Mahathir bin Mohamad

File away another patently offensive remark by former Malaysian Prime Minister (1981-2003) Mahathir bin Mohamad, who once again spewed anti-semitic and anti-Western conspiratorial claptrap. In Beirut last week for the 7th annual Conference for Al Quds, an organization that opposes what they view as Israel’s occupation of Palestine, Mahathir let fly with his invective. He argued that if the US could make Avatar, it could also have faked the 9-11 attacks (there’s the conspiracy!). And he argued that despite occasional massacres, Jews have thrived and hold some governments  “to ransom,” including the “Jewish lobby” in the United States. The Jakarta Globe story is here.

Anyone remotely familiar with Mahathir and Malaysian politics is familiar with these kinds of statements. It was Mahathir, after all, who blamed the 1997 East Asian financial crisis first on Jews, then on George Soros. The Anti-Defamation League has a brief compilation of some of Mahathir’s anti-semitic slurs here, dating to 1970. Offending Jews and others has long been Mahathir’s modus operandi, but since stepping down as Prime Minister, it seems as though he is after more attention (and adoration). But first let’s view his statements.

The “Avatar” argument is just silly. Aside from the conspiratorial element of the argument (which I realize still has many adherents, in the Muslim world but also here in the US), it is simply not logical. Avatar was produced in 2009 (although its roots are deeper; director James Cameron felt that the technology wasn’t ready for the film until 2005). The 9-11 attacks occured in 2001, eight (or four) years prior. This argument doesn’t makes sense temporally or logically… unless one buys whole hog into the conspiracy and leaves the real world behind. I suppose that is one of the great things about conspiracies: Logic doesn’t have to play much of a role in the thinking, and arguments that contradict the conspiracy are trotted out as proof of deeper conspiracy in a rapidly degenerating downward spiral. At least in subsequent statements Mahathir acknowledged that it was true the Twin Towers had fallen, but that the American/Zionist conspiracy remains.

Mahathir’s remarks about Jews, which seemingly condone the killing of Jews as a means to control their supposed influence, are simply a continuation of his ugly anti-semitic history. Although well regarded political scientists John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago) and Kenneth Walt (Harvard) wrote a book in 2007 describing not a Jewish Lobby but an Israel Lobby (there is a significant difference), the book was only about the alleged Lobby’s effects — supposedly detrimental — to both American and Israeli foreign policy. The book caused much controversy, as the authors expected, and accusations of anti-semitism, which they flatly denied; more here.

Controversial academic writing is one thing, but one doesn’t usually expect this level of wacky conspiratorial thinking from the former leader of a state on friendly terms with the US. Mahathir’s explanatory statements on his comments at al Quds and a subsequent explanation of the explanation are in English here and here. I recommend reading the comments below the former PM’s posts; he’s got no shortage of sycophants who seemingly eat up his every word. Mahathir has attracted an audience outside of Malaysia as well, who are equally conspiratorial in their thinking. One of my favorite comments is from someone with a western name who feels sorry for Mahathir, who, like Iran’s Holocaust-denying President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has been “unfairly” labelled an anti-semite. That’s great company for the ex-PM to keep, but I thought that Ahmadinejad’s anti-semitism has been established by the words of Ahmadinejad himself, just as the responsibility for 9-11 has been admitted by al Qaeda.

I can’t comment as to whether Mahathir really holds these offensive beliefs. Trained as a medical doctor and skilled in politics, there is no doubt that he is an intelligent man. But events in Malaysia may help explain Mahathir’s ridiculous rants.

After developing a dislike for the policies of Anwar Ibrahim, the man he was grooming to take over as PM, Mahathir fabricated charges of sodomy in 1998 and had Anwar imprisoned. He chose who he thought would be a safe replacement, and then stepped down in 2003, handing the reigns to Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Badawi pursued his own policies, at times rankling Mahathir, who found himself sidelined by his party, UMNO (after clearly hoping for a position similar to Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, who after stepping down as Prime Minister took the position of Mentor Minister, and who still plays a significant role in Singaporean politics). Despite trying to elbow his way back into the room, Mahathir remained marginalized. So he turned to the one outlet where he could still appear to be a player, the blogosphere, and where he became an armchair critic of the Badawi administration. Najib Tun Razak succeeded Badawi as PM in 2009.

It’s more than a little ironic that Mahathir, who controlled the Malaysian press with an iron grip during his rule, has turned to the kind of criticism that he would have jailed people for making during his own rule. But in this context it’s perhaps easier to understand why Mahathir would publish such rubbish in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence (remember that “overhwelming contradictory evidence” is often cited by conspiracy theorists as evidence of the conspiracy). The poor man still craves the attention (and adoration) he felt as Prime Minister, and has found his realm. Judging by the comments on his blogs, he has found like minded company that will remain, along with him, marginalized.

I almost feel bad responding as it gives Mahathir more attention. But when the former leader of an important state such as Malaysia makes comments such as these, it’s better to try understand his thinking. It’s clear he has his fans in Malaysia and elsewhere, but it’s also clear that they will remain a fringe element for whom logic does not apply.

by R. Bennett Furlow

Geert Wilders is a Dutch parliamentarian and head of the Party for Freedom (PVV).  He is also a very clear opponent of Islam.  Most critics of Islam are very careful to say that they oppose “radical Islam” or “Islamism” or “Islamic extremism,” but have no problem with the religion as a whole.  Not Wilders.  He has made it clear in no uncertain terms that he “hate[s] Islam.” He has compared the Qur’an to Mein Kampf, referred to Islam as fascist, and made a film, Fitna,(“discord” in Arabic), that juxtaposes passages from the Qur’an with images of 9/11, the Madrid bombings and other acts of terrorism.

