by Bruce Gregory*

ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller, “Arab Youth Survey 2012,” May 2, 2012.  In this fourth annual survey of young Arabs in 12 countries, 82 percent say economic concerns, “fair pay and home ownership,” are their top priority, displacing “living in a democracy” as their greatest concern.  Other findings: optimism about the future and trust in government have increased; lack of democracy and civil unrest are viewed as obstacles to progress; the UAE is seen as a model country; views of France, China, and India are more favorable; and “news consumption skyrockets” with TV viewership declining and online activity up dramatically.  A 24-page White Paper, “After the Spring,” discusses the survey’s findings and methodology.

Robin Brown, “The Four Paradigms of Public Diplomacy: Building a Framework for Comparative Government External Communications Research,” Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego, April 2012.  Brown (University of Leeds) urges a comparative research agenda that looks at why public diplomacy is the way it is — an approach he distinguishes from an agenda grounded in how to make it better.  He discuses four ideal types that give rise to fruitful propositions about the purposes and nature of public diplomacy and how it should be conceptualized:  (1) public diplomacy as an extension of diplomacy; (2) public diplomacy as national projection, now viewed as nation-branding; (3) external communication for cultural relations; and (4) external communication as political warfare.  Brown discusses the utility of these paradigms for understanding organizational differences and mapping changes across time and countries.

Caitlin Byrne, “Public Diplomacy and Constructivism: A Synergistic and Enabling Relationship,” Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, San Diego, April 2012.  Byrne (Bond University) looks at ways in which constructivist theories of international relations can inform public diplomacy practice.  She draws on Australia’s approach to diplomacy and explores what diplomatic practice offers as “a vehicle for operationalizing constructivist approaches.”  A diplomacy practitioner turned scholar, Bryne approaches the connection between theory and practice “with an element of caution” and keen awareness of its possibilities.

Derek Chollet and Samantha Power, eds., The Unquiet American: Richard Holbrooke in the World, (Public Affairs, 2011).  Chollet (author of The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft) and Power (founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard University) compile essays by Holbrooke’s colleagues, journalists, and others who had a special relationship with him.  Includes contributions by Kati Marton, Strobe Talbott, E. Benjamin Skinner, Jonathan Alter, Gordon M. Goldstein, Roger Cohen, Derek Chollet, James Traub, John Tedstrom, David Rhode, and Samantha Power.  The essays provide insights into Holbrooke’s personality, opinions, diplomatic skills and style, and events in his life and career.  For an essay-length critique of the book and an argument that “Holbrooke’s actions and philosophy were problematic,” see Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Hagiography of Mr. Holbrooke,” The National Interest, Number 119, May/June 2012, 71-80.

Eliot A. Cohen, Conquered Into Liberty, (Free Press, 2011).  Cohen (Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies) looks at how two centuries of conflict among British, French, Canadians, Americans, and Indians in the corridor between Albany and Montreal shaped a “distinctive American way of war.”  Because Americans episodically “discover” public diplomacy in wartime, there is much of interest to diplomacy scholars and practitioners.  An early French advantage over the English in woodland diplomacy and propaganda.  Lessons learned by the American colonies from British mistakes.  Canada’s “practical anthropology” skills in engaging Indian cultures.  Mastery of Indian languages by French Jesuits.  America’s use of armed conflict as an instrument of democratization.  In a public letter distributed widely to the citizens of Quebec, Congress wrote: “You have been conquered into liberty, if you act as you ought.”  Instructions to Benjamin Franklin for his diplomatic mission to Canada in 1776 contain this early “say-do” gap in American diplomacy:  “You are to establish a free press . . . and give directions for the frequent publication of such pieces as may be of service to the cause of the United Colonies.”

Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, “America’s ‘Engagement’ Delusion: Critiquing a Public Diplomacy Consensus,” International Communication Gazette, March 28, 2012.  Comor (University of Western Ontario) and Bean (University of Colorado, Denver) challenge the central concept of engagement in the Obama administration’s diplomacy.  Their claim: engagement’s conceptual emphasis on dialogue and interaction masks intent in practice to use social media and other tools of engagement to persuade audiences to support US policies.  An “ethical public diplomacy,” they contend, should embrace genuine rather than contrived dialogue.

Creating an Independent International Strategic Communication Organization for America: Business Plan, SAGE: Strengthening America’s Global Engagement, Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, March 2012.  The SAGE business plan offers a roadmap for creating a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation — a “flexible, entrepreneurial, and tech-savvy partner” that will complement government public diplomacy.  The plan draws on recommendations in reports by the Brookings Institution, the Defense Science Board, the Council on Foreign Relations and others.  It was developed by five nonpartisan working groups consisting of some 80 former government practitioners and experts from the private sector and civil society.  It was launched in Washington on March 26, 2012, at meeting hosted by Woodrow Wilson Center President Jane Harmon with a panel that included former US Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, former State Department Director of Policy Planning Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs Goli Ameri, and SAGE Project Director Brad Minnick.  For a brief summary and comment, see Matt Armstrong’s Mountain Runner blog of March 27, 2012.

“InterMedia’s Ali Fisher Discusses the Changing Digital Landscape,” Intermedia, December 21, 2011.  In this brief video interview with Wilton Park Chief Executive Richard Burge, Fisher (InterMedia’s Associate Director of Digital Media) discusses advances in social media, tools that enable digital programming by non-specialists, and anticipated changes over the horizon.

John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life, (The Penguin Press, 2011).  George Kennan, widely acclaimed as one of America’s most accomplished diplomats, is not usually thought to have contributed to the rise of public diplomacy in the second half of the 20th century.  In this masterful biography, however, Gaddis (Yale University) shows there is much that public diplomacy scholars and practitioners can learn from Kennan’s career, organizational changes in the Department of State, and events with which Kennan was associated.  Examples include:
– Kennan’s views on the psychological effects of actions, particularly his view that racism at home undercut diplomacy and America’s standing abroad.
– His entrepreneurial diplomatic style and willingness to take personal and professional risks in the field and Department of State.
– His public speaking in the United States at the request of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton.
– A strong belief in professional education as a necessary complement to training.
– His storied role in creating a grand strategy studies curriculum for soldiers and diplomats at the National War College.
– His contributions to the creation of the National Committee for Free Europe and Radio Free Europe.
– His founding role and effective use of the State Department’s policy planning office as an instrument of strategic planning.
– State’s one time insistence on education as well as training.  Kennan as a junior officer was sent to Tallinn and Berlin not only to learn Russian but for post-graduate studies — with instructions to gain “an education similar to that which an educated Russian of the pre-revolutionary era would have received.”
And much more.

