by Chris Lundry (with R. Bennett Furlow)

It did not take long for the images of the US Marines urinating on corpses of Taliban fighters to go viral. A moment of lapsed judgment will circulate as long as anyone is interested in seeing it, certainly long after short attention spans move on to other things and the fallout – including, presumably, disciplinary actions for the soldiers – settles.

Predictably, extremist sites have been all over this. In Indonesia, the story has run on Voice of al Islam, Hidayatullah, ar Rahmah, and others. Voice of al Islam made a clever play on words in their headline; they cited the Council on American-Islamic Relations by using its acronym CAIR, which means “liquid” in Indonesia. The headline “CAIR Kutuk Penodaan Mayat Anggota Taliban oleh Marinir AS” means “CAIR condemns the desecration of Taliban Corpses by US Marines,” but it could be read “Accursed Liquid Desecrates the Taliban corpses by US Marines.” The story itself is a pretty straightforward account of CAIR’s reaction – writing to secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, issuing a condemnation, and hoping for justice.

VOI’s subsequent post ratchets up the rhetoric, however. “Animals! American Marines Piss on Taliban Mujahidin.” The story quotes Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi, who stated that “actions such as this make the Taliban want to continue to attack America.” For emphasis, the quote was highlighted and used as a pull quote in the text. The behavior is condemned as abominable, wild, and animalistic.

Ar Rahmah’s coverage invokes the Crusader master narrative, linking the act to centuries of perceived conflict and occupation. The headline quotes Taliban Spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed’s statement that there are hundreds of similar unreported cases.

The story is also being repeated in the Arabic-speaking world. The bladialyoum blog embedded the video, and refers to the soldiers as barbarians, condemning the occupation of Muslims lands, and linking the act to other perceived acts of aggression against the Muslim world. In this post on Arabic.rt, comments condemn the act, and link it to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed denounced the act as “barbaric.”

That extremist sites are reporting this story should come as no surprise, nor should it be surprising that mainstream media outlets are covering it as well. In Indonesia, for example, both English language dailies – the Jakarta Post and the Jakarta Globe – ran stories, as did most Indonesian language outlets such as Kompas, which embedded a link to the video on its website. Al Jazeera has been following the story, and updating it as details emerge (such as this report about the identification of US soldiers). These mainstream outlets reach exponentially more readers, and their coverage is nearly identical to the extremists, minus the hyperbole and the explicit anti-Americanism.

Not to say that those interested in combating extremism shouldn’t be paying attention to the extremist sites, but the readers of the mainstream sites are important too. Most of those few who follow the extremist sites have already chosen sides, but many in the mainstream media audience are “middle ground” observers, who may not have a strong opinion about the conflict. Stories such as this may push them toward sympathizing or even supporting extremists.

The story also shows the importance of non-verbal communication in the digital age. The despicable act itself was communication, but seeing and hearing it for oneself has much more of an impact than simply reading about it. Will the images inspire copycats and image manipulators in the same way the infamous images from the abuse scandal at Abu Ghraib did? Will they become memes? Cartoon parodies have popped up, in both liberal and (neo)conservative media.

Domestic reaction to the images is mixed. Public officials and military spokespeople are nearly unanimous in their condemnation. So are many among the commentators on mainstream new sites. But many other sources  are not, arguing, essentially, that it is “no big deal.” Floundering presidential candidate Rick Perry’ argued, essentially, that it was no big deal, and criticized President Obama’s (and just about every other public figure’s) reaction. Islamist sites duly reported Perry’s words, and continue to follow the story, reporting on new details such as the identification of the soldiers.

It is, however a “big deal.” The internet age has drastically changed strategic communication, which is why it’s unfathomable that these soldiers thought it was a good idea to film this. As Robert Wright in the Atlantic writes in “The Banality of Urination,” that the act itself was committed is not particularly surprising:

You send hordes of young people into combat, people whose job is to kill the enemy and who watch as their friends are killed and maimed by the enemy, and the chances are that signs of disrespect for the enemy will surface–and that every once in a while those signs will assume grotesque form.

It is, rather, the “transparency of war” and the danger that the act will spread hatred and revulsion among those who view it.

The attention surrounding this act gives the extremists symbolic ammunition and may make the “middle ground” readers forget about the Taliban’s horrendous atrocities, such as their bombings of weddings, volleyball games, and other events that kill Muslims, or training children to behead their enemies. It may appear that they have gained the “moral high ground” for a brief period. Swift and public disciplining of those responsible may help reduce the fallout, but as the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, this is another reminder why the US needs to go to great lengths to try to minimize negative perceptions in the Muslim world.

by Jeffry R. Halverson*

“If a group of people feels that it has been humiliated and that its honor has been trampled underfoot, it will want to express its identity.”                                                                                                                       – Abdolkarim Soroush

In a recent NY Times Op-Ed, Professor John W. Owen of the University of Virginia argues that the electoral success of Islamists after the Arab Spring is due to Islamism’s longstanding role as the dominant voice of political dissent. He writes: “Islamism is winning out because it is the deepest and widest channel into which today’s Arab discontent can flow.” It’s an interesting perspective, but I think it misses the mark. Islamism is not about dissent, it’s about identity.

I explored the electoral success of Ennahda in Tunisia and the future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt previously on COMOPS. If you haven’t read those blog entries, I encourage you to do so. I won’t repeat that material here. Rather, I want to look at the broader issue of identity, which I think lies at the heart of Islamism’s current popularity.

As readers know, Tunisia and Egypt are the only two countries of the historic Arab Spring to hold democratic elections so far. These countries are commonly designated as Arab states. However, there was a time when the “Arab world” was restricted to the Arabian Peninsula and the southern Levant. It was only after the rise of Islam in the seventh century and the subsequent conquest of North Africa that the lands we know today as Egypt and Tunisia started a gradual shift toward “Arabness.”

‘Who is an Arab’ is a far more complex question than you might guess. The simple answer (my apologies Arabist scholars) is twofold: An Arab is someone who speaks Arabic (there’s even a saying by the Prophet Muhammad that ‘Arabness’ is conferred by the tongue) and/or shares a genealogical or cultural-historical heritage with an Arabic speaking people. Despite certain stereotypical images about what an ‘Arab’ looks like, I assure you that Arabs come in every shade and color of the human family. The Arabic language (including its enormous variety of dialects) is the real root of Arab identity. But what does this have to do with Islamist parties?

The Arabic language arrived with the Muslim expansion across North Africa in the seventh century. Arabic gradually became the dominant language of the peoples in those lands over time. This means that Islam is irrevocably bound to Arab identity, despite the fact that millions of Arabs are Christians. The Qur’an is actually the foundation of literary Arabic as we know it. The Arab tribes of the Peninsula were an oral culture and largely illiterate, and the rise of Islam transformed those conditions.

When you add in the fact that national identities (e.g. American, Iraqi) are a modern innovation developed in the West and largely imposed in North Africa by Western colonial powers, we are left with the fact that Islam served as the primary reference point for identity formation for centuries before that time, along with tribal and ancestral ties.