Normally, unless their words lead directly to violence, advocates of hate can be dismissed.  Wilders gets a little more attention because he is an elected politician and is adept at using the media to promote himself and his beliefs.  Recently two things occurred that raised Wilders’ status.  First, he was banned from entering the United Kingdom.  This was seen by many (not just his supporters) as a violation of freedom of speech.  The ban was later overturned.  Second, Wilders was charged with violating hate speech laws in his native Netherlands.  Once again, Wilders is crying foul and saying his freedom of speech is being violated.  Wilders’ trial began January 20th.

The issue of Geert Wilders boils down to one of hate speech versus free speech.  Certainly one should be allowed to express one’s opinion freely and without fear of prosecution, but there are hate speech laws for a reason.  If Wilders’ intent is to bring about hostility toward a group (Muslims) then his speech is “hate speech” and the prosecution is justified.  If it is merely criticism, and not intended to cause harm to anyone then it is free speech and the prosecution is unjustified.  However, Wilders seems to want to make his trial not just about free speech but about Islam as well.  In a statement to the court Wilders said:

This trial is obviously about the freedom of speech.  But this trial is also about the process of establishing the truth.  Are the statements that I have made and the comparisons that I have taken, as cited in the summons, true?  If something is true then can it still be punishable?  This is why I urge you to not only submit to my request to hear witnesses and experts on the subject of freedom of speech.  But I ask you explicitly to honour my request to hear witnesses and experts on the subject of Islam.  I refer not only to Mister Jansen and Mister Admiraal, but also to the witness/experts from Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom.  Without these witnesses, I cannot defend myself properly and, in  my opinion, this would not be a fair trial.

Among those Wilders wants to call as “experts” are Robert Spencer, Wafa Sultan and Andrew Bostom, all of whom are highly critical of Islam.

The Wilders case illustrates a larger problem in Dutch society, and potentially across Europe.  While approximately five percent of the Netherlands is Muslim, they are increasingly victims of prejudice and even persecution.  Filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was killed by a Dutch Muslim (of Moroccan decent) over his short film, Submission,which crudely criticized Islam’s treatment of women.  Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a native Somali and former Dutch parliamentarian went into seclusion for a period and has since had significant security because of her statements about Islam (she was the writer of Submission).  These acts have in turn lead to an increase in attacks against Muslims in the Netherlands, including the burning of a Muslim school among other acts of violence.  Muslims in the Netherlands have a very low voter turnout rate.  They tend to be insular and stay within their particular communities, causing them to identify more and more with their  religion and less with their ethnicity or nationality.

A pattern has developed over the past ten years or so that goes as follows: A prominent non-Muslim figure speaks out against Islam, a Muslim reacts, sometimes violently, leading to more statements and actions against Islam, again a Muslim reacts, and so on.  All the while the Muslim community begins to turn further inward and embraces the status of a marginalized outsider.  The alienation of the Muslim community will obviously only create more strife and tension.  If this pattern continues, things will only get worse in the Netherlands, for both Muslim and non-Muslim alike.

The real issue in the Wilders case is one of motivation.  What is the purpose of his statements?  What is the strategic goal of this level of discourse?  Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and others use language like “infidel”, “crusader” and “apostate” to define their enemy in terms of “otherness.”  Once the designated (often abstract) enemy is seen as a violent oppressor it is easier to recruit followers and continue the cycle of violence, or so the theory goes.

Wilders seems to be the flip side of the coin.  His statements are attempts to define Islam not just in negative terms, but as a threat that should be met with violence.  He seems to desire a “clash of civilizations” much like Bin Laden.  Otherwise what is the point of his speech?  Obviously there is not going to be a mass exodus of Muslims from the Netherlands, nor are they going to convert to Christianity en masse.  So if violence is not the point, what is?

When a Muslim extremist commits an act of violence, many in the West call on extremist Muslim preachers to be held accountable for their inflammatory rhetoric.  This trial is the Dutch people calling Wilders out.  If his language is something beneficial to the people of the Netherlands, then he and others like him need to prove it by clarifying their goals.  Otherwise they are doing nothing but furthering the cycle of animosity and violence.

by Steven R. Corman

Yesterday the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report on civilian casualties in Afghanistan over the last year.  It concluded that “2009 proved to be the deadliest year yet for civilians since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001.”  The surprise is what it says about the causes of these deaths, which in turn identifies an under-exploited opportunity to amplify ideological contradictions.

Sources of conflict-related civilian deaths in Afghanistan, 2009

Of the 2412 conflict-related deaths in 2009, 67%  were at the hands of “anti-government elements,” whereas 25% were attributable to ISAF and other pro-government forces.  Eight percent “died as a result of cross fire or by unexploded ordinance[sic].”

The anti-government figures represent an increase of 41% over 2008.  According to the report this is attributable to an increase in suicide and IED attacks.  Militants are also killing people they believe to be government supporters.

The pro-government numbers represent a decrease of 28% over the same period.  A report by Dexter Filkins in the New York Times attributes this welcome news to a tightening of restrictions on use of airstrikes.  To maintain the downward trend, American commanders also plan to reduce their use of night missions into villages, which often lead to unintended firefights with locals.