Fergus Hanson, Revolution @State: The Spread of EDiplomacy, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, Australia, March 2012.  Written while on a four-month professional Fulbright research project in Washington, Hanson (Research Fellow and Director of Polling, Lowy Institute) enthusiastically contends the “US State Department has become the world’s leading user of ediplomacy.”  His study examines State’s use of Ediplomacy in eight program areas, with knowledge management, public diplomacy, and Internet freedom taking the largest share of resources and staff.  Hanson’s sweeping and problematic conclusion:  “State now operates what is effectively a global media empire, reaching a larger direct audience than the paid circulation of the ten largest US dailies and employing an army of diplomat-journalists to feed its 600-plus platforms.”  He argues that Australia’s foreign ministry has “some catching up to do.”

Craig Hayden, “Audience, Mechanism, and Objective: A Comparative Framework for Soft Power Analysis,” Paper presented to the International Studies Association conference in San Diego, April 2, 2012.  Hayden (American University and Intermap Blog) offers an alternative to categories of resources and behaviors in Joseph Nye’s analytical concept of soft power.  Hayden’s constructivist methodology seeks an understanding of soft power through a pragmatic and contingent perspective grounded in three categories: (1) audience and scope, or the subjects and objects of soft power; (2) mechanism, the ways actors connect resources to behaviors; and (3) objectives, or the range of outcomes anticipated from effective uses of soft power.  His article explores his reasoning in brief case studies of uses of soft power by the US and China.  He examines what he calls “the facilitative turn” in 21st century networked diplomacy and provides helpful references to current literature in public diplomacy scholarship.

Nat Kretchun and Jane Kim, A Quiet Opening: North Koreans in a Changing Media Environment, InterMedia, Washington, DC, May 2012.  In this report, Kretchun (Intermedia) and Kim (East-West Coalition) show “how North Koreans’ growing access to a range of media and communication technologies is undermining the state’s monopoly on what its citizens see, hear, know, and think.”  Drawing on research among refugees, travelers and defectors from North Korea, the authors conclude that despite lack of evidence that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un plans to loosen state control of media and information, the reach of uncensored media is expanding and giving many North Koreans alternative news and views.

Teresa La Porte, “The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Non-State Actors and the Public Diplomacy Concept,” Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego, April 2012.  La Porte (University of Navarra) examines the rise of civil society organizations as public diplomacy actors.  She proposes an approach to public diplomacy that goes beyond dialogue and networking in state-centric terms to include actions by non-state actors.  Her paper explores what this might mean in terms of analytical concepts and boundaries.  She calls for taking analysis beyond a focus on actors as “subjects” to a focus on the “objects” of their actions.  Two such objects, the “legitimacy” of actions and “perceptions of effectiveness,” she argues, are important pre-conditions to recognizing civil society organizations as diplomatic actors.  She discusses these pre-conditions in the context of two practice scenarios and the European Union’s public diplomacy.

Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, (Public Affairs, 2012).  Lynch (George Washington University) brings scholarship, Arabic proficiency, his standing as a leading voice in online discourse, policy advisory connections, and a deep understanding of the Arab public sphere to this account of the origins and implications of changes in the Middle East.  Hard power and wealth will continue to matter, he argues, but loosened state control, independent mobilization of activists, and unification of Arab political space are generating three challenges that will matter more: (1) the ability to credibly align with the Arab public on its core issues will become a greater source of influence; (2) unified political space will increase linkages between issues in the region; and (3) the ability to intervene in the domestic politics of others, while resisting penetration of one’s own politics, will determine whether a state is a player or an arena for the proxy wars of others.  Lynch’s pragmatism and historical insights form the basis for an assessment of America’s grand strategy and public diplomacy in the region.

Meridian International Center and Gallup, “US Global Leadership Track,” The U.S.-Global Leadership Project, April 20, 2012.  Findings in Gallup’s third annual survey of international perceptions in 130 countries show median global approval of US leadership at 46%.  Three countries “experienced double digit gains.  Many more showed double digit losses.  Africa gave US leadership the highest median approval rating, while the Americas gave it the lowest. In Europe and Asia, approval ratings held relatively steady.”

Metzgar, Emily T., “Public Diplomacy, Smith-Mundt and the American Public,” Communication Law and Policy, 17:1, 67-101.  Available online: January 9, 2012.  Metzgar (Indiana University) explores political, legal, policy, conceptual, and practitioner issues relating to the US statutory ban on domestic dissemination in the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 as amended (aka, the Smith-Mundt Act).  Her article, framed in the context of US international broadcasting, looks at consequences of continuing or ending the ban and potential policy advantages that might result from its repeal.  Includes numerous references to current and historical literature.

Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power — Culture and Society,” Keynote address at the launch of Macquarie University’s Soft Power and Advocacy Research Center (SPARC), Sydney, Australia, April 17, 2012.  Nye (Harvard University) discusses concepts of soft power in the context of the “rise of China,” US relations with China, and evolving relations between China, India, and Australia.  His address (with Q&A) is available as a 90-minute ABC “Big Ideas” video and audio webcast.  Macquarie’s SPARC Center seeks to advance the study and practice of soft power and public diplomacy through research, education and training, post-graduate courses in public diplomacy, and other initiatives.

Office of Inspector General, US Department of State, “Inspection of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,” Report No. ISP-I-12-15, February 2012.  In a 68-page report (some sections redacted), State’s Inspector General concludes that the Department’s exchange programs “enhance mutual understanding” and “are increasingly aligned with foreign policy priorities.”  Their effectiveness is undermined, however, by “long-standing institutional weaknesses.”  Key judgments include employee resistance to changes “fundamental to operating efficiently,” needed senior management restructuring, “unfettered growth and weak regulation” of the Summer Work Travel program, inadequate strategic planning, and deficiencies in program monitoring and evaluation.

PBS NewsHour, “China’s Programming for U.S. Audiences: Is it News or Propaganda?” March 23, 2012.  The NewsHour’s Ray Suarez reports on CCTV’s news programs for American audiences recently launched from a state-of-the-art broadcast studio in Washington, DC.  Includes views of CCTV America’s director Ma Jing and news anchor Philip Yin and analysts Susan Shirk (University of California) and Philip Cunningham (Cornell University).

Shawn M. Powers and William Youmans, “A New Purpose for International Broadcasting: Subsidizing Deliberative Technologies in Non-transitioning States,” Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2012, 1-14.  Powers (Georgia State University) and Youmans (George Washington University) argue “a scaled down standard of deliberation is appropriate” in failed or failing states that lack advanced communication infrastructures, high literacy rates, and other elements of highly developed public spheres.  Their paper examines the potential for international broadcasting strategies that seek to complement traditional roles by finding new purpose in “the development and promotion of deliberation technologies.”

Gary Rawnsley, “Approaches to Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in China and Taiwan,” Paper delivered at the International Studies Association Conference, San Diego, April 2012.  Rawnsley (University of Leeds and Public Diplomacy and International Communications Blog) analyzes Taiwanese and Chinese views of soft power, their adaptation of the Anglo-American model of soft power, and their contrasting public diplomacy strategies and practices.  He argues each faces different challenges that undermine their soft power capacity: Taiwan’s need to acknowledge limitations of its cultural approach to soft power and China’s struggle to bridge gaps between its outputs and how audiences perceive their credibility.