Jump forward to the independence movements in the Arab world of the mid-twentieth century. The British are ousted in Egypt and the French are ousted in Tunisia. The two young nation-states are independent and can choose a system of governance, including a legal system, for themselves. The dominant trend in the twentieth century was to try to ‘catch up’ to the powers of the age and borrow or adopt European systems and ideologies; not only nationalism, but socialism, communism, even fascism. This sort of borrowing extended into culture (even the way people dressed), technology and education as well. The most radical example in the region was Turkey, a non-Arab state, but still a neighbor with strong cultural ties. Among the Arabs, Tunisia came closest to following Turkey’s radical example. As we know, the post-colonial ‘experiments’ in the Arab states of Tunisia and Egypt ultimately produced the authoritarian regimes that would fall during the Arab Spring.

When Tunisians and Egyptians went to cast their votes this past year, they weren’t too concerned with particular candidates (nor were the election systems set up as such). The elections were about people expressing identities and aspirations freely, perhaps for the first time. Judging by the election results, a large segment of Tunisians and Egyptians who cast votes (note the qualifier) believe that it is important to retain or affirm an Arab-Muslim identity. So far these elections have been about asserting that sense of identity more so than caliphates or a desire to implement medieval penal codes or ban wine.

These elections also come at a time when the United States (its military might aside) is a cultural superpower across the globe. People in many parts of the world, not only in Arab states (note the NY Times recent piece on China), fear the loss of ‘who they are’ in the face of American (or Western) cultural or socioeconomic hegemony.  In my home state of Arizona, we have witnessed the strange, sometimes militant, response of Anglo-Americans who fear Hispanic cultural encroachment and cast votes accordingly. Those are identity votes too. I see little difference between them and those people in Egypt or Tunisia who vote for parties that champion longstanding identities rooted in Islam.

_____________________________

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

by Scott W. Ruston*

In December, COMOPS was invited to participate in a question and answer forum with General Stéphane Abrial, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, hosted by Atlantic-Community.org. Atlantic-Community is a leading European online think tank focused on transatlantic relations. The Q&A reveals that General Abrial has an integrative, forward-looking conceptualization of the role of strategic communication in NATO.  A close read also suggests that NATO faces both internal, as well as external, strategic communication challenges.

As the head of Allied Command Transformation (ACT), General Abrial is one of two strategic commanders in the NATO organizational structure (Allied Command Operations or ACO is the other, led by Admiral James Stavridis), and is charged with leading and facilitating the continuous improvement of NATO capabilities to meet NATO missions, operations and goals now and into the future.  The online forum consisted of a video by General Abrial introducing the concept of “Smart Defense”, an initiative recently put in place by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and General Abrial’s thoughts on what Smart Defense means for ACT.

Members of Atlantic-Community were invited to submit questions to General Abrial, facilitated by the editors at Atlantic-Community, and over the course of two subsequent sessions General Abrial answered a selection of these questions.  The first set of questions addressed specific implementations of Smart Defense, including definitions and ACT implications as well as transparency and development concerns.  The second inquired about broader NATO issues such as maritime security, cultural obstacles to cooperation and strategic communication.  The complete question and answer session can be found here.

One of the underlying factors driving Smart Defense, emphasized both in General Abrial’s introductory video and his answers to multiple questions, is the increased pressure on defense budgets in the face of the current European debt crisis and severe recession in the United States.  Yet, the security challenges faced by NATO and member countries have not abated.  These fiscal conditions motivate a need to do more with less, or as the general puts it: “We need to spend better.”  General Abrial provides some interesting thoughts about cooperative procurement as a method to leverage economies of scale.  In addition, he suggests the coordination of each member-country’s unique strengths and capabilities would be more efficient than developing parallel capabilities across the Alliance.

Acknowledging the fiscal challenges underpinning Smart Defense, my question to General Abrial centered on what sort of security dividend could be realized by emphasizing strategic communication as an additional tool for achieving NATO security objectives.  In other words, with the significant rise in insurgency and other irregular warfare situations, might non-kinetic solutions offer a cost-effective supplement to traditional kinetic military capabilities (and by implication, could successful non-kinetic solutions reduce the need for expensive weapons systems procurement and maintenance, if only slightly)?

General Abrial’s answer emphasized the role of strategic communication as part of a broad public diplomacy effort and cited a 2009 NATO Summit conclusion that strategic communication must be an integral part of both political and military objectives.  This dual role of strategic communication points to a significant challenge for conducting it effectively.  Which arm of NATO (or any government for that matter), the political or military, should lead strategic communication?

Thinking of strategic communication in terms of public affairs and information operations is too restrictive. It is a discipline that bridges both political and military domains and is intricately enmeshed with both political and military operations.  It requires careful planning and forethought, otherwise devaluing its strategic benefit.  General Abrial calls for “building a professional framework strategic communications related military disciplines” and I would argue that this framework should be overtly collaborative with the political dimension of the alliance’s functions.

General Abrial’s answer also got me thinking about two sides of strategic communication and the special challenges faced by NATO.  All countries when seeking to communicate their objectives and goals, and seeking to persuade an audience to cooperate in the achievement of those goals have two audiences, external and internal.  In its traditional definition—communication crafted and coordinated to support the achievement of a goal—strategic communication is often conceived as an externally focused process, and this is especially true when subcomponents of the discipline such as public diplomacy, information operations and psychological operations (psyops) are considered.  However, countries have domestic audiences that require information and need to understand what their government is trying to accomplish.

In NATO’s case, this internal audience presents a particular challenge:  28 member countries, each with its own unique security and diplomatic concerns, its own internal political turmoil, not too mention significant historical and cultural concerns.  Each country itself has both internal and external audiences.  General Abrial’s comments introducing Smart Defense indicates this need to address this internally-focused facet of strategic communication.

He observes that a question facing NATO is: “how do we best encourage groups of like-minded countries to reap economies of scale by working together more often?”  This sounds like a strategic communication issue, but not one suited to information operations or pysop campaigns.  Rather, it is about getting all the member countries to share the same vision of NATO’s future and the same vision about how they can contribute to that future.  In short, they need to participate in the same narrative.

This challenge illustrates how approaching narrative from a systemic perspective can be helpful, not only in terms of narrative analysis and understanding, but also in terms of strategic communication planning.  Smart Defense already articulates some fundamental themes: cooperation, fiscal prudence, balancing sovereignty and solidarity, etc.  As we’ve noted here at COMOPS Journal before (notably here and here), a narrative is (1) an explanatory organization of information; (2) is structured with a trajectory towards the resolution a conflict or satisfaction of a desire (and the events of this trajectory illustrate themes, values and ideals); and (3) is a system of stories.

Constructing a Smart Defense narrative, then, would consist of identifying a variety of stories that constitute the events in the overall narrative trajectory.  For an effective and coherent narrative that unites the alliance, these stories would ideally be sourced from the member countries and thus consistent with those narrative landscapes.  Next, they would contain within them actions and characters and events that, when collected together, place Smart Defense at the resolution of the conflicts or the satisfaction of  desires germane to each member country.  Of course, that’s easier said than done.

The most encouraging of all the general’s comments, though, was his assertion that strategic communication “must be incorporated into all operational planning, instead of being relegated to an after-the-fact attempt to explain, or build support for a decision that has already been taken.”  As my co-authors and I argue in our upcoming book Narrative Landmines, understanding the narrative landscape and incorporating that knowledge into the decision-making process at operational and strategic levels can make the difference between success or failure of civil affairs, public outreach, crisis management and other soft power enterprises.

We at COMOPS thank General Abrial and Atlantic-Community for the opportunity to engage in this dialogue, and look forward to following NATO’s efforts in implementing Smart Defense and ensuring both European and Transatlantic security in the years to come.