The state of affairs signaled by this report presents the UN/NATO/ISAF forces with a crucial opportunity.  As we argued in a white paper published last year, one of the critical functions of ideology is to smooth-over contradictions, like the one between the realities of extremist operations and the Qur’anic prohibition on killing innocents (especially when they are Muslim).

This function of ideology is why we were treated last month to a desperate video by Adam Gadahn, in which he said his buddies are not killing civilians, and are sorry for any civilians they have killed by accident. His dissembling is a clear sign of worry about the issue, and these new numbers show that there is good reason for worry on their part.

The pro-government response should be to push this contradiction into the open.  Norah Nilan, Chief Human Rights Officer for UNAMA, took a small step in this direction by saying in today’s release

Anti-Government elements remain responsible for the largest proportion of civilian deaths, killing three times as many civilians as pro-Government forces. It is vital that determined efforts are now made by the insurgency to put into effect the Taliban “Code of Conduct” that calls on them to protect the lives of civilians.

She added that “Anti-Government elements must realize that they too have obligations under international law.”

To me this statement is too tepid and deferential to the Bad Guys.  It more or less says that they have good intentions but have problems with execution, and they need to do better.  This is not unlike Gadahn’s argument.

Yet this assessment is at odds with facts stated in the same report that a number of the casualties are from cold-blooded political executions.  And isn’t killing 70 adults and children (and wounding 65) by bombing a volleyball game in Pakistan something more than a failure to stick with policy?

A better statement would be that the extremists are insincere in their claims that they want to protect civilian lives.  The Good Guys should be putting Gadahn saying “we don’t kill Muslims,” and quotes from the Taliban “code of conduct” about protecting civilians, side-by-side with press reports about and images of the innocent civilians who they are killing.

They should ask how the extremists can say they value and protect civilian lives when they bomb volleyball games and execute people.  And how could it be true that the extremists value innocent civilians while the Western forces hate them, as Gadahn claims, when the extremists’ deaths are going up and the Westerners’ numbers are going down?

Muslim allies in the region should be branding the extremists al-Munafiqin (or perhaps an equivalent in local languages).  Because like the Hypocrites of Medina they say they accept the word of God, but then act contrary to it when they see some advantage in doing so.  They are pretending to be devout Muslims for the sake of political expediency, but they are not acting like devout Muslims.

These kinds of efforts would help amplify the extremists’ contradictions and show them for what they really are.  Chiding them about their obligations under international law, not so much.

by Steven R. Corman

In today’s Washington Post, Bruce Hoffman published an op-ed piece entitled “Al-Qaeda has a new strategy. Obama needs one, too.” I have a lot of respect for Hoffman and whatever he says about terrorism bears consideration. But in this case I’m not too sure what he’s driving at.

As evidence for the existence of a new AQ strategy, Hoffman offers the following:

• They have graduated people from multiple countries from training camps and sent them to conduct operations.
• They are being opportunistic and are monitoring our defenses for openings in our security efforts
• They have killed our operatives in a foreign country
• They have involved our citizens in their organization and have used them to conduct attacks and attempted attacks here and abroad

Little of this strikes me as new.  The 9/11 attackers were AQ training camp alumni, and they conducted that attack by monitoring and exploiting our security weaknesses.  They killed our operatives in Iraq (though actual military ones rather than the quasi-military ones killed in the attack against the CIA in Afghanistan).  I suppose the involvement of Americans in high profile attacks is somewhat new.  On the other hand they have had involvement from American and British citizens for some time, and have always wanted to use those people to attack the West.  The recent attacks in the US have neither been numerous nor large in scale.

If there is a new strategy here, I wish Hoffman would tell us what it is. Or maybe I’m just being dense. If so please enlighten me with a comment.

In the rest of Hoffman’s piece there is little to disagree with:  We’re still being reactive, we’re defencing against yesterday’s threats, and we are not focusing enough on radicalization and recruitment.  But then again none of that is really new, either.

by Chris Lundry

In an AP wire story picked up by numerous print and online media, Russell Contreras writes about discovering the “new movement” of Muslim-Hindu punk bands (including Boston’s the Kominas). The implication is that we are witnessing a new youth music movement that might serve as a challenge to religious fundamentalism and its extremist outcomes.  It’s a great bit of publicity for the band, but it reflects the author’s lack of prior awareness about the music rather than a description of a breaking music movement.  In fact Muslim punk is nothing new.

Punk rock was invented by New York’s The Ramones, who took a couple chords, played them loud and fast, and added lyrics that reflected their comic books and B-movies sensibilities. After the Ramones played an early show in London, with future members of seminal British punk bands the Clash, the Damned, and the Sex Pistols in the audience, the music and movement quickly bloomed there. It went through the first of many changes, however, as British punk was more political (reflecting the direr economic situation there), and people such as Malcom McClaren linked it to colorful, shocking fashion and art. Musical skills increased on both sides of the Atlantic, but in the United States the bands began to eschew what had become peacock-like fashion for a simpler look and sound that lost some of the pop tinges of of both the Ramones and British punk, and thus “hardcore” was born. Punk rock and hardcore branched out in all sorts of directions: new wave and post punk, straight edge (whose adherents foreswear sex, alcohol and drugs), vegan hardcore, Krishnacore, emo, pop-punk, grunge, crossover and thrash (punk fused with heavy metal), and even so-called Christian punk, to name just a few.

