the dead.

Then there is the 2004 statement by bin Laden himself:

I will speak to you about the reasons behind these incidents. I will honestly tell you about the minutes in which the decision was made so that you will consider. I say to you that God knows that the idea of striking the towers never occurred to us. But, after things had gone too far and we saw the injustice of the US-Israeli alliance against our people in Palestine and Lebanon, I started thinking of that.

The events that influenced me directly trace back to 1982 and subsequent events when the United States gave permission to the Israelis to invade Lebanon, with the aid of the sixth US fleet. At those difficult moments, many meanings that are hard to describe went on in my mind. However, these meanings produced an overwhelming feeling to reject injustice and generated a strong determination to punish the unjust ones. While I was looking at those destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me to punish the unjust one in a similar manner by destroying towers in the United States so that it would feel some of what we felt and to be deterred from killing our children and women.

Chomsky dismisses this as “rather like my confession that I won the Boston Marathon. He boasted of what he regarded as a great achievement.”  But this is a faulty analogy.  We know who won the Boston Marathon.  A better analogy would be Timothy McVeigh.  We had no videotape of him actually lighting the fuse on his truck bomb, just a lot of evidence connecting him with the crime.  Nobody treated his confession as disingenuous boasting.

Chomsky also says: “We might ask ourselves how we would be reacting if Iraqi commandos landed at George W. Bush’s compound, assassinated him, and dumped his body in the Atlantic.”  This is another faulty analogy. Whatever one says about Bush’s decision to invade Iraq (and I was no supporter of that move), it was not a surprise attack intentionally designed to slaughter thousands of innocent people. He also has not been responsible for ten years of continued attacks killing thousands of his own people, as has bin Laden.

A more appropriate counterfactual is this: How might we have reacted if Adolf Hitler had escaped to Argentina after the fall of Berlin, and the Allied powers had sent a commando team to assassinate him and dump his body in the Atlantic?  We would have said he got what he deserved, and good riddance.

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As details pour in regarding this past weekend’s daring raid in which U.S. Navy SEALs  killed elusive al-Qaeda leader and world’s most wanted terrorist Osama Bin Laden, the exact details of the events keep changing slightly. The New York Times titled an article covering a recent revision to the sequence of events and details about the operation as “White House Corrects Bin Laden Narrative”.

I would argue, however, the “Bin Laden Narrative” that matters most is not the play-by-play account of what happened, and in what sequence, in that Abbottabad compound. (In fact, I wouldn’t even call that sequence of events a “narrative” in order to avoid confusion about that term.)  While the details of who was shot first and where are important, the bigger narrative concern is what happens now that Osama bin Laden has been killed. And, my interest here in this piece is not an operational question, i.e. will Ayman al-Zawahiri take over as the leader of al-Qaeda or will another figure assert leadership of the terrorist network. No, my concern here is: How will the U.S. (collectively both the government and the populace) frame, conceive and think about the contemporary world order now that the number-one-most-wanted-terrorist story has come to an end.

In an earlier post I noted that narrative is more than simply the recounting of events. Stories and events are crucial parts of narrative: They are parts of the system that is narrative. And, systems are more than just assemblages of their parts. Systems have emergent properties, and in the case of narrative, one of those properties is sense-making.

Narrative, fundamentally, is a method of making sense of a body of information that includes actors (entities that act, not Denzel Washington or Natalie Portman), actions/events,  settings and even stories. Sometimes a narrative is a system comprised of actual events, real actors, and a collection of stories told about them. Other times, a narrative is a fictional construction. The factual and fictional domains can also overlap and influence on another. America is famously a world leader in generating moving image narratives (films and television), so I use examples from that art form in what follows.

As Americans, we tend to organize the world in the most simplistic of narrative structures, the binary. In a binary narrative there is one protagonist who is understood as the good guy.*  This is usually “us” or “America” or our hero-du-jour, be it John Wayne, Tom Cruise, General MacArthur, President Abraham Lincoln, or James Bond (never mind that he’s English). The hero represents all that is good and right about us. The good guy is opposed by the antagonist “bad guy.”