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*Dr. Scott W. Ruston is an Assistant Research Professor at the Center for Strategic Communication at Arizona State University. A specialist in narrative theory and media studies, he is the co-author of Narrative Landmines: Rumors, Islamist Extremism and the Struggle for Strategic Influence (Rutgers UP, available March 2012).  He is also an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve newly assigned to a NATO ACT reserve support unit.

by Steven R. Corman

In an apparent budget cutting move, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy was cut from the recently passed budget, and has ceased to exist. The move eliminates an organization over 60 years old.

The Commission was established under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 as the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information.  It was merged with an educational exchange commission in 1977 to produce the current name and configuration.

According to its website, the Commission had only one permanent staffer (its Executive Director) and a budget of just $135,000.  I can attest that the activities of the Commission were valuable.  In a recent post I recounted some events from one of their meetings.  That meeting also led to a connection between our group and a group in Afghanistan working on narrative issues there.  It doesn’t take too many such connections to justify a budget that basically amounts to a rounding error in the Federal balance sheet.

The now-former Executive Director of the Commission is Matt Armstrong, whose mountainrunner blog went into hibernation while he had the gig.  Matt is restarting the blog and I welcome him back to the PD/SC blogoshopere, though I wish it were under different circumstances.

 

 

by Bruce Gregory

Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People, November 15, 2011.  While nearly half (46%) of Afghans say their country is moving in the right direction, more respondents (35%) than at any time since the Foundation began polling there in 2004 say Afghanistan is headed in the wrong direction.  Attacks, violence, and terrorism are cited.  The survey also found, however, that Afghans see progress in access to education, drinking water, health services, and in household financial well-being.  Sympathy for armed opposition groups declined dramatically in 2011, reaching its lowest level since the Foundation’s surveys began.

Tom Bartlett and Karin Fisher, “The China Conundrum,” The New York Times, November 6, 2011.  In this NYT Education Life feature, Bartlett and Fisher argue that American colleges have been slow to adjust to challenges caused by the rapid rise in Chinese undergraduates — now the largest group of foreign students in the United States.  In their eager competition for students from China’s expanding middle class who can afford to pay full tuition, American colleges contend with application, language, and acclimation problems as they “struggle to distinguish between good applicants and those who are too good to be true.”  The article is a collaboration between The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education.

British Council, Corporate Plan 2011-2015, posted September 2011.  The British Council’s vision for 2015 anticipates significant reductions in government funding, more collaboration with corporate and civil society partners, increased income from paid services, and greater priority to countries with strategic importance to the UK.   Includes a foreword by Council CEO Martin Davidson and sections on English teaching, education and society, the arts, sports, science, climate change, digital platforms, regional programs, and a financial plan.  See blog comments by Alex Case on implications of a 26 percent cut in government funding and keeping an eye on the Council’s “increasing commercialism.”

British Council, “Trust and Why it Matters,” Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, pp. 190-193.  Calling for an evidence-based approach to trust building, the Council reports on its survey of young urban, educated, and online “influencers” (age 16-34) in India, China, Poland, and Saudi Arabia.  The survey tested for levels of trust in the people and governments in the UK, the US, Germany, and France.  The Council found “a clear positive association” between self-assessed levels of trust and some form of cultural relations activity involving the base line countries as well as a willingness to engage further with those countries.  Levels of trust were significantly higher for the UK, Germany, and France than for the United States.

Broadcasting Board of Governors, Impact Through Innovation and Integration, BBG Strategic Plan, 2012-2016, posted November 2011. In this brief (seven pages) and imaginative five year plan, the BBG outlines a strategy for US international broadcasting intended to address fundamental changes in the global information environment.  Its strategy includes a revised statement of mission, a vision for “altogether new ways of doing business” in programing and use of new technologies, making internet censorship circumvention and anti-jamming a top priority, and transformational changes in the identity and organizational structure of the BBG and its broadcasting services.  See also the BBG’s press release and “Frequently Asked Questions.”

Massimo Calabresi, “Hillary Clinton and the Rise of Smart Power,” Time, November 7, 2011, 26-33.  Time magazine’s cover story chronicles US Secretary of State Clinton’s efforts to face different situations, threats, and opportunities with smart combinations of diplomacy, development, and military hard power.  Her tools include the “convening power” of connections with civil society organizations, greater control over US foreign aid strategy, expansion of political advisors in the Department of Defense, and immersing “everyone from entry-level foreign service officers to newly appointed ambassadors in social media.”  Many of her initiatives, Time observes, are low on budget, “long on jargon and short on deliverables,” and run out of her office making their duration problematic.  Includes a Q&A with the Secretary by Time’s Managing Editor Richard Stengel.

Daryl Copeland, “Science Diplomacy: What’s It All About?” Center for International Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 13, November 2011.  Copeland (Canadian diplomat and author of Guerrilla Diplomacy) calls for greater attention to science diplomacy in addressing global issues that challenge development and security.  He distinguishes between science diplomacy (a subset of public diplomacy with governance connections) and international scientific collaboration among corporate and civil society partners.  His paper frames conceptual issues and outlines difficulties flowing from dominance of defense-related funding and lack of awareness and capacity in foreign ministries, multilateral organizations, and science-based institutions.

Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “All Talk and No Action,” Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011, pp. 20-25.  Cross (University of Southern California) looks at rising Euro-pessimism in the United States and finds widespread lack of awareness of Europe’s political, economic, and military achievements.  She suggests three images that Europe should strive to promote:  a Europe “united in diversity,” a Europe that acts and doesn’t just talk, and a Europe that effectively combines hard and soft power in facing 21st century challenges.  Cross examines the role the European External Action Service can play in addressing US misperceptions with particular emphasis on the value of networked cultural diplomacy.

Recent articles by Professor Cross also include:  “Building a European Diplomacy: Recruitment and Training to the EEAS,” European Foreign Affairs Review, (2011), 16: 447-464.  On building professionalism, expertise, flexibility, and collective identity in the European External Action Service.  “Europe, A Smart Power?” International Politics (2011), 48, 691-706.  On the meaning of smart power and Europe’s use of soft and smart power.

European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC), Culture Report, EUNIC Yearbook 2011.  This fourth edition of the Culture Report — published for the first time within the framework of EUNIC (a network of 19 European cultural diplomacy organizations) — examines the current state of Europe’s external cultural relations.  Includes chapters by 30 scholars and practitioners from 20 countries that examine external perspectives on Europe, the role of culture in Europe’s external affairs, and the evolution of the EUNIC network.

“2011: Facets of Diplomacy,” Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Association of Public Diplomacy Scholars, Syracuse University, November 2011. Graduate students at Syracuse University have published their second edition of online journal Exchange.  Includes:

Simon Anholt (Editor, Place Branding and Public Diplomacy), “Beyond the Nation Brand — The Role of Image and Identity in International Relations”

Rachel Wilson (Syracuse University), “Cocina Peruana Para El Mundo: Gastrodiplomacy, the Culinary Nation Brand, and the Context of National Cuisine in Peru”

Sofia Kisou (Ionia University), “The Power of Culture in Diplomacy: The Case of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy in France and Germany”

Ivaylo Ladjiev (University of Bath), “Searching for Influence and Persuasion in Network-Oriented Public Diplomacy: What Role for ‘Small States?’”