All of this occurred mostly under the radar of mainstream media, until the early 1990s (or, as some state more precisely, 1991, “The Year Punk Broke“). Bands such as Sonic Youth and Nirvana played punk-influenced music that was radio friendly, and hence radio stations played them and they became huge. There were plenty of earlier bands that got some limited radio airplay in the United States, most notably the Clash (albeit far past their prime); in the late 1970s British punk bands were all over the British charts. Most of punk remained underground (although subjected to more outside attention that usual), but plenty of bands formed to play radio friendly pop with a “punk” edge and look, and this genre of music is now well established. It was also around this time that “jocks” stopped beating up “punks” and joined them at concerts.

Why the brief history of punk? Because throughout this entire evolution, punk bands formed all over the world, including Hindu and Muslim countries, and including Hindus and Muslims — nominal and practicing — in the United States, consistent with the DIY (do-it-yourself) ethos of the movement (often there was a time lag, but always there were local musical and cultural elements). Maximum Rock and Roll, the standard bearing ‘zine for hardcore and punk (published since 1982, with roots to 1977), published “Scene Reports” from around the world that chronicled bands and the scenes that supported them. Muslims playing punk rock is not a new phenomenon. Rather, it is the environment today (or post 9-11) that is new.

Popular and “underground” music has always had an air of rebellion; punk rock merely turned up the volume. Music has provided a space for young people to express themselves and their identities, to question the cultural assumptions of their environments and to push for social change (COMOPS Journal has already published blog posts on heavy metal and rap). Social commentary and criticism has a long history in American music (from slaves’ work songs to Billie Holiday’s “Strange Fruit” to punk tours such as Rock Against Reagan).

So what about the Kominas and the so-called “Taqwacore”? To my ears half of their music stands close to the radio friendly side of punk, with others a bit noisier (some songs can be heard on their myspace page). Their tunes blend funk and ska, and borrow heavily from their forebearers. “Sharia Law in the USA” is derived from the Sex Pistols “Anarchy in the UK,” for example, and “Suicide Bomb the Gap” echoes the Big Boys’ taste for funk (and Kool and the Gang). Some of their music blends South Asian elements, but this isn’t new (remember the Rolling Stones “Paint it Black” and the Beatles “Norwegian Wood”?).

The notion of Taqwacore is interesting, although this is still American music played in the United States. They may face derision from some Muslim members of their audiences, but they won’t face beheading for apostacy. With the expansion of new media and the ease of global communication, it would be interesting to see if the Kaminas had any influence on bands elsewhere — I’m sure they’ve got fans whose only connection to the band is the internet. What would be infinitely more interesting, however, would be to see how punk bands made up of faithful Muslims are faring in Muslim countries with oppressive social environments and strong pressure to conform. They do exist — I’ve seen them in Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1990s — but it’s much harder for westerners to gain access to their music or to be able to gauge their impacts.

Interesting though this may be from a cultural point of view, the fact is that Muslims punk has been around for years.  It’s doubtful that this latest spurt from the movement signals anything new with respect to resisting extremism or the religious establishment.

Below is a list of the top ten most-viewed posts of 2009 on COMOPS Journal:

1. Why Israel’s Twitter Experiment Flopped (January 12).  Dawn Gilpin analyzes Israel’s use of Twitter during its excursion into Gaza, concluding that it failed because of a lack of understanding of symmetry, culture, and the structure of the different media platforms.
2. OK Now I’m Confused (April 17).  Steve Corman comments on an apparent blurring of lines between public affairs and public diplomacy in the State Department.
3. Introducing the PD Chief Count-Up Clock (April 10).  COMOPS Journal inaugurates a count-up clock to the appointment of a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.  It ran for 129 days until the appointment of Judith McHale on May 26.
4. Understand What Narrative Is and Does (September 3).  Scott Ruston urges a more sophisticated view of narrative in the conflict in Afghanistan.
5. Getting Beat in the War of Ideas (February 26).  Steve Corman discusses on a poll released by WorldPublicOpinion.org showing dismal perceptions of the US in the Muslim world as of the end of the Bush administration.
6. NATO Conference on Strategic Communication (May 16).  Steve Corman reports on a NATO-sponsored meeting in Ankara, Turkey discussing main themes that emerged from the conference.
7. Recent Developments in Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Efforts (September 10).  Chris Lundry analyzes developments in Indonesian anti-terrorism in the aftermath of the July 17 hotel bombings in Jakarta.
8. Rap is Da Bomb for Defeating Abu Yahya (September 14).  Jeff Halverson proposes an alternative strategy for undermining AQ ideologue Abu Yahya al-Libi.
9. A Broader View of Internet Radicaliztion (March 26).  Pauline Cheong analyzes apparent disagreement in two reports about Internet radicalization.
10. Goodbye GWOT, Hello…Overseas Contingency Operation? (April 5).  Steve Corman critiques the Obama administration’s questionable effort to relabel the conflict formerly known as the global war on terrorism.

There were also some posts from previous years with staying power.  Here are the top five:

1. Did the Bad Guys Scuttle Their Own Forums? (October 13, 2008).
2. COMOPS Top Posts of 2008 (December 31, 2008).
3. Resisting Wahhabi Colonialism in Yogyakarta (November 6, 2008).
4. Analysis: Blogging Better at the State Department (October 9, 2007).
5. Strategic Communication by Any Other Name (September 30, 2008).