Philip Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in The Social Media Era, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  Seib (University of California) uses the Arab Awakening of 2011 as context for analyzing two questions.  How have the speed and reach of information flows changed theories and practices of diplomacy?  And how are social media affecting political structures and activism?  His book provides an overview of political and media revolutions in the Middle East, comparisons of traditional and “rapid-reaction” diplomacy, a discussion of expeditionary diplomacy and public diplomacy, and analysis of debates on how social media tools are changing networks and creating ripple effects beyond the Arab world and beyond politics.

Science & Diplomacy, Center for Science Diplomacy, American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS).  In this new online quarterly journal, the AAAS provides “a forum for rigorous thought, analysis, and insight to serve stakeholders who develop, implement, and teach all aspects of science and diplomacy.”  Articles in the first edition include: “Science and Diplomacy: The Past is Prologue,” “Science Diplomacy and 21st Century Statecraft,” “Nunn-Lugar: Science Cooperation Essential for Non-proliferation,” “South African Science Diplomacy,” and “Rediscovering Eastern Europe for Science Diplomacy.”  The editors (Vaughan Turekian, Tom C. Wang, and Caitlin Jennings) welcome submissions from scholars and practitioners.  (Courtesy of Alan Kotok)

James Stavridis and Evelyn N. Farkas, “The 21st Century Force Multiplier: Public-Private Collaboration,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2012, 7-20.  Admiral Stavridis (Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO, and Commander, US European Command, EUCOM) and Farkas (Senior Advisor for Public-Private Partnership) discuss growing US collaboration with private sector and civil society organizations to leverage their expertise and skills to mutual advantage in defense, diplomacy, and development.  The authors view this “whole of society” approach as a step beyond an interagency “whole of government” approach.  The biggest obstacle to such collaboration: “the mindset, mainly on the government side.”  The biggest gain: enhancing US innovation, efficiencies, and effectiveness.

Strategic Public Diplomacy,  Proceedings of the CEI Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum, May 20-22, 2010, sponsored by the Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Republic of Croatia in cooperation with the US Embassy in Zagreb.  In these conference proceedings, recently published online, diplomats from US and European countries explore issues and challenges in the study and practice of public diplomacy.  Topics include public diplomacy in support of EU membership, nation branding, the role of cultural diplomacy, the Internet and social networks, and international foundations.  The purpose of the Dubrovnik Diplomatic Forum is to encourage international debate from practical and academic points of view and to promote understanding of concepts, methods, skills and techniques of diplomacy and diplomatic training.  (Courtesy of Mladen Andrlic and Tihana Bohac)

Gaye Tuchman, “Measured and Pressured: Professors at Wannabe U,” The Hedgehog Review, Spring 2012, 17-29.  In one of several essays on “the corporate professor” in this edition of the Review, Tuchman (University of Connecticut) explores ways in which professors “have bought into or been shaped by the corporate culture of the university and seem strangely inarticulate about the purposes and worth of higher education.”  She finds professors anxiously pursuing the metrics of productivity and impact often with more enthusiasm than administrators.  Frank Donoghue (Ohio State University) in “Do College Teachers have to be Scholars?” (pp. 29-41) focuses on the motives of adjunct and tenured faculty and the consequences of the surge in adjunct hires for learning, scholarship, and society.  Ethan Schrum (Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture) provides “A Bibliographic Essay on the University, the Market, and Professors” (pp. 43-51).

“U.S. International Broadcasting: Impact Through Innovation and Integration,” Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), 2011 Annual Report, Released April 16, 2012.  The BBG’s report summarizes activities of US funded broadcasting services: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and TV Marti, Radio Free Asia, the Alhurra TV and Radio Sawa, and the International Broadcasting Bureau.   

Guido Westerwelle, “Explaining Europe – Discussing Europe,” Federal Foreign Office, Federal Republic of Germany, February 29, 2012.  Germany’s Foreign Minister outlines “a new concept on communicating Europe” in a paper presented to the Federal Cabinet.  He argues it is time to look beyond Europe’s debt crisis to the future of “Europe as a political project,” because “there can be no bright future for Germany without a united Europe.  The paper discusses three communication themes: building confidence among European neighbors, promoting Europe in the world, and campaigning for Europe in Germany.  (Courtesy of Anna Tepper)

R. S. Zaharna, The Cultural Awakening in Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 4, 2012, April 2012.  Zaharna (American University) looks at culture as an under-examined force relevant to every aspect of communication between nations and publics — and to every aspect of public diplomacy “from policy, to practice, to scholarship.”  In part one of her paper, she discusses the importance of culture as a fundamental dimension of public diplomacy that nevertheless “gets lost in political, economic, and bureaucratic factors.”  In part two, she explores ways to “develop cultural awareness and knowledge [of others and self] and learning how to recognize culture’s eloquent signs in communication, perception, cognition, values, identity and power.”  Her study does not focus on culture as a tool of public diplomacy.  It is about awareness of the intersection of culture and public diplomacy and implications for study and practice.

Ethan Zuckerman, “A Small World After All?” The Wilson Quarterly, Spring 2012, 44-47.  Zuckerman (Center for Civic Media, MIT) sees a central paradox in an age of connection:  “while it’s easier than ever to share information and perspectives from different parts of the world, we may be encountering a narrower picture of the world than we did in less connected days.”  Studies of social media find a locality effect in which users are more likely to connect with those in close physical proximity.  “The Internet has changed many things,” he argues, “but not the insular habits of mind that keep the world from becoming truly connected.”

Blogs of Interest

Robert Albro, “Aspiring to an Interest-free Cultural Diplomacy?” April 26, 2012.  “Cultural Engagement as Glocal Diplomacy,” May 12, 2012.  Posted on the CPD Blog and Public Policy Anthropologist Blog.

Craig Hayden, “Terministic Compulsion” [on definitions and terms in public diplomacy], April 13, 2012. “Some Lessons from ISA 2012,” April 10, 2012.  Intermap Blog.

Matt Armstrong, “Public Diplomacy Achievement Awards 2012,” May 8, 2012.  See also Public Diplomacy Alumni Association website. “Science and Technology for Communication and Persuasion Abroad: Gap Analysis and Survey,” May 1, 2012.  MountainRunner Blog

P.J. Crowley, “Actions in Beijing Speak Volumes,” May 7, 2012.  Mary Jeffers, “Everybody’s Talking About World Press Freedom Day,” May 3, 2012.   William Lafi Youmans, “The Transitive Problem,” April 25, 2012.  Take Five, The IPDGC Blog on Public Diplomacy and Global Communication.