The original Star Wars film offers a readily accessible example of how the binary offers a simple and air-tight understanding of a world. In a galaxy far away, a young man (Luke Skywalker on behalf of “The Republic”) enters into battle with an archetypal enemy (Darth Vader, dressed ominously in black and leading the forces of the evil “Empire”). Understanding this world is simple. There are those allied with Luke and the Republic and there are those allied with Vader and the Empire. It is a black and white world.

Our predilection for formulaic, familiar and always-resolved narratives is evident in the overwhelming popularity of police and medical “procedurals” on American television. While these shows might appear on the surface to be more complicated than the binary just described, at base they are just that.

In most police procedurals (think the CSI franchise, the Law and Order franchise, and the host of newer shows like Castle or the newly remade Hawaii Five-0.), the “good guys” and the “bad guys” are clearly delineated. The police (and prosecutors) represent the forces of good, normative American society opposing a criminal element—classical bad guys whether they are on-screen shooting at police or the off-screen subject of a mystery investigation.

In the medical procedurals (think House or Crossing Jordan as well as the reality-based medical/crime crossover shows like, Dr. G: Medical Examiner and Forensic Files), the intelligent and committed medical practitioners battle their enemy, disease or mystery, and the disease’s ever-present ally of the ticking clock.  All of these shows, whether fictional or reality-based, share the common traits of a clear protagonist (individual or group), a clear antagonist (criminal or disease) and, most importantly for what I see as the dominant form of narrative in the American psyche, a clear resolution.

So, what does all this have to do with Osama Bin Laden? For more than 10 years, Osama bin Laden has been the Darth Vader leading an evil empire of al-Qaeda, Taliban and miscellaneous Islamist extremists. The antagonist umbrella even covered Iraq and Saddam Hussein for a period of time (before the lack of narrative coherence finally separated Iraq from the bin Laden/al-Qaeda menace). The binary narrative structure in which the U.S. fights bin Laden and his allies actually simplifies a complex geo-political landscape into a format already familiar to the American public—the Cold War.

A classic binary narrative structure, the Cold War narrative neatly divided the world into good and evil, protagonist and antagonist, and made understanding simple. With the demise of the Soviet Union, that binary narrative structure was disrupted until the advent of bin Laden. While both President Obama and President Bush have repeatedly asserted that the U.S. is not at war with Islam or the Arab people, neither would have had to say this if the binary narrative that offers only two options (you’re with us or you’re against us) had not been dominating the American psyche.

Iraq was a sub-plot, one that we tried to force-fit into the fairly simple binary narrative pattern of protagonist vs. antagonist. The lack of unity in accepting the Iraq campaign illustrates that it did not cohere with the overall narrative system. This is a good illustration of the narrative comprehension process. Data is received (actions, events, actors) and a template (such as the binary structure here described) is applied. If the data fit the template, a concise comprehension is achieved. If they don’t fit, back to the drawing board. The situation in Iraq has never conveniently fit the binary template, which gave rise to the considerable contention, confusion and lack of understanding surrounding that ongoing episode.

With clear resolution being one of the hallmarks of the binary structure (House cures the disease, Benson and Stabler catch their criminal, Luke Skywalker defeats Darth Vader), what happens to our narrative understanding of the world now that resolution of this narrative is at hand?  With bin Laden dead, does the narrative end and the credits roll?  Hardly.

The geo-political landscape is just as complicated and unsuited to a binary narrative today as it was a week ago (not to mention 10 years ago). It seems to me that we have two options. We can take the “24 approach” and simply discover a new antagonist. This path elevates Ayman al-Zawahiri (or perhaps, as our friend Jarret Brachman suggests, Abu Yahya al-Libi) into the antagonist role. Then we could continue comprehending the contemporary moment as one of conflict between the U.S. and al-Zawahiri (or whatever new figurehead represents the evil empire of Al Qaeda, Taliban, AQAP, AQLIM, etc.).