Many thanks to all our readers, and may you have a happy and prosperous 2010.

by Mark Woodward

Former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) died yesterday. He was 69 years old. His passing was sudden, but not altogether unexpected because his health had been fragile for many years. He will be buried tomorrow in Jombang in East Java at Pesantren Tebuireng, the Islamic school founded by his grandfather. Tens of millions mourn his passing and join together in prayer, that as one friend put it “all of his sins will be forgiven and all of his prayers received by God.”

Gus Dur was a remarkable person. It is hard to find words to describe him and the contributions he made to Indonesia. He devoted his life to the struggle for social justice, democracy, peace and religious harmony which he passionately believed to be core Islamic values. But perhaps his greatest contribution was his role in transforming Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, the traditionally conservative Muslim organization founded by his grandfather Hasyim Ashari 1875-1947). NU has more than fifty million members and tens of millions more supporters. This makes it by far the largest Muslim organization in the world. Its primary base of support is among people from villages and small towns in East and Central Java. The organizations leaders are almost exclusively traditional Muslim scholars who have well deserved reputations of deep knowledge, not only of the Qur’an but of centuries old traditions of Islamic scholarship in areas including Quranic Exegesis, Theology, Law and Mysticism. Until recently they have been slow to venture outside this world.

Gus Dur did a great deal to bring NU into the modern world, while preserving the its spiritual traditions and intellectual heritage. He often led by example in ways that some NU traditionalists, to say nothing of Muslim fundamentalists, found outrageous. He was, for example, an avid fan of western classical music and once quipped that losing the presidency was not nearly as painful and loosing his collection of 27 recordings of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony. He had a well-deserved reputation for being disorganized and impulsive. He sometimes described Indonesia’s first President Soekarno as the “Order President,” Suharto (Indonesia’s second president and founder of the totalitarian military regime that ruled from 1965 to 1998) as the “New Order President,” and himself as the “No Order President.” A habit that aides and rivals found particularly frustrating was that a times of crisis, which were many in the early days of Indonesia’s democratic transition, he would break off meetings to pray at the tomb of one of Java’s many Muslim saints. He once told me that he got much better advice from them than from most of the members of his cabinet.

This combination of tradition and modernity, and the fact that many NU people thought of him as a living saint, made it possible for Gus Dur to bridge vastly different social and intellectual worlds. He could talk about Kant, Hegel and Marx in any number of European languages and suddenly switch to reciting and expounding upon classical Javanese or Arabic poetry. He was always unpredictable. A common Indonesian joke about him was that, “There are two things that are impossible to know: When you will die and what Gus Dur will do next.”

Gus Dur had a remarkable memory, not only for philosophy and poetry, but for names and numbers. He could recall hundreds of phone numbers and the details of conversations he had years before in an instant. In these and many other ways he embodied the archetype of the Javanese Islamic scholar-saint. At the same time his dedication to democracy, religious pluralism and social justice was unwavering. His conviction that Islam is not only compatible with these values, but that they are central Islamic teachings was absolute. He was equally committed to the cultural and theological plurality of Islam and viewed attempts to equate it with political extremism and Arab culture with bemused indifference. On a visit to Arizona State University in 1993 he remarked that: “The problem with Saudi Arabs is that they do not understand the difference between Islam and their own culture.” He also thought that their understanding of Islam was simplistic – at best.

He also promoted modern education for the young people of NU. This may be his most enduring legacy. As recently as the 1970s most of Indonesia’s modern intellectuals were from either secular or “modernist” neo-fundamentalist Muslim backgrounds. This is no longer true. There are now many who bring NU’s traditional concern with scholarly attainment to their study of “modern” disciplines in the natural and social sciences.
Gus Dur was an enigmatic and genuinely remarkable figure. He was an inspiration for tens of millions of Indonesians and truly, as many have called him, “The Nation’s Teacher.”

[Editor's note:  A CSC white paper on Mr. Wahid written by Mark Woodward can be found here.]

by Scott W. Ruston

Recent headlines revealed that video feeds from the Predator, the US unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) used for surveillance and targeting in both Iraq and Afghanistan, have been intercepted by insurgents in Iraq.  Early follow up analysis focuses on whether the intercept of Predator video feeds qualifies as a “hack” or whether that term has over-sensationalized the situation.  This attention to semantics strikes me as a repeat of the “how are men in caves out-smarting us” debate with much hand-wringing about whether Islamic militants really have sophisticated skill and technology or not, and whether Iran must be involved supporting the militants with advanced technology.

The logic of this debate breaks down like this:  If it’s a “hack” then the insurgents have significant cyberwarfare skills and technology and are thus increasing their capability (and in a related version, they must be receiving Iranian support).  If it’s not a “hack” then they remain primitive fighters in caves, opening up criticism of the US military for allowing such an exploitable vulnerability to remain.

This attention to whether “hack” accurately describes the militants’ actions, loses sight of some important strategic communication ramifications of this intelligence breach.  Whereas I’m fully aware of the power of language to shape thoughts and perspectives, in this case the debate over terminology is just not an important issue.  Nor, really, is how the militants accomplished the intercept.  According to news report linked above, the Pentagon has indicated they’ve operated the Predator drone with unencrypted video feeds since the 1990s, assuming that unsophisticated opponents would not know about the vulnerability nor have the access to the technology (apparently a $29.95 box and some patience) to exploit it.  The same report indicates the DOD is already at work encrypting the video feeds, but I’ll address the apparent hubris evident here below.