Shahihul Alam (Independent University) “Stretching the Parameters of Diplomatic Protocol: Incursion into Public Diplomacy”

Ellen Huijgh (Netherlands Institute of International Affairs), “Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension”

Candace Ren Burnham (University of Southern California), “Public Diplomacy Following 9/11: The Saudi Peace Initiative and ‘Allies’ Media Campaign”

Michael Schneider (Syracuse University), “Book Review: The Practice of Public Diplomacy — Confronting Challenges Abroad”

Bruce Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 6 (2011) 351-372.  This article looks ways in which characteristics of an American approach to public diplomacy are rooted in the nation’s history and political culture.  These include episodic resolve correlated with war and surges of zeal, systemic tradeoffs in American politics, competitive practitioner communities and powerful civil society actors, and late adoption of communication technologies.  The aarticle examines these characteristics in the context of the Obama administration’s strategy of global public engagement and three illustrative issues:  a culture of understanding, social media, and multiple diplomatic actors.  It concludes that characteristics shaping US public diplomacy significantly constrain its capacity for transformational change.

Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts, (Lexington Books, 2012).  Hayden (American University) asks why do international political actors increasingly believe communicating with foreign audiences is crucial to their interests?  His answers are provided in a significant new inquiry into the theoretical nature of soft power and the variety of ways soft power is interpreted and implemented in the public diplomacy initiatives of different actors.  Hayden draws on concepts and methods in international relations and communications to develop a theoretical treatment of soft power and public diplomacy.  He then examines discourses and practices of soft power in case studies of the public diplomacy and strategic communication policies of China, Japan, Venezuela, and the United States.  Hayden is particularly concerned with the rhetoric of soft power — the reasoning, policy discussions, and public arguments that shape how public diplomacy programs of these actors are imagined and what they view to be necessary political action through communication.

Institute for International Education (IIE), Open Doors 2011, November 2011.  IIE’s annual report on cross border student flows finds international student enrollment in the US increased 5% in 2011. Students from China led the increase followed by students from India, South Korea, Canada, and Taiwan.  The top three countries comprise almost half of the international enrollment in US higher education.  Although only 270,604 American college students studied abroad in 2010-2011, there has been a steady annual rise with an increase of about 10,000 from the previous year.  Most US students still choose traditional destinations in Western Europe.  However, enrollment in less traditional destinations such as India, Israel, and Brazil is on the rise.

Robert Kelley, “Repairing the American Image, One Tweet at a Time,” The United States After Unipolarity, LSE Ideas, London School of Economics, 2011, 35-39.  Kelley (American University) looks at the Obama administration’s public diplomacy.  He commends efforts to put “social media and technology exchanges into the toolkit of the public diplomat.”  In contrast with these innovations in method, however, he finds an “absence of a strategic framework for public diplomacy” and a “strategic incoherence” in which means matter more than content.

Michelle Lee, “Public Diplomacy: At the Crossroads Between Practitioner and Theorist,” Council of American Ambassadors, The Ambassadors Review, Fall 2011.  Lee (a US Foreign Service Officer currently assigned at the Department of State) looks at reasons for the divide between practitioners and academics in public diplomacy and what might be done in the two communities to benefit from greater collaboration.  Her article discusses recent efforts to bridge the divide, the value of advanced educational as well as increased training for mid-career diplomats, and recommendations to strengthen the practice and study of public diplomacy.

Jan Melissen, Beyond The New Public Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael Discussion Paper No. 3, October 2011.  The Director of Clingendael’s Diplomatic Studies Program and co-editor of The Hague Journal of Diplomacy looks at changes in diplomatic practice in a world of multiple actors and diverse networks.  His paper assesses criticisms of public diplomacy; varieties of public diplomacy practices by states; the increasing public diplomacy roles of sub-state, regional, and civil society actors; and points of learning from the public diplomacy of East Asian countries.  Given these changes, Melissen argues the juxtaposition of “traditional” and “new” public diplomacy is no longer satisfactory.  Rather, public diplomacy and diplomacy are merging into a more inclusive and “societized” form of diplomacy.  In a polylateral world of multiple actors, states remain highly relevant, but their diplomacy can best be understood in a context where non-state and non-official actors have a much greater role in international relationships.  Practitioners, he suggests, can learn much “outside their comfort zone from how public diplomacy is practiced in distinct organizational and cultural settings.”

Pew Research Center, Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking Popular Worldwide, December 20, 2011.  Pew’s survey of digital communication in 21 countries finds overwhelmingly large majorities in most major countries use cell phones for text messages (75%), taking pictures/video (50%), and Internet use (23%) based on median percentages across the nations surveyed.  Social networking remains popular but with only marginal change in use since 2010.  Exceptions are Egypt and Russia where usage has increased from 18% to 28% in Egypt and 33% to 43% in Russia.  Multiple uses of cell phones and social networking correlates with youth demographics and education. Media release.

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, guest editors, “American Diplomacy,” The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 6, Nos. 3-4 2011.  In this special issue of the Journal, Sharp (University of Minnesota, Duluth) and Wiseman (University of Southern California) convene a team of scholars and practitioners to look at the conduct of American diplomacy, the character of its diplomatic culture, efforts to reform, and suggestions for what lies ahead.  Includes:

Introduction

Paul Sharp and Geoffrey Wiseman, “American Diplomacy,” 231-234

Research Papers

Geoffrey Wiseman, “Distinctive Characteristics of American Diplomacy,” 235-259

David Clinton (Baylor University), “The Distinction Between Foreign Policy and Diplomacy in American International Thought and Practice,” 261-276

CHEN Zhimin (Fudan University), “US Diplomacy and Diplomats: A Chinese View,” 277-297

Michael Smith (Loughborough University), “European Responses to US Diplomacy: ‘Special Relationships,’ Transatlantic Governance and World Order,” 299-317

Karin A. Esposito and S. Alaeddin Valid Gharavi (School of International Relations, Tehran), “Transformational Diplomacy: US Tactics for Change in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2004-2006,” 319-334

David Bosco (American University), “Course Correction: The Obama Administration at the United Nations,” 335-349

Bruce Gregory (George Washington University/Georgetown University), “American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” 351-372

James Der Derian (Brown University), Quantum Diplomacy: German-US Relations and the Psychogeography of Berlin,” 373-392

Paul Sharp, “Obama, Clinton and the Diplomacy of Change,” 393-411

Practitioners’ Perspectives

Chas W. Freeman Jr. (US diplomat, retired), “The Incapacitation of US Statecraft and Diplomacy,” 413-432

Thomas Hanson (University of Minnesota, Duluth), “The Traditions and Travails of Career Diplomacy in the United States,” 433-450

Alec Ross (US Department of State), “Digital Diplomacy and US Foreign Policy,” 451-455.

Clay Shirky, Salant Lecture — Press Freedom in a Global Era, Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, October 2011.  Shirky (New York University and author of Here Comes Everybody) looks at press freedom as a relationship between technological capability and the regulatory power of legal and policy constraints.  Using Wikileaks and other examples, Shirky examines challenges to freedom of expression in “a post national environment.”  He argues the US and other democracies, which have been good at lecturing autocracies on freedom of speech, need to become much better at holding themselves to the standards they espouse.  (Courtesy of Bob Coonrod)

Russell Shorto, Descartes’ Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict Between Faith and Reason, (Vintage Books, 2008).  Intellectual historian and journalist Russell Shorto tells the story of Descartes’ legacy and its relevance to today’s competing fundamentalist impulses (secular, Christian, and Muslim).  His lively and witty narrative uses the strange story of a centuries long struggle between scientific and religious authorities over the disposition of Descartes’ physical remains as a metaphor for understanding the continuing conflict between faith and reason.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “A New Theory for the Foreign Policy Frontier: Collaborative Power,” The Atlantic, November 30, 2011.  Slaughter (Princeton University) updates her inaugural Joseph S. Nye lecture at Princeton to frame a concept of “collaborative power,” — defined as “the power of many to do together what no one can do alone” — which she contrasts with Nye’s concept of “top down” relational power.  Elements of collaborative power include mobilization, connection, and adaptation of one’s preferences to enable meaningful dialogue.  For Slaughter, collaborative power is not held by A in relation to B.  Rather it is an “emergent phenomenon,” which leaders can learn to unlock and guide but not possess.