Gem From the Past

George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” (December 11, 1945) pp. 954-967 in John Carey, ed., George Orwell: Essays, (Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).  Orwell’s classic essay continues to serve as a superb guide to good writing for students and scholars.  His insights on problematic political uses of “meaningless words” such as “freedom” and “democracy” — words for which there is “no agreed definition” and each user “has his own private definition” — also continue to prompt reflection.  What is the point of using such words, he asks, other than as perhaps some kind of general praise or framing of a positive good?  Such words whose multiple meanings cannot be reconciled, Orwell argues, allow countries and individuals to use them for purposes that lack meaning and mask differences in application and intent.  Orwell’s views come to mind at a time when US broadcasters (and other public diplomacy practitioners) proclaim the following mission statement: “To inform, engage, and connect people around the world in support of freedom and democracy.”
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*Bruce Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

by Jeffry R. Halverson

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) has released a short monograph, De-Legitimizing al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach, by sociologist Paul Kamolnick, a professor at Eastern Tennessee State University. Kamolnick criticizes current US efforts to counter al-Qaeda’s messaging and recruitment strategies as ineffective, and proposes an alternative two-fold solution to marginalize and defeat al-Qaeda. However, Kamolnick’s proposed strategy is problematic for several reasons.

In the first component of his proposed strategy, Kamolnick suggests that since Islam (specifically Sunni Islam) is a religion of orthopraxy and law, American policy makers and strategists should determine how Islamic jurispru­dence, specifically discourses on jihad, “may be leveraged for, and not against, vital U.S. national security interests.” It is unclear what exactly this “leveraging” entails. But he does warn that the US government must do so in secret (deferring “open association” until a later time) so as not to taint the legitimacy of potentially helpful sharia scholars and their formulations.

These formulations should ideally come from “credentialed actors of immense statue and learning.” And these jurists would reaffirm how Islam and the sacred texts prohibit things such as killing non-combatants indiscriminately. He is particularly interested in what he calls “jihadi-realist” scholars, meaning militant Islamists (such as Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl) who have rejected terrorism as a strategy to bring about change. By “leveraging” this sort of work (how remains unclear) for “vital U.S. national security interests” the US can create a narrative (my wording, not his) that portrays the US as a country “on the side of the lawful and just” against those who violate sharia (i.e., al-Qaeda).

The truth is that there is no shortage of Muslim scholars, jurists, preachers, activists, and so on, who have condemned terrorism and al-Qaeda’s violent strategies – despite the bizarre yet common refrain in America that no one in the Muslim community has done so. The traditional rules of warfare in Islam, such as prohibitions against killing civilians or women and children, are also already commonly known among Muslims. Therefore, I’m not sure how having the US secretly “leverage” these condemnations will harm al-Qaeda. When it comes to fatwas (Islamic juridical rulings) it only takes one to justify a practice or behavior. And there have been plenty of bizarre and isolated fatwas out there justifying abhorrent behavior.

It must also be said that while sharia is important to Sunni Muslims, especially Salafi and other über devout people, Kalmonick’s emphasis on the resounding mass influence of sharia on the decisions people make, especially the youth, seems exaggerated. At the end of the day, someone bent on committing an act of violence won’t stop because someone gave a ruling that it was a sinful or bad idea. Aspiring perpetrators will either find a ruling to support them, make their own ruling, or dispense with a juridical ruling altogether and act anyway. They could even invoke a dream where the Prophet Muhammad told them to act – which is not as far fetched as it sounds.

Another issue on the topic of sharia and fatwas is that even seemingly clear-cut issues can be stretched, twisted, and overturned by using a range of well-established juridical principles. That’s why most everyone knows that killing civilians is forbidden, but al-Qaeda still manages to win some people over. For example, it is a well-established belief in Islam that suicide is forbidden. Suicide is a grave sin.

There are numerous hadiths that describe the truly horrific punishments that someone will receive in Hell if they commit suicide. We can also find countless rulings by Muslim jurists that prohibit suicide. These positions are well-known. So why do we have some Muslims committing suicide by strapping bombs to their bodies or crashing airliners into buildings for al-Qaeda? It could suggest that religio-legal justifications aren’t that important when it comes to people seeking vengeance or justice for outstanding sociopolitical grievances.

But more to the point, extremists also utilize concepts like niyya (intention), darura (necessity), and reciprocity, among others, to neutralize these prohibitions against suicide or whatever else goes against their preferred strategy or plan of action. For example, al-Qaeda might claim that a terrorist who blew himself up at a military outpost in Iraq did not commit suicide because his intention was to attack and inflict harm on the enemy. After all, the Prophet once said: “All actions are judged by intentions.”

For al-Qaeda, it only counts as suicide if the person was lost in despair and their intention was to end their life. That was not the intention though, it is argued, and thus the prohibition is nullified. Instead, the terrorist is a celebrated battlefield martyr. The core of the matter is that sharia is always the product of interpretive agents; meaning people devise the divine rules according to their own subjective human interests and goals. So I wouldn’t invest too much in the restrictive powers of Islamic law as a counter-terrorism strategy.

The second part of Kalmonick’s strategy is a radical shift in US foreign policy and military policy in order to fundamentally alter perceptions of US intentions in the Muslim world. No specifics are given. “No amount of spin or messaging matters,” he writes, “when daily life and its common-sense interpretation contradict official pretensions and pronouncements.” I can agree with this statement, but then again he doesn’t provide any specifics. And let’s get real. Given the various special-interest groups and ideological trends currently entrenched in the US political system, this part of Kamolnick’s strategy is probably even less plausible than his problematic covert sharia ideas.

Major changes in US foreign and military policies might help alleviate some of the serious grievances among Muslims that al-Qaeda invokes in its messaging against the US. And I think most scholars would agree with that. But Kamolnick does not specifically discuss what changes should be made – maybe a compelling US push to establish a two-state solution along the 1967 borders to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Nor does Kamolnick address how the memories of past events still influence the present. For example, ending the Crusades centuries ago hasn’t stopped it from being invoked (as a narrative system) at every opportunity.

Regardless, it is extremely unlikely that the US government will ever make major changes to address Muslim grievances, such as the annexation of East Jerusalem or Russian control of Chechnya. More importantly though, the intention or meaning behind any changes to US foreign policy are still entirely subject to interpretation, despite US intentions or what Kamolnick calls “common-sense interpretation.” Those interpretations, typically conveyed as narratives, can vary widely among different audiences.

For example, if the US withdraws from a country (e.g. Iraq) under the pretense that the mission was accomplished and it has no interest in occupying the country, al-Qaeda disseminates a narrative that the US withdrawal was a “retreat” and a victory for the mujahideen over the “Crusaders.” This is the business of narrative, and human beings, regardless of religion, love and live by their stories. And do not think for a second that “leveraging” condemnations of al-Qaeda by some credentialed Muslim jurists or “jihadi-realists” won’t fall victim to al-Qaeda’s narratives either. Sayyid Imam, aka Dr. Fadl, was dismissed by Zawahiri and other extremists as a sell-out and someone who gave into torture in prison. Extremists discredit and condemn Muslim scholars and jurists who oppose them as hypocrites, apostates, heretics, Zionist agents, even as the “magicians of the Pharaoh,” every day. And this sort of rhetoric existed long before al-Qaeda ever took shape in Afghanistan.