While I think the “hack” or “not hack” debate is unimportant, I don’t mean to diminish the tactical importance of these intercepts.  Obviously, it is a huge intelligence coup for the insurgents (and reports indicate that it is not an isolated incident but rather an on-going activity of unknown scale).  But there is more here.  Beyond the ability for insurgent leaders to see what US and allied commanders were seeing, beyond the possibility of knowing where US attention was focused at any particular time, and beyond representing a minor cyberwarfare victory  for the insurgents, this situation points to two strategic communication victories for them as well.

First, it is well known that the insurgent and extremist spin machines, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but across the world where Islamic extremists seek to discredit the US, are adept at transforming news reports, images and videos of US actions into anti-US propaganda (or, for that matter non-US actions: here,  an Indonesia-based jihadist blames an Al-Qaeda bombing in Pakistan on Blackwater).  What better way to document the violent, brutish ways of the imperialist, crusading aggressor than to show the US military’s own tactical video?  Even seemingly innocuous surveillance video could easily feed the insurgent media machine.  Simple surveillance video of a village becomes  “Look how the Crusader targets civilians, women and children!”  Targeting video becomes proof of US violence.

Intercut some actual intercepted Predator surveillance video with some generic grainy footage of missile strikes easily obtained on YouTube or a thousand other sites, and an insurgent information operator has powerful, damning “evidence” of US violence killing righteous and/or innocent Muslims.  In a strategic communications environment where the US and its allies are struggling to close the say-do gap (for more see here and also here), having access to first hand video of US actions only fuels the insurgents’ abilities to exploit and perpetuate that gap.

Second, this intercept of Predator video is an act that fits into a broader narrative system.  It becomes a story as it circulates in the media and is retold by Western news media and insurgent mouthpieces.  In a recent post I discussed how  narrative works and what it does:

A narrative is a system of stories that hang together and provide a coherent view of the world.  People use narratives to understand how their world works.  Narratives contain patterns that fit the data of everyday life (events, people, actions, sequences of actions, messages, and so on), explaining how events unfold over time and how one thing causes another.

Osama Bin Laden has been telling stories of US imperialism and invasion, but also of US over-confidence and lack of resolve.  The stories of weakness include the 1993 defeat in Somalia, the bombing of the USS Cole, and 9/11, of course.  These stories all revolve around the central figure of the US as an over-confident monolithic force that is weaker in actuality than its image portrays.  I mentioned “hubris” above.  Here’s a quote from the Wall Street Journal report linked above:

The potential drone vulnerability lies in an unencrypted downlink between the unmanned craft and ground control. The U.S. government has known about the flaw since the U.S. campaign in Bosnia in the 1990s, current and former officials said. But the Pentagon assumed local adversaries wouldn’t know how to exploit it, the officials said.

This assumption belies a degree of US hubris, and even if the assumption was based on fairly solid intelligence it would play in the insurgents’ narrative system as a story of American over-confidence, arrogance and under-estimation of the skills of the militants.

Another key component of these stories is the clever and righteous mujahid warrior:

• In Somalia a combination of Al-Qaeda fighters and Somali militiamen defeated US Rangers and Special Operations forces.
• In the case of the USS Cole, clever fighters used an innocuous looking boat to approach the complacent warship.
• In the 9/11 story, the Al-Qaeda team crafted a creative plan to bring down a symbol of US decadence and excess.

With the number of these stories in circulation, a pattern develops creating the expectation in the intended audience that the US is weak and that clever mujahideen can, will and do defeat the Americans.  With the Predator drone representing as feared an asset as the Russian Hind attack helicopter was in the Soviet-Afghan war, this hack story fits the same pattern as the mujahideen defeating the Soviets with resolve, piety and righteousness (oh, and some Stingers).

Complementing these contemporary stories of clever Muslim soldiers defeating the American forces are older stories from Islamic traditions wherein a seemingly overmatched righteous warrior defeats a seemingly invincible power.  The David and Goliath story is one recognizable to Christians and Jews, but is also revered by Muslims.  The clever David eschews bulky armor and close-in weaponry, using speed, agility and an easily available supply of rock ammunition for his sling to defeat the over-confident and fear-inducing imperialist Goliath. The David and Goliath story establishes a pattern repeated with IEDs:  Clever warriors use unsophisticated and easily obtained weapons to defeat heavily armored warriors of a conquering government.

Another clever victory story by Muslims comes in the form of the Battle of the Trench.  Salman al-Farsi advises Muhammad to dig a trench around Medina to defend it against a massive Meccan confederacy of some 10,000 warriors.  The force of 3000 Muslims thwarts the Meccan assault and effectively ends the Meccan threat against the developing Islamic ummah.

Thus, these Predator video hack events contribute to a robust narrative system.  This system is made up of coherent and similar stories, across a range of time periods from the ancient to the contemporary.  In this consistent system there is a Crusading force, oppressing and/or invading the land of the innocent and righteous and pious.  Through a combination of righteousness, piety and cleverness, the oppressed (and after the Battle of the Trench this narrative system narrows its protagonists to Muslims) warriors defeat the overbearing, overconfident and seemingly all-powerful invaders.

So while we’re all paying attention to whether the video intercepts constitute a “hack” or not, we should be spending equal time, at least, in thinking through the strategic communication ramifications of this intelligence breech.  Commanders in the field should be screaming bloody murder about this counter-intelligence vulnerability, but so too should those charged with maintaining an effective strategic communication campaign.

by Mark Woodward and Mariani Yahya*

Thai-Buddhist colonialism? That is a strange concept, but it is reality as far as the Malay-Muslims of the “Deep South” of Thailand are concerned.