Tara Sonenshine, Under Secretary-designate for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, US Department of State, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, December 8, 2011.  In prepared remarks for her confirmation hearing, Sonenshine (Executive Vice President, US Institute for International Peace) described public diplomacy as “a shared means to a shared goal of extending America’s reach and security by influencing how individuals around the world come to know and understand us.  It is about the advancement of foreign policy goals through people-to-people connections in a complex, global networked society.”  Successful public diplomacy, she stated, “is inextricably linked to national security.”  Public diplomacy “increases economic security through global engagement,” and it “must be agile and adaptive in using state of the art information technologies.”

In a Huffington Post blog, “America’s Next Move on Public Diplomacy,” co-authored with her USIP colleague Sheldon Himelfarb on May 5, 2009, Sonenshine offered her ideas to then incoming Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale.

Janet Steele, “Justice and Journalism: Islam and Journalistic Values in Indonesia and Malaysia,” Journalism, 12(5) 533-549.  Drawing on interviews with journalists in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Kuala Lumpur, Steele (George Washington University) looks at ways in which Southeast Asian journalists think about their work and implications for US public diplomacy.  She argues “journalists in Indonesia and Malaysia express universal values of journalism, but do so in an Islamic idiom” that privileges goals of economic justice and the legitimacy of those in authority more than freedom.  If the US wishes to engage journalists in these countries, Steele contends, “rather than focusing on ‘the role of a free press in a democracy,’ it would make far more sense to focus on ‘the role of independent media in a just society.’”

Kishan S. Rana, 21st Century Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Guide, (The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011).  In this recent contribution to the Key Studies in Diplomacy series, former Indian Ambassador and DiploFoundation scholar Kishan Rana provides a guide to modern diplomacy for diplomacy practitioners and scholars.  His book is written with particular attention to its use in foreign ministry training courses and by teachers and students in academic institutions.  The book divides into three categories.  (1) A section on the international environment includes chapters on globalized, regional, and small states diplomacy; public diplomacy and country branding; and disapora diplomacy. (2) Chapters on institutions and processes look at foreign ministry reform, the reinvented embassy, decision-making and risk management, performance evaluation, information and communications technologies, the new consular diplomacy, and protocol.  (3) A section on diplomacy skills offers guidance on professional responsibilities, advocacy and public speaking, media skills, writing skills, and training exercises.

Websites and blogs of Interest

Robert Albro (American University), Public Policy Anthropology, a blog site that looks at cultural diplomacy, public diplomacy, intercultural dialogue, and other topics.

Intermedia’s AudienceScapes, an interactive tool and knowledge resource “on how citizens and policymakers gather, share, and use information for all sources.”  In a news release on December 15, 2011, Intermedia announced the appointment of Ali Fisher (Director of Mappa Mundi Consulting) as Associate Director of Digital Media Research.

R. S. Zaharna (American University), Culture Posts, an interactive blog site on USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy platform.

“U.S. Department of State Announces Launch of New Website,” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, October 12, 2011.  The Department’s interactive Discover Diplomacy website seeks to introduce the world of diplomacy and the work of the State Department to high school and college students.

Gem from the past

Walter R. Roberts, “The Evolution of Diplomacy,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 17.3 (Summer 2006), 55-64.  In this article, retired US diplomat and scholar Walter Roberts examines the origins of diplomatic practice as it focused increasingly on publics and differed from traditional diplomacy between governments during the second half of the 20th century.  It is a succinct overview of a transformation in diplomatic practice that led eventually to a global conversation on the meaning and methods of public diplomacy.  His article is a useful foundational reading as scholars and practitioners in the 21st century ask whether another transformation is occurring.  Has public diplomacy become so central to diplomacy that it is no longer helpful to treat it as unique theoretical concept and subset of diplomatic practice.  Mediterranean Quarterly lists “The Evolution of Diplomacy” as its seventh most cited article of the past eleven years.  His article is available online courtesy of the Public Diplomacy Alumni Association.

Walter Roberts career, which began in the Voice of America in 1942, included diplomatic assignments in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, service as an associate director of the US Information Agency, and a presidential appointment to membership on the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.  He pioneered the teaching of public diplomacy at George Washington University in the 1980s and 1990s.
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*Bruce Gregory is an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Georgetown University, and publishes this list periodically via mailing list.  We reprint it here as a service to our readers.  Bruce can be reached by email via bgregory at gwu dot edu

 

By Mark Woodward and Inayah Rohmaniyah*

Earlier this month (December 13-15) we were privileged to participate in a “The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media” sponsored by the Saudi sponsored Muslim World League (MWL, Rabita al-Alam al-Islami) and the Indonesian Ministry of Religion in Jakarta Indonesia.  Tension between the co-sponsors was evident in the selection of participants, the themes of formal presentations and in social interaction over the course of the conference. Differing perspectives on religious inclusivism, freedom of expression, social media and gender were especially apparent.

The conference theme was “The New Media and Information Technology.” Approximately 400 delegates and guests from 39 countries in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia were in attendance.  Jakarta was chosen as the conference venue because it was the site of the first conference that was held in 1980.  Many observers noted that the timing of the two conferences was not coincidental.  Both were held shortly after social and political upheavals that presented serious challenges to Saudi Arabia – the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Arab Spring of 2011.

Indonesian participants noted that the pairing of MWL and Indonesia’s Ministry of Religion was “peculiar” because of their very different orientations and agendas.  MWL is an international organization founded by the Saudi government in 1962 with the purpose of globalizing Saudi Wahhabism and countering other understandings of Islam and secularism. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion has a more inclusive understanding of Islam, and unlike MWL, actively promotes democracy and freedom of expression.

The Guest List

MWL selected conference delegates from the Middle East, Africa and Europe who share the leadership’s Wahhabi orientation. Efforts to secure a similarly sympathetic Indonesian contingent failed. The Indonesian Ministry of Religion delegated responsibility for inviting participants to academics in the Islamic University system, who invited Muslim scholars, journalists and activists with diverse religious views. The result was that while delegations from Middle Eastern, European and African countries supported the MWL agenda, the Indonesian contingent was less sympathetic. While participants included representatives of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, and other Indonesian organizations affiliated with MWL, none were invited to make formal presentations.

Most of the Indonesian participants were university lecturers with religious orientations very different from their Saudi hosts. This led to a marked contrast in the themes of formal presentations and a combination of humorous remarks and sometimes bitter comments about the implicit Saudi agenda.  Some found it ironic that Muslims who Wahhabis think of as kafir (unbelievers) because they engage in “deviant” forms of religious devotion including the veneration of saints, were invited at all. There were many sarcastic comments about the contrast between the pious pontificating of Saudi delegates and the burgeoning “temporary marriage”/sex tourism trade catering primarily to Saudis centered in Bogor, only a short distance from the conference venue. Others were angered by what they saw as Saudi arrogance and their exclusivist, self-referential use of the terms Islam and Muslim. One described Saudis as “colonialists,” echoing a theme discussed previously on this blog.