In the final evaluation, I did not find anything that is particularly new or plausible in Professor Kamolnick’s approach to dealing with al-Qaeda’s messaging and recruitment strategies. In fact, I fear that his dismissal of the importance of narrative and counter-narrative strategies would set the US back in this ongoing struggle and make his own strategy suggestions all the more untenable.

By Steven R. Corman & Jarret Brachman

The release last week of documents captured from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbotabad has generated a flurry of interest in the press and blogosphere.  Yet a question has arisen as to whether the release was wise, since the documents are intelligence assets that could give the enemy valuable information regarding what we know about them.  We argue that the release makes sense from a strategic communication perspective, given what al-Qaeda has become.­

The controversy was raised by James Carafano of the Heritage Foundation in an op ed in Friday’s New York Post. Asking “why would the government publish these documents in the first place,” Carafano concluded that it was an act of election-year “preening” by the White House, and said:

The first rule of intelligence is this: Don’t tell the enemy anything if you don’t have to. It would be like FDR releasing the messages captured by ULTRA, the US-British signals-intelligence program that broke the Nazis’ most secret codes.

The analogy to ULTRA is excessive (al-Qaeda leadership already knew we captured their documents whereas the Nazis did not know we had broken their codes), but Carafano’s basic objection is worth taking seriously.  Our position is that whatever intelligence disadvantages accrued from the release are more than offset by strategic communication advantages.

First, everyone agrees that the conflict formerly known as the Global War on Terrorism long ago degraded al-Qaeda’s ability to organize large scale attacks.  As outlined in President Obama’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism, American-led efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have destroyed much of al-Qaida’s leadership and “weak­ened the organization substantially.”

For some time now, the concern has been less about al-Qaeda’s operational abilities and more about their force as a social movement. Its brand name has been flexible enough in recent years, much to bin Laden’s discontentment, to accommodate everyone from regional affiliate organizations to organically appearing terrorist cells to anomalous lone wolves.  In many ways, the social movement that al-Qaeda hoped to inspire on 9/11 has transcended the group that created it.

Robert Benford and David Snow have shown that social movements face three key framing tasks. Diagnostic framing means identifying what a movement should consider as the problem it is facing.  Prognostic framing deals with establishing a course of action, and motivational framing establishes reasons members should participate in the recommended actions.

Al-Qaeda has been masterful at diagnostic framing.  The problem, as presented to their audience, is that the West is engaged in a cosmic battle against Islam—a continuation of the Crusades.  Stories of recent wars, al-Nakba (the loss of Palestine to Israel), and treacherous alliances with governments of the Middle East all support this narrative.  Their diagnosis is that a force of champions must step forward to defeat this menace and restore the Ummah to safety and prosperity, and that violent offensive Jihad is the only plausible path to success.  For example, Ayman al-Zawahiri asserted in a 2008 video that “there is no hope of removing the foul regimes in the Muslim countries by anything but force. There is no opportunity for change through peaceful activity.” The motivational frame is to portray al-Qaeda as this champion, an organization that all good Muslims should support, if not join.

Attacking a movement’s framing ideally means undermining its diagnosis, because without it the prognosis and motivation are irrelevant. However, this is impractical in the case of al-Qaeda because public opinion in Muslim continues to support their diagnostic framing.  The alternative, then, is to attack the prognosis and motivation. The same public opinion data show better prospects here, with half to three-quarters of Muslims expressing concern about Islamist extremism.

Release of the Abbotabad documents is good strategic communication precisely because it further undermines the idea that al-Qaeda is a champion of Muslims and that they deserve support. The documents are already challenging, if not entirely rewriting, the bin Laden story. Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership can no longer be viewed as master architects running the show from behind a curtain. Rather, the documents reveal impotent leadership in an al-Qaeda that is internally divided, marginalized and exasperated.

The image is equally bad for their regional affiliates in places like Iraq and Yemen.  Far from the dutiful soldiers they portray themselves to be, the documents show just how far off the reservation they have wandered, pursuing parochial agendas against bin Laden’s wishes and the interests of al-Qaeda’s brand.  They are revealed as loose cannons that can accomplish little except killing the Muslims they are supposed to be saving.

Release of the documents is also justified because turnabout is smart play.  Al-Qaida has long supported the philosophy of rhetorical ninjitsu. Any time they can turn our own words against us, they do.  In the foreword to a book he penned about America’s internal bureaucratic dysfunction al-Qaeda senior leader Abu Jihad al-Masri even used the phrase, “From the words of your own mouth I condemn you” to describe this strategy.

Now the tables are turned.  Thousands of al-Qaeda’s followers in the extremist support forums have already read about these documents, which highlight bin Laden’s strategic irrelevance and managerial impotence. Their reactions are of defensiveness and confusion.  It is hard to dismiss the evidence when it is penned by bin Laden’s own hand.

In short, the Abbotabad documents should have been released because they provide a golden opportunity to injure al-Qaeda the social movement.  The anachronistic argument that they should not have been released ignores the reality that today our adversaries thrive more on perceptions of strength and leadership than real world applications of it.

Update May 11, 2012

Tony Lemieux has posted a blog on this topic.

by Jeffry R. Halverson

The Arab Spring showed the world how social media can help organize mass political dissent. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, single issues coalesced online into far broader and diverse campaigns that toppled ruling regimes. Recently, outside of the Arab world, discriminatory government policies  in Iran against Afghans have come to light. Decried by critics as overt state-backed racism, it is a scandalous hot-button issue that the rulers of the “Islamic Republic” have little chance of defending.  Already a nascent but growing social media campaign has emerged to condemn it and may soon tap into broader popular grievances against the entire regime.

“We are all Afghans” is the new rally cry among Iranian and Afghan social media users, shocked by recent discriminatory Iranian government policies against the over two million Afghans living in Iran. A Facebook page with over 20,000 members now exists. And yes, there are protests planned. Iran’s recent Oscar-winning filmmaker, Asghar Farhadi, is speaking out too.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has hardly dispelled these growing charges of racism either. On the contrary, his recent speeches have contained overt declarations of Persian supremacy. The regime of the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” whose clerical leadership claims the mantle of the Prophet Muhammad (an Arab) and his family, is baring an increasing resemblance to the resurgent Neo-Fascist parties of Europe. And it is ironic that the hated Shah Reza Pahlavi regime, overthrown by the 1979 Revolution, was once fiercely condemned by Shiite clerics for emphasizing a Persian identity for Iran instead of an Islamic one.

The BBC reports that the deputy governor-general of Iran’s northern Mazandaran Province announced late last month that all Afghans must leave the province  irrespective of their legal status by July 2 (meaning it’s not an illegal immigration issue). The deputy governor has further warned the public that offering employment or any kind of assistance to Afghans is a crime “punishable by the full force of the law.” He also asserted the validity of a law passed in 2006 that made marriage between Iranian women and Afghan men illegal. Meanwhile, last month in Isfahan, Afghans were banned by officials from attending Nowruz (Persian New Year) celebrations in a public park because they “caused insecurity.”