Edward Said noted that the representation of political- and military-subject people as less than fully human is among the basic elements of the culture and ideology of colonialism. He also observed that despite other differences, in this respect all colonialisms are the same. In the introduction to Culture and Imperialism he wrote:

Each great metropolitan center that aspired to global dominance has said, and alas done, many of the same things. There is always the appeal to power and national interest in running the affairs of lesser peoples. There is always the same destructive zeal when the going gets a little rough, or when the natives rise up and reject a compliant and unpopular ruler who is ensnared and kept in place by the imperial power; there is the horrifically predictable disclaimer that “we” are exceptional, not imperial. (p. xxviii)

Today, we generally think of colonialism as a Euro-American phenomenon. It took less than a day in Pattani in far south Thailand to learn that this is not the case, and that almost everything that has written about the insidious nature of colonialism applies to Thailand as much as it does to Britain, France and the United States.

Thailand is generally known as a Buddhist kingdom, but the south part of the country – which consists of three provinces—Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala—has an overwhelmingly Malay Muslim population. Every day they struggle to preserve and assert their cultural and religious identities in the face of more than a century of domination and marginalization by the Thai state.

Approaching a roadblock.

On a recent trip to the three provinces we realized that we had come to a strange and dangerous place as soon as we arrived in Narathiwat from Bangkok. Our cell phones showed “no network” and soldiers with AK-47 automatic rifles lined the airport entrance and exit. We did not learn until later that one could not activate a cell phone without approval from the Thai military and roadblocks every 5 km or so are rather common.

When we arrived at the only 4-star hotel in Narathiwat, the atmosphere was almost eerie and dense with silence. We found that we were the only guests and that the staff was vaguely uncomfortable to see three obvious foreigners, two Malays (who are Muslim) and one white person.

In a region that is predominantly Muslim, there are portraits of the Thai royal family everywhere. Most road signs are in Thai and the Malays are expected to adapt the language in their daily lives. They are expected to accept the royal family as benevolent patrons.

During the span of four days, we spoke with local Muslim religious leaders and academics and quickly learned that the insurgencies that have plagued the provinces have little to do with “global jihadism” and everything to do with Thai political and cultural imperialism.

The Imam of the Al Furqan Mosque. His father, the previous Imam, was killed in the attack of June 8 attack while leading prayers.

On a visit to the Al Furqan mosque where close to thirty people were gunned down mafia-style during prayers on 8 June 2009, the air was thick with humidity and anxiety. Will there be masked men attacking us from the surrounding forests or will the imam of the mosque who carried a pistol underneath his sarong sprint into action? Questions like these flashed through our minds.

It is not clear who carried out the attack, though most villagers around the mosque suspected Buddhist paramilitaries financed and armed by the Queen Sirikit of Thailand—who the Thai government portrays as a model of Buddhist virtue—had something to do with it.

The Thai military informed us that most of the Buddhist populations of the region are people who have been resettled from poverty-stricken regions in Northeast Thailand to bring Buddhism and Thai culture to the south. Buddhist temples are nestled in the midst of army camps and some monks carry automatic weapons to protect Buddhism.

During a meeting with the Thai military, Lieutenant-General Keresri (who is in charge of civil, military and police affairs in the region) told us that the people of the region were not Malays, but Thai Muslims. He described majority of the residents are “simple people who do not know much about civilization and only want to pray in the mosque five times a day and sit in the village.” He described the Thai army’s mission as being to “win their hearts and minds.”

We could not take photos of the military base camp. It seemed like something from Oliver Stone’s Vietnam War story. The meeting with the General was a revelation. He insisted on using an official interpreter, though he speaks English well. It seemed not to occur to him that the conversation could just as well have been conducted in Malay.  Even if he did, he chose to use English. Language use is an element of domination.

Teaching Malay Muslims to raise chickens.

He then “invited” us to visit a training and re-education camp. An aide took us across the road and showed classes being conducted about raising chickens and farming fish. Malays domesticated chickens thousands of years ago and have been raising fish in ponds for centuries. He explained that the classes were intended to teach people about domestic production. When asked if these techniques could be used for commercial purposes the answer was: “These people are not interested in that. They just want to live in the village, if they have enough to eat, that is good enough for them.”

The general’s statement echoes the “the myth of the lazy native,” a phrase coined by Malaysian scholar Syed Hussein Alatas. It was one of the cornerstones of British colonial ideology in Malaysia. The Thais made the British myth their own when they annexed the Malay territory that is now the “Deep South”.

The real purpose of the camp soon became clear. Army officials would “visit” graduates and ask them about the activities of “criminal gangs.” When asked if the “criminal gangs” are jihadis, he said: “No, just criminals.” Thailand would not like to be associated with jihadism or to be known as a center of Islamist activism. Few of the people at the training camp asked to be there. Most were “invited” from villages nearby in which insurgents are known to be active.

Colonialism at its worst is a systematic attempt to colonize the ordinary residents and to devalue their culture, religion and language. This seems to be exactly what is happening in these three provinces.

The Malays, who have a long tradition of sophisticated Islamic scholarship, refuse to send their children to Thai government schools. They continue to send them to traditional “pondok” or small religious schools, many of which teach a combination of Islamic and “modern” subjects.  As Thailand emerged as a nation state in the early decades of the twentieth century, it has consistently attempted to impose Bangkok-centered religion, language and culture onto its border regions. The Malay Muslims of the Deep South have consistently resisted these efforts.