Formal Presentations

The conference included formal remarks by political figures, academic papers, mostly by Indonesian scholars, triumphalist, self congratulatory presentations by representatives of WML sponsored Islamic television networks in the United Kingdom and South Africa, speeches by WML officials calling for Muslim unity in efforts to counter western moral decadence and the destabilizing effects of the “New Media.” There was a consensus that there are positive and negative sides to New Media, and that the negatives include its use as a tool for the dissemination of radical ideologies and pornography. Indonesian speakers tended to embrace New Media because it promotes democratic change and freedom of expression. WML speakers expressed concern about it for exactly the same reason.

The disconnect between Saudi and Indonesian perspectives was apparent throughout the conference.  An editorial in the December issue of MWL Journal, distributed at the conference, summarized the Saudi position:

If the changing dynamics of media are not understood in its proper perspectives and an effort is not made to discipline the youth, it can create havoc in the society, as is being witnessed in many places.

Indonesian Vice-president Boediono opened the conference with a speech in which he stated:

The emergence of social networking media has created  new social institutions, in the forms of new social networks that bypass social borders and strata, creating virtual horizontal relationships. This New Media also helps to strengthen civil society and allows everyone access to it, greater freedom of expression and freedom of speech, including direct and open criticism of the Government.

Governments that have not been willing to allow greater democratic   participation and failed to respond adequately and in a timely manner to democratic voices have found themselves in difficulties or even been forced out of power by popular movements, the people’s power. Government’s control over media, is no longer effective. Gadgets, small yet very high-tech devices that can provide any information at any time, are easily available everywhere. Information has become a public domain. This is the new reality that we all have to adjust to and live with.

Social networking media can produce enormous benefits for the society. This is the experience in this country. The practice of democracy in Indonesia has been enriched by the development of social networking media.

He also called on Muslim religious authorities to issue “contextual fatwa (legal opinions)” to counter the influence of Internet based extremism. In Indonesian Muslim discourse “contextual” refers to a mode of legal reasoning that uses general principles abstracted from sacred texts to arrive at solutions to contemporary problems. This discursive style is an anathema to Saudi scholars who insist on literal readings. These are very different understandings of Shari’ah. The conflict between these positions was evident throughout the conference.

Presentations by General Secretary Abdallah Ben Abdel Mohsen At-Turki and other MWL speakers reiterated the themes of the MWL Journal editorial. They emphasized the dangers that global news and entertainment media pose to “Islam and the Muslims.” They stressed the need for government to government cooperation in efforts to establish “Muslim” alternatives to both existing Old Media and New Media. One speaker proposed creating a “Muslim” alternative to Facebook. Several speakers were critical of (unnamed) individuals who have declared the Internet to be haram (forbidden). They stressed the point that technology is morally neutral and should be used to promote Islamic values. Several presentations focused on the importance of satellite television as a communications medium. They indicated that television is the preferred medium because it can be used to deliver standardized content in multiple languages.

In their formal presentations WML delegates tended to speak of “Islam,” “The Muslim Community” and “The West” in monolithic ways. There were frequent references to “genuine” and Islamic teachings and the need to “correct” deviant tendencies. These statements reflect WML’s concerns with establishing Wahhabi orthodoxy and combatting other forms of Islam, especially Sufism and the Shiah.  “The West” was described as being anti-Islamic and as a source of moral corruption. “Western media” were often mentioned as engaging in conspiracies to corrupt Muslim youth and ultimately to destroy Islam. In general, portrayals of the West were far more negative than those in WML English language publications.

WML delegates we interviewed seemed not to understand the dynamics of New Media. One spoke of establishing an on line international Muslim media clearing house complete with electronic versions of “authentic texts,” and encouraging young people to study Information Technology as strategies to counter “anti-Islamic forces and influences.”  He did not appear to grasp the point that New Media is user driven. One of the editors of MWL Journal stated that he used e-mail and that some of his children had Facebook pages but that he did not really understand it. Another expressed confidence that if they were given proper Muslim educations, young people would watch “Muslim” programs on satellite TV instead of the frivolous entertainment programing offered by conventional media.

Presentations by Indonesian delegates echoed Boediono’s embrace of the democratizing power of New Media.  Parni Hadi, one of the founding editors of the Indonesian Islamic daily Republika, spoke with great passion and idealism about the constructive role of the New Media. In his remarks he mentioned links between technology and democratization, pointing to the role New Media in the Arab Spring movements that led to the overthrown of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. He called for the development of a “Prophetic” journalistic ethos and practice  based on freedom of expression with “no oppression by whosoever, government and religious authorities as well as media owners.” He called on journalists to follow in the footsteps of the Prophet Muhammad in efforts to promote “dignity, devotion, tolerance, mutual understanding, mutual respect and non-violence.” He was also critical of government attempts to control print, broadcast and on-line media.

In general Indonesian participants were far more open to changes wrought by the New Media than their Saudi counterparts. They tended to emphasize the opportunities rather than the dangers of the emergence of citizen journalism. They were less inclined to paint monochrome portraits of either “The West” or “Islam.” They also had a more expansive visions of “Muslim” media. In his address Professor  Azyumardi Azra, Dean of the Graduate School at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University in Jakarta, called for a pluralistic understanding of Islam. He later observed that Muslim media can, and should be more than sermons and that there was nothing “un-Islamic” about media coverage of the Manchester United football team, a perennial favorite in Indonesia.

The Social Dimension – Exclusivism and Gender

International conferences are complex social events in which cultures sometimes collide. Gender was an especially divisive issue at this conference. Men and women mix freely at conferences sponsored by Indonesian Islamic Universities. There are always women on the program. Seating is gender mixed, women and men converse freely and join each other for meals and coffee breaks.

Saudi and other MWL organizers were clearly uneasy about these aspects of Indonesian Muslim intellectual and cultural practice. There were no women in MWL sponsored delegations. Of the approximately 200 Indonesians invited by the Ministry of Religion, at least half were female, but in deference to Saudi concerns, none were asked to make presentations. Gender issues were not addressed in any of the formal presentations. The Indonesian organizers did not compromise on gender integrated seating and meals. Saudi and other WML sponsored delegates did not, however, speak with Indonesian women when they could avoid it, much less join them for coffee or lunch.

Many Indonesians, men as well as women, found the absence of women from the program to be unprofessional and insulting. When Labibah Zain of Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University raised the issue in a question and answer session, the Saudi response was that the question could not be answered. After the session ended, but with at least a hundred people still in the room, she and Inayah Rohmaniyah, Senior Lecture in the Department Quranic Exegesis and Hadith Studies at the same Islamic University “occupied” the podium to which they and other female scholars had been denied access.  The Saudi English language Arab News mentioned her “protest” but described her only as a blogger and social activist.  It did not mention the act of symbolic resistance that followed the non response to her question.