One Iranian blogger, suggesting a more pervasive racism beyond Iranian government institutions, recently posted photos of signs in Iran that ban the use of facilities by Afghans or dictate segregated facilities for Afghans. Still another Iranian blogger compared recent events to the rise of Le Pen’s anti-immigrant Front National  party in France and lamented the racism in Iran by stating: “[We tell Westerners that] we are from the land of Cyrus the Great, but we think Afghans are murderers, Arabs are savages, Turks are naive and Blacks smell.”

Responses to the controversy from officials in Iran’s “Islamic” government have ranged from silence and denial to speeches glorifying the supremacy of the Persian people among the nations of the earth. Take, for instance, a recent speech (broadcast on state television) by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on April 11, 2012, in the province of Hormozgan. In the speech, he states:

Inside Iran, some ask me why I always speak about Iran. They say this is, I do not know, nationalism, ethnic racism, and so forth. Such talk is baseless. Iran is not an ethnos. Iran is a culture, vision, ethics, and ideology. . . . You look for people similar to our people in other countries. Look around the borders and compare with neighbors, and you will see the difference. There is a huge difference. This difference does not mean arrogance and vanity. It is first of all a divine gift, the glorification of the divine gift. It points to a mission [for our people].

Ahmadinejad goes onto boldly claim that: If you take away the share of the Iranian nation from human civilization, nothing will be left. In support of his ethnocentric narrative, Ahmadinejad sprinkles his speech with a range of anecdotal stories. In one instance, he recounts how extensively he has traveled, visiting more places in Iran than anyone else. Thanks to his travels, he claims, he has seen firsthand that “the best people of the world are living in Iran today.” He also lists some recent achievements of Iran, claiming in the vaguest terms that Iran has improved “nanotechnologies and biotechnologies,” making it “among the few top countries in the world.” And finally he recounts a story that seems to be a hadith from the Prophet Muhammad (again, an Arab), although I am personally unfamiliar with it. It relates that the Prophet once told his followers that “Iranians will [one day] guide and lead, and introduce the truth of Islam to the world.” This, Ahmadinejad says, proves that Iranians have a divinely decreed mission to lead the world (and they must act on it).

This rhetoric of racial or ethnic pride and supremacy goes entirely against Islamic ideals about the equality and universal brotherhood of all Muslims as a single ummah. And yes, I do mean ideals. On an everyday level, one can find examples of racism and prejudice in every Muslim country in the world, just as one can find it in any other country, including the United States of America. But what makes this case so peculiar is that most countries don’t claim to be an “Islamic Republic” or a righteous state representing God’s Mahdi on earth. Moral condemnation aside, it is a tremendous blunder for the theocratic regime to indulge in this sort of racist rhetoric and behavior. And I cannot see how the “Great Satan” or the “Zionist entity” can be blamed for this one. At the very least, Iran’s treatment of its Afghans, many of whom arrived as refugees during the Soviet invasion, will only further alienate its Sunni neighbors and produce further international isolation.

More importantly though, recent events in mind, I have to wonder if the “We are All Afghans” movement might coalesce into something much more. After all,  there is no shortage of grievances among the Iranian populace. Iran’s nuclear program has yet to produce anything but international tensions and sanctions. And the tragic martyrdom of Neda Agha Soltan amidst the 2009 election scandal has yet to be forgotten, despite the regime’s best efforts. Sound far-fetched? Perhaps, but who would have thought that a fatal case of police brutality in Alexandria, Egypt, would have led to the “We are all Khaled Saeed” campaign that grew into a popular revolution that overthrew the US-backed Mubarak regime? Perhaps there’s a “Persian Spring” on the horizon after all.

by Steven R. Corman

CNN is re-reporting a story from Die Zeit about a treasure-trove of al-Qaeda documents and manuals found encrypted in pornographic videos.  The encryption was done using a technique call steganography.

The videos were found in the possession of Maqsood Lodin, a 22 year old Austrian and suspected al-Qaeda member.  He was detained by authorities in Berlin as be returned from a trip to Pakistan.  The documents discussed plans to attack cruise ships as a distraction while Mumbai-style attacks were initiated in Europe.  Training manuals were also found.

The information was encrypted in the frames of the videos using steganography.  This technique manipulates the least significant bit of the pixels making up digital images to store hidden information.  Changes to the picture are so subtle they are impossible to detect visually, but if someone knows the information is there and has the necessary software and passwords, they can extract the encoded information.  For example, this image

is a reproduction of one that encodes the scripts of five major plays of Shakespeare.  You can see the demo for yourself by running S-Tools.

Since a video is basically a series of digital images like this, steganography can be applied to its frames to hide huge quantities of information. A 20 minute video at 30 frames per second can hold 36,000 times as much information as is stored in the above picture.

This is not the first time there have been reports about al-Qaeda using the technique.

by Chris Lundry

Indonesian extremists continue to portray Ambonese Christians as engaged in separatist rebellion against Indonesia, and a crusade against Muslims. This isn’t true, but raises the question: where on earth did they get this idea?

The adage that if a lie gets repeated enough times it becomes true is, apparently, applicable in Indonesia’s Ambon region. It was home to a brief separatist insurgency following the Indonesian revolution (1945-49).  Following their defeat in 1950, the separatists (who were Dutch loyalists and both Christian and Muslim) fled the region for asylum in Holland.  There they have carried the torch for an independent Republic of the Southern Moluccas (RMS) ever since.

A strange thing happened with the case of the RMS over time, however: It came to be perceived as a Christian movement that is anti-Islam in nature. Islamist sources in Indonesia repeated this claim Tuesday as the 25 April anniversary of the declaration of the RMS approaches:

History shows that the formation of the RMS is a kind of rebellion among a number of Christian Moluccans opposed to the Jakarta Charter (that would impose Shariah law as state law) as the foundation for the state… This proves that the Moluccan Christian Community has the spirit of separatism, where the church protects these separatist movements.

Nevermind that Islamist extremists aren’t particularly fond of the Indonesian state and its newfound democracy, and that some of them want the state dissolved into a pan-Southeast Asian caliphate that include Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, and southern Philippines.

Scholars – notably Richard Chauvel – have noted that the RMS movement was supported by both Christians and Muslims, especially those who gained by their associations with the Dutch. This included village-level and higher Muslim authorities. They were supported by the Dutch and felt that they would lose the prestige and financial rewards – and be punished by the Indonesians – for this association with the former colonizer.

Because much of the fighting that occurred was between the Ambonese Dutch colonial soldiers (who were predominantly Christian and trusted by the Dutch) and the predominantly Muslim nascent Indonesian military, the perception that it was a war of Christians versus Muslims emerged and spread. This is despite the fact that Indonesia’s first president had Christian Moluccans among some of his most trusted (and rewarded) advisers.