There are 3,400 mosques in Thailand and out of this, 2,300 of them are located in Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani. Because of this, Thailand’s Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva recently tried his best to back a suggestion by his Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak to grant autonomy in the region. However, when Mr Najib raised the sensitive issue in a recent interview with a Thai daily, he was countered by strong opposition from the hawks in the Thai establishment and armed forces.

The Malaysian government is doing its best to work together with the Bangkok administration to make the autonomy concept materialize in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. The shadowy insurgency, which operates in scattered semi-autonomous cells with no visible centralized leadership, wants the restoration of the old Pattani state.

The Islamic Sultanate of Pattani, which included Malaysia’s Kelantan and Kedah states, was once a thriving commercial and cultural hub. In 1902 all three provinces, Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat, were annexed by mainly Buddhist Thais. This sparked decades of tension that spiraled into a full-blown insurgency five years ago that has killed close to 4,000 people.

According to a Thai-based Wikipedia page, most Thais describe resistance fighters in the South as violent Muslim extremists but they are known as freedom fighters or jihadists by the Malay Muslims. With more than 60,000 Thai army troops now stationed in the three provinces, it is apparent that Said was quite right about colonialism, but failed to consider how his observations might apply to colonial states other than those in Europe and America.

________________________________________
*Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at the Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies at Gadjah Madah University and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, both in Yogyakarta Indonesia. Mariani Yahya is a Journalism Lecturer at the Management Development Institute of Singapore. She holds a Master in Science Degree in International Relations.

by Bennett Furlow

Somalia is finally getting some recognition.  For far too long Somalia was ignored unless someone wanted to point to an example of a failed state.  Not until 2006, when the Union of Islamic Courts effectively gained control of the southern half of the country, did Somalia make a significant return to the international news cycle.  Since then there has been

• An Ethiopian invasion, war and withdrawal
• The emergence of al-Shabaab (and to a lesser degree Hizbul Islam) as major Islamist forces in the country
• A series of young Somali men from Minnesota travelling to Somalia to take up arms
• Fears that the country will become an al-Qaeda safe haven
• The most devastating suicide attack in Somali history in which three cabinet ministers and twenty others at a medical school graduation were killed

And then, there are those pirates.

In the most recent issue of the journal Perspectives on Terrorism, Peter Lehr wrote an article entitled Somali Piracy: The Next Iteration.  In it he does a bit of soothsaying and attempts to lay out a possible future scenario for Somalia’s pirates.  It is not a bad story at that.  Lehr suggests that Somali pirates, who have thus far been primarily interested in monetary payoffs, may soon replace their financial interests with political ones.  He gives a recent example of a demand for the release of hostages, reminiscent of the airline hijackings in the 60s and 70s, and he quotes a member of al-Shabaab referring to the pirates as “mujahideen” in a clear attempt link the pirates to the Islamist group.

Making pirates the “maritime arm” of al-Shabaab is not beyond the realm of possibility, but it is not as likely as Lehr would have us believe.  First, Lehr does not account for the political divisions within Somalia.  The northern part of the country is the semi-autonomous Somaliland which has little connection to al-Shabaab.  The north-central part of Somalia is Puntland, also semi-autonomous, and the location of the vast majority of the piracy coming out of Somalia (piracy is slowly expanding in the south and it is here that Lehr’s scenario is most plausible). The most well-known pirate attack, the seizing of the MV Maersk Alabama, was perpetrated by pirates based in Ely, a port city in northern Puntland.   It is in the southern half of the country, Somali proper, that al-Shabaab has influence.  Certainly it is true that the fates of all three sections of the country are tied to one another but the actual connection between pirates and al-Shabaab is slight to say the least.

Second, there are rumors, unsubstantiated though they may be, that the government of Puntland is receiving some of the profits from pirate activities.  This gives the pirates some cover as they don’t need to worry about any type of crackdown on their activities by the local authorities.  That may not be the case in an area governed by Islamist militants, at least for certain target vessels.  In fact in late 2008 when pirates attacked and captured the Saudi tanker MV Sirius Star, members of al-Shabaab attempted to find and free the ship because it belonged to a Muslim country.

Third, all the piracy activity has been crime-focused, not terror-focused.  Pirates do not attack passenger ships where they could potentially kill hundreds of people.  Instead they focus on goods-related cargo vessels. What this says about the price of a barrel of oil verses the price of a human being I don’t know, but the pirates have made it clear they think it is more cost effective to grab cargo ships rather than passenger ships.  The sinking of a passenger ship would be the equivalent of a maritime 9/11 and nothing like that has been attempted.

To be fair, Lehr does state that piracy is more like organized crime than it is like terrorism, he just feels the connections between the two are stronger than I think the facts warrant.

There is no question that Somalia is a complicated country with some very complicated problems, but it does no good to conflate piracy and terrorism.  Both need to be addressed by the international community but in very different ways.  Terrorism is the buzzword of the decade.  It brings to mind a very specific type of individual with a very specific type of ideology or motivation.  Pirates do not use terror to further an agenda; theirs is a strictly criminal enterprise.  Nor are they Islamists.  They have no Islamic agenda or any Qur’anic defense for their actions.

At the moment and for the foreseeable future Somali pirates will continue to hit the same type of targets for the same monetary reasons.  In true pirate fashion.  Arrr.