Final Thoughts – New Media, Media Events and the World Muslim League

The Muslim World League describes itself as a non-governmental organization. While this is technically correct, it functions as a public diplomacy arm of the Saudi Arabian State. Its publications depict the Saudi State, the king and the Saudi religious scholars as patrons and defenders of Islam and denounce their opponents.  It supports the spread of the Saudi version of Islam by funding schools, mosques and media outlets in many countries. It sponsors international conferences that usually unanimously endorse directives from the Saudi religious establishment. These conferences are as much media events, promoting Saudi claims to leadership of the global Muslim community, as they are forums for intellectual discussion and debate.  The 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media was intended to further this agenda and to formulate strategies to control opposing voices in the New Media. The conference approved a resolution establishing a “code of honor” for Muslim journalists and media organizations emphasizing their responsibility:

…… to affirm a belief in the moral principles and values of Islam, to safeguard the Islamic identity from the negative effects of globalization and westernization and to ensure freedom that is responsible and disciplined by Shari’ah guidelines; confront atheism and all other anti-Islam tendencies that spread hatred against Islam and Muslims.

It was, however, clear that the Indonesian Muslim establishment, including the Ministry of Religion and the Islamic University system and many Indonesian Muslim intellectuals do not share the Saudi desire to control either the Old or the New Media or to counter the role of New Media in democratic change. They clearly do not share Saudi perspectives on gender. WML publications often include photos of conferences in which no women appear. There were no such “photo ops” at this conference. One account of the conference, including quotations from Parni Hadi’s address, can already be found by searching 2nd International Conference on Islamic Media on Facebook. There will, no doubt, be others.

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* Mark Woodward is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at Arizona State University and Visiting Professor of Comparative Religion at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University. Inayah Rohmaniyah is Senior Lecturer of Tafsir and Hadith at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University.

by Steven R. Corman

A few weeks ago I did a keynote speech at a public meeting of the U.S. Advisory Commission in Public Diplomacy.  Later in the meeting I heard a presentation by Ambassador Richard LeBaron, Coordinator of the State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC).  The topic of his talk tied together several topics recently discussed on COMOPS Journal, and accordingly I want to share it with readers.

Presumably in response to the myriad calls to better coordinate U.S. government strategic communication, the CSCC was charged in a recent executive order to

coordinate, orient, and inform Government-wide public communications activities directed at audiences abroad and targeted against violent extremists and terrorist organizations, especially al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents, with the goal of using communication tools to reduce radicalization by terrorists and extremist violence and terrorism that threaten the interests and national security of the United States.

Among other things, the CSCC oversees the State Department’s Digital Outreach Team (DOT), which has been the subject of  previous posts on this blog, both appreciative and critical. Amb. LeBaron’s talk focused on a recent DOT effort that allows me to add another post in the appreciative category, and I don’t believe it is very well known.

The DOT recently produced three videos juxtaposing AQ’s ideology with facts-on-the ground in the Arab Spring protests.  The first features clips from an Ayman al-Zawahiri video where he insists that “apostate regimes” can only be overthrown by violent jihad and that change through peaceful means is hopeless.  The second is based on a rant against democracy by Abu Yahia al-Libi.  The third (and most hilarious) uses clips of captured video from bin Laden’s compound showing him watching videos of himself.  In all three cases the AQ clips are intercut with news footage of the Arab Spring protests.

In my opinion this is a superb effort for a number of reasons:

• They reinforce messages that have long been priorities for U.S. strategic communication in the counterterrorism arena, namely that violent jihad is not necessary for social change, and that the best change is democratic.
• They present these messages while side-stepping problems with U.S. credibility, by mashing-up AQ’s own video with clips from independent news reports.
• They are “prosumer” efforts, done by DOT members with desktop video editing software, rather than slick professional productions.  As such they embrace cutting-edge trends in social media.
• They effectively employ the principle of ridicule as strategic communication, poking the Bad Guys in the eye by making them seem silly and out of touch with reality, and contributing to their developing image as a toxic brand.

We have argued that on the rugged-landscape of counterterrorism communication more out-of-the-box efforts like this are needed.  So hats off to the DOT for taking the leap.

You can watch the DOT videos, with English subtitles, here:

By Jeffry R. Halverson

I’ll admit that I slip sometimes in everyday conversation and use the word “story” as a synonym for “narrative.” A lot of people do it. But I should know better. There’s an important difference between the two. For the average conversation the difference doesn’t really matter much. However, when it comes to strategic communication and understanding the role of narrative in messaging strategies, it’s a distinction that has to be made.

Explaining the difference between a story and a narrative can easily get bogged down in academic jargon. Eyes will glaze over. There might be some dismissive comments about the “ivory tower.” I think I can avoid this with a good example that illustrates the differences.

First, I want to give you a definition of narrative. We have a detailed definition in our book Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). But since we’re avoiding academic language here, let’s abbreviate it by defining narrative simply as a “system of stories.” That means that narratives are composed of multiple stories that relate to one another.

The aforementioned book also provides a nice academic definition of “story.” But again to keep things moving, I’ll abbreviate that too. Let’s define story simply as an “event unit.” It relates the ‘who, where, when and how’ of an event that occurred (or will occur if we’re talking about ‘prophecy,’ although prophecy is prefaced as something ‘revealed’ in the past). A narrative is made up of several of these interrelated “event units” that work together as a system. There’s no maximum number, but there is a minimum (at least two). And the system isn’t exclusive either. A narrative can have stories added, subtracted, and swapped out. Confused? Let’s get to that great example I told you about.

Talk to your average Christian at church on Sunday morning and ask him or her to tell you the “story” of Jesus (by which you actually mean “narrative”). The response is what we’ll call the “Jesus narrative.” Most readers probably already know the narrative. You’ve seen it depicted in a movie or two or three. It’ll start with Jesus being miraculously born to a virgin, Mary. The virgin birth (no, it’s not called the Immaculate Conception – that’s Mary’s birth, honest) is a story. It’s one story that operates within the system of stories that makeup the Jesus narrative.

Now if you open a Bible while you’re at church, you’ll find that the New Testament contains four different narratives about the life and mission of Jesus Christ. We call them the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John. Each one of these Gospels contains similar but different narratives, which is why the Church fathers decided to include four Gospels instead of one. For example, the story (event unit) of the virgin birth is found in only two of the Gospels, namely Matthew and Luke. We won’t find it in the narratives of Mark or John. As you’ll recall, narratives aren’t exclusive. That means that when you ask someone at church to tell you about Jesus, the stories from all four Gospel narratives can come together to form a coherent system of stories, the Jesus narrative.

Let’s take another example. When I was a kid attending Risen Christ Lutheran Church in Rochester, New York, I was taught the Lord’s Prayer. It’s the one that starts, “Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name.” Jesus teaches this prayer to his disciples in the Jesus narrative. But again, if you pick up the Bible, you’re only going to find that story in the narratives of Matthew and Luke. You won’t find it in Mark and John. Additionally, the “Lord’s Prayer” I was taught, the one Christians use every week at Church, is only found in Matthew (6: 9-13).  It’s much shorter in Luke. This story unit from the Matthew narrative is freely incorporated with the stories of John, Luke, and Mark to form the system of stories we know as the Jesus narrative.

Seeing the distinctions between stories and narratives may sound like academic nit-picking. But it’s essential when it comes to organizing and making sense of narrative and the way people deploy or use them. Stories are pieces that can come and go, change, and morph, but the narrative remains.

When the narrative shows great resilience, we have “master narratives,” meaning narratives that have endured the test of time and become deeply embedded in culture. These are the most important narratives in strategic communication. People make use of them all the time. The American Revolution is a master narrative that we learn in grade school civics class, and it’s composed of a lot of stories like Paul Revere’s ride, Washington crossing the Delaware, the Boston Tea Party, and so on.  A modern political group calls itself the “Tea Party,” using revolutionary slogans, dressing up in period costumes, and so on.  They don’t do that for nothing:  Their aim is to invoke the values, thinking, and grievances of the American Revolution in the minds of people they hope to persuade.