While it is true that most Christians, including Moluccans (such as Johannes Leimena, co-founder of the Christian political party Parkindo and member of both Sukarno’s and Suharto’s cabinets) opposed the Jakarta Charter and lobbied against it, so did many Muslims. Opposing the Jakarta Charter did not make one a separatist, but rather merely one who disagreed with Sharia as the foundation of the state. But among some of today’s Islamist thinkers in in Indonesia, opposing sharia as state law makes one a separatist.

After the debate over the Jakarta Charter, many of the Muslims who supported it, such as Muslim cleric, scholar and prolific writer Haji Abdul Malik Karim Amrullah, essentially conceded their loss and accepted the desire of the majority. The country had more pressing problems to overcome. In the early years of Indonesian independence, Sukarno made repeated overtures to reassure the Moluccan Christians (and Christians elsewhere) that they would be welcome in the Indonesian fold, even while the smoldering remnants of the RMS waged a low-intensity guerrilla war on nearby Ceram Island (the main RMS rebellion was put down within a year or so).

When Suharto came to power, however, things changed. Following a bloody purge of communist and left-leaning Indonesians, Suharto imposed a security state based on fear to create stability. Despite the lack of danger from the extinguished RMS, Suharto treated the Ambon region as a threat, built up a strong military presence there, and continued to cite it (along with West Papua, Aceh, and after its 1975 invasion, East Timor) as a threat to the unity of the Indonesian state. He planned to ease population density on Java and elsewhere and to “water down” Christian communities perceived as supporting separatism. So Suharto ordered forced and voluntary transmigration to Ambon and other regions. This sparked resentment.

In 1998, the East Asian Economic Crisis caused chaos that crippled Indonesia’s economy and led to the abdication of Suharto. Violence between Christians and Muslims broke out in Ambon and nearby regions. Scholarship has shown that political competition and jockeying for power in a newly democratizing Indonesia was a major factor in the violence in Ambon. The violence started between Christian Ambonese and non-Ambonese Muslim immigrants.

But the government – and Islamists – blamed the RMS. Muslim senior military officials were implicated in programs to send arms and armed groups to the region, which swung the advantage clearly to the Muslims fighting the Christians. A nervous peace emerged in the region following the conflict’s cessation.

It was shattered last September and December as Muslims once again battled Christians (see COMOPS blog post here). Again, Islamists blamed the RMS.

In my experience interviewing Christian Ambonese in Java and the Ambon region, they, and the vast majority of Christian Ambonese, remain frustrated but loyal Indonesians. No matter what they do or how vehemently they refute the accusation that they are separatists, they continue to be framed as such by Islamists and by some in the Indonesian government.

This legacy, dating back to the Suharto era, is based on lies and fear. It goes to show, however, that state-sponsored strategic communication – albeit with dubious goals – can come back to haunt. The nominal enemies of the state – in this case, Indonesia’s Islamist extremist community –  use these arguments to support their calls for violent jihad among a predominantly peaceful and loyal Ambonese Christian community.

Despite the tremendous positive changes Indonesia has made since beginning its transition to democracy, it continues to struggle in some regions that have or are currently experiencing conflict. Ambon is one such region. If the Indonesian government actively worked to dispel the myth that separatism was somehow tied to Christianity in the region and more actively promoted the role of patriotic Christian Ambonese (such as Leimena, who was declared a national hero), it would help to deflate the argument that the Indonesian state’s enemies – the Islamist extremists – are making. It could also deescalate some of the tensions that lead to spasms of violence, and eliminate some of the resentment among Christian Ambonese, many of whom are frustrated with being portrayed as a threat to the state. A more peaceful Ambon is in everyone’s interest – except the Islamist extremists.

by Steven R. Corman

The CSC has an article in the current issue of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism on casualty inflation by the Taliban in the Afghanistan conflict.  The abstract follows, and the full text is available here (subscription).

Cooking the Books: Strategic Inflation of Casualty Reports by Extremists in the Afghanistan Conflict

Chris Lundry, Steven R. Corman, R. Bennett Furlow, & Kirk W. Errickson

Islamist extremists in Afghanistan and elsewhere are exaggerating their successes in inflicting casualties on American and other International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces. This article quantifies the exaggeration for the month of November 2010, putting the claimed casualty rate at approximately one-half battalion per month. It provides an analysis of how and why this is occurring, and links this extremist strategic communication effort to dominant historical master narratives in the region that may produce sympathy among intended recipients of the messages. The authors argue that these measures undertaken by the extremists can be countered successfully through the use of similar story forms, more timely reporting, use of side-by-side comparisons, and use of similar reporting venues. These steps could challenge the credibility of the Taliban reports, reduce sympathy, and diminish potential recruitment.

by Steven R. Corman

Last month, James Appathurai, NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy,  agreed to participate in an electronic Q&A sponsored by the Atlantic Community.  He answered 20 questions in four installments, on global partnerships and the Arab spring, partnerships in Asia, questions on Central Asia/Caucasus, and the NATO mission.  The latter includes an item on the NATO narrative that illustrates the large challenge the alliance faces in filling a narrative vacuum that currently exists.

Yours truly was invited to submit a question to Mr. Appathurai. As it happened, my colleagues and I had recently been discussing the issue of NATO’s narrative. So I asked:

It is widely acknowledged that public and political support for the NATO alliance is flagging in many member countries. I and many of my colleagues believe this is because NATO’s narrative has been slowly disintegrating. With the Cold War some twenty years in the past, its original motivating conflict is fading from memory.

What do you see as a sustainable narrative for NATO in the 21st Century? What basic conflict does it exist to deal with, and what desire does that create? What is the projected resolution of that desire? What actors, actions, and events lead from the desire to the resolution?

He answered:

This is the classic and very important question. I don’t mean classic in an old-fashioned sense. We debate this here all the time. I personally don’t have too many questions about it.

What we don’t have is a good slogan. In the early days of the Cold War, one NATO Secretary General defined NATO’s purpose as “keeping the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down.” That was the post-Second World War conception. Since the end of the Cold War, those things aren’t really necessary. The Americans are in. We don’t need the Russians out. Actually, we have them as partners. And the Germans are, of course, strong and vibrant members of this Alliance and of Europe and of the world, without there being anything negative, only positive things about that.

So we never found a good new slogan. And I can assure the new Secretary General has encouraged us to look for one. But to my mind, NATO is about what it is and then about what it does. What it is, is a collection of democracies that is uniquely capable militarily. No other organization can do what NATO can do militarily. You saw it in Libya. You see it in Afghanistan. And that’s a priceless thing because there are times when you need that capability as an international community. We can’t get rid of it.

And it’s also a place where we consult politically. All these 28 countries are here every single day and discussing and debating all sorts of issues. And by the way, with a very wide group of partners now as well. So it is a unique political forum and a very important one.

What do we do? We do three things. We do collective defense. That’s the ultimate mission of NATO, to defend the Allies. Second, crisis management. I mentioned Libya, I mentioned Afghanistan. I can mention Kosovo. I can mention counter piracy missions. And third we do collective security. Building trust and confidence and inter-operability in the broadest political sense as well as technical sense with partners around the globe. So all of that I think is a very important role. But I can’t think of the slogan to define it, and I tried for a long time. I came up with a lot of bad ones, but I never came up with a good one.