Alternatively, we could jettison the binary narrative structure, its simplicity of conflict and its obvious path to resolution. Perhaps it is time that our mainstream culture and mainstream media recognize what our troops on the ground in Afghanistan already know and deal with everyday. There is no simple us vs. them arrangement in Afghanistan, or across the Middle East. Pakistan seems to be playing both sides of the fence. The Taliban is only one of at least five different insurgent groups in Afghanistan contesting the American presence. The Arab Spring has displaced leaders like Egypt’s Mubarak (who by virtue of the binary structure became an ally but who is now revealed as a less-than-savory bedfellow), and has left only questions in the wake of the uprisings. I’m not saying there isn’t evil in the world that needs to be opposed by American will and American military might. But I am saying that in the complicated geo-political and socio-cultural landscapes we face, an overly simplistic and binary organization of people, events and actions into some sort of uber-narrative structure is problematic and unhelpful.

The considerable gnashing of teeth occurring right now over Pakistani complicity or incompetence in bin Laden’s concealment illustrates the flaws of the binary that has dominated American culture. Why?  Because we had assigned to Pakistan the ally role in our binary narrative. Discovering the archetype of evil residing in relative comfort 60 miles from the capital of an ally does not comport with a simplistic understanding of “us vs. them”. Politicians across the political spectrum are grand-standing and calling for investigation in the $4 billion of foreign aid provided to Pakistan annually, claiming, essentially, some sort of breach of contract.

The reality is twofold. As a single nation-state entity, Pakistan has multiple interests (deter India, collect U.S. aid, limit anarchy in the northwest, deter further extremist attacks inside Pakistan, assert Pakistani sovereignty, develop relations with Russia and China, etc). As a fractured, barely functional government, different factions exercise different agendas and thus the government may not act in a consistent manner. This reality means that elements in Pakistan might have known of bin Laden’s presence and some may have aided him, but it does not mean that Pakistan is secretly a member of bin Laden’s evil empire. It also means that Pakistan is not always a stalwart ally. Complicated.

What to do then? We live in a complex world and it is time for our mode of understanding to embrace that complexity rather than try to over-simplify. Rather than imposing one, dominant and over-arching narrative to explain all things, we should embrace the systemic (recognize that sub-components of narrative such as stories, actors, events, settings may play different roles in multiple smaller narrative systems), multi-layered (rather than one dominant explanation that all components fit under, recognize that narratives exist in parallel and at multiple levels) and intersecting qualities of narrative.

These qualities are increasingly apparent in popular culture in the field of transmedia storytelling. Stories that share some common elements are told across a variety of media platforms. The recent glut of comic book hero movies exemplifies the trend. Spiderman begins as a comic book (one with multiple titles, no less), then movies and video games (and an animated television series with an oh-so-catchy theme song, lest we forget) proliferate.

The stories told on these different platforms sometimes integrate, and sometimes contradict. Add in fan-generated fiction from fan sites, and the system of stories, actions, events, actors and settings proliferates in a complex and tangled web. Yet, despite contradictions, the Spiderman universe remains eminently understandable. Complementary (and complimentary) stories add to Spidey’s heroism, while contradictory stories can be held at the same time by the reader/viewer. These add nuance and multiple facets to characters and situations without compromising understanding. This is precisely because these seemingly contradictory elements are part of smaller narrative systems that are flexibly interlinked into a broader system, rather than components being force-fit into a single, simplistic, binary narrative structure.

From cowboys vs. Indians to Axis vs. Allies to the Cold War, American culture has been fond of its simple, binary narratives. This same, familiar pattern has been applied to America’s conflict with terrorism and Islamist extremism, but now with bin Laden’s death perhaps we can put an end to this detrimental over-simplification. Again taking a cue from pop culture, our political communication can embrace the complexity of narrative structure that the culture is clearly capable of managing, and drive towards a more nuanced understanding of the complicated world around us.

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* it is almost always a guy or a team that collectively constitutes the good team. Female-lead fictional narratives tend towards structures other than the binary.

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