When we look at the way extremists utilize master narratives, we can see the dynamics of the story system working. An extremist may invoke a master narrative as a whole while ignoring some stories it contains, to better serve his or her ideological goals.  For example, Islamist extremists like to call the U.S. and other Western countries Christian “crusaders” and liken themselves to the Muslim champion Saladin. However, Saladin was actually allied with Byzantine Christians against the Crusaders of the Holy Roman Church. It was hardly a cosmic clash of civilizations.

Recognizing these kinds of inconvenient stories allows us to subvert, refute, and disrupt extremists’ use of  narratives, perhaps by promoting a different variation of the story system that challenges their own.

* Jeffry R. Halverson is an Islamic studies scholar and an Assistant Research Professor in the Hugh Downs School of Human Communication at Arizona State University. He is the author of Theology and Creed in Sunni Islam (Palgrave Macmillan 2010), Searching for a King: Muslim Nonviolence and the Future of Islam (Potomac 2012), and co-author of Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism (Palgrave Macmillan 2011).

by Chris Lundry

President Obama has now made his second trip in office to the land where he spent four years of his youth, Indonesia, while on a trip to Asia and Australia. Although Obama’s time in Indonesia was brief, he was welcomed relatively warmly by most Indonesians, who appreciate his ties to the most populous Muslim country. There are, however, plenty of people who disapproved, including the usual suspects, the Islamist extremists.

The trip is part of a plan to shore up ties and increase the US presence in Southeast Asia in order to balance a rising China, and in response to the previous administration’s general neglect of the region (one of the reasons China made such significant inroads there in the last decade). Obama also announced plans to increase the US military presence in Australia, which irked China. The disputes in the South China Sea — the Spratly and Paracel Islands — and China’s increasing assertiveness are certainly part of the decision to increase the US presence there.

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia staged a protest at the American embassy prior to his visit. Although their website listed the number of demonstrators as 20,000, other sources gave estimates from hundreds to 2500.

“Why Obama (must be) Shot” is the title of a story on the ar Rahmah extremist web site. The image accompanying the story is one they and others have used before — Obama as pharaoh, invoking a strong Islamist narrative of tyranny and injustice. The caption reads “Pharaoh of this time, demon predator of Muslims.” The article goes on to repeatedly refer to Obama as a “crusader,” another powerful narrative — although an explanation of how he can be both a pharaoh and a crusader at the same time is lacking.

The articlH cites Oscar Ortega Hernandez, the 21-year-old who fired shots at the White House last week. Although Pennsylvania police stated that he was mentally disturbed (he told friends that Obama is the anti-Christ, so I guess he does have more than one thing in common with the extremists), the “psychologists” at ar Rahmah give him a clean bill of health:

Funny thing is the Pennsylvania police who arrested Oscar alleged that he suffered mental illness and was reported missing by his family since last week. Yet if you look at the published photos of Oscar, of course anyone would argue that Oscar is not mentally handicapped, but rather very healthy and very aware of what he did, namely to shoot Obama!

Not sure what they will make his tattoo of the word “Israel” — his young son’s name — on Ortega’s neck, however.

According to ar Rahmah, the plan to station Marines in Australia is simply a pretext to begin a crusade against Indonesian Muslims. In agreement with the English extremist group Muslims Against Crusades (a group recently banned by the British government), the assassination of Obama is allowed because of his execution of two Muslim heroes: Osama bin Laden and Anwar al Awlaki.

Jailed extremist leader Abu Bakar Basyir concurs. In another story on ar Rahmah, Basyir argues that because he is the leader of a crusade started by his predecessor, Obama must be fought. Voice of Islam posted a story arguing that Obama was in Indonesia to attempt to “Christianize” the country.

While Obama was in Bali, there was a 5.3 earthquake. Ar Rahmah pinpointed the cause of the earthquake, however: when Obama greeted the Indonesian First Lady Ani Yudhoyono, he (“ferociously”) kissed her on the cheek. It’s another attempt to link a natural disaster with some kind of moral transgression, something Indonesian Islamist extremists do frequently, just as Christian extremists do here in the US.

As usual, ar Rahmah posted a link to their website on Facebook. In a country of around 240,000,000, with around 30,000,000 Facebook users (ranking second in the world), the article about the earthquake received 139 “likes,” 21 “shares,” and 39 comments, including one brave soul who cautioned that posting stories such as this one can make Muslims appear to be provocateurs. In a new democracy with newly found freedoms of press and expression, Indonesia’s extremists continue to test the boundaries. Calling for the assassination of a visiting head of state is apparently within those boundaries. Thankfully the number of supporters of this group are small, and none chose to act on the call to violence.

by Steven R. Corman

NSI has just released a new edited volume (PDF here) that should be of interest to COMOPS Journal readers.  Entitled Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies, it contains the latest thinking on the subject, including a chapter on narrative by yours truly.  The contents are listed below.

Foreword (Brig. Gen. John N.T. “Jack” Shanahan)
Preface (Diane DiEuiliis)
Executive Summary (Laurie Fenstermacher)

Section 1: Current Insights into Violent Extremism

• Not All Radicals are the Same: Implications for Counter-Radicalization Strategy (Tom Rieger)
• Countering Extremist Violence (Marc Sageman)
• Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication (Steven R. Corman)
• Tracking the Spread of Violent Extremism (Dipak Gupta)
• Violent Extremism in Algeria: A Quest for Identity from Colonization to Globalization (Latefa Belarouci)

Section 2: Prevention of Violent Extremism

• Forecasting Terrorism, Predicting its Nature, and Driving Innovative Responses: “At-Risk Group Identity” as a Pivotal Concept for Understanding Political Violence (William D. Casebeer)
• A Strategic Plan to Defeat Radical Islam (Tawfik Hamid)
• Prevention of Violent Extremism: “What Are The People Saying?” (Alexis Everington)
• Countering Violent Extremism: Shifting the Emphasis towards the Development Paradigm (Ziad Alahdad)
• Partnering with Muslim Communities to Counter Radicalization (Hedieh Mirahmadi & Mehreen Farooq)
• The Role of Non-Violent Islamists in Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization: The European Debate (Lorenzo Vidino)

Section 3: Delegitimizing/Minimizing Popular Support for Violent Extremism

• The Mechanics of De-Legitimization (Cheryl Benard)
• Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s Vulnerabilities for Delegitimization (Eric Larson)
• Arab Satellite Television and Popular Culture (Evelyn A. Early)
• The Role and Impact of Music in Promoting (and Countering) Violent Extremism (Anthony Lemieux & Robert Nill)

Section 4: Pursue and Protect/Risk Management/Deradicalization

• Using Citizen Messengers to Counteract Radicalism (Qamar-ul Huda)
• Evaluating the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs: Towards A Scientific Approach to Terrorism Risk Reduction (John Horgan & Kurt Braddock)
• Battling the “University of Jihad:” An Evidence Based Ideological Program to Counter Militant Jihadi Groups Active on the Internet (Anne Speckhard)
• Mediation and Civil Wars Involving Terrorism (Karl DeRouen & Paulina Pospieszna)
• Deterrence, Influence, and Violent Extremist Organizations (Paul Davis)
• Coercing Violent Non-State Actors (Troy Thomas)