I would first like to thank Mr. Appathurai for answering my question, and indeed for participating in entire exercise.  High ranking officials are not required to do things like this, and taking the time that was involved here indicates his commitment to strengthening the alliance’s partnerships and frameworks, and doing so openly and participatively. This is commendable.

That said, I do not find his response especially satisfying.  True, it might be useful if NATO had a slogan. But slogans encapsulate narratives; they do not substitute for them.  I suspect Mr. Appathurai’s difficulty finding one stems from the incoherence of the narrative elements as they exist.  Yes, NATO “defends the Allies” and does collective security, but defends and secures against what?

The second paragraph of my question invokes a narrative arc described by Kenneth Burke.  He said that all narrative is based on a conflict (or other deficiency) that creates desire.  The desire implies a satisfaction (actual or potential). Narrative is a trajectory of participants, actions, and events that leads from the desire to the satisfaction.  This is rhetorically powerful because the narrative is grounded in the desire, and suggests a path to the resolution of the desire.  The need for satisfaction creates an incentive for people to buy into the trajectory–i.e. accept and participate in the narrative.

During the Cold War, NATO had a very strong narrative arc.  The conflict was with the Soviets, as Mr. Appathurai notes, and its behavior in the wake of World War II created a strong desire for protection from the “bear in the woods” (to use the 1984 Reagan campaign’s brilliant storyline).  The bear threatened to eat the North Atlantic countries, so a strong military alliance was the resolution of that desire.  NATO–its participating countries, treaty, mutual defense agreements, joint exercises, funding, etc.–was the trajectory leading from the desire to the resolution.  The story form organizing this narrative was deliverance, in which a threatener menaces a community until a champion comes along to defeat the threatener and restore the community to safety (David and Goliath is a deliverance story).

This was a compelling narrative that served NATO well for many decades.  Then the bear wandered away, leaving a gap where there was once a clear conflict creating a strong desire for the trajectory leading to the alliance.  As a result, to some observers, NATO looks today like a solution in search of a problem.  Lawrence Kaplan, for example, wonders if NATO is anything more than the military arm of the UN.

The 9/11 attacks against the United States are the basis for NATO’s participation in the Afghanistan conflict, and terrorism seems to be the leading candidate for a new conflict/threat to organize NATO’s narrative.  A page on NATO’s website explaining Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty even bears the header (graphic) “NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism.”  Terrorism also figures prominently in  NATO’s most recent (2010) strategic concept.

However, there are many ways terrorism does not fit into NATO’s existing story.  It would be a stretch to link NATO’s action in Libya to terrorism (while the Libyan government is suspected of involvement in the bombing of Pan Am 103, that happened over 20 years ago).  The intervention in Kosovo was not related to terrorism. Also numerous terrorist incidents in Europe in the 70s and 80s were never met with a NATO response.  There is even disagreement, especially in Europe, about whether terrorism should treated as a matter of war (as opposed to crime).

Stephen Walt notes the incoherence of the current narrative when he says “in recent years NATO has tried to transform itself into some sort  of global expeditionary force.” This incoherence leaves some NATO partners questioning their investment, and disagreeing about what the organization should be, as Klaus Wittman notes in a Danish Institute of International Studies report:

[T]here is no really solid unity on a number of issues: namely whether NATO is a regional or a global organisation, predominantly political or military, how it must balance collective defence and expeditionary orientation, how it must assess certain security challenges and their emphasis in the view of individual allies, the NATO–EU relationship and its political ‘blockage’, the UN mandate issue, the approach to Russia, nuclear weapons policy etc. (p. 37)

Most commentators seem to agree that NATO should be sustained.  But this requires filling the current narrative vacuum.  To do so, NATO must define a clear conflict and corresponding desire that that alliance resolves. Once this is done, it should be scrupulous about maintaining narrative coherence by lending its name only to those actions that are squarely consistent with resolving the desire.

by Steven R. Corman

In previous posts I have advocated amplifying al-Qaeda’s record of killing Muslims, and argued this practice was doing serious damage toAQ’s brand.  Captured documents from bin Laden’s compound indicate that he was worried about the same thing.

Last week David Ignatius of the Washington Post wrote a story based on his “exclusive look” at those documents.  The headline was about bin Laden’s supposed plot to kill President Obama.  But later in the story he describes bin Laden’s hand-wringing over his organization’s image:

Bin Laden’s biggest concern was al-Qaeda’s media image among Muslims. He worried that it was so tarnished that, in a draft letter probably intended for Atiyah, he argued that the organization should find a new name.

The al-Qaeda brand had become a problem, bin Laden explained, because Obama administration officials “have largely stopped using the phrase ‘the war on terror’ in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims,” and instead promoted a war against al-Qaeda. The organization’s full name was “Qaeda al-Jihad,” bin Laden noted, but in its shorthand version, “this name reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them.” He proposed 10 alternatives “that would not easily be shortened to a word that does not represent us.” His first recommendation was “Taifat al-tawhid wal-jihad,” or Monotheism and Jihad Group.

Bin Laden ruminated about “mistakes” and “miscalculations” by affiliates in Iraq and elsewhere that had killed Muslims, even in mosques. He told Atiyah to warn every emir, or regional leader, to avoid these “unnecessary civilian casualties,” which were hurting the organization.

“Making these mistakes is a great issue,” he stressed, arguing that spilling “Muslim blood” had resulted in “the alienation of most of the nation [of Islam] from the [Mujaheddin].” Local al-Qaeda leaders should “apologize and be held responsible for what happened.”

The moral is that words really do matter when it comes to government strategic communication.  As William Saletan writes in Slate, the Obama administration took a lot of political heat for ratcheting-down the “war on terror” rhetoric, but has been vindicated.  Maintaining the idea that the United States is fighting a religion only reinforces the clash of civilizations narrative, which in turns plays directly into the communication strategy of the Bad Guys.

CSC members H. L. Goodall, Jr, Pauline Hope Cheong, Kristin Fleischer and Steven R. Corman have just published a new article in Perspectives on Terrorism.  The abstract is below, and the article is available (free) here.

Rhetorical Charms: The Promise and Pitfalls of Humor and Ridicule as Strategies to Counter Extremist Narratives

In this article we provide a brief account of the uses of humor, in particular satire and ridicule, to counter extremist narratives and heroes.  We frame the appeals of humor as “rhetorical charms,” or stylistic seductions based on surprising uses of language and/or images designed to provoke laughter, disrupt ordinary arguments, and counter taken-for-granted truths, that contribute to new sources of influence to the globally wired world of terrorism.  We offer two recent examples of how the Internet in particular changed the narrative landscape in ways that offer potent evidence of uses of humor to remake extremist heroes into objects of derision.  We also caution those who would make use of humor as a strategic communication device to take into account the negative side effects and unexpected consequences that can accompany such